In an equal era of evolution on the Rhode Island scene—that will forever bear the label of our beloved Theodore Francis Green and Robert E. Quinn—Frank Condon made the sacrifice of turning his back on the broad page of national history to write the bright page of history which is the record of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in his time.

Only in terms of political opportunity would I say "sacrifice." To Frank Condon it was no sacrifice to come back to this high service to the State of his birth.

He has touched these 30 years with a courageous, correct and courteous application of justice and humanity, unsurpassed in equity and integrity.

No one knows this better than a young prosecuting attorney, no one appreciates it more than a Governor leaning upon him amid the anxieties of office. No one is prouder of it than a Senator who rejoices in his own State's excellence among constitutional equals.

This may be grand language to describe a man whose own language was simple and sincere, whether in his eloquence to an enraptured audience or in his quiet encouragement to a friend. A call, a message, a handclasp, a bit of spoken praise from Frank Condon was high satisfaction and inspiration.

The honors that came to him from his church were splendid. The honors that came from his people were sacred. The shadow that falls on his loved ones is our common sorrow.

A great American and a good man leaves us all the heritage of a life lived to its finest.

VIETNAM, PAST AND PROSPECT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in a series of four newspaper articles, Miss Beverly Deepe has recently reviewed the war as it has evolved in Vietnam during the past year. Miss Deepe is eminently qualified by experience to report on this critical area.

Miss Deepe writes from Vietnam, from the delat, from Saigon, from the coastal bases, from the highlands. And the picture which emerges from the four articles is a vivid and accurate summary of the situation which confronts us in Vietnam.

These articles, Mr. President, make highly informative and highly useful reading. For the benefit of the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the four articles which appeared in the New York Herald Tribune, in the issues of January 16–19 inclusive be included at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 16, 1966]

NEW SERIES: VIETNAM, PAST AND PROSPECT

(By Beverly Deepe)

PLEIKU, SOUTH VIETNAM.—Amid mortar craters and charred aircraft here on the morning of February 7, 1965, three figures in the war against the Communist in South Vietnam met in a gleaming C–123 transport. Before they emerged, the nature of the war had changed.

One was McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to President Johnson for national security affairs, who took time before the meeting to survey Pleiku's blasted airplanes and helicopters and the billets where shortly before 8 Americans had died and 125 had been wounded in a Vietcong guerrilla raid.

With Mr. Bundy was Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the American commander, who provided the C–123, called the White Whale and the only wall-to-wall carpeted airplane in South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese commander in chief, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, had arrived earlier. Meanwhile, in Saigon U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor conferred by telephone with the highest ranking American officials in Washington.

General Khanh, Mr. Bundy, and General Westmoreland escaped inquisitive reporters inside the White Whale. Soon, the key decision was told to General Khanh and within hours 49 U.S. planes from three 7th Fleet aircraft carriers sped north of the 17th parallel to bomb the military barracks at the North Vietnamese city of Dong Hoi.

At first, the bombing of North Vietnam was a policy of tit for tat—if you destroy our installations, we'll destroy yours. But it soon gave way to general retaliation, and then to regular and continual bombing. In the beginning, the policy was officially proclaimed an inducement to the north to negotiate. High ranking American officials said hopefully: "We'll be at the conference table by September."

But Hanoi did not negotiate. The new official objective was to hit the military installations and the communication routes which allowed Hanoi to pour men and materiel into South Vietnam. By the year's end, however, official estimates said North Vietnamese infiltration had more than doubled—to 2,500 men a month.

Superficially, bombing North Vietnam failed. It did not force Hanoi to negotiate; it did not stop the infiltration. But actually, the policy half succeeded. By the end of the year, the bombing had partially paralyzed the economic capacity and manpower reserves of North Vietnam.

If the bombing did not stop Hanoi's aggression, in official eyes, it would at least make it more expensive and painful for North Vietnam to continue. Escalation was accompanied by a little noticed policy of expansion, Laos was known to be subject to American bombing raids throughout the past year. By the beginning of 1966, the air war threatened to spread to Cambodia, and then would engulf the whole Indochinese Peninsula.

GROUND WAR

The air war over North Vietnam, however, did not abate sharp deterioration in the allied ground efforts in South Vietnam, which had been worsening since the fall of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in November 1963. The repercussions of the coup against Diem badly damaged the Government's administrative and intelligence apparatuses. Amid Government instability in Saigon swirled whirlwind changes of officials at every level. The strategic hamlet program, formulated and nurtured by the Diem regime, collapsed as the Vietcong regained one Government hamlet after another, leaving behind their own guerrilla bands and political machinery.

With some accuracy the situation in the countryside could be measured by statistics. Before the fall of Diem, the Saigon government claimed control of 8,000 of the 12,000 hamlets in the countryside. By the end of 1965, the most optimistic estimate put the number of "pacified," or pro-government, hamlets at 2,000.

After the fall of Diem, military commanders quickly began to change their "measle" maps. Pink contested areas became red; and white "measle pox"—which once had been government controlled—became contested "pink." By the middle of 1965, government provincial capitals and district headquarters were ringed by small oases of friendly villages, but otherwise were isolated by increasing Red pressure in the countryside. Then, in July 1964, the first North Vietnamese regular troops began appearing. These units, later to be designated as People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN), solidified the growing Red strength.

By the end of 1965, military spokesmen said nine PAVN regiments had infiltrated from North Vietnam, (American, Korean, and Australian ground units by late 1965 numbered 44 battalions—or roughly 15 regiments.)

On March 8, 1965, the first 3,500 U.S. marines came ashore and were welcomed by a bevy of girls.

The American and allied buildup continued throughout the year. It came part of the 3d Marine Division, and later the whole division, a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, elements of the 1st Marine Division, the Republic of Korea's Tiger Regiment and Marine Division, an Australian regiment, and finally the entire U.S. 1st Cavalry Airmobile Division, with its more than 400 helicopters and 15,000 troops, many of them airborne. By the end of the year, American combat military personnel numbered 130,000. The outlook for 1966; the equivalent of at least 1 division a month for 12 months, or nearly 200,000 more troops.

MARINES

The 1st Marines officially were to provide "local, close-in security" for the Da Nang airbase, but soon they began what U.S. spokesmen called "offensive patrolling for defensive purposes." By mid-July, American troops went into unequivocal full combat with Communist forces for the first time since the Korean war—as the 173d Airborne Brigade went out on a search-and-destroy operation in the Red stronghold known as D-Zone.

With the new employment of ground and air forces, the U.S. role went through gradual metamorphosis. At the end of 1965 America was in a war it barely realized it had entered. The cold war had gone hot in the jungles of the Indochinese peninsula.

Beyond the ideological conflict, the war dramatized and tested two systems of power. One, the massive physical power of America; the other, the power of the Communists to manipulate the masses, to incite uprisings labeled by the Chinese Communists as the "war of liberation." Washington and Peiping appeared to agree it was the "war of the future."

The essence of the war was described by a 20-year-old American private who saw the buildup in Da Nang:

"I can tell you when Uncle Sam moves in, there's no goofing around," he said. "There was nothing here. Then the Marines moved in and the buildings started going up. We got word an F–100 squadron was moving in here and we had 4 days to fill 200,000 bags of dirt to sandbag mortar defenses. Even the colonels were shoveling dirt.

"Now you can look down this runway and for 2 miles there are American jets wing tip to wing tip," he said. "That's real power."

The private, who had sat 14 hours a day for 13 months in a foxhole at the edge of the Da Nang runway, turned to the other side of the war.

INTELLIGENCE

"The Vietcong know more about what's happening on this airbase than the base commander and the 20,000 American Marines around it," he said. "There are 6,000 workers who come on here daily. We know some of them are Vietcong. If the Vietnamese security officer keeps them off, he and his family will be killed.

"The Vietcong can come on this base right under our noses—we don't know who's who. We saw an old woman carrying a bucket of drain oil into the gate. When we checked her, there was only and inch of oil and the rest of the bucket was a false bottom filled with plastic explosive. We captured one of the workers drawing diagrams of all the defense structures on the base. We captured one of the drivers of an American bus taking down the tail numbers of all the American aircraft on the base," the private went on.

"Once my unit was given 5 hours of leave to go to the commissary. When we returned, more than half of the 100 American foxholes around the base had small paper bags in them. Each bag had a poisonous krait snake in it. Some worker had just walked around and dropped a snake in each foxhole."

This conflict of the two systems of power—the old woman with a bucket of explosive and the double-the-speed-of sound Phantom jets—was the essence of America's inscrutable war, which one Western diplomat described as "the unholy trinity of terrorism, subversion, and guerrilla warfare."

America's inscrutable war in Vietnam had brush-fired into another area of the volatile, underdeveloped, uncommitted third world.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 17, 1966]

VIETNAM: PAST AND PROSPECT—SOUTH VIETS IDENTIFY GI'S WITH COLONIALISM

(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—The buildup of American combat troops in Vietnam during 1965 produced a visible buildup in anti-Americanism among the Vietnamese population.

A significant date between the February 7 bombing of North Vietnam and the March 8 arrival of the first American combat units was the February 20 mutiny against Commander-in-Chief Gen. Nguyen Khanh by his generals. The net effect of General Khanh's overthrow was to fragment the anti-Communist power in Saigon, while the Vietcong had seized partial control of the country at the village level.

As commander in chief, a more important post in wartime than that of Prime Minister, Generan Khanh had dominated the anti-Communist scene—and had been acclaimed by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara as America's strongman for Vietnam. But by late 1964, General Khanh grew bitter toward U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, who demanded political stability, while General Khanh was aspiring to the presidency.

FALSE COUP

Twelve days after the bombing of North Vietnam, a false coup was led by Col. Pham Ngoc Thao, who was openly acknowledged to be associated with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The next day the generals forced General Khanh out of the country. The 600,000-man Vietnamese armed forces were turned over to a weak commander in chief. Finally, the post was abolished, leaving the armed forces virtually leaderless.

Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat ran into trouble. After 3 months in office he called for support from the Vietnamese generals, who promptly tossed him out of office. A Vietnamese military junta again took on the job of governing the country while attempting to defeat an enemy.

Amid instability on the anti-Communist side, the Reds could exploit the first American combat units—who arrived without solid political, economic, or social battle plans. The instincts of the Vietnamese, traditionally xenophobic, were to identify the American troops with the former French colonial masters. Better political and economic preparation of the American troops would have eased the situation considerably.

It was widely known in Saigon that the Vietnamese—including Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat—learned of the date of the arrival of the first Marines in March from foreign press announcements made in Saigon and Washington. The Vietnamese feared they might win the war but lose their country. Outbursts from officers, students, and intellectuals charged that "the Americans were running the whole show."

THE DOLLAR

No sooner did the American troops land in the northern provinces than the medium of exchange became the U.S. dollar rather than the piaster. With no restrictions on the amount of available dollars, an American private had purchasing power once held only by Vietnamese generals. Cokes, beers, and wash basins were purchased in villages with nickels, dimes, and quarters. In at least one instance, a Vietnamese village chief, backed up by his popular force platoons, attempted to invade the village of another chief and to seize the villagers' American dollars at an unfair rate of exchange. Six months after the arrival of the first American units, American officials abolished the use of dollars in Vietnam. Replacing them was military scrip, which now has become another "floating currency."

The American troops quickly became the predominant possessors of one of the scarcest items in Vietnam. Women. Few Vietnamese appreciated the loss of their women—or the fact that illiterate females could earn 10 times a man's pay. Gradually, in any city or village bordering American units, drugstores, villas, and furniture stores quickly gave way to bars and brothels.

WAGES

The buildup of American forces also brought demands for more housing, runways, offices, and other facilities. Wages for skilled labor, and cost of building materials and transportation brought inflation. "The Vietnamese economy is in horrific shape. This could ruin the whole campaign against the Vietcong," one Western diplomat said recently.

The Vietcong sabotage of roads had also produced inflation on items such as rice, charcoal, and fish sauce. The American economic mission reacted by importing consumer goods to sop up the excess purchasing power—and financed the emergency import of 250,000 tons of rice. While the Saigon price of rice dropped, in the provinces rich merchants continued to charge what the traffic would bear.

The Vietnamese hurt most by the inflation were not the Communists, but the government's own officials and troops, paid mostly on fixed salaries.

In the city of Da Nang, an average of three or four fistfights a week break out between GI's and teenage Vietnamese gangs, popularly known as "cowboys." One American serviceman was beaten up and lay in a back alley for 2 days. Though Vietnamese shopkeepers saw the body, they did not report it to police. The American military police finally located it.

By the beginning of 1966, it became apparent that the Buddhist bonzes, as well as the Vietcong, could easily exploit Vietnamese nationalism and anti-Americanism.

One incident used by the Buddhists occurred when the American marines fired two tank rifle rounds into a pagoda from which they claimed a sniper was firing at them. The word immediately spread among Vietnamese peasants that the marines had maliciously fired into the pagoda. The marines also were accused of having deliberately broken a Buddhist statue and strewn human excrement around the pagoda.

The Buddhists, widely considered to include neutralists and pro-Communists, previously had successfully toppled two administrations in Vietnam: President Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963, and General Khanh in August 1964.

"If the Buddhist priests do turn anti-American, the war will change into a new dimension which we can't even yet imagine," one source said, looking forward to 1966.

At the beginning of the year, rural Vietnam was half conquered by the Vietcong, and the urban portion was in a state of semi-insurrection. As more American troops arrived, resulting anti-Americanism vastly complicated the prospects for economic and political stability.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 18, 1966]

VIETNAM: PAST AND PROSPECT—SUBVERSION IN THE MEKONG DELTA

SA DEC, SOUTH VIETNAM.—Officially, the Mekong Delta south of Saigon—where no American combat units have yet been based—is one of the spots where the Vietnamese Government is progressing well. The simple tranquillity of fishing boats passing through canals, the hectic automobile traffic on the roads, the unbroken routine of peasant life would seem to confirm the official version.

But those who live in the villages say the Vietcong have seized virtual control of this rich rice bowl.

The process is not one of violent battles, but the invisible strangulation and isolation of government authority. It is a process of subversion which might be called termite warfare. Government authority has been squeezed into small rings of villages around provincial and district capitals, and into isolated outposts along the main roads and canals.

At Sa Dec is the headquarters of the Vietnamese 9th Infantry Division. Six miles away is the village complex of Nha Man. Two of its three villages are already controlled by the Communists. The third village, Tan Nhuan Dong, is protected by one company of about 100 paramilitary troops. An additional platoon is assigned to each of two smaller outposts—Ba Thien, 1 mile away, and Nga Ba, 2 miles off.

ENCIRCLED

The company at Tan Nhuan Dong lives in an old French fort. Its job is to protect the village and a bridge which stretches across a river flanked by several operating rice mills and brick factories.

The two outposts are encircled by Vietcong guerrillas. Last month they were totally isolated from the local population. To bring in supplies and support for these two posts, the government has to use 10 armored boats. On every voyage the boats and their complement of troops draw Communist sniper fire.

The platoons in each of the two small posts theoretically send out small, regular patrols to gather intelligence. They are called the "ears and eyes of the regular forces." But recently, a local villager described them as "blind men in a jail." For it is rare that a member of either platoon dares leave his compound, even to fetch water from the river 20 yards away.

Last week, one defender crossed the outpost's barbed wire fence for water. He was wounded by a sniper and fell on the river bank. No one dared rescue him. He died and his body was left on the same spot for three days. The commander asked headquarters for reinforcements, to pick up the body 20 yards away from his post. The request was refused.

The platoon was ordered to bury the corpse inside the post, but again the men refused to pick up the body. On repeated orders, they eventually brought in the corpse, but the outpost had no shovels, so they used knives to dig the grave. They had no lumber or nails, so they ripped wood from the walls of their outpost to make the coffin.

After the grotesque burial, morale was so low the company commander decided to transfer the platoon. The 100-man company ordered to relieve them refused to obey their transfer order and most of them defected to the Communists rather than man the Nga Ba outpost. Most returned after the province district chiefs were forced to visit the company of deserters, but the order to man the outpost was rescinded.

ISOLATION

The influence of the Communists goes, however, far beyond the terror built with sniper's bullets.

Last month, the Vietcong ordered peasants and businessmen working or living within a half mile of the Nga Ba outpost to move away. The word went out: No one was allowed to move inside the half mile limit. Rather than sail on the river 20 yards from the outposts, villagers' sampans were assigned to small canals.

One rice miller moved his mill brick-by-brick, machine-by-machine, to a new spot nearer government authority. One villager's reaction: "The Vietcong were very nice to give him the permission to move his rice mill. Otherwise, he would have starved to death. No one would have brought rice to him to be polished within the half mile radius of the post."

In monthly propaganda meetings with the villagers, Vietcong political agents claim "the Americans are waging an all-out war against the Vietnamese people. The people have to make a clear-cut choice between their friends and their enemies. Those who want to fight with the Americans can go to the government-controlled area. Those who want to fight against the Americans can stay with us. There is no third choice."

In Sa Dec, refugee villagers prefer to live in their sampans moored along the riverfront. They have refused to live in refugee housing provided by the government.

Many of the wealthier landowners already have been forced to flee to government-controlled zones, producing the effect of an economic purge of the area by the Communists. Their abandoned lands, especially fruit groves along the canals, have been boobytrapped and mined by Red guerrillas. The Vietcong have warned landowners that their lands will be confiscated if they allow their sons to become government soldiers.

The Vietcong forbid landowners to hire local labor, and terrorize potential workers—drying up the labor force from both ends. Once-wealthy landed proprietors must plant and harvest their own rice—backbreaking work.

VISITS HALTED

Within the last month, the Vietcong have withdrawn permission to local residents to visit friends or relatives in government-controlled areas. Even the father of one of the senior generals at the Vietnamese Army headquarters in Saigon—who previously had been allowed by the Vietcong to visit his son—now is forbidden to leave the Vietcong area.

But the Vietcong efforts are not all just erosive. They have established efficient—though unofficial and terroristic—taxation. Often using children as collectors, they force millers, small factory owners and businessmen to pay regular levies.

Peasants must turn over to the Reds 40 percent of the rice they grow above their own family's consumption. Any fish or grain grown in the Red-controlled area which is sent into government territory is taxed by the Vietcong—as if they maintained a national border.

So under the noses of government officials and a major army force, the Communists have established their own government in the Mekong Delta. It has almost eroded away the authority of the anti-Communist Saigon regime, and, perhaps more significantly, has taken major steps toward replacing it with an authority of their own.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 19, 1966]

VIETNAM: PAST AND PRESENT—MARINES' GREAT EFFORT: SECURING DA NANG

(By Beverly Deepe)

DA NANG, SOUTH VIETNAM.—Last fall, the battle cry of the U.S. Marines here was: "We'll be in Hoi An by New Year's Day 1966." Today, they estimate it will be New Year's 1968.

Hoi An is a provincial capital, only 15 miles south of the strategic airbase of Da Nang. The change in the marines' mood illustrates the changing role of American troops in Vietnam—and some of their problems.

"We could easily have fought our way to Hoi An," one marine said recently. "But then, we would have had to fight our way back. The essential problem of this war is not moving your front lines forward. It is keeping your rear covered."

The key to the problem lies in getting and keeping the support of the rural population. Without it, most authorities believe the war could go on for years.

So it was decided to halt the marines' advance until the Vietnamese could win over the local population. The decision brought dissent from within Marine Corps ranks and sneers from Army colonels, who claimed "the marines are afraid to go out and find the Vietcong." But gradually, the marine effort outside of Da Nang, under the direction of Marine Cmdr. Maj. Gen. Lewis Walt, began to dovetail with the work of the Vietnamese Government.

THIRD DIMENSION

"In a conventional war, progress is measured by an advancing front line," one official explained. "But in this war our outlying positions are constant. Progress must be measured in the third dimension. We must go down into the population to dig out the Vietcong infrastructure and then rebuild the local anti-Communist government."

The result of this coordinated effort was the Five Mountain Villages Campaign, less than 10 miles southwest of Da Nang and 15 miles from Hoi An. It is the principal current pacification program and a pilot case for the future.

"If this plan doesn't succeed here, it's not going to succeed anywhere else in the country," an official said. "We'll really be in serious trouble then."

The project already has run into some serious trouble.

The five villages of the campaign are subdivided into 19 hamlets, covering a 20-square-kilometer area. In the complex dwell 42,000 people, of whom about 7 percent are believed to be related to Vietcong. Snuggled among lush rice paddies, the villages are surrounded by the five peaks of mountains containing gray and salmon-colored marble. "These marble mountains would make a great tourist attraction, but you'd be killed going out there," one marine said.

The pacification campaign has three components: U.S. Marines are assigned to secure the outer limits of the area, patrolling to prevent the invasion by Communist units; Vietnamese paramilitary troops maintain security in the villages; Vietnamese civilian teams distribute goods, wage psychological warfare, take censuses, and attempt to undo the Vietcong's existing political devices and to bring the villagers to the Government's side.

"The role of the U.S. Marines is like an egg," an official said. "Our front lines, on the rim of the area, are the shell—but like a shell, the lines can be broken. The vital installation—the Da Nang airbase—is the yolk, and we also defend that. The white is the countryside, which we are trying to pacify and solidify."

On October 18, the Vietnamese forces began their effort, using one headquarters company and four understrength line companies of the 59th Regional Forces Battalion. A civilian cadre of 327 persons was moved in from provincial headquarters. The Vietnamese commander put them through a 2-week retraining course. They were joined by five Vietnamese People's Action Teams (PATs), of 10 persons each, who were responsible for census taking and other activities.

To each village, the Vietnamese commander, sent one Regional Forces company and one People's Action Team. In each of the 19 hamlets, he put a civilian cadre team.

"During the third week of the campaign, a 50-man Vietcong platoon broke through the marine blocking position. They were in our area shooting things up. They hit us hard," an official related.

"Five Regional Force troopers and several cadremen were killed. Each of our armed companies was understrength, so we had 15-man platoons where we should have had 35 men. Fighting against 50 Vietcong, of course, we lose against those odds.

"Until that we were just beginning to get the confidence of the people—but after that, the people clammed up and wouldn't tell us anything. And it also hurt the morale of our cadre. One whole 11-man team took off—but the district chief talked them into coming back," the official went on.

"Then, four nights later, the same Vietcong platoon hit us again. They slipped in between two Marine patrols, attacked the regional force headquarters unit of 17 men, killed several civilian cadre and kidnaped 2 women working with a drama unit. We haven't seen the women since. One of the American marines saw action from 50 yards away—but he couldn't open up with his machinegun—he would have killed more friendlies than enemies.

"Of course, the marines can't stop all small-unit infiltration. It would take marines shoulder-to-shoulder to do that. And once you had that, the Vietcong would mortar them from across the river, which they've already started doing," he said.

Since the late November action, the Vietnamese and the marines have slightly reinforced the area. Now the marines are not only holding the outer perimeter by extensive patrolling, they also are responsible for the securing of the civilian cadre in 11 of the 19 hamlets. Vietnamese troops defend the remaining eight.

TRY AGAIN

By mid-December, "we started pacifying again and things were moving slow, but good," the official said. "The people began giving us good intelligence and were turning in some Vietcong. For the first time, on a Sunday afternoon, families from Da Nang would come to the villages to visit their relatives. More than 100 families moved back into the area—but none of the people were of draft age."

On one night in late December, however, the Vietcong launched four harassing attacks. They hit the central command post with mortars and struck another People's Action Team, killing several.

Gradually, the cadre force fell from 331 to 304. Besides attrition, there were substantial problems with the cadre because of inadequate training and the fact that they were not natives of the villages in which they were working.

The PAT's—equipped, paid, and trained for political activity and intelligence work by an arm of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency—had their own troubles. They were better armed than the Vietnamese troops, and the local commander wanted to use them for military security. They refused. One team defected and another had to be transferred because of local conflicts.

"The biggest headache is that we can't move our Vietnamese troops and cadre out of this 20-square-kilometer collection of hamlets until we have villagers here who can defend the area," the official said. "There's not one young man here between the ages of 10 and 38 whom we can recruit. We've lost the middle generation, and no one has begun to find an answer to that problem."

Before the Marines reach Hoi An—with their backs protected—80 square kilometers of land must be pacified. At that, the Ma-

rine estimate of New Year's Day, 1968, is not far away.

BASIN, WYO., POSTMASTER RECEIVES CITATION OF MERIT

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, it was my most welcomed privilege this morning to be present in the office of the Postmaster General when an old friend, the postmaster at Basin, Wyo., received a citation of merit for beautification of the post office building and grounds.

Postmaster R. J. O'Neill, in cooperation with J. E. Johnstone of the Denver regional post office, carried out a program which included planting of flowers and shrubbery, and had the cooperation of a number of the good people of Basin. Local organizations assisted in this most worthwhile project by funishing flowers and shrubbery.

Mr. O'Neill and 13 other postmasters met in the reception room of the Postmaster General's Office at 11 this morning to receive the citations I take this opportunity to felicitate Mr. O'Neill and the other postmasters, as well as other employees of the postal department and citizens of this Nation who are making the national beautification program a significant success.

THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Mr. HART. Mr. President, we need swift action toward a nuclear nonproliferation treaty for the simple reason that we are running out of time. There is no other issue before the Senate this year—including even the war in Vietnam—which is of greater basic importance to the world and the nations.

The desperate importance of this question has been seen, and stated, for many years by noted scholars and political leaders. It was recognized by President John F. Kennedy, who told a press conference on March 21, 1963, that 15 or 20 countries might have nuclear weapons by 1975 and that he was haunted by this problem. A year and a half later, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told an interviewer that in 10 to 20 years tens of nations would be capable of having nuclear weapons, and that the danger to the world increases geometrically with the increase in the number of nations possessing those warheads.

Secretary McNamara explained that American nuclear warheads then cost anywhere from roughly half a million dollars on up, perhaps to a million doldollars. But in the years ahead he warned:

> Because of advances in nuclear technology, the cost of nuclear weapons will fall dramatically—

McNamara added—

> and as the technology becomes simplier, we can expect more and more nations to acquire capability for both developing and producing such weapons.

A year later President Johnson solemnly warned the world that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was the "gravest of all unresolved human issues" and he stated:

> The peace of the world requires firm limits upon the spread of nuclear weapons.

And as all Members of the Senate are well aware, the junior Senator from New York presented two brilliant analyses of these problems in June and October of last year.

Now Mr. President, I am not technically trained or knowledgeable in matters of producing nuclear weapons, and I do not know how fast this anticipated reduction in the cost and time required to produce nuclear weapons has taken place, or what the current figures are. But I did notice in an Associated Press dispatch dated October 7, 1965, from London a statement that the annual report of the British Atomic Energy Authority indirectly revealed that Britain has been working on research "which could lead to production of cut-price atomic and hydrogen bombs."

And I am aware that for many years scientists in a number of countries have been working on top-secret efforts to make the centrifuge method of uranium separation not only workable, but workable at a cost much reduced from the gaseous diffusion process used by the present nuclear powers.

Consequently, I have absolutely no reason to doubt, and have every reason to agree with, the startling statement made last June by the junior Senator from New York:

> Within a very few years, an investment of a few million dollars—well within the capacity even of private organizations—will produce nuclear weapons. Once such a capability is in being, weapons will probably be produced for costs in the hundreds of thousands of dollars each. Similarly, delivery systems are far cheaper than they once were.

One of the wonderful things about scientific technology is that it rapidly discovers cheaper production methods for even the most expensive items. Unhappily, this remarkable ability extends to nuclear weapons as well as tractors and gumdrops.

It is not too difficult to foresee the day when atomic bomb production will be within the ability of any nation that now possesses even the know-how to efficiently manufacture popguns.

In fact, if a nuclear entrepreneur could find a permissive host country, it is even conceivable that he could open an international fireworks stand that would sell to all comers.

We already have five nervous fellows holding shotguns on each other and a new influx of gunmen will do nothing to soothe that jittery feeling and calm the stomach.

This is not a problem for some future administration to deal with. It is not a problem for some future Senate to take seriously while today we satisfy ourselves with making brief speeches. This is a problem for this year, this month, this week, this very day.

The actual work being conducted on nuclear weapons development is naturally a closely guarded secret in these, as in other countries, but we do have some disturbing clues.

In the case of Israel, we know that there has been grave concern in that beleaguered country about the work for several years on rockets by Egypt, assisted by some West German engineers. And we know that Israel has been pushing for a good many years research and development on her own atomic reactors, with a considerable amount of assistance from France.

And as long ago as July 5, 1962, there was an article in the Washington Post reporting from Jerusalem that Israeli intellectuals were protesting the building of atomic weapons by their country. Perhaps Israel had not then in fact launched an actual atomic weapons program. But the fact remains that this is a country with a well-advanced reactor program, a country that is rich in technical personnel, a country determined to fight for its survival in a hostile environment—a country, in short, which might be pressed to develop its own nuclear weapons before much longer, if the present world nuclear anarchy continues.

In the case of India, we have had repeated public assurances first from Prime Minister Nehru and then from Prime Minister Shastri that India was not embarking on a nuclear weapons program. But such expressions of intent should not lull away our concern.

This is highly unlikely to remain India's policy indefinitely. During the September fighting with Pakistan, a large group of Parliament members petitioned the Government to begin atomic bomb production. Should conflict with her neighbors reerupt, such pressures might become irresistible.

And if India takes this fateful step, how great will be the pressures for Pakistan to draw scarce resources from its own urgent economic development efforts in order to follow suit.

And, of course, so, too, will Nasser's Egypt inevitably follow the same path if Israel does develop atomic weapons.

Within a few years more, with the price and difficulty of building these horror weapons reduced, we may expect such countries as Sweden, Italy, and Canada to follow. And, by this time, West Germany may have decided to break her 1954 treaty commitments in order to start on the road to becoming one of the most powerful of the burgeoning nuclear powers, while Japan will doubtless have redrafted her constitutional inhibitions and also taken the plunge.

Other countries listed by AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg last summer as being capable of building their own bombs before too much longer included Switzerland, Brazil, Spain, and Yugoslavia.

Fortunately, if the need for constructive action to deal with this dread possibility is great, so too is the opportunity now a great one.

For many months, the United States and the Soviet Union have been at an impasse that, basically, involved West Germany's participation in a European nuclear defense.

I think Russia's nervousness about Germany is understandable to any student of modern history. Our problem is to give Germany the feeling of being a full-fledged member of the European defense team while, at the same time, providing Russia with positive assurances