Col. Serong interview

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363-01694 to 363-01697.pdf

Digital Object Identifier

363-01694 to 363-01697

Title

Col. Serong interview

Description

Original title: "Background interview with Col. Serong on significant developments since the first Honolulu Conference." Transcript of interview with Colonel Francis Philip "Ted" Serong of the Australian Army

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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.

Transcript

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Strategy.
Background interview with Col. Serong on Thursday, July 18, 1968, on
significant developments since the first Honolulu Conference, Feb., 166,
until the second Honolulu Conference this week.
On the question of what was the great watershed point; was it,
for example, the '68 Tet offensives
The great watershed point was sometime in late '65. In early '65,
we had the U. S. troop buildup and then that troop buildup continued to
the point where we could say the Allies had pushed back the Communist
main forces and prevented the VC from overthrowing ARVN--so that by
pure military action, the U. S. battalions had prevented defeat.
Then, we had an intellectual crisis--which way to go? Should
the U. S. use more and more big battalions, or should they choose what
I call the Special Forces route? The Special Forces by now were disliked--
they had been Kennedy's special child and when he was gone they got
kicked around. Almost as a matter of professional gravitation,, we
went against the Special Forces route and were sucked into the big-unit
route.
The strategy anxin decision was: to destroy the main-force
and let the infrastructure problem be dealed with later and at leisure--
or to concentrate on the infrastructure and hold off the main force.
For almost emotional reasons, the first course was chosen.
Qe
Honolulu
Then, several months later, after this watershed decision,
66 was held. What was the significance of that?
A. Even in Honolulu '66, they made all those speeches about
the economy, the second front etc. But, these were made with the
mouth; the action was minimal; there was minimal expression of this
in a otion because of the distraction with the main-force war.
Q. If the turning point was in late '65, would the Ia DrangValley
battle be a specific date of this?
A.
That's as good a point as any.
So, we see that Tet was the consequence of the watershed decision
in late 65-Tet itself was not a watershed point. The thinking was
that while we were pushing the main-force towards the borders, we were
making the cities secure; but in fact, as Tet showed, we were not
succeeding in that.
Q. What went wrong in the Honolulu '66 strategy.
What
Ae The White House never intellectually acknowledged even to
themselves that were was only one controlling element; MACV ran the war,
not the Ambassador and MACV was all geared in one direction.
was needed was a change of emphasis. Before, ont of the U. S. battalions,
two were concentrated on fighting the main-force for every one committed
to pacification. This should have been reversed.
enclave theory at all.
This is not the
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page 2
Now, where wo stand now, interestingly and by accident we have
got oursolves into the 2 to 1 ration (two US. battalions for pacification
versus one for mainforco war), instead of the old 1 to 2 ratio. We have
brought the troops back to the urban centers, the emphasis which we should
have had originally. This is currently true except for massive deployments
along the 17th parallel and around Kontum with the 4th Infantry Div.
Now, by acdis accident, whon Abrahms took over, Johnson said
no more troops; ebrams would have to live with this situation. At
this stage, my guess is neither Johnson nor Abrams understood the
implications of this. But, the implications were plain in Vietnam.
Never before did the U. S. have a strategio reserve here, because it
never needed it; if more troops were needed, they were in the pipeline
or out of country. A strategio reserve should run 25% of the deployable
forces; now Abrams just substract this from his existing deployment and this
must come from his anti-main-force war forces. (Hence, his battalions
fighting the main-force war must be reduced by 25% to build up his
in-country strategio reserve). And, hence, Abrams must reshape his
strategy for his anti-nainforce war. He must re-shape om his
strategy only one way-by emphasis on the counterinsurgency aspects and
by de-emphasis on his anti-main-force ware That's where we stand nowe
This will be intellectually and professionally resisted by MACV-but
it is inevitable.
Q. What is Abrams strategy?
A.
Abrams is not doing anything. The actions he says he's taking
are not reflected by troop movements on the ground. What is is doing is
montally appreciating that the enemy is not homogenously strong throughout
the country and Abrams is using his intelligence units to find enemy
strongpoints and once found, then to operate against them. I have yet
to see evidence rather than words of thos things) the reasons it is taking
paloc is because we're still in a posture in which they only sotion we can
effectively undertake is rast reaction. Our reaction is goods our initiative
techniques are non-existent.
What about the Honolulu Conference starting tomorrow?
Ao What dex is the need of this Honolulu? If you assume the war
is going on along the agreed strategy--thon suddenly a Honolulu Conference.
It is either a propaganda gesture for the world, or it means some radical
change of policy, and Johnson is using Honolulu to get all the boys lined
up.
If it is a radical change of policy, what could it be? Only one-out.
The conference could only be held to work out the speeds, doconoies and
mechanics of pulling oute
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page 3.
What are the indications for this? When Clark Clifford said we
are going flat out to re-equip ARVN, even at the expense of our own
troops. This is acceptable only if we are going out. This is an
indication of a
state of mind. All this does is make it easier to
withdraw the Americans hand material over to the ARVN, and if ARVN
losses it to the VC, that's there problem.
Q. Deganiummon This policy change would depend on how Johnson
wants to play his cards before the American election, no?
A. Before I thought it was impossible for Johnson to limit the
options of his successor, that to do so would be a new low in political
morality... the
immorality of having decisions his binding on the now President.
Now, I see significant evidence this decision taken and actions have
been planned, if not implemented, although n there's not any substantial
steps taken for the implementation yet.
Q. The key index of this decision would be stopping the bombing of
the North
?
Ao That's a good bollweather.
Qo
What is the military balance of forces at this time?
A.
ferm After Tot, I said we had the war won now. But, then
we failed. We sat and stared and had a mental paralysis for several weeks.
The enemy recovered themselves--they did it at the time a local sense,
but in a strategio sense they haven't been able to recover. At this
tigo, Hanoi can not force its will on Saigon. It can only try to ket us
to pull out. The bombing of the North is important only as a means to force
Hanoi to negotiatowe have to have a military impact on täter their soil,
* if not, there's no way in which we can impose our will on Hanoi to negotiate.
The
only options Hanoi now has, excepting negotiations, is to fadeaway,
to continue the war at a more subdued level for years.
Qe And this is the importance of the Honolulu decisions now?
Ao I predict two things will happen.
Johnson will make a final
or
bid to go down in history and he will take concrete steps to end the war
with the least disadvantages to us--but still pretty disadvantageous and the
extent of the disadvantages will be covered up by JUSPAO.
And the American option is just to keep going?
A. Yes, and how do we keep going?
Abrams strategy being thrust upon him.
With the inevitable ohange of
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page 4.
I suspect that in the final election battle, Humphrey may
campaign on the platform that Johnson is now onacting--the latter-day versiom
of bringing the boys home. Humphrey will be the peace candidate and Nixon
the dove. But, both of them will be forced to the center and in time
both of the voices in the center will be the same.
Q. Why is Johnson doing this?
You
of
A. Johnson's desire will be to go out with one last hubris.
don't know that that is? It's a word used by American intellectuals,
which there's only three,
and I'm one of them, based on the ancient Greek
Johnson's desire is to
word meaning an act of arrogance based on pride.
ma ie make a place for himself in history-any sort of place and second
to hand over a going coner concern for a Democratic President.
Q. And,
noises,
so this will lead to Fortress America?
Ae All of our Allies will know its they may make their own
and all in due course will make adjustments with Communism, Soviet
Communism in Europe and Chinese Communism in Asia.

Date

1968, July 18

Subject

Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Australia. Australian Army; Serong, F. P., 1915-; Honolulu Conference (1966 : Honolulu, Hawaii); Strategy; Interviews

Location

Honolulu, Hawai'i

Coordinates

21.3069; -157.8583

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B66, F4

Format

interviews

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Collector

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections

Language

English