-
derivative filename/jpeg
-
363-08291 to 363-08299.pdf
-
Digital Object Identifier
-
363-08291 to 363-08299
-
Title
-
Article about the delegations to the Paris Peace Talks
-
Description
-
Original title: "delegation", Keever's title: N/A, Article draft about the delegations to the Paris Peace Talks, for the Economist
-
AI Usage Disclosure
-
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
-
Transcript
-
--------------------
- Page 1
--------------------
zczc sag
yy let
delegation 1 (park/deepe)
SAIGON, DECEMBER 4-The official and semi-official South Vietnamese delegations leave for the expanded peace talks in Paris this week, believing the Saigion government has won major concessions from the Johnson Administration, but Saigon is still planning to stall from making any significant decisions on substantive matters until the Nixon Administration is installed in Washington, and they hope American Ambassador Averell Harriman has been replaced as chief American negotiator in Paris.
Whether procedural battles actually do facilitate the South Vietnamese government's stratagem, however, remains a question-even among Americans o matter of debate-even among American officials in various world capitals, some arguing that Hanoi may be willing to make significant procedural concessions in order to deal with President Johnson, rather than a new administration whi more hard-line administration which would have to live with the consequences of a hasty Vietnam solution for the remaining four years in office.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 2
--------------------
zczc sag
yy let
delegation 2 (park/deepe)
The several Saigon delegations also leave for Paris expecting hard fighting in their homeland during their absence, hard bargaining with both the Americans and their enemies at the conference and a rather spectacular propaganda struggle with the Communists. Certainly, as the peace talks begin, American and Vietnamese officials here foresee the Communists continuing perhaps escalating their policy of "fighting while talking", although the intensity and form of fighting may fluctuate, with American military officers predicting another concerted Communist offensive, but while some political sources envision or the Communists reverting to or de-escalating, simply souped-up guerrilla warfare and terrorism.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 3
--------------------
zczc sag
yy let
delegation 3 (park/deepe)
And, while all the Vietnamese belligerents of the war may soon be facing each other across the peace table, there seems little doubt here that the long-term objectives of none have shifted. The Viet Cong and Hanoi radios daily continue calling for the general offensive and uprising funneled to overthrow the legal Saigon government, and which would lead to setting up a transitional coalition government with the Communists playing a dominant role. And, the Saigon delegations, to be masterminded by hard-line Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, are equally adamant in accepting only something close to a Communist surrender in the South, with the insurgents laying down their weapons in return for being given full rights of other Vietnamese citizens, including the right to use ballots instead of bullets in selecting rather than overthrowing Saigon governments.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 4
--------------------
zczc sag
yy let
delegation 4 (park/deepe)
Hence, the battlefield developments may take on an even more significant dimension in the future, with victories and defeats splashing up into the diplomatic arena. And so, as the Saigon delegations leave for Paris, it may be equally significant that President Nguyen Van Thieu at the same time begins a cross-country review of the current government drive to accelerate pacification of an additional one thousand hamlets and to line up his provincial subordinates to work harder on the upcoming 1969 pacification program.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 5
--------------------
zczc sag
yy let
delegation 5 (park/deepe)
The November political developments in the South which finally moved the Saigon delegation to Paris must be viewed as a continium of the heated Palace discussions before President Johnson announced the bombing halt. Only a few hours before President Johnson's Novemember 1 announcement, the American officialdom here rejected the last-minute compromise proposal of Vice President Ky that Saigon would still send a delegation to Paris to talk directing with Hanoi--but only on procedural questions, the implication being that the Saigon government no longer trusted the arrangements the Americans were making for them with Hanoi. The Americans officials rejected the proposal arguing that these procedural discussions would take months and Washington was in a hurry and wanted substantive [illegible] discussions. Then Thieu said he would refuse to send a delegation to the November 6th meeting in Paris and would not join Washington in announcing the halting of the bombing over the North.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 6
--------------------
zczc sag
yy let
delegation 6 (park/deepe)
During the past month of boycotting Paris, however, the Thieu government got the substance of that last mintue minute proposal the American officials here had once rejected-in writing, Thieu got the Washington in its November 27th statement to agree to direct Saigon-Hanoi talks during discussions of the future political settlement--and the Saigon delegation is also going
to Paris simply to discuss initially procedures, which some Vietnamese officials predict may last as long as three months.
Another factor leading to Saigon's decision to end the boycott was the return to South Vietnamese ambassador to Washington, Mr. Bui Diem, who explained much of the Washington post-election political life to the Saigon officials. Diem was important in the pre-bombing halt period of the Palace discussions for cabling the government that the Nixon camp had urged Saigon to hold to a firm line until after the election. Whether Diem's brought back any word or not from Nixon's camp tax rescinding this after the election, and urging Saigon to end its boycott is unknown here. But, Vice President-elect Spiro Agnew has said, according to press dispatches reaching here, that Nixon did help convince Saigon to send a delegation to Paris.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 7
--------------------
zczc sag
yy let
delegation 7 (park/deepe)
The American officialdom also used the traditional carrott-and-stick approach in mid-November to convince Saigon to end its boycott. The big stick was the ominous public tantrum of Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, threatening to leave Saigon out in the cold if it did not go; and the carrot was the gentle, conciliatory manners and concessions made here by American Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who sweated out seven drafts before the Vietnamese government approved the final Washington statement and announced Saigon would go to Paris.
The Washington statement of November 27th gave the Vietnamese government not only the face-saving devices, but also the political assurances it had long wanted: no American approval for a coalition government in the South (which Saigon officials, including reportedly even President Thieu, had suspected the Johnson Administration had already tacitly agreed to with Hanoi), no repeat no territorial division of South Vietnam, direct Saigon-Hanoi talks on the future political settlement in the South, explicit and public definition of two-sided Paris conference, rather than the four-sided conference the Communists had been shrewdly propagandizing.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 8
--------------------
zczc sag
yy let
delegation 8 (park/deepe)
Hence, by waiting a month, the Thieu government lost somewhat propaganda-wise to the Communists, but in turn gained more concessions from Washington which may affect the short-range course of, if not repeat not the final outcome, of the peace conference. The Thieu government won much more from Washington than it had even asked for before the bombing-halt: a better high-level understanding with the Americans on the future course of negotiations, a dramatic undercutting of Communist propaganda that Saigon was simply puppets of the Americans, a unifying of Thieu's own government more than it had ever been before, an increase in the internal political prestige of Thieu, Ky and the whole government. And, Thieu also won time.
==end reuter
--------------------
- Page 9
--------------------
zczc sag
yy let
editorial note 1 (park/deepe)
SAIGON, DECEMBER 7--Probeedham. I've booked room at Embassy Hotel for Mr. Mackenzio for December 21, but reservation is subject to reconfirmation. Hotel would like to know his arrival time. I'll do my bext best to help him during his visit here, although there is some chance I'll be on a field trip during that period. Sorriest I'm unable to file your request for Tuesday foreign report, viewve getting ready for January departure from Vietnam. However, I'll try to file for the economist if you like before his or mark's arrival. Regards Deepe.
==end reuter
-
Date
-
Unknown, Dec. 4
-
Location
-
Saigon, South Vietnam
-
Coordinates
-
10.8231; 106.6311
-
Size
-
20 x 26 cm
-
Container
-
B191, F3
-
Format
-
dispatches
-
Collection Number
-
MS 363
-
Collection Title
-
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
-
Creator
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Collector
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Copyright Information
-
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
-
Publisher
-
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
-
Language
-
English
