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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-02273 to 363-02278.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-02273 to 363-02278
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Title
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Article on the effect of the Vietnam War on communism in Africa and South America
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Description
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Original title: "insurgency." Article by Keever about the way that the outcome of the Vietnam War will effect their future wars in Africa and South America against communism
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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Beverly Deepe
101 Cong Ly
Saigon
insurgency-page 1
xxxm
Jov. 12.
ро
SAIGON-Reliable observers here, reviewing the desperate but
not hopeless mess in Viet Nam, are becoming increasingly concerned about
America's capability of winning future counter-subversive wars in
underdeveloped lands in South American and Ax Africa.
These observers, well aware of counter-subversive wars and
Communist tactics, openly cringe when they hear radio reports of
pro-Communist guerrilla raids in Venzuela. American military advisors
"I'll see
often depart Viet Nam with the hal only half-joking remark,
you in South America in five years."
to their buddies
to win
wiy
As current American policy here faces a "last chance"
reverse the losing trends in Viet Nam, observers are readily distrubed by
the "inertia" of American policy to make the "first step" to counter
Communist subversion and guerrilla warfare in other parts of the world.
They note that while American policy debates during recent Presidential
election campaign centered on the nuclear issue, little attention was
ofu focused on what they call here "the war of the future." Even raising
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deepe
insurgency-2
Even ranking American military men, who openly advocated almost
a decade ago that American should become loss dependent on muclear arms end
regret
capability to now admit that the problems of counter-insurgency wore n
not met with any sense of urgency." (Informatively only-Taylor's viewpoint).
Possibly without roa li realizing it, Ga Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh,
former prime minister and now commander-in-chief of Vietnamese armed forces,
has vigorously questioned the very basis of American foreign policy since
World War II--the policy of containment. In a quiet lotus-pond garden
in the far-off provincial opaital of Vi Thanh Thanh last week, Gen.
Khanh said: "The source of this war is not the National Liberation Front
(the political z organization for the Viet Cong guerrillas). The source
is Hanoi and Peking.
"I had a talk with (socretary of State Dean) Rusk and
(Secretary of Defense Robert) MoNamara and I told them you can maintain
an equilibrium of forces-Red China has the manpower and the United States
has the nuce nuclear firepower. But if you wait until the Chinese Communists
have their own atomic bomb then you can see you will no longer maintain
the equilibrium."
The implication of Khanh's statement-made seven months before
the Chinese C Peking exploded its own atomic device-west that the war in
Viet Nam vou could be won only by he hitting the root of the problem-
xxxmmmmmmmmm
South America
for example,
and tiggande h 1
right. Conversely
Khanh's view is not substantially different from that of
General Douglas McAr MacAu MacAruthor MacArthur, when hommabombom during th
Korean War he wanted to att bomb Chinese invasions in China, but he was dism
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deepe
insurgency-3
Observers here note that if America regets rejects the Khanh
viewpoint and continues its strategic policy of containment, it is thon
faced with two broad alternatives: the United States must support the
guerrillas and subversives, making them revolutionary but anti-Communists
or it must defeat or contain tthe Communist guerrillas and subversives.
The first alternative-that America backs the poor class versus
the richer ruling class-is at least temporarily rejected here.
"That means America would have to support the 'ins' versus the
'outs," according to one observer here. "It means that instead of supporting
a government, Americans would have to overthrow the government and become
that government. But that decisions has never yet been mae made anywe
anywhere else in the world. Besides, Americans probably do not have the
capability to aid guerrillas and overthrow a government. They would blotch
Informatively only,
the whole thing up."
(Actually, source of this is J-3 Gen. De Puy
who's come from the Special Warfare Department in Pentagon--but these quotes
can not be attributed to American sources).
And More Pre
The second alternativeto alo allow the guerrillas and subversives
to be hite ploited by 00 harnessed to the Communist old to become
Communist and then to defeat them--is the worry of observers here.
(More)
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doope
insurgency-4
"In the late 1950's, the American army trained the Vietnamese
army, the American Air Force trained the Vietnamoso Air Force, the
economic programs ga v gave money to the country, United Staten Information
Service published the President's speeches and the Central Intelligence
Agency sent reports back to Washington," one well woll-informed observer
noted.
"The Americans thought if they did all this it would solve the
problem. But it hasn't."
He explained that this is now the programs used in South American
and in Shidan other countries, to try to stop suby communist subversion
and guerrilla warfare, but they undoubtedly will fail thoro too.
"The real reason for the failure in Viet Nam," he explained
"is that the Communists-and not the Americans are the real organization
They have a doctrine they have confidoneo in-and an organisation
they have modified and tinkered with through the years."
man
The observer noted that at the lowest hamlot level, "there the
people are," the Communist organization in porhaps 25 times stronger than
the covernment Amor Saigon government's apparetus; at the district level,
the Communists are even more efficient, but perhaps at the provincial
level they are the same.
(More)
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doopo
# insurgonoy-5
"The Americans--and the Saigon government-haven't even paid
any attention to the Communist apparatus organisational apparatus at the
village and hamlot lovol. There's no one agency in the American hierarchy
in Viet Nam that has the particular mission to root it out-though every
one agency has bits and pieces of the problem. And there's no one agency
a in the Vietnamese government that's in charge. It's a police and
intelligence problem. I assume in any country-hothor it's the Congo
or Vonseul Vonsuela--the free world will face thumpbibomamn a
problem much like this.
"The government in power would be woak: at the lowest lovel
where there's contact with the rico farmers or Indien natives, but it's
there that the Communist organisation is institutionally the strongest.
The Americans are not very well organised to correct this either from
a conceptual or organisational standpoint."
The source noted that the British Conol Colonial Office
equipped them to meet this problem in their areas, "but tho Amoricans
do not have that. The Public Administration of USAID, for example,
in focused at the ministerios at the nationa 1 level and not at the village
lovel.
"The American intelligence program is designed to report to
Washington rathorn t rather than to help the police within a country.
and all the total intelligonoo-gathering operation is split between different
agencies. It's a moss."
(More)
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deepe
insurgency-6
The source said that the basic decision facing the
American policymakers is the extent of interference in the internal
affairs of a friendly nation.
Evident
"The problem with Venzuela or the Congo id is that if the
Americans wait to interfere until the problem is explosive the government
is so weak it's already on its own one-yard line and it's already too
late to win."
Another counterinsurgency expert suggested that at the
ashingtn Washington level the Americans must set up "a small, elite
group" of career military and civiliam leaders who would deal with this
"predictable type of war.
"
"This means raising and training and holding x in reserve
forces to meet future guerrilla wars,"
one expert.
according to the suggestions of
"Initially, in one country, most of this elite group
should be civilians to deal with police and intelligence missions, but
if the situation deteriorates more military personnel must be added."
Observers here believe that the present. American posture, policy
and organisational ability of "odds are against" the present American
pesture, policy and organizational ability to deal with counter-subversive and
counter-guerrilla wars. "But wars have been won against worse odds than
this," one observer hastily added.
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Date
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1965, Nov. 12
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Strategy; Communism; Guerrilla warfare
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6297
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B28, F6
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections
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Language
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English
