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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06022 to 363-06029.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06022 to 363-06029
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Title
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Article about criticism by South Vietnamese officials of United States policy
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Description
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Original title: "series", Keever's title: "'With all the Money You Are Spending in the Military Field, You Cold Buy All the Land from the Landowners and Give it to the Peasants', Vietnamese Major Says about U.S. Policy", article about criticism by South Vietnamese officials of United States policy that focused on war and not on public opinion, article 3 of 7-part series
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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deepe
article 3 of 7-article series
page 1
may 19, 1965
SAIGON--These are the political mistakes that
high-placed sources in Saigon believe the United States has
made during the past decade of involvement in Viet Nam.
1. The American political posture in Viet Nam
has been essentially negative, rather than positive, that
is essentially anti-Communist, rather than pro-something.
The overwhelming impression is that the American policymakers
are attempting "to stem the tide of Communist aggression"
or "to teach Hanoi a lesson." This implies a status quo
political political position in a country that is changing
in its post-colonial development, and is, indeed, fighting
for change..
"Nothing negative has ever prevailed over something
positive," one western military expert explained. One of
the most frequently asked questions by Vietnamese captains
and majors on the battlefront is "What are we fighting for?"
as they take one look at the political turmoil in their rear
area of Saigon."
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- Page 2
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deepe
series--article 3 of 7 article series
pago 2
While some Americans in Saigon pay some lipservice
to the principles of freedom and democracy, these are, as
one American government employee explained, "hollow words
that moan little in Asia." As one Western diplomat
explained, the Western concepts of democracy and freedom have
never been simplified and codified as have the Communist X
ideology. There are no American primers for democracy as
there are Communist primers for revolution.
"One can not understand these American principles
unless he has reaped the benefits fa of them, of soon them
first hand," one Western diplomat explained. Hence, he explained,
the principles in which Americans believe must be translated,
demonstrated and visualized by for the Vietnamese--by the
Vietnamese government--and this has yet to be done.
Hence, the first political problem during the past
decade has been to realise there is a political problem--
and to act positively.
2. The American policymakors view the battle in
Viet Nam as principally, if not solely, a military operation,
against armed Communist guerrillas. They are operating
dramatically on one front while the Communists are operating
on six fronts-political, economic, social, cultural,
psychological and military, all integrated into one powerful
stream of warfare.
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deepe
series--article 3 of 7 article series
page 3
one
"Suppose you lose your billfold in a dark place,"
Vietnaneso provincial official explained. "But you
insist on looking for it where there is light because it is
easier. Well, you are now looking for the Communists in
the light place--the military fiold--but you never, never
find them all--they are also where you refuse to look."
mill.
During the past decade, A1.1
was spent on the
Military Assistance Program for weapons, tanks, ammunition
In addition 21
mil.
for the Vietnamese armed forces. In addition, 21 was
spont
in Vietnam from American economic aid funds. But 75% of the
economic aid was for the purpose of paying the sale-tus of
the national army through the commercial import program.
(These figures excludes the salaries of American servicemen
and government officials, and all their operating costs,
phos gasoline, parts aid ammunition for American-owned
equiment in American units).
It's another matter that the Vietnamese national
army was built to counter an invasion instead of the
guerrillas, and that once the "slow motion invasion" began
a year ago the army was slow in re-acting.
3. There is no grand, dramatic political strategy
for winning the political war in South Viet Nam comparable
to the dramatic military actions.
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doopo
series--article 3 of 7 article series
page 4
The bombing raids, in North Viet Nam, have not
or cannot win the political war within the South; but without
them the war could never have been won--or contained--because
of the sustained influx of North Vietnamese troops, weapons,
If
and much more significant, political leadership cadre.
the raids have not won the war, however, they have in effect
won time--they have provided the time to act politically.
Sources in Saigon now hope for an enormous political
bomb--or nuclear proportions--to reverse the adverse political
tide. Honce, the military operations would not be considered
as an end in themselves, as is now the case, but the means
to an end--an honest, efficient government, a land reform
program for the peasants, a smashing medical-educational
program that would escalate the nation economically and cata-
pult it socially-politically into the 20th century. Hence,
these sources argue, the elaborate and effective military
battle plans have in effect given the nation time to formulato
and implement a massive bihueprint for the political-economic->
Instead of Vietnam being
social development of Viet Nam.
simply a military battleground, it would also become a
political showplace.
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deepe
series--article 3 of 7 article series
page 5
"We lack any political imagination," one young American
government civilian employee explained. "We are fighting
against revolution. How can we expect to win. It's like
advocating the murdering of mother."
One Western ambassador said that it was "politically
inadmissible" that 200,000refuggees in the central part of the
country victims of an autumn flood, Communist terrorism and
friendly bombing raids--had not been made a symbol of the
pro-American revolution by the Vietnamese government.
"They
are given charity rice and propaganda lectures--they should
be put in factories and apartment houses, to show the world the
benefits of Ilooing the Communist side
some Anti-Communist refugees are not give help by the government
and return to Viot Cong areas.
Another source criticized the American officials for
not forcing the Diem regime years ago to establish "centers
of prosperity" in which the Vietnamese people and the outside
world could see the results of American presence. One Western
military source decried the fact that for 10 years American
has been launching a counter-guerrillas operation--yet now
they had the means to revolutionize the total nature of war
itself--he advocated that instead of killing people with mortars
and bombs Communist battalions could be captured by the use
of non-lethal gas, that instead of killing the Communists,
they could be defested simply giving them a tummy ache.
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doepe
series-article 3 of 7 article series
page 6
One high-ranking Western official decried the fact
that television had not been introduced in Vietnam as a
means to relay government propaganda to the villages, to
educate the children and to show adult films on better
farming methods. More than three years ago, private
Japanese companies made proposals for this; the Japanese
government has tentatively offered technical assistance
and funds. A television station would cost half-million
dollars; successive Vietnamese governments have postponed
the decision on this; American authorities appear cool to
the idea; economic planners are more interested in Japan's
contribution to a $9 million dollar bridge for the Mekong
River.
4.
The United States has political power in
Viet Nam, but chooses not to use it; yet at this time the
Saigon is too weak to act with political dynamism and
effectiveness.
"We have the power to take names and kick fannies,
one American explained. "But we don't do it. We are still
timorous about interfering in a nation's interna 1 affairs."
One Western ambassador said: "The first basic fault in
the system, "one Western Ambassador explained; is: you are
too respectful of Vietnam independence so you do not
interfero in making decisions on great issues--and in my
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deepe
series--article 3 of 7 article series
page 7
my opinion you should-while instead you are very particular,
you pester them on small things of almost no importance.
This creates the wrong impression and does not get the
results. Your instructions should be more articulate but
fower."
American generals, colonels and captains admit they
do not talk politics with their Vietnamese military counter-
parts; and no other American agency has been given the
responsibility of cementing all the fighting Vietnamese
political factions together.
This is in contrast to the
Viet Cong and the Communist apparatus--a guerrilla is first
and foremost a politican, and then a soldier; the Communist
political cadre--perhaps with only the rank of sergeant-
decides what villages will be attacked, and the military
commander, with a rank of major, follows his orders.
The Viet Cong military apparatus is of a secondary,
supporting nature to the Communist political machine; honce
American's offorts to defeat the guerrilla still has not
defeated the political subversivo. American advisors in the
provinces admit that even once the Communist guerrillas are
defeated, still the Communist political cell infrastructure
in the village is rarely destroyed.
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deepe
series-article 3 of 7 article series
page 8
The introduction of new French faces on mainstreet
of Saigon, the increasing number of pro-neutralist
Vietnamese who have arrived from Paris, and thousands of
pro-neutralist and pro-Communist Vietnamese who have been
released from prison within the past 18 months is more
important in the subversive field than the introduction
of American combat marines and paratroopers is in the
counter-guerrilla military field.
"With the amount of money you are spending in the
military field," one Vietnamese major explained, "you
could buy all the land from the landowners and give it to
the peasants. You could pave Viet Nam with gold."
A .155 mm. howitzer shell costs $70; a 500-pound
general purpose bomb costs $180--and tens of them are
expended daily and nightly in Viet Nam.
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Date
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1965, May 19
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; United States. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Vietnam (Republic)--Relations--United States; Diplomacy
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B187, F5
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
