
More Crises in Viet Nam

With the dry season approaching in South Viet Nam, new major assaults can be expected from the Communist guerrillas. But military problems are not the only ones in the Southeast Asian battleground. The Buddhists are on the warpath against the month-old regime of Premier Tran Van Huong, and the No. 3 man in the United States economic mission has reportedly resigned in a major battle over policy. For the reports from Washington and Saigon, see Page 14.



By Beverly Deepe A Special Correspondent

SAIGON.

The United States' largest and most unorthodox economic aid mission is in South Viet Nam. Now a major policy battle is raging over the role of the aid and its administrators in the fight against the Communist Viet Cong.

Reliable sources indicate that the dispute has grown so sharp that the No. 3 man in the economic mission, Dr. George K. Tanham, a widely known counter-insurgency scholar, reportedly has resigned in protest against the views of his boss, mission Director James S. Killen.

The conflict Reportedly is complex, involving differing viewpoints on the administration of economic aid, the role of American economic representatives in Viet Nam's 45 provinces, as well as personality differences.

The outcome of the dispute is likely to determine the degree of American economic support for the crucial pacification program, the fortified hamlets, on which is based America's hopes of helping win the war.

LARGEST MISSION

With a staff of nearly 500 Americans and a budget of \$250 million to \$300 million, the United States Operations Mission (USMO) is the largest maintained by the United tSates Agency for International Development (USAID).

"The two men have a difference in concept," one reliable source explained. "Killen has the conventional approach with emphasis on economic development as a menas of strengthening the government, which serves as a means to prosecute the war.

"Tanham's approach is a program designed for support of counter-guerrilla warfare, with emphasis on operations and more emphasis on the role of the Americans in the provinces."

Mr. Killen's viewpoint represents traditional government-to-government dealing. His approach emphasizes improvements in Saigon and the provincial capitals, developing job opportunities and providing electricity. USOM has also crash-programmed training of low-level government administrators and is assisting the training of 60,000 policemen in 10 centers throughout the country. Mr. Killen is more prone to cutback on "giveaway" aid, making the Vietnamese responsibile for relying on their own resources, and, in his judgment, leading to more effective prosecution of the war.

In an attempt to direct the American economic aid to the provinces and to support the strategic hamlet program, USOM in 1962 set up a division now called the Office of Rural Operations (headed by Dr. Tanham). Saigon ministries were by-passed and the American aid flowed directly through an American distribution system to each of the country's 45 provinces. Each province chief planned with the USOM representative—now numbering more than 80—the requirements of American aid needed locally.

The American provincial representative, because of his power in disbursing American aid, came to serve the province chief more as a planning staff officer than as adviser.

Dr. Tanham, who held the title of associate director and ranked just under USOM deputy director Alfred M. Hunt, held that this system should be broadened. Mr. Killen's view is considered to be that the procedure should be curtailed, that the field representative should act as "quiet, patient advisers," in the words of one observer.

Dr. Tanham, 42, has had long experience in dealing with insurgency. He visited Viet Nam eight times during the French Indo-China war and the following years and wrote "Communist Revolutionary Warfare—The Viet Minh in Indo-China." For the last nine years he worked for the Rand Corp. in Washington.

POWER AND SYMPATHY

Mr. Killen, 56, came to Viet Nam after serving as USOM director in Korea, Yugoslavia and Pakistan. In 1947-'48 he advised Gen. Douglas MacArthur on labor affairs in the Tokyo occupation headquarters. Before joining the government he was vice-president of the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill Workers of the United States and Canada (AFL).

Both Mr. Killen and Dr. Tanham arrived in Viet Nam in mid-July shortly after the appointment of Maxwell D. Taylor as ambassador.

In the current dispute, observers note that "Tanham has more sympathy, but Killen has more power." Mr. Killen's position is considered to dovetail with

Ambassador Taylor's view that the Vietnamese must have their own stable, functioning government before any major American effort would be of benefit in winning the war. The Tanham position, supported by hard-line Ameri-

can military advisers, is that Viet Nam is so important that Americans must assume more responsibility in the war. Added to the policy differences are the clashing personalities of the two men.

The majority opinion is sympathetic to Dr. Tanham's view. They note that Mr. Killen's approach is "out of step with the times" and that Killen's idea of having the Vietnamese run the show is a goal of the future, but not a fact at the present times."

The Killen-Tanham cleavage is also considered to reflect differences of opinion between non-career and career administrators in USOM.

"There are two classes of people in /USOM," one young provincial representative explained. "There's the older traditional bureaucrat who likes the government-provided villa, the 25 per cent extra living allowance for hardship post and is interested in his career. Then there's the young gung-ho type who doesn't care how much money he makes or if he lives in a pup tent in the provinces. These young gung-ho types came to do a mission and are now leaving. Oft course, the don't think he war is being won, but they can't see they will be allowed to do any good in winning it."