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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06135 to 363-06136.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06135 to 363-06136
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Title
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Letter to Harry Rosenfeld from Beverly Keever about the Battle of Khe Sanh
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Description
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Letter to Harry Rosenfeld, New York Herald Tribune editor, from Beverly Keever about her article and source on the Battle of Khe Sanh
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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Saigon; June 13
Dear Hank:
which I'
The Khe Sanh si tuation is still such that I couldn't find clear-cut
answers to any of the questions you poised your cable. Generally speaking,
I think I interviewed most of the people in the northern provinces who
would be informed on the subject. My basic approach in interviewing,
used slot in the past, was to try to play the four services--Army, Marine,
Air Force and Navy--off against each other, i. e. to use one to check or
e tattle-tale on the other; and also to check one echelon sen against
another within the service most involved in the action, in this caset the
Marines. Before leaving Saigon, I requested through Marine press channels
to have interviews set up for me with the Intelligence and Operations Officers
first at the Danang level, and then at the Dong Ha (division) level and
than ai Khe Sanh. Unfortunately, the press officers kept giving me appointmen
to see the Marine generals involved--but not their staff officers. I suspect
the Marines were covering up a great deal, but, I think the Army intelligence
officer spilled most of the beans.
1.
Sources interviewed were:
General Tompkins, the division commander during the Khe Sanh siege.
Three days before I arrived in Danang, he held a press conference, for
direct attribution, on Khe Sanh. I listened to that tape and quoted him
by name from that in certain places. I also had a non-attributable
background briefing with him, which turned up some good material. I've
used alot of his thinking in the first article, but attributed it only
to informed sources. It seems clear to me though, that there were not
2 NVA divisions round Khe Sanh through mid-March, as he said officially.
2. Col. Dick, the chief of staff at Third Marine Division at Dong Ha.
He wasn't very helpful or articulate and I didn't use his thinking in the piece
3.
General Hoffman, who has replaced Col. Lownds as commander at Khe
Sank. I haven't quoted him by name, but he's the source for the present
situation around Khe Sanh in article 1.
4. By accident, I met one of the Khe Sanh battalion commanders I
had interviewed in March in Khe Sanh. He is now working with the ground
surveillance teams, which I mention, but all of this is so classified
I couldn't get any details. His assistant now is the former intelligence
officer to Lownds, en whom I interviewed in Khe Sanh. Bot of them
the view the NVA did not attack because of U. S. firepower. But, the
intelligence officer conceded "I got into alot of trouble about Khe Sanh,"
on the his staff judgments.
5. On the Air force side, I talked with the commander for all the
Khe Sanh flights at the central control center, the commander of a fight
squadron component, the airlift commander, one forward air controller
whom I can quote by name in the piece and went on a FAC mission over Khe Sanh
they
with another one. While all were proponents of the firepower view,
had
come interesting observations.
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None of them would go so far as Clerk Clifford in late March and say the
airpower forood the NVA to withdraw their answers were "Te still don't
know why Giep didn't attack or what he was up to--but we killed alot of
NVA"
etc. In fact, none of the sources in any service went as far
Clarke Clifford in saying U. S. firepower fareed the NVA to withdraw-except
the two
montioned in item 4.
I talked
6. During my Danang trip, I also jumped up to the 7th Fleet.
with the admiral there and some f of the pilots; they were outsiders in
the Khe Sanh oporation-doers, but not in command positions. But, they
gave me a useful tip about the Intruders being the only plane that could have
saved Khe Sanh if the ground-controlled rader had been knocked out during bad
we
thor.
7. All of the above
except the Navy,
of viewpoints the Clark Clifford viewpoint,
commend,
the Air Force,
represents sort of a coalition
with v rying nuances... the Marine
The opposition view was expressed
by the intelligence officer of the lat Cav Divion Division, which got involval
in Khe Sanh intelligence by mid-aroh, and then on the ground by April 1.
He maintains
he was in a better position to know about NVA strength around
Khe Sanh
than the Marinos in Khe Sanh--because the First Cav was meeting
some of these regiments in the battle for Hue eto, He is the source of most
of the views quotos in article 3, the source of the diversion theory-which
others
also hold in Saigon also hold and the pooh-poohing of the gagod try.
I've tried to take care not to identify him by position or by his unit,
xx cinoe I doubt that his view would be appreciated in official channels.
He is very articulate, open and pro-press and I spent more than three hours
talking with him. Io was the only one who would go through the NVA order
of battle, when the units moved out of Khe Sanh eto-the Marines kept
fussing over these questions. I think ho gave me some of the best detailed
information and judgments and as he sad said, he could be more objective aba
about Khe Sanh than the Marines.
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Date
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1968, Jun. 13
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Subject
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Journalists; War correspondents; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; New York herald tribune; Khe Sanh, 2nd Battle of, Vietnam, 1968
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B13, F1
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Format
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commercial correspondence
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
