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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-08300 to 363-08314.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-08300 to 363-08314
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Title
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Article about President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's decision not to send a delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
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Description
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Original title: "thieu", Keever's title: N/A, Article draft about President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's decision not to send a delegation to the Paris Peace Talks, for the Economist
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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thieu 1 (park/deepe)
SAIGON, NOVEMBER 5-President Nguyen Van Thieu's bombshell refusal to send a delegation to the expanded Paris peace talks has glaringly exposed some of the most questionable--if not shocking--American a diplomatic
chicanery in the current history of the Vietnam war. The gist of the affair during this decisive phase of the Vietnam war and peace was that American Ambassador Ellsworth S. Bunker here had secured the agreement of the South Vietnamese to go to a three-way peace conference at Paris, with representatives of the U. S., the South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese governments. A general understanding was that the National Liberation Front would be an integral part of the Hanoi delegation. Meantime, in Paris, American Ambassador Harriman
had already made the deal with Hanoi that the NLF could be there separately as an independent delegation, and Harriman made the slip of telling the South Vietnamese delegation in that too. When Thieu received the
cable from Paris, his delegation in Paris telling of the
NLF separate representation, sheer pandemonium broke out at the Presidential Palace and in the end the South Vietnamese washed their hands of the whole
American sheenanigans. The debate here in diplomatic and official circles is whether somewhere between the White House, Bunker and Harriman, the American coordination and communications broke down or whether en toto the Americans were attempting to double-oross
the South Vietnamese government.
==more reuter
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thieu 2 (park/deepe)
The whole chain of Palace discussions in which the Vietnamese leadership ended up directly repudiating the Johnson Administration in Washington must also be viewed--at least from this vantage point--against a background of the American elections. As the American-South Vietnamese discussions, which dramatically began with Ambassador Bunker's dramatic visit to the
Presidential Palace at 6:45 a.m. on October 16--as these discussions unraveled
it became increasing clear to both the Vietnamese government and the
American and diplomatic communities here that the American President
had geared up the bombing halt of North Vietnam and the upcoming
peace negotiations to coincide with the American election on November 5.
Even senior American officials here--including life-long Democrats and
fervent Johnson supporters--sensed and expressed their private view that, as one
said, "this is a most vulgar display by Johnson of outright political
expediency." And as another said--"This is an out and out political
machination by Johnson either to get Humphrey elected or else to go down
in boldface type in the history books."
--more reuter
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thieu 3 (park/deepe)
Even senior Vietnamese government officials including those participating in the Palace discussions expressed belief that Johnson
was playing politics with peace during the three weeks preceding the American election and they were becoming acutely aware that Bunker was frenetically
attempting to bundle them off to Paris, regardless of the tactics he employed and the consequences to South Vietnam itself.
Now, in Saigon, the tactics of the American Ambassador and his deputy,
Samuel Berger, have become even more of the focus than the merits of the peace package deal. Some members of the American community and
pro-American diplomats have become outraged"--as one source said--at
Bunker's tactics while simultaneously shrieking an "American sell-out" on the crucial point of the NLF representation in Paris.
--more reuter
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thieu 4 (park/deepe)
The first a questionable tactic
am was the
"streamroller process, " used the very first day when Bunker met Thieu on
October 16th at 6:45 a.m.
In the words of one pro-American diplomat
who followed developments closely, "Bunker simply handed Thieu the typewritten
joint communique on the bombing halt Washington wanted to send out and expected him to sign on the dotted line in a matter of hours. This whole
approach seemed incredible since the Americans had been secretly negotiating
with Hanoi for days on the peace package that vitally affected South Vietnam--and the South Vietnamese government itself became the last
party to know.
And, at that, Saigon was given only a few hours
deadline time by Washington to make its decision.
It hardly seemed the way
to treat an ally for which 29,000 Americans have already died.
"One theory is that Bunker went to the Palace at such an undiplomatic
hour in hopes of catching Thieu half-asleep. But, by god, at six in
the morning all Orientals are wide-awake and Thieu certainly was. "
--more reuter
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thieu 5 (park/deepe)
Thieu's answer was he would have to consult the rest of the
government Other Vietnamese officials pointedly reminded the
Americans that the Vietnamese constitution--which the Americans had once
been so keen for the Vietnamese to adopt--provided in Art Article 39 that
on matters of war and peace the President was obliged to get agreement
from the two-house legislature.
"But, this time, the Americans didn't care about the constitutional process after all the pains they had gone through to initiate it here,*
one senior Vietnamese said.
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thieu 6 park/deepe)
Variations of these tactics also occured during the three weeks of Palace confrontations. There was the "soft-sell" approach in which
American Embassy officials invited numerous influential Vietnamese to
dinners and lunches and
proceeded to "feed us full of baloney that we
were strong enough to negotiate at this time," one Vietnamese diner
explained. There was the "hard-sell" in a discreet
war of nerves in which several American economic aid officials off-handedly, but deliberately broadcast around Saigon that the U. S.
"could" start cutting economic aid. Another tactic was the
traditional "divide and rule" approach of attempting to split the senior
Vietnamese officials. At one time,
one of the American
ambassadors called on Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky privately and urged
him to give his personal agreement to the American plan so that Washington
could be notified. Ky politely said he served the Vietnamese President.
--more reuter
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thieu 7 (park/deepe)
This latter approach was the most pathetically ironic of all--because
during the past 15 months, the American officialdom here had been urging
Thieu and Ky to work together, while instead they fought like cats and dogs. But now--with the increased pressure at the Palace confrontations,
Thieu and Ky politically coalesced at the time the American Embassy least
expected or wanted it. The Thieu-Ky alliance from the very first day
of the Palace meetings was the internal political turning point for the
Vietnamese--and from that time more and more Vietnamese leaders in and out of the government
were magnetized to Thieu as the American pressure grew.
--more reuter
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thieu 8 (normass/deepe)
But, the real American chicanery began later. At the best, the
Americans must be accused of gross misrepresentation; at the best,
of low-level lying to the Vietnamese government on the status of the NLF
at the expanded peace talks. The degree of American malpractices was
probably acouratedly described by one pro-American diplomat when he said:
"Bunker stretched diplomatic language to the limit without going to the
brink of telling an outright lie."
The whole American-South Vietnamese affair became un-hinged when
Thieu found out the wild discrepancies between what Harriman was
telling South Vietnamese delegates in Paris-that there would be
a four-power oonference with the NLF separately represented and what
Bunker was telling the Saigon government in Saigon--that Paris was to be
a tripartite affair.
--more reuter
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thieu 9 (parkdeepe)
This stage began on October 25 when the Vietnamese presented the
Americans with two new drafts of the joint communique to end the bombing.
With reluctance, Bunker accepted the mildest version--the one making it seem
lead likely Hanoi had made any concessions.
Both drafts, however, had specified the crucial phrase that "direct and en serious talks between
the Republic of Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."
Thus, it specified the direct Saigon-Hanoi conversations that Thieu had wrung
from Johnson in writing in the Honolulu communique last July.
Then the Americans said in effect hey, what about us, and the Vietnamese said sure, the Americans could go, too.
Hence, the direct Saigon Hanoi talks were phased into
a three-power talk--but the South Vietnamese
stated that in no shape or fashion,
could the NLF be in Paris as a separate delegation, though it could join the Hanoi representatives.
Bunker took the Vietnamese draft which contained
this crucial provision on which the composition of the Paris conference hinged-
and sent it to Washington.
--more reuter
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thieu 10 (park/ deepe)
The last week of October was the cruncker. On Sunday, October 27,
Hanoi gave its final approval to the Americans on Harriman's
peace package. On October 29, Thieu asked Ky to prepare to head the
new Saigon delegation to Paris because he believed the bombing halt was imminent. Then, the same day, at 6 p.m.
Bunker came in to tell
Thieu that everything was fixed. [deletion: and the bombing bait would be the next]
Ky specifically asked Bunker if Washington okayed Saigon's draft communique
mentioning the three-way conference. Bunker said yes. Ky asked if Hanoi approved. Bunker said yes. Ky said fine. Bunker said the bombing
halt would be the next day and that the expanded peace talks would begin
on November 2. In rough translation, the Vietnamese replied,
"baloney.
We can't get a national delegation there in five days. We agreed to
go to Paris, but not on November 2." They reminded the Americans it had taken Hanoi
one month to send a delegation to Paris after had first accepted.
Bunker and Berger both reportedly flew into "a rage."
This "fisticuff" went on for at least three hours.
--more reuter
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thieu 11 (park/deepe)
"Then the damnest thing you ever saw happened," one Vietnamese who kept
a brief diary of the whole event explained. "While we were haggling with
Bunker about whether we'd go on November 2 or not, an aide came in
with a cable from Lam in Paris (South Vietnamese Ambassador Pham Dang Lam).
He had an angry session with (Philip) Habib and Harriman in Paris. Harriman
told Lam Hanoi had not repeat not agreed to any damn thing and that all your
pretensions are out of this world. Hanoi did not repeat not accept
your proposal (for a three-power conference) and we did not repeat not
even Hanoi to accept them. Then Harriman ended up with that sentence
Newsweek quoted correctly--your government does not repeat not represent
all of South Vietnam, Mr. Ambassador, and you would do well to remember that./
--more reuter
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thieu 12 (parkdeepe)
"Well,
the faces of Thieu and the Vietnamese crumbled and the Palace
broke out in pandemonium.
Bunker was asked to go to the next room so the
Vietnamese could talk among themselves. Everyone
on the Vietnamese
side was shocked at the discrepancy between Harriman and Bunker. Even
Prime Minister Huong said this must be 'blatant duplicity'
on the part of the Americans, and Thieu said obviously someone was lying.
"Then we showed Bunker and Berger the cable from Lam. What about this--
before we decide about going on November 2. Bunker diplomatically said
maybe Lam misunderstood Harriman. We said Lam's English isn't very
good, but Habib's French is--and no one could misunderstand to that extent.
"In funeral silence, Bunker and Berger mounted their armored car (automobile) back to the American Embassy. Meantime, all
the Vietnamese ordered chicken soup while wating waiting for the Americans
to return....One and a half hours later, they came back. Bunker handed
Thieu a letter dictated over the phone by President Johnson. Johnson
said it was all a misunderstanding.
Bunker is my representative at your side in Saigon. Everything Bunker says is right. I stand by him and my policy is what Bunker says."
--more reuter
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thieu 13 (park/deepe)
The subsequent arrival of the NLF in Paris as a separate delegation would
seem to contradict the contents of President Johnson's letter.
The Vietnamese then said in essence they did not repeat not trust
the Americans and that the Americans were not repeat not correctly arranging
things on their behalf in Paris. But, Saigon would still send a
delegation to Paris to talk to the Communist directly--but preliminary talks to arrange
the ground rules for themselves.
Again, pandemonium broke out, this time the Americans accusing
the Vietnamese of betraying them, and saying in essence you
want to go to Paris and then you don't.
The final cont confrontation occured c occured on the evening
of October 31, with the Vietnamese knowing the bombing halt was imminent.
It was Thieu's first anniversary of his Presidential inauguration and the
meeting opened as the Communists were shelling the city. It was a tense)
dramatic meeting, with strong words between Thieu and Berger and Bunker
smoothing remarks [deleted: away] over.
--more reuter
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thieu 14 (park/deepe)
At one point, Berger turned to Thieu and said if he insisted on a
mandate from Hanoi officially keeping the NLF out as a separate delegation,
then Berger did not repeat not think even the American government could
support that demand.
Thieu pulled out a piece of paper, saying, oh is that right Mr. Ambassador, and began to write down the exact statement. Thieu countered, in that case, it sounded to him as though Berger was the deputy ambassador from Hanoi instead of the deputy American ambassador to
Saigon. Bunker said Berger's remarks were all a misunderstanding--and brushed it off.
The Vietnamese presented another draft text for the joint communique similar to their other draft, but included the word "preliminary" talks.
At 4 a.m.---five hours before Johnson's bombing-halt speech--Bunker and Berger
left with the draft they returned two hours later with a counter-draft which
had dropped the word "preliminary"--the word necessary for the South Vietnamese
to set up their own procedural arrangements in Paris directly with the Communists,
rather than trusting
the American arrangements.
Thieu replied in that case the South Vietnamese could not repeat not
join the Americans in the bombing halt communique or participate in the Paris
peace talks.
--more reuter
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thieu 15 (park/deepe)
Three hours later, Johnson announced the ending of the bombing, which
the South Vietnamese declared a unilateral action and a day later,
Thieu dropped his own bombshell about not repeat not going to Paris.
Now, South- Vietnamese-American deadlock
on Saigon's attending the Paris talks continues here, with the American
Embassy awaiting instructions from Washington and the
Thieu government privately hoping for a new Republic Administration in
the White House.
--end reuter
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Date
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Unknown, Nov. 5
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B191, F3
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
