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Part of Congressional Record mentioning Keever's article, page 676-679

extracted text

676

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -

In an equal era of evolution on the Rhode
Island scene-that will forever bear the label
of our beloved Theodore Francis Green and
Robert E. Quinn-Frank Condon n!<tde the
sacrtfice o! turning his back on the broad
page of national history to write the brtght
page of history which Is the record of thjl
Rhode Island Supreme Court In his time. \
Only in terms of political opportunity
would I say "sacrifice." To Frank Condon
It was no sacrifice to come back to this high
service to the State of his birth.
He has touched these 30 years with a
courageous, correct and courteous application of justice and humanity, unsurpassed
in equity and integrity.
No one knows this better than a young
prosecuting attorney, no one appreciates it
more than a Governor leaning upon him
amid the anxieties of office. No one is
prouder of it than a Senator who rejoices
in his own State"s excellence among constitutional equals.
This may be grand language to descrtbe
a man whose own language was simple and
sincere, whether in his eloquence to an enraptured audience or in his quiet encouragement to a friend. A call, a message, a
handclasp, a bit of spoken praise from
Frank Condon was high satisfaction and
inspiration.
The honors that came to him from his
church were splendid. The honors that
came from his people were sacred. The
shadow that falls on his loved ones is our
common sorrow.
A great American and a good man leaves

:::::T•:"::~:~
/4
MANSFIELD. Mr. President, n
s of four newspaper articles, iss
Beverly Deepe has recently reviewed the
war as it ha.s evolved in Vietnam during
the past year. Miss Deepe is eminently
qualified by experience to report on this
critical area.
Miss Deepe writes from Vietnam, from
the delat, from Saigon, from the coastal
bases, from the highlands. And the picture which emerges from the four articles is a vivid and accurate summary
of the situation which confronts us in
Vietnam.
These articles, Mr. President, make
highly informative and highly useful
reading. For the benefit of the Senate,
I ask unanimous consent that the four
articles which appeared in the New York
Herald Tribune, in the issues of January 16--19 inclusive be included at this
point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Jan.
16, 1966)
NEW SERIES: VIETNAM, PAST AND PROSPECT
(By Beverly Deepe)
PLEIKU, SoUTH VIETNAM.-Amid mortar
craters and charred aircraft here on the
morning of February 7, 1965, three figures In
the war against the Communist in South
Vietnam met in a gleaming G-123 transport.
Before they emerged, the nature of the war
had changed.
One was McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to President Johnson for national security affairs, who took time before the
meeting to survey Pleiku's blasted airplanes
and helicopters and the b!llets where shortly
before 8 Americans had died and 125 had
been wounded in a Vietcong guerrilla raid.
With l'vir. Bundy was Gen. William C.
Westmoreland, the American commander,
who provided the G-123, c.alled the White

SENATE

January 20, 1966

Whale and the only wal\-to-wall carpeted
By the end of 1965, m111tary spokesmen
airplane in South Vietnam.)
said nine PAVN regiments had infiltrated
The Vietnamese comma,hder ln chief, Lt. from North Vietnam, (American, Korean, and Gen. Nguyen Khanh, hid arrived earlier. Australian .ground units by late 1965 numMeanwh!le, in Saigon U.S. Ambassador Max- bel)ld 44 battalions-or I roughly 15 re.gi•
well D. Taylor conferr~ by telephone with i;rfents.)
the highest ranking American officials in ' On March 8, 1965, the first 3,500 U.S. maWashington.
~ rines came ashore and were welcomed by a
General Khanh, Mr. BWldY, and General bevy of girls.
Westmoreland escaped inqui,sltive reportevs- The American and allied buildup coninsi.<ie the White Whale. Soon, the key de- tlnued throughout the year. It came part
clsion 11cas told to General Khanh and wil;,!J.
of the 3d Marine Division, and later the
hours 49 (J.S. planes from three 7th Fl1;,f.Jtair- whole division, a brigade of the 101st Aircraft carr!ers sped nor!h of~.1_'.lt-h-parallel borne Division, elements of the 1st Marine
t o ~ l l he miii-tary~ c k s at the North Division, the Republic of Korea's Tiger RegiVletnamese city of Dong Ho!.
ment and Marine Division, an Australian
At first, the bombing of North Vietnam was regiment, and finally the entire U.S. 1st
a policy of tit for tat--if you destroy our in- Cavalry Airmoblle Division, with its more
stallations, we'll destroy yours. But it soon than 400 helicopters and 15,000 troops, many
gave way to general retaliation, and then to of them airborne. By the end of the year,
regular and continual bombing. In the be- American combat m1lltary personnel numginning, the policy was officially proclaimed bered 130,000. The outlook for 1966; the
an inducement to the .north to negotiate. equivalent of at least 1 division a month
High ranking American officials said hope- for 12 months, or nearly 200,000 more troops.
fully: "We'll be at the conference table by
MARINES
September."
The 1st Marines officially were to provide
But Hanoi did not negotiate. The new "local, close-in security'.' for the Da Nang
official objective was to hit the m1lltary in- airbase, but soon they began what U.S.
stallations and the communication routes spokesmen called "offensive patrolling for
which allowed Hanoi to pour men and ma- defensive purposes." By mid-July, American
terlel Into South Vietnam. By the year's end, troops went into unequivocal full combat
however, official estimates said North Viet- with Communist forces for the first time
namese infiltration had more than doubled- since the Korean war-as the 173d Airborne
to 2,500 men a month.
Brigade went out on a search-and-destroy
Superficially, bombing North Vietnam operation in the Red stronghold known as
failed. It did not force Hanoi to negotiate; D-Zone.
It did not stop the infiltration. But actually,
With the new employment of ground and
the policy half succeeded. By the end of the air forces, the U.S. role went through gradyear, the bombing had partially paralyzed the ual metamorphosis. At the end of 1965
economic capacity and manpower reserves of America was In a war it barely realized It
North Vietnam.
had entered. The cold war had gone hot in
If the bombing did not stop Hanoi's aggres- the jungles of the Indochinese peninsula.
sion, 1n official eyes, it would at least make it
Beyond the ideological conflict, the war
more expensive and painful for North Viet- dramatized and tested two systems of power.
nam to continue. Escalation was accom- One, the massive physical power of Amertca;
panied by a little noticed policy of expan- the other, the power of the Communists to
sion, Laos was known to be subject to Amer!- manipulate the masses, to incite uprisings
can bombing raids throughout the past year. labeled by the Chinese Communists as the
By the beginning of 1966, the air war threat- "war of liberation." Washington and Peiened to spread to Cambodia, and then would ping appeared to agree It was the "war of
engulf the whole Indochinese Peninsula.
the future."
The essence of the war was described by
GROUND WAR
a 20-year-old American private who saw the
The air war over North Vietnam, however, buildup in Da Nang:
did not abate sharp deterioration in the allied
"I can tell you when Uncle Sam moves in,
ground efforts in South Vietnam, which had
been worsening since the fall of the Ngo there's no goofing around," he said. "There
was
nothing here. Then the Marines moved
Dinh Diem regime in November 1963. The
repercussions of the boup against Diem badly ln and the buildings started going up. We
damaged the Government's administrative got word an F-100 squadron was moving in
and intelligence apparatuses. Amid Govern- here and we had 4 days to fill 200,000 bags
ment instability In Saigon swirled whirlwind of dirt to sandbag mortar defenses Even
changes of officials at every level. The stra- the colonels were shoveling dirt.
"Now you can look down this runway and
tegic hamlet program, formulated and nurtured by the Diem regi.me: -collapsed as the for 2 miles there are American jets wing tip
to
wing tip," he said. "That's real power."
Vietcong regained one Government hamlet
The private, who had sat 14 hours a day
after another, leaving behind their own
for 13 months In a foxhole at the edge of
guerr!lla bands and political machinery.
With some accuracy the situation In the the Da Nang runway, turned to the other
countryside could be measured by statistics. side of the war.
INTELLIGENCE
Before the fall of Diem, the Saigon government claimed control of 8,000 of the 12,000
"'The Vietcong know more about what"s
hamlets In the countryside. By the end of happening on this airbase than the base
1965, the most optimistic estimate put the commander and the 20,000 American Marines
number of "pacified," or pro-government, around it," he said. "There are 6,000 workers
hamlets at 2,000.
who come on here dally. We know some
After the fall of Diem, military command- of them are Vietcong. If the Vietnamese
ers q'Uickly began to change their "measle" security officer keeps them off, he and. his
maps. Pink contested areas became red; family wlll be k!lled.
and white "measle pox"-which once had
"The Vietcong can come on this base right
been government controlled-became con- under our noses-we don't know who's who.
tested "pink." By the· middle of 1965, gov- We saw an old woman carrying a bucket of
ernment provincial capitals and district drain oil Into the gate. When we checked
headquarters were rtnged by small oases of her, there was only and inch of oil and the
friendly v!llages, but otherwise were isolated rest of the bucket was a false bottom filled
by increasing Red pressure In the country- with plastic explosive. We captured one of
side. Then, In July 1964, the first North the workers drawing diagrams of all the
Vietnamese regular troops began appearing. defense structures on the base. We captured
These units, later to be designated as Peo- one of the drivers of an American bus taking
ple"s Army of North Vietnam (PAVN), solidi- down the tall numbers of all the American
fied the growing Red strength.
aircraft on the base," the private went on.

January 20, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -

SENATE

"Once my unit was given 5 hours of leave of exchange became the U.S. dollar rather
to go to the commissary. When we returned. than the piaster. With no restrictions on the
more than half of the 100 American foxholes amount of available dollars , an American
around the base had small paper bags In private had purchasing power once held only
them. Each bag had a poisonous krait snake by Vietnamese generals. Cokes, beers, and
in it. Some worker had just walked around wash basins were purchased in villages with
and dropped a snake in each foxhole."
nickels, dimes, and quarters. In at least
This conflict of the two systems of power- one instance, a Vietnamese village chief,
the old woman with a bucket of explosive backed up by his popular force platoons, atand the double-the-speed-of sound Phantom tempted to invade the village of another
jets-was the essence of America's in.scrut- chief and to seize the villagers' American
able war, which one Western diplomat de- dollars at an unfair rate of exchange. Six
scribed as "the unholy trinity of terrorism, months after the arrival of the first Amerisubversion, and guerrilla warfare."
can units, American officials abolished the use
America's Inscrutable war in Vietnam had . of dollars in Vietnam. Replacing them was
brush-fired into another area of the volatile, mil!tary scrip, which now has become anunderdeveloped, uncommitted third world. other "floating currency."
The American troops quickly became the
(From the New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 17, predominant possessors of one of the scarcest
1966]
items in Vietnam. Women. Few VietVIETNAM; PAST AND PROSPECT-SOUTH VIETS namese appreciated the loss of their womenor the fact that illiterate females could earn
IDENTIFY GI'S WITH COLONIALISM
10 times a man's pay. Gradually, in any city
(By Beverly Deepe)
or village bordering American units, drugSAIGON.-The buildup of American combat stores, villas, and furniture stores quickly
troops in Vietnam during 1965 produced a gave way to bars and brothels.
visible buildup in anti-Americanism among
WAGES
the Vietnamese population.
The .buildup of American forces also
A significant date between the February 7
bombing of North Vietnam and the March 8 brought demands for more housing, runways,
arrival of the first American combat units offices, and other facilities. Wages for skilled
was the February 20 mutiny against Com- labor, and cost of building materials and
mander-in-Chief Gen. Nguyen Khanh by his transportation brought inflation. "The Vietgenerals. The net effect of General Khanh's namese economy ls in horrific shape. This
overthrow was to fragment the anti-Com- could ruin the whole campaign against the
munist power in Saigon, while the Vietcong Vietcong," one Western diplomat said rehad seized partial control of t!1e (;ountry at cently.
The Vietcong sabotage of roads had also
the village level.
produced inflation on items such as rice,
As commander in chief, a more Important
post in wartime than that of Prime Minister!• charcoal, and fish sauce. The American ecoGeneran Khanh had dominated the anti- nomic mission reacted by importing conCommunist scenfr-and had been acclaimed sumer goods to sop up the excess purchasing
by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara power-and financed the emergency import
as America's strongman for Vietnam. But of 250,000 tons of rice. While the Saigon
by late 1964, General Khanh grew bitter to- price of rice dropped, in the provinces rich
ward U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, merchants continued to charge what the traf.
who demanded political stability, while Gen- fic would bear.
The Vietnamese hurt most by the inflation
eral Khanh was aspiring to the presidency.
were
not
the
Communists,
but
the governFALSE COUP
ment's own officials and troops, paid mostly
Twelve days ~ter the . bombing of North on fixed salaries.
Vietnam, a .false coup was led by Col. Pham
In the city of Da Nang, an average of three
Ngoc Thao, who was openly acknowledged to or four fistfights a week break out between
be associated with the U.S. Central Intelli- GI's and teenage Vietnamese gangs, popugence Agency. The next day the generals larly known as "cowboys." One American
forced General Khanh out of the country. serviceman was beaten up and lay in a back
The 600,000-man Vietnamese armed forces alley for 2 days. Though Vietnamese shopwere turned over to a weak commander In keepers saw the body, they did not report
chief. Finally, the post was abolished, leav- it to police. The American military police
ing the armed forces virtually leaderless.
finally located 1t.
Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat ran into
By the beginning of 1966, it became aptrouble. After 3 months in office he called parent that the Buddhist bonzes, as well as
for support from the Vietnamese generals, the Vietcong, could easily exploit Vietwho promptly tossed him out of office. A namese nationalism and anti-Americanism.
Vle.tnamese m!l!tary junta again took on the
One incident used by the Buddhists ocjob of governing the country while attempt- curred when the Ainerican marines fired two
ing to defeat an enemy.
tank rifle rounds into a pagoda from which
Amid instability on the .anti-Communist they claimed a sniper was firing at them.
side, the Reds could exploit the first Ameri- The word immediately spread among Vietcan combat units-who arrived without solid namese . peasants that the marines had
political, economic, or social battle plans. malicious!:,, fired Into the pagoda. The maThe instincts of the Vietnamese, traditionally rines also were accused of having deliberxenophobic, were to identify the American ately broken a Buddhist statue and strewn
troops with the former French colonial mas- human excrement around the pagoda.
The Buddhists, widely considered to inters. Better political and economic preparation of the American troops would have eased clude neutral!sts and pro-Communists, previously
had successfully toppled two adminthe situation considerably.
It was widely known In Saigon that the istrations In Vietnam: President Ngo Dinh
Vietnamesfr-including Prime Minister Phan Diem in November 1963, and General Khanh
Huy Quat-learned of the date of the ar- in August 1964.
"I! the Buddhist priests do turn anti~ ; e fl~st Marines In March from forth& war will change Into a new
~ig;{ p;e~nouncements made in Saigon Amerlcan,
dimension
which we can't even yet imagine,"
and Washing~ The Vietnamese feared
they might win ther-..,war but lose their coun- one source said, looking forward to 1966.
At the· beginning of the year, rural Viettry. Outbursts frolll'--,officers, students, and
Intellectuals charged t at "the Americans nam was half conquered by the Vietcong,
and the urban portion was in a state of semiwere running the wholes~ w."
insurrection. As more American troops arTHE DOLLAR
rived, resulting anti-Americanism vastly
No soon er did the American ~ops land complicated the prospects for economic and
in the northern provinces than the"..:'"'O.ed lu m political stabil!ty.

677

[From the New York Herald Tribune, J an. 18,
1966)
VIETNAM: PAST AND PROSPECT-SUBVERSION
IN THE MEKONG DELTA
SA DEC, SoUTH VIETNAM.-Officially, the
Mekong Delta south of Saigon-where no
American combat units have yet been basedis one of the spots where the Vietnamese
Government is progressing well. The simple
tranquillity of fishing boats passing through
canals, the hectic automobile traffic on the
roads, the unbroken routine of peasant life
would seem to confirm the official version.
But those who live in the villages say the
Vietcong have seized virtual control of this
rich rice bowl.
The process is not one of violent battles,
but the invisible strangulation and isolation
of government authority. It is a process of
subversion which might be called termite
warfare. Government authority has been
squeezed into small rings of villages around
provincial and district capitals, an:d into isolated outposts along the main roads and
canals.
At Sa Dec is the headquarters of the Vietnamese 9th Infantry Division. Six miles
away ls the village complex of Nha Man.
Two of its three villages are already controlled by the Communists. The third village, Tan Nhuan Dong, is protected by one
company of about 100 param!l!tary troops.
An additional platoon is assigned to each of
two smaller outposts-Ba Thieu, 1 mile away,
and Nga Ba, 2 miles off.
ENCIRCLED

The company at Tan Nhuan Dong lives in
an old French fort. Its Job ls to protect the
village and a bridge which stretches across
a river flanked by several operating rice
mills and brick factories.
The two outposts are encircled by Vietcong
guerrillas. Last month they were totally
isolated from the local population. To bring
in supplies and support for these two posts,
the government has to use 10 armored boats.
On every voyage the boats and their complement of troops draw Communist sniper fire.
The platoons in each of the two small
posts theoretically send ou t small, reglllar
patrols to gather ilntelligence. They are
called the "ears and eyes of the reglllar
forces." But recently, a local villager described them as "blind men in a jail." For
it is rare that a member of either p latoon
dares leave his compound, even to fetch water
from the river 20 yards away.
Last week, one defender crossed the outpost's barbed wire fence for water. He was
wounded by a sniper and fell on the river
bank. No one dared rescue him. He died
and his body was left on t h e same spot for
three days. The commander asked headquarters for reinforcements, to pick up the
body 20 yards away from his post. The
request was refused.
The platoon was ordered to bury the
corpse Inside the post, but again the men refused to pick up the body. On repeated
orders, they eventually brought in the
corpse, but the outpost had no shovels, so
they used knives to dig the grave. They
had no lumber or nails, so they ripped wood
from the walls of their outpost to make the
coffin.
After the grotesque burial, morale was so
low the company commander decided to
transfer the platoon. The 100-man company ordered to relieve them refused to
obey their transfer order and most of them
defected to the Communists rather than
man the Nga Ba outpost. Most returned
after the province district chiefs were forced
to visit the company of deserters, but the
order to man the outpost was rescinded.
ISOLATION
The influence of the Qommunlsts goes,
however , far beyond the terror built with
sniper's bUllets.

678
.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -

SENATE

Hol An is a provincial capital, only 15
Last month, the Vietcong ordered peasants
and bus!nes1!lllen working or living within . miles south of the strategic airbase of Da
a half mile o:l'-'the Nga Ba outpost to move Nang. The change In the marines' mood
away. The word went out: No one was al- •illustrates the changing role of American
lowed to move Inside the half mile limit. troops in Vietnam-and some of their probRather than sail on the river 20 yards from lems.
the outposts, villagers' sampans were as"We could easily have fought our way to
signed to small canals.
Hoi An," one marine said recently. "But
One rice miller moved his mill brick-by- then, we would have had to fight our way
brick, machine-by-machine, to a new spot back. The essential problem of this war is
nearer government authority. One villager's not moving your front lines forward. It is
reaction: "The Vietcong were very nice to keeping your rear covered.''
give him the permission to move his rice
The key to the problem lies in getting and
mill. Otherwise, he would have starved to keeping the support of the rural population.
death. No one would have brought rice to Without it, most authorities believe the war
him to be polished within the half mile could go on for years.
radius of the post.''
So it was decided to halt the marines' adIn monthly propaganda meetings with the vance until the Vietnamese could win over
villagers, Vietcong political agents claim "the the local population. The decision brought
Americans are waging an all-out war against dissent from within Marine Corps ranks and
the Vietnamese people. The people have to sneers from Army colonels, who claimed
make a clear-cut choice between their friends "the marines are afraid to go out and find
and their enemies. Those who want to fight the Vietcong." But gradually, the marine
with the Americans can go to the govern- effort outs1'ie of Da Nang, under the direcment-controlled area. Those who want to tion of Marine Cmdr. Maj. Gen. Lewis Walt,
fight against the Americans can stay with us. began to dovetail with the work of the VietThere is no third choice."
namese Government.
In Sa Dec, refugee villagers prefer to live
THIRD DIMENSION
in their sampans moored along the river"In a conventional war, progress is measfront. They have refused to live In refugee
ured· by an advancing front line," one official
housing provided by the government.
explained. "But in this war our outlying
Many of the wealthier landowners already positions
are constant. Progress must be
have been forced to flee to governmentcontrolled zones, producing the effect of an measured in the third dimension. We must
economic purge of the area by the Commu- go down into the population to dig out the
nists. Their abandoned lands, especially Vietcong infrastructure and then rebuild
fruit groves along the canals, have been the local anti-Communist government."
The result of this coordinated effort was
boobytrapped and mined by Red guerrillas.
the Five Mountain Villages Campaign, less
The Vietcong have warned landowners that than
10 miles southwest of Da Nang and 15
their lands will be confiscated if they allow
miles from Ho! An. It ls the principal curtheir sons to become government soldiers.
The Vietcong forbid landowners to hire rent pacification program and a pilot case
local labor, and terrorize potential workers-- for the future.
"If this plan doesn't succeed here, it's not
drying up the labor force from both ends.
Once-wealthy landed proprietors must plant going to succeed anywhere else in the counan official said. "We'll really be In seriand harvest their own rice-backbreaking try,"
ous trouble then.''
worlc
The project already has run into some
VISITS HALTED
serious trouble.
Within the last month, the Vietcong have
The five villages of the campaign are subwithdrawn permission to local residents to divided Into 19 hamlets, covering a 20visit friends or relatives In government- square-kllometer area. In the complex dwell
controlled areas: Even the father of one of 42,000 people, of whom about 7 percent are
the senior generals at the Vietnamese Army believed to be related to Vietcong. Snuggled
headquarters In Saigon-who previously had among lush rice paddles, the villages are
been allowed by the Vietcong to visit his surrounded by the five peaks of mountains
son-now is forbidden to leave the Vietcong containing gray and salmon-colored marble.
area.
"These marble mountains would make a
But the Vietcong efforts are not all just great tourist attraction, but you'd be killed
erosive. They have established efficient-- going out there," one marine said.
though unofficial and terroristic-taxation.
The pacification campaign has three comOften using children as collectors, they force ponents: U.S. Marines are assigned to secure
millers, small factory owners and business- the outer l!mits of the area, patrolling to
men to pay regular levies.
prevent the invasion by Communist units;
Peasants must turn over to the Reds 40 Vietnamese param!l!tary troops maintain sepercent of the rice they grow above their own curity in the villages; Vietnamese civilian
family's consumption. Any fish or grain teams distribute goods, wage psychological
grown in the Red-controlled area which Is warfare, take censuses, and attempt to undo
sent Into government territory Is taxed by the Vietcong's existing pol!tical devices and
the Vietcong-as If they maintained a na- to bring the villagers to the Government's
tional border.
side.
"The role of the U.S. Marines ls l!ke an
So under the noses of government officials
and a major army force, the Communists egg," an official said. "Our front lines, on
have established their own government In the rim of the area, are the shell-but like
the Mekong Delta. It has almost eroded a shell, the lines can be broken. The vital
away the authority of the anti-Communist installation-the Da Nang airbase-ls the
Saigon regime, and, perhaps more signifi- yolk, and we also defend that. The white ls
cantly, has taken major steps toward replac- the countryside, which we are trying to pacify and solidify."
ing It with an authority of their own.
On October 18, the Vietnamese forces began their effort, using one headquarters com[From the New York Herald Tribune,
pany and four understrength line companies
Jan. 19, 1966)
the 59th Regional Forces Battalion. A
VIETNAM:
PAST AND PRESEN'I'--MARINES' of
clv1!ian cadre of 327 persons was moved In
GREAT EFFORT: SECURING DA NANG
from provincial headquarters. The Vietnam(By Beverly Deepe)
ese commander put them through a 2-week
DA NANG, SOUTH VIETNAM.-Last fall, the retraining course. They were joined by five
Vietnamese
People's Action Teams (PATs),
battle cry of the U.S. Marines here was:
"We'll be in Hoi An by New Year's Day of 10 persons each, who were responsible !or
1966." Today, they estimate It will be New census taking and other activities.
Year's 1968.
To each vmage, the Vietnamese comman-

January 20, 1966

der, sent one Regional Forces company and
one People's Action Team. In each of the
19 hamlets, he put a civ!l!an cadre team.
"During the third week of the campaign, a
50-man Vietcong platoon broke throi,igh the
marine blocking position. They were in our
area shooting things up. They hit us hard,"
an official related.
"Five Regional Force troopers and several
cadremen were killed. Each of our armed
companies was understrength, so we had 15man platoons where we should have had 35
men. Fighting against 50 Vietcong, of
course, we lose against those CX:ds.
"Unt1! that we were just beginning to get
the confidence of the people-but after that,
the people clammed up and wouldn't tell us
anything. And it also hurt the morale of our
cadre. One whole 11-man team took off-but
the district chief talked them into coming
back," the official went on.
"Then, four nights later, the same Vietcong platoon hit us again. They sl!pped in
between two Marine patrols, attacked the
regional force headquarters unit of 17 men,
killed several civilian cadre and kidnaped 2
women working with a drama .unit. We
haven't seen the women since. One of the
American marines saw action from 50 yards
away-but he couldn't open up with his
machinegun-he would have k1lled more
friendlies than enemies.
"Of course, the marines can't stop all
small-unit infiltration.
It would take
marines shoulder-to-shoulder to do that.
And once you had that, the Vietcong would
mortar them from across the river, which
they've already started doing," he said.
Since the late November action, the Vietnamese and the marines have slightly reinforced the area. Now the marines are not
only holding the outer perimeter by extensive patrolling, they also are responsible for
the securing of the c!vll!an cadre in 11 of
the 19 hamlets. Vietnamese troops defend
the remaining eight.
TRY AGAlli
By mid-December, "we started pacifying
again and things were moving slow, but
good," the official said. "The people began
giving us good !ntell!gence and were turning
in some Vietcong. For the first time, on a
Sunday afternoon, !amll!es from Da Nang
would come to the v!llages to visit their relatives. More than 100 families moved back
into the area-but none of the people were
of draft age."
On one night in late December, however,
the Vietcong launched four harassing attacks. They hit the central command post
with µ10rtars and struck another People's
Action Team, killing several.
Gradually, the cadre force fell from 331
to 304. Besides attrition, there were substantial problems with the cadre because of
inadequate training and the fact that they
were not natives of the vlllages in which
they were working.
The PAT's--equ!pped, paid, and trained
!or pol!tlcal activity and !ntell!gence work
by an arm of the U.S. Central Intell!gence
Agency-had their own troubles. They were
better armed than the Vietnamese troops,
and the local commander wanted to use them
for m!l!tary security. They refused. One
team defected and another had to be transferred because of local conflicts.
"The biggest headache ls that we can't
move our Vietnamese troops and cadre out
of this 20-square-k!lometer coll~~~of
hamlets until we have v!llagerS""nere who
can defend the area," tb.e-,,.. official said.
"There's not one young man here between
the ages of 10 and 38 whom we can recruit.
We've Jost the m!ddl& generation, and no one
has begun to flnq. ' an answer to that problem."

Before th«; Marines reach Hoi An-with
their backs pratected-80 square kilometers
of Iav-::, must be pacified. At that, the Ma-

January. 20, --1.966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -

rlne estimate of New Year's Day, 1968, ls not
far away.

BASIN, WYO., POSTMASTER RECEIVES CITATION OF MERIT
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, it was
my most welcomed privilege this morning to be present in the office of the
Postmaster General when an old friend,
the postmaster at Basin, Wyo., received
a citation of merit for beautification of
the post office building and grounds.
Postmaster R. J. O'Neill, in cooperation with J. E. Johnstone of the Denver
regional post office, carried out a program which included planting of flowers
and shrubbery, and had the cooperati?n
of a number of the good people of Basm.
Local organizations assisteci in this most
worthwhile project by funishing flowers
and shrubbery. 1,
.
Mr O'Neill and 13 other postmasters
- met i~ the reception room of the Postmaster General's Office at 11 this morning to receive the citations I take this
opportunity to felicitate Mr. O'Neill and
the other postmasters, as well as other
employees of the postal department and
citizens of this Nation who are making
the national beautification program a
significant success.
THE NONPROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Mr. HART. Mr. President, we need
swift action toward a nuclear nonproliferation treaty for the simple reason that
we are running out of time. There is no
other issue before the Senate this yearincluding even the war in Vietnamwhich is of greater basic importance to
the world and the nations.
The desperate importance of this question has been seen, and stated, for many
years by noted scholars and political
leaders. It was recognized by President
John F. Kennedy, who told a press conference on March 21, 1963, that 15 or 20
countries might have nuclear weapons by
1975 and that he was haunted by this
problem. A year and a half later, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told
an interviewer that in 10 to 20 years tens
of nations would be capable of having
nuclear weapons, and tha t the danger to
the world increases geometrically with
the increase in the number of nations
possessing those warheads.
Secretary McNamara explained that
Ame1ican nuclear warheads then cost
anywhere from roughly half a million
dollars on up, perhaps to a million doldollars. 'But in the years ahead he
warned:

SENATE

The peace of the world requires firm limits
upon the spread of nuclear weapons.

And as all Members of the Senate are
well aware, the junior Senator from
New York presented two brilliant analyses of these problems in June and October of last year.
Now Mr. President, I am not technically trained or knowledgeable in matters of producing nuclear weapons, and
I do not know how fast this anticipated
reduction in the cost and time required
to produce nuclear weapons !!'as taken
place, or what the current figures are.
But I did notice in an Associated Press
dispatch dated October 7, 1965, from
London a statement that the annual report of the British Atomic Energy Authority indirectly revealed that Britain
has been working on research "which
could lead to production of cut-price
atomic and hydrogen bombs."
And I am aware that for many years
scientists in a number of countries have
been working on top-secret efforts to
make the centrifuge method of uranium
separation not only workable, but workable at a cost much reduced from the
gaseous diffusion process used by the
present nuclear p-owers.
Consequently, I have absolutely no
reason to doubt, and have every reason
to agree with, the startling statement
made last June by the junior Senator
from New York:
Within a very few years, an Investment of
a few million dollars-well within the
capacity even of private organizatlons-wlll
produce nuclear weapons. Once such a
capablllty ls In being, weapons wlll probably b e produced for costs in the hundreds
of thousands of dollars each. Similarly,
delivery systems are far cheaper than they
once were.

One of the wonderful things al:fout
scientific technology is that it rapidly discovers cheaper production methods for
even the most expensive items. Unhappily, this rema rkable ability extends to
nuclear weapons as well as tractors and
gumdrops.
It is not too difficult to foresee the day
when atomic bomb production will be
within the ability of any nation that now
possesses even the know-how to efficiently manufacture popguns.
In fact, if a nuclear entrepreneur could
find a permissive host country, it is even
conceivable that he could open an international fireworks stand that would sell
to all comers.
We already have five nervous fellows
holding shotguns on each other and a
new influx of gunmen will do nothing to
soothe that jittery feeling and calm the
stomach.
This is not a problem for some future
Beca use of advances ln nuclear technology, administration to deal with. It is not
the cost of nuclear weapons will fall dramati- a problem for some future Senate to take
callyseriously while today we satisfy ourselves
with making brief speeches. This is a
McNamara addedand as the technology becomes simplier, we problem for this year, this month, this
can expect more and more nations to acquire week, this very day.
capability !or both developing and producing
The actual work being conducted on
such weapons.
nuclear weapons development is natA year ·later President Johnson urally a closely guarded secret in these,
solemnly warned the world that the as in other countries, but we do have
proliferation of nuclear weapons Wa.9 some disturbing clues.
the "gravest of all unresolved human
In the case of Israel, we know that
lssues" and he stated:
there has been grave concern in that beNo.8---4

679

leaguered country about the work for
s~veral years on rockets by Egypt, as- ,
s1sted by some West German engineers.
And we know that Israel ha.s been pushing for a good many years research and
development on her own atomic reactors
with a considerable amount of assistanc~
from France.
And as long ago as July 5, 1962, there
was an article in the Washington Post
reporting from Jerusalem that Israeli intellectuals were protesting the building
of atomic weapons by their country.
Perhaps Israel had not then in fact
launched an actual atomic weapons program. But the fact remains that this
is a country with a well-advanced r eactor program, a country that is rich in
technical personnel, a country determined to fight for its survival in a hostile
environment-a country, in short, which
might be pressed to develop its own nuclear weapons before much longer, if the
present world nuclear anarchy continues.
In the case of India, we have had repeated public assurances first from
Prime Minister Nehru and then from
Prime Minister Shastri that India was
not embarking on, a nuclear weapons
program. But such expressions of intent
should not lull away our concern.
This is highly unlikely to remain In·dia's policy indefinitely. During .the
September fighting with Pakistan, a
large group of Parliament members petitioned the Government to begin atomic
bomb production. Should conflict with
her neighbors reerupt, such pressures
might become irresistible.
And if India takes this fateful step,
how great will be the pressures for Pakistan to draw scarce resources from its
own urgent economic development efforts in order to follow suit.
And. of course, so, too, will Nasser's
Egypt inevitably follow the same path if
Israel does develop atomic weapons.
Within a few years more, with the
price and difficulty of building these horror weapons reduced, we may expect such
countries as Sweden, Italy, and Canada
to follow. And, by this time, West Germany may have decided to break her
1954 treaty commitments in order to
start on the road to becoming one of the
most powerful of the burgeoning nuclear
powers, while Japan will doubtless have
redrafted her constitutional inhibitions
and also taken the plunge.
Other countries listed by AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg last summer as being capable of building their own bombs
before too much longer included Switzerland, Brazil, Spain, and Yugoslavia.
Fortunately, if the need for constructive action to deal with this dread possibility is great, so too is the opportunity
now a great one.
For ma:r.y months, the United States'
and the Soviet Union have been at an
impasse that, basically, involved West
Germany's participation in a European
nuclear defense.
I think Russia's nervousness about
Germany is understandable to any student of modern history. Our problem is
to give Germany the feeling of being a
full-fledged member of the European defense team while, at the same time, providing Russia with positive assurances