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Part of More Crises in Viet Nam - Infighting on U.S. Aid

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More Crises in Viet Nam

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Infighting
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With the dry season approaching in South Viet
Nam, new major assaults can be expected from
the Communist guerrillas. But military problems
are not the only ones in the Southeast Asian
battleground. The Buddhists are on the warpath
against the•month-old regime of Premier Tran
By Beverly Deepe
Van Huong, and the No. 3 man in the United
.
A Special Correspondent
1
States economic mission has reportedly resigned
SAIGON.
The United States' largest and most unorthodox ecoin a major battle over policy. For the reports
nomic aid mission is in South Viet Nam. Now a major policy
from Washington and Saigon, see Page 14.
battle is raging over the role of the aid and its adminis-

On .U. S. Aid

,trators in the fight against the Communist Viet Cong.
Reliable sources indicate that the dispute has grown so
sharp that the No. 3 man in the economic mission, Dr.
George K . Tanham, a widely known counter-insurgency
scholar, reportedly has resigned in protest against the views
of his boss, mission Director James S. Killen.
The conflict Reportedly is complex, involving differing
viewpoints on the administration of economic aid, the role
of American economic representatives in Viet Nam's 45
provinces, as well as personality differences.
The outcome of the dispute is likely to determine the
degree of American economic support for the crucial
pacification program, the fortified hamlets, on which 1s
based America's hopes of helping win the war.

LARGEST MISSION
With a staff of nearly 500 Americans and a budget o!
$250 million to $300 million, the United States Operations
Mission <USMO) is the largest maintained by the United
tSates Agency for International Development (USAIDl.
"The two men have a difference in concept," one reliable
source explained. "Killen has the conventional approach
with emphasis on economic development as a menas of
strengthening the government, which serves as a means to
prosecute the war.
"Tanham's approach is a program designed for support
of counter-guerrilla warfare, with emphasis on operations
and more e11J.phasis on the role of the Americans in the
ptovinces."
Mr. Killen's viewpoint represents traditional government-to-government dealing. His approach emphasizes improvements in Saigon and the provincial capitals, developing job opportunities and providing electricity. USOM has
also crash-programmed training of low-level government
administrators and is assisting the training of 60,000 policemen in 10 centers throughout the country. Mr. Killen is
more prone to cutback on "giveaway" aid, making the Vietnamese responsibile for relying on their own resources,
and, in his judgment, leading to more effective prosecution
of the war.
In an attempt to direct the American economic aid
to the provinces and to support the strategic •hamlet program, USOM in 1962 set up a division now called the Office
of Rural Operations (headed by Dr. Tanham). Saigon
ministries were by-passed and the American aid flowed
directly through an American distribution system to each
of the country's 45 provinces. Each province chief planned
with the USOM representative-now numbering more
than 80-the requirements of American aid needed locally.
The American provincial representative, because of
his power in disbursing American aid, came to serve the
province chief more as a planning staff officer than as
adviser.
Dr. Tanham, who held the title of associate director
and ranked just under USOM deputy director Alfred M.
Hunt, held that this system should be broadened. Mr.
Killen's view is considered to be that the procedure should
be curtailed, that the field representative should act as
"quiet, patient advisers," in the words of one observer.
Dr. Tanham, 42, has had long experience in dealing
with insurgency. He visited Viet Nam eight times during
the French Indo-China war and the following years and
wrote "Communist Revolutionary Warfare-The Viet Minh
in Indo-China ." For the last nine years he worked for the •
Rand Corp. in Washington.

POWER AND SYMPATHY
Mr. Killen, 56, came to Viet Nam after serving as
USOM director in Korea, Yugoslavia and Pakistan. In
1947-'48 he advised Gen. Douglas MacArthur on labor af- ,
fairs in the Tokyo occupation headquarters. Before joining the government he was vice-president of the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill Workers
of the United States and Canada (AFL).
Both Mr. Killen and Dr. Tanham arrived in Viet Nam
in mid-July shortly after the appointment of Maxwell D.
Taylor as ambassador.
In the current dispute, observers note that "Tanham
has more sympathy, but Killen has more power."
Mr. Killen's position is considered to dovetail with
Ambassador Taylor's view that the Vietnamese must have
their own stable, functioning government before any major
American effort would be of benefit in winning the war.
The Tanham position, supported by hard-iine American military advisers, is that Viet Nam is so important
that Americans must assume more responsibility in the war.
Added to the policy differences are the clashing personalities of the two men.
The majority opinion is sympathetic to Dr. Tanham's
view. They note that Mr. Killen's approach is "out of step
with the times" and that Killen's idea of having the Vietnamese run the show is a goal of the future, but not a tact
at the present times."
.
The Killen-Tanham cleavage is also considered to
reflect differences of opinion between non-career and
career administrators in USOM.
"There are two classes of people in USOM," one younc
provincial representative explained. "There's the older
:traditional bureaucrat who likes the government-provided
villa, the 25 per cent extra living allowance for hardship
post and is interested in his career. Then there's the young
gung-ho type who doesn't care how much money he makes
or if he lives in a pup tent in the provinces. These young
gung-ho types ca:me to do a mission and are now leaving.
Oft course, the don't think he war is being won, but theYi
can't see they will be allowed to do any good in winning it."