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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-08291 to 363-08299.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-08291 to 363-08299
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Title
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Article about the delegations to the Paris Peace Talks
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Description
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Original title: "delegation", Keever's title: N/A, Article draft about the delegations to the Paris Peace Talks, for the Economist
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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2020 sag
Vylet
delegation 1 (park/deepe)
SAICON, DECEMBER 4-The official and semi-official South Vietnamese
delegations leave for the expanded in peace talks in Paris this week,
believing the Saigion government has won major concessions from the
5
Johnson Administration, but still planning to stall from making any
significant decisions on substantive matters until the Nixon Administration
is installed in Washington,
and they hope hope, American Ambassador
Averell Harriman in has been replaced as chief American negotiator in Paris
Whother leathy procedural battles actually do facilitate the
South Vietnamese government's stratagem, however, remains a question even
among Ameri
American o matter of debate-even among American officials in various
world capitals, some arguing that Hanoi may be will to make significant
procedural concessions in order to deal with President Johnson, rather than
a new administration whi more hand-line administration which would have to
live with the consequences of a hasty Vietnam solution for the ite
remaining four years in office.
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2020 506
yy let
delegation 2 (park/deepe)
The
several Saigon delegations also leave for Paris expecting hard
fighting in their homeland during their absence, hard bargaining with both
the Americans and their enemies at the conference and a rather spectacular
propaganda struggle with the Communists.
Certainly, as the
peace talks begin, American and Vietnamese officials here foresee the
Communists continuing perhaps escalating their policy of "fighting while
talking, although the intensity and form of fighting may fluctuarate
fluctuate, with American military officers predioting another concerted
Communist offi offensive, but wil while some political sources envision
or de-escalating
the Communiste reverting to sound-up simply sep- souped-up guerrilla
warfare and terrorism.
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2020 sag
y let
delegation 3 (park/deepe)
And, while all the Vietnamese belligerents of the war may soon
be facing each other across the oon peace table, there seems little
doubt here that the long-term objectives of none have shifted, The
Viet Cong and Hanoi radios daily oontinue oalling for the general
offensive and uprising funneled to overthrow the legal Saigon government,
hence setting up
to be
and hence setting up a transitional coalition government with Communists
playing a dominant role in it. And, the Saigon delegations,
masterminded by hard-line Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, are equally
adamant in accepting only something olose to a Communist surrender in
the Suht South, with the insurgents laying down their weapons in return
for being given full rights of other Vietnamese oitisena, including
the right to v use ballots instead of bullets in selecting rather than
overthrowing Saigon governments.
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2020 sag
ᎩᎩ let
delegation 4 (park/deepe)
Hence, the battlefield developments may take on an even more
significant dimension in the future, with victories and defeats
splashing up into the diplomatio arena.
And so,
as the Saigon delegations
leave for Paris, it may be equally significant that President Nguyen
Van Thieu at the same time begins a cross-country review of the
ourrent government drive to accelerate pacification of an additional
one thousand hamlets and to line up his provincial subordinates: to
work harder on the upcoming 17 1969 pacification program.
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Zozo; sag
ᎩᎩ let
delegation 5 (park/deepe)
The November political developments in the South which finally
moved the Saigon delegation to Paris must be viewed as a continium of the
heated Bac Palace discussions before President Johnson announced
the bombing halt. Only a few hours before President Johnson's Novemember 1
announcement, the American officialdom here rejected the last-minute
compromise proposal of Vice President Ky that Saigon would still send a
delegation to Paris to talk directing with Hanoi--but only on procedural
questions, the implication being that the Saigon government no longer
trusted the arrangements the Americans were making for them with Hanoi.
Americans officials rejected the proposal arguing that these procedural
AND WANED SUBSTAnitive c
discussions would take months and Washington was in a hurry.,
Thieu said he would refuse to send at delegation to the November 6th meeting
in Paris and would not join Washington in announc:
then
announcing the halt of the bombing
over the North.
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the
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20 20 sag
ᏭᎩ let
delegation 6 (park/deepe)
During the past month of boycotting Paris, however, the Thieu government
got the substance of that last mintue minute proposal the American officials
here had once rejected-in writing, Thieu got the Washington in its November
27th statement to agreement to direct Saigon-Hanoi talks during discussions
of the future political settlement--and the Saigon delegation is also going
to Paris simply to discuss initially procedures, which some Vietnamese
officials predict may last as long as three months.
Another factor leading to Saigon's decision to end the boycott was the
return to South Vietnamese ambassador to Washington, Mr. Bui Diem, who
explained much of the Washington post-election politiofa political life
to the Saigon officials. Diem was important in the pre-bombing halt
period of the Palace discussions for cabling the government that the
Nixon camp had urged Saigon to hold to a firm line until after the election.
Whether Diem'xx brought back any word or not from Nixon's camp tax resoinding
SAgon
this after the election, and urging them to end their boycott is
unknown here. But, Vice President-elect Spiro Agnew has said, according
to press dispatches reaching here, that Nixon did help scire convince
Saigon to send a delegation to Paris.
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zcze sag
ᎩᎩ
let
delegation 7 (park/deepe)
The American officialdom also used the traditional carrott-and-stick
approach in mid-November to convince Saigon to end its boycott. The
Public
big stick was the ominous/tantrum of Secretary of Defense Clark
Clifford, threatening to leave Saigon out in the cold if it did not
go; and the carrott was the gentle, conciliatory manners and concessions
made here by American Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who spated
sweated out seven drafts before the Vietnamese government approved the
final Washington statement and announced Saigon would go to Paris.
27th gave the
The Washington statement of November
Vietnamese government not only the face-saving devices, but also the
political assurances it had long wanted: no American approval for a
coalition government in the South (which Saigon officials, including
reportedly even President Thieu, had suspected the Johnson Administration
had already tacitly agreed to with Hanoi), no repeat no territorial
division of South Vietnam,
direct Saigon-Hanoi talks on the future
political settlement in the South, explicit and public definition of th
Ly
two-side Paris conference, rather than the four-sided conference the
Communists had been strewedl shrewdly propagandizing.
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zczc sag
ᎩᎩ let
defugi delegation 8 (park/deepe)
propaganda-wise to the Communists,
Hence, by waiting a month,
the Thieu government lost somewhat
but in turn gained more concessions
short-range course of,
of the peace
conference.
The
from Washington which would easily affect the
if not repeat not the final outcome,
won
Thieu government red gained much more from Washington than it had
asked for
even agreed to before the bombing-halt:
a better under's high-level
understanding with the Americans on the future course of negotiations,
a dramatic undercutting of Communist propaganda that Saigon was simply
puppets of the Americans, a ui unifying of Thieu's own government more
than it had ever been before, an increase in the internal political
prestige of Thieu, Ky and the whole government.
1 also won time.
And,
Thieu nhỏ Kỳ
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ZCZO sag
V let
editorial note 1 (park/deepe)
SAIGON, DECEMBER 7-Probeedham.
I've booked room at Embassy
Hotel for Mr. Mackenzio for december 21, but reservation is subject
to reconfirmation.
yamaha do
Hotel would like to know his arrival time.
my bext best to help him during his visit here,
there is some chance I'll be on a field trip during that period.
Sormix I'll
although
Sorriest
yem unable to file your request for Tuesday foreign report,, viewve
getting ready for January departure from Vietnam.
However, I'll
eyell try fild file for the economist if you like before his or
mark's arrival.
Regards Deepe.
end reuter
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Date
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Unknown, Dec. 4
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B191, F3
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
