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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05972 to 363-05977.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05972 to 363-05977
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Title
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Article about negotiations and possible bombings of Chinese Communist atomic bomb plants
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Description
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Original title: "superscalation", Keever's title: "Negotiate or Bigger Regional War Waft in with Monsoon Rains", article about whether failed peace negotiations would result in bombings of Chinese Communist atomic bomb plants, escalating the war in the region
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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deepe superescalation--1 june 24, 1965 SAIGON--If the Hanoi regime refuses to negotiate a political settlement for peace within South Vietnam, a crushing long-term dilemma facing free world policymakers would be whether or not to bomb the Chinese Communist atomic bomb plants. For, unless the Hanoi regime, plus the Communist-led National Liberation Front within South Vietnam, prepare to negotiate by the end of monsoon rainy season in September, [deletion: a probably alternative] probable policy alternative is “super-escalation”--a bigger regional war--which would ultimately lead to a dramatic, violent confrontation between America and her allies and Communist China. (More) deepe superescalation--2 june 24, 1965 An additional [XXXX indicating deletion] behind-the-scenes factor in the “super-escalation” is the apparently mounting pressure from the “hawks” within the Pentagon, plus hardening attitude of Chinese Nationalist and South Vietnamese generals that the end of the monsoon rainy season, or [deletion: shot shortly] the months thereafter, offers the “now or never--all or nothing” time to bomb [XXXX indicating deletion] Communist China, its atomic bomb plants and its economic means of production which gives [deletion: the] it the capability of producing the nuclear devices. The difference between this “bigger regional war,” which would involve a number of Asian countries, and a world war depends on whether or not the Soviet Union and America’s European allies become involved. (More) deepe superescalation--3 june 24, 1965 According to high-placed sources, if the Hanoi regime does not negotiate this fall, high-ranking Chinese Nationalist military officers have urged, and offered, to use Chinese Nationalist ground troops either for an invasion of Hainan Island, which lies in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Viet Nam, or a direct frontal attack on the mainland. [XXXX indicating deletion] While the Chinese Nationalist armed forces totals 600,000 men--the second largest number in Asia--such invasions would require logistical and other support from the United States, which [deletion: they have] has already [insertion: been] requested. So far, they have been told “that’s not the way America does things,” according to one reliable source. [deletion: High] Chinese Nationalist officials have also reportedly, on good authority, asked that either America bombs the Chinese Communist atomic bomb plants, or else that the United States gives the [deletion: means to do so.] Chinese Nationalists the military means to do so. Other reliable sources in Saigon indicate that if Hanoi refuses to negotiate by fall, the most immediate form of escalation will be not only more American airstrikes nearer to Hanoi and the Chinese Communist border frontiers, but may also include a two-pronged ground [deletion: [illegible]] invasion of [insertion: North Vietnam by] American troops, perhaps [insertion: jointly] with [deletion: other] Asian troops, with one wave invading from the sea and the second invading from the Mekong [deletion: Delta] River regions of Thailand, forming one giant pincher movement deepe superescalation--4 june 24, 1965 Following this phase of escalation, the next stage would be China itself. The leaking of these possible plans to Western newsmen by official sources were considered intented to [deletion: establish] create a political threat for the Hanoi and Peking regimes to consider--[deletion: but] much like the official discussions about bombing North Vietnam were publicly aired one year before the actual bombings took place. These sources imply that without negotiations the choice facing America and American-backed South Viet Nam is clearly either a [deletion: political defeat] political-military defeat or a bigger war, and that clearly a bigger war is the lesser [XXXX indicating deletion] and more acceptable of the two evils. A third alternative--a last-chance attempt for total victory within South Vietnam [deletion: wit] by implementing a dramatic political, economic, social program after [insertion: militarily] securing selected areas--is still talked of by Western diplomats in Saigon, but seems to have little support [deletion: with] within the American mission [deletion: in Saigon] here. Vice President Hubert Humphrey briefly mentioned this alternative in a recent speech, which may indicate new thinking along these lines at the highest levels of the Administration. Part of this program, as seen from Saigon diplomats, would entail using President Johnson’s $2 billion economic development program as a means to victory rather than as a reward [deletion: for [illegible]] for Hanoi to negotiate. (More) deepe superescalation--5 june 24, 1965 [insertion: To analyze future alternatives in Vietnam,] One of the most difficult and most critical basic judgments to be made is the extent of the Sino-Soviet split. According to reliable sources, [deletion: Washington] some officials in Washington regard the split as irreparable and [deletion: bound] likely to increase in its intensity and depth. Hence, an extension of this line of reasoning is that an increase in the Moscow presence in Hanoi would be a leveling counter-balance to the militant pro-Peking line, that Moscow would be a favorable, though perhaps marginal, pro-negotiating influence on the Hanoi regime. Hence, the Russian missile sites outside of Hanoi should not be bombed--before the missiles are placed in them. According to reliable sources, the Russians “are not rushing” to install the missiles, [deletion: which indicates that] that leads some officials to believe they are training North Vietnamese technicians to man the missiles, rather than to bring in Soviet experts. “Officials in Washington breathed a sigh of relief when they learned [insertion: about] the Russian missile [deletion: [illegible]] sites and bombers,” one reliable source indicated. deepe superescalation--6 Anti-Communist Vietnamese sources, however, virtually laugh at this viewpoint, stating that there is no difference in strategy between Moscow and Peking regarding Vietnam specifically and subversive warfare in general, but only a difference in tactics. These sources believe the Soviet missile sites should be bombed immediately, fearing that the Russians will install--not the defensive surface-to-air missiles as Washington has suggested--but instead will clandestinely slip in offensive [deletion: intercontinen] inter-continental ballistic missiles, which could be used for political blackmail against Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila or Saigon. “There’s no difference between Moscow and Peking about Vietnam--except in tactics,” one anti-Communist Vietnamese general explained. The Moscow line is to win Vietnam at the conference table, the Peking line is to win it on the battlefield, thus giving America a massive defeat. It’s simply a question of dying fast of dying slow--but it’s still the end of Viet Nam.” -30-
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Date
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1965, Jun. 24
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Atomic bomb; Bombardment; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Diplomacy; Escalation (Military science)
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B187, F5
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
