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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-08099 to 363-08103.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-08099 to 363-08103
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Title
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Article about Strategic Hamlets and the war effort
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Description
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Original title: "war", Article draft about the Strategic Hamlet program, for the Washington Post
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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Beverly Deepe
101 Cong Ly
Saigon
IV CORPS HEADQUARTERS, South Viet Nam-- The foundation of the military effort in the crucial southern third of Viet Nam--the multi-million-dollar strategic hamlet and village militia program--has caved in and the war in now being lost there.
The vital question is whether the new military government, administrators and unit commanders can reverse the trend. Few observers here believe the war against the Viet Cong Communist guerrillas can be won without an effective strategic hamlet program.
Strategic hamlet experts in the field believe the U. S.-supported Vietnamese government has lost at least six months in the fight against the Communist guerrillas. They predict it will be mid-1964 before the government can rebuild the hamlet program to its former position.
The strategic hamlet villages fortified with bamboo stakes and barbed wire and defended by volunteer militiamen--were devised in an attempt to separate the Viet Cong guerrillas from population, food and intelligence information. The program has succeeded tolerably well in the mountainous two-thirds of the country, where military experts believe the government is holding its own.
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Deepe
War--2
However, in the 13 provinces of the southern third of the country--popularly called the Mekong Delta--the food is in abundance in the richest part of the country and the population is widely scattered, making almost impossible the denial of bad and information to the guerrilla.
Under consistent Viet Cong barrages during the past six months, thousands of the hamlets have been attacked. Many of the persons thought to be government supporters have been driven from them; houses have been burned; government functionaries driven off.
The government is now abandoning hundreds of outposts, hamlets and watchtowers which they had once defended. In the 13 provinces south of Saigon, "big shifts" are expected in the numbers of strategic hamlets actually held by the government and those carried on the books.
For example, An Xuyen province, a Viet Cong stronghold area at the southernmost tip of the peninsula, only five per cent of that the sixtyfive hamlets once listed as government controlled are now considered viable. Start Further north in Chuong Thien province, only twenty percent of the 1970-170 completed hamlets are now considered secure.
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Deepe
War--3
The situation is no less disheartening in the provinces forming the Saigon perimeter. In Dinh Tuong province, the government retains control of only 45 of the 200 hamlets they once thought it controlled. In Long An province, which begins only 15 miles south of Saigon, the government has lost about 75 per cent of its hamlets, many of which secured Highway No.4 connecting the rice-rich delta with the capital city. Ambushes are now regularly laid on the outskirts of Saigon.
"We control 200 yards either side of Highway No. 4 during the day," said one American working in the province. "And we don't even control that in the nighttime. We now hold the provincial capital and six district capitals at night...and we're lucky to do that."
As the hamlet program crumbled, so did the armed volunteer militia that defended them. In one province alone, the fighting strength of the village militia in fifty per cent of what it had been. Many fought bravely in defense of their homes and families. Others simply deserted their hamlets, some joining the Viet Cong, some "running into the bush." In June, some of them began turning their weapons back to the government officials and refused to cooperate with the program. Other weapons lost provided an arsenal of shotguns and carbines for the enemy. The capabilities of the Viet Cong in weapons, supplies, personnel and training has increased dramatically in the delta in the past six months.
In addition to the partial collapse of the strategic hamlet program, the government in now withdrawing troops from outposts and watchtowers which had once defended some of the hamlets, bridges, canals and roads. In the nine provinces of IV Corps, 200 outposts and watchtowers have been withdrawn. Unit strength withdrawn ranged from 30-man platoons to 100-man companies.
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Deepe
War--4
Newly-appointed province chiefs in the delta are now taking a "new look" at the hamlet program valuating how many are viable, how rebuilt the others, which ones to withdrew troops from. The official word for this is "consolidation," but it must be considered a retreat from the land and people the government said it held.
Why did the strategic hamlet pragmata deteriorate so badly?
The popular version is "we went too far too fast"--that under intense pressure from Saigon, province and district chiaf strung barbed wire fences faster than Macy's could hang Christmas treelights. The hamlets then became a shell without adequately trained and motivated armed defenders. They became "paper hamlets."
The former regime under President Ngo Binh Diem refused to withdraw from indefensible posts and hamlets because "it meant withdrawing the prestige of his government."
However, in a report which hit desk of Ambassador Lodge forwarded to Washington, reasons for hamlet deterioration was that the villagers were promised security from regular forces and reinforcements during night attacks. But when a village called for reinforcements, government officials sent flareships and artillery. They seldom sent troops to meet the Viet Cong where they were--on the ground.
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Deepe
War--5
Better trained troops were in theory supposed to patrol outside the strategic hamlets at night to ward off Viet Cong attacks. But they never did. They were tied down to static positions in other outposts, watchtowers and hamlets. The hamlet militia soon realized they were "sitting ducks" and began pulling out of the program.
Military advisors agree that one of the key problems is there has consistently been two parallel wars that seldom met. One was the war of the daytime, where government units launched operations with helicopters and armored cars. Second was the war of the night, where the Viet Cong roamed at will, seldom endangered by government night patrols.
While the strategic hamlet is disheartening, it is not hopeless, provincial advisors believe. They believe the concept is valid if properly implement with enough military strength and aggressiveness. They point out examples such as Thanh Duo district in Long An province. More than 1000- army regular soldiers secured the district and helped villagers build their hamlets in one and half months. And once the regulars moved out, the aggressive district chief personally led night reinforcements to nid a village under attack.
Advisors believe the hamlet program will succeed because it must. There is no other alternative to it.
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Date
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Unknown
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Subject
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Vietnam, 1961-1975;
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B2, F1
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
