Article about General Nguyễn Đôn

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363-07401 to 363-07410.pdf

Digital Object Identifier

363-07401 to 363-07410

Title

Article about General Nguyễn Đôn

Description

Original title: "LIBERATE", Keever's title: "Unknown, Unseen Viet Cong General Rattles U.S. and Allies", Article draft about Việt Cộng General Nguyễn Đôn and his activities in South Vietnam, for the New York Herald Tribune

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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.

Transcript

LIBERATE--1 march 18, 1965 SAIGON--The most important general in South Vietnam is, perhaps, one that many have heard of but few have even seen. His name is Major General Nguyen Don. He is the highest-ranking Communist commander in South Viet Nam; some Saigon officials speculate he will be named commander-in-chief of the Communist Viet Cong “Liberation Army”, if [deletion: , and when] it ever becomes a regular, conventional army. General Don [insertion: trained in [illegible]] commands the Communist Inter-Zone 5, which [deletion: covere] covers the northern provinces of South Viet Nam where for the past month guerrilla forces re-inforced by North Vietnamese units have waged an impressive, but not entirely successful, offensive against government forces. They have with some [deletion: consistently] [illegible] employed mobile warfare tactics--which are a step above usual guerrilla warfare tactics. Much of this Communist offensive has come in General Don’s home province of Binh Dinh, which some Saigon officials suspect the Communists will attempt to [deletion: control] [illegible], severing the [deletion: counte] country into two parts, and then establishing a “mobile capital” for a provisional government to rival the American-backed Saigon government. deepe liberate--2 march 18,1965 General Don is considered to represent the “new generation of Communist commanders”--[XXXX indicating deletion] none of the Communist generals which fought the Indo-China War and defeated the French are considered to [XXXX indicating deletion] act as commanders in the south. However, North Vietnamese Generals, such as General Vo Nguyen Giap, would adapted Mao-Tse-Tung’s principles of guerrilla warfare to the Indo-China campaign, may play an important [insertion: strategic] directive role via remote-control from Hanoi. There is scant confirmed information about General Don, but he is believed to be nearly 40 years old. Born in Binh Dinh province, __ miles north of Saigon, Don [insertion: [illegible]] is believed to have remained in South Viet Nam after [deletion: he] the 1954 Geneva Accords [deletion: dividing] [illegible] North and South Viet Nam, and which provided that Communist troops would [XXXX indicating deletion] move to North Viet Nam. Reliable sources indicate that in 1959, Don, then a captain, moved through the jungle mountain trails to North Viet Nam. During the next two years, he received additional training in [XXXX indicating deletion] North Viet Nam and in Moscow. In 1961, shortly after the birth of the National Liberation Front and the “Liberation Army,” Don reportedly [XXXX indicating deletion] left North Viet nam with two eleven-man squads and fought his way [XXXX indicating deletion] through Laos and government-held areasof South Vietnam back to Binh Dinh province. deepe liberate--3 march 18, 1965 Although still a captain in rank, he was named a leading military and political cadre in charge of Inter-Zone 5, which extends along the populous, rice-growing plains of the South China Sea southward for 300 miles from the 17th parallel. Viet Cong officers who have served with Don, and [insertion: have] since been captured by the government, reportedly consider him “more intelligent and competent than the older generation generals,” although this may be an exaggeration of his ability. Don’s headquarters is, according to government commanders, in Do Xa, a jungled mountainous stronghold in Quang Ngai province, just north of Don’s native Binh Dinh province. About once a year government forces launch a large-scale operation though the intricately tangled jungles around Do Xa, where they destroy storehouses of food, medicines and administrative buildings, [insertion: but] are seldom been able to capture or kill any of the command headquarters staff. The Viet Cong commanders of the five other inter-zones and two special zones into which the Communists have divided South Viet Nam are relatively unknown or unheard of, but reliable sources indicate that they range in rank from lieutenant colonel to brigidier general (one-star). deepe liberate--4 While the Communist offensives in Don’s command area have escalated into semi-conventional warfare tactics along a mobile frontline, the Communists themselves do not claim the “Liberation Army” to be a regular, conventional army. According to a captured Viet Cong document, the Communists require “five conditions” for the formation of a regular, conventional army. These “five conditions for unification” are: 1. Unification in military [XXXX indicating deletion] command. At this time, the Liberation Army has reached the inter-zone level (a combination of a number of provinces), but they do not have a unified [XXXX indicating deletion] nation-wide military command under a commander-in-chief. 2. Unification in political leadership. At this time, the political backbone for the Communists within South Viet Nam is the Communist Party-directed National Liberation Front for South Viet Nam. But this is still a front, and not a government. 3. Unification in equipment. The capture of a number of the “new family” of weapons, Chinese Communist copies of Soviet weapons, indicate to some military sources that the “Liberation Army” is attempting to standardize its equipment. 4. Unification in organization and adaptation to local conditions. 5. Unification in training. deepe liberate--5 The Communist calendar in South Viet Nam revolves around two important holidays--December 20th, which is the founding of the National Liberation Front, and May 19th, which is the birthday of North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh. Observers in Saigon are carefully watching these two dates this year to see whether the Communists within the South create either an official provisional government or a regular, conventional army. Some Saigon observers, however, believe the “Liberation Army” will not attempt to create a conventional army--as they did in the final phases of the French Indo-China War--first because militarily they are successful at their present stage of development and second because large concentrations of troops--of a division in strength--would be vulnerable to the superior firepower and airpower of the American-backed government forces. Reliable sources indicate that since the Communists have neither a commander-in-chief of a regular army nor a provisional government, they are unable to issue an official medal for meritorious [XXXX indicating deletion] services performed by their troops. This has reportedly caused some grumbling and dissatisfaction among the Viet Cong forces. The “Liberation Army” at this time does have three kinds of commendation, however, a certificate of commendation, a diploma of commendation and a citation. But until they official launch a conventional army, they have not [deletion: yet initiated the issuance of] [XXXX indicating deletion] official medals, according to reliable sources. (More) deepe liberate--9 Since its official inception in 1960, the “Liberation Army” has had a complex, but very effective four-tiered military structure. The bottom tier, like the lower level of a large wedding cake, comprises the popular forces, which are part-time farmers and part-time fighters. They may be responsible for the production of food; there are no precise estimates of their strength, as it varies from minute to minute throughout the countryside. Above this layer is the guerrilla forces, which operation in platoon strength it in the villages. The third level is the regional forces, which operate in at least one company strength in each district throughout the countryside. These two levels are estimated to number more than 100,000 full-time troops. [deletion: According to reliable sources, some of these troops are leaving their units to return to their families, indicating a drop in morale. The fourth level is the main force units, which operate in at least one [deletion: battalion] strength in each [deletion: province] and regimental strength at the inter-zone level. American military officials estimate there are about 35,000 regular troops organized into units in this category [insertion: [illegible]]. Reliable military sources indicate the Communists can amass 3000 troops from all four tiers of this military organization on 48 hours notice. Paralleling this military organization at every level is the political organization of the unarmed cadres and commissars of the National Liberation Front--which Revolves deepe [deletion: li] liberate--6A around the People’s Revolutionary Party (Communist). Saigon observers believe that even if “all the guerrilla units leave the country, the Communists through Political subversion can still take over the country without firing a shot.” deepe liberate--7 Since the [insertion: [illegible]] 1964, a new and entirely different fifth layer has been added to the “Liberation Army” military structure. This has been the introduction of North Vietnamese-born personnel, many of them operating in fixed, defined units. American military officials [XXXX indicating deletion] have confirmed that at least 90 per cent of the 4000 confirmed persons who infiltrated from North Vietnam during the first months of 1965 1964 [deletion: are of] were born and raised in North Viet Nam. This is in marked contrast to previous infiltration, which had largely been of persons born and raised in South Viet Nam, but who moved to North Viet Nam in 1954 division of the country, and then again re-infiltrated back to their native provinces during this present [XXXX indicating deletion] conflict. The Northerners, because of the regional differences [deletion: in] among the Vietnamese, are hence largely considered to be “invaders,” instead of “native sons” like General Don. Officially, both the Saigon government and American officials call these new North Vietnamese infiltratees as “Viet Cong,” a term which [deletion: had actually] means Vietnamese Communist, but which had largely been used to [deletion: defe] define the Southern-born Communist who moved to North Vietnam and then re-infiltrated back to his native province. American military officials call them “infiltration groups” from North Viet Nam, but are hesitant to call them units of the People’s Army of (North) Viet Nam, [XXXX indicating deletion] commonly called PAVN deepe liberate--8 This quibbling over [deletion: semen] semantics is largely overlooked, however, by American advisors working in the Communist-infested areas where these units have infiltrated. “It’s like saying a new bunch of American Army recruits, trained at Fort Riley (Kansas) and equipped by the U.S. government are not [XXXX indicating deletion] U.S. Army units,” one tired American advisor explained. “These are units from North Vietnam, operating as a unit with orthodox infantry tactics, [deletion: using the best weapons now] equipped with the best weapons now used by the current Soviet army.” [XXXX indicating deletion] It is the introduction of these new PAVN units into the northern provinces of South Viet Nam which [deletion: have] has [XXXX indicating deletion] escalated internally the war. These units, operating in battalion and regimental strength, have been able to employ mobile warfare tactics, [deletion: in which] [illegible] PAVN units [illegible] a mobile frontline position [XXXX indicating deletion] of six miles in length [deletion: have been held] for [insertion: [illegible]] days--but this [deletion: is] was still not a fixed frontline position which characterizes conventional warfare. These [insertion: PAVN] units have been equipped with mortars, plus .75mm. recoilless rifles [insertion: [illegible]], Chinese Communist copies of Soviet designs. “So far, these North Vietnamese have used their .75mm. rifles in direct fire [deletion: lin] like an ordinary weapon,” one American advisor in the northern provinces explained. deepe liberate--9 Their next step will be to use it as pack artillery, employing it in indirect fire,” [deletion: the advisor] [XXXX indicating deletion] he groaned. “This will give them a range of four miles that they can attack from.” In [deletion: the sourt] some of the [insertion: [illegible]] mountain areas, Viet Cong troops have been stopping government-controlled gasoline trucks, indicating to some reliable sources that these new units have their own [deletion: trucks] vehicles and are transporting [deletion: there] their troops by truck, [XXXX indicating deletion] within South Viet Nam. Not long ago, a South Vietnamese general was talking with an American general at a cocktail party at the government’s High Command. The South Vietnamese general recalled when he was a division commander in the area which encompasses Inter-Zone 5, lead by General Don of the “Liberation Army.” “I was then a colonel," the South Vietnamese general explained, “and my Viet Cong counterpart was a lieutenant colonel. He was very good and very lucky. He did not have to worry about sending his children to school; he did not have to take his wife to the movies; he did not have to go to cocktail parties. He had only a map and [XXXX indicating deletion] he spent all his time making war against me and my troops.” The American general was embarrassed and said nothing. The South Vietnamese general absentmindedly took another sip of his gin and tonic. -30-

Date

1965, Mar. 18

Subject

Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Nguyễn Đôn ; Military leadership; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam

Location

Saigon, South Vietnam

Coordinates

10.8231; 106.6311

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B4, F10

Format

dispatches

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Collector

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries

Language

English