Article on security around the Pleiku airbase

Item

derivative filename/jpeg

363-07500 to 363-07509.pdf

Digital Object Identifier

363-07500 to 363-07509

Title

Article on security around the Pleiku airbase

Description

Original title: "security", First of a two part series of articles on security, focusing on security around the Pleiku airbase, for the New York Herald Tribune

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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.

Transcript

deepe security--1 - Article I. feb. 16, 1965 SAIGON--The defenses around American billets and Vietnamese airbases are not good enough--[deletion: but] yet there is no total defense against bold Viet Cong attacks and acts of sabatoge. In the recent Pleiku attack on February 7th in which eight Americans were killed and 108 wounded in worst battle incident of the war, there were barbed wire fences around the perimeter. [deletion: but] Yet unlike even the most isolated Vietnamese outpost there were no [deletion: beer cans with] pebbles-filled beer cans to [deletion: make a noise] rattle when touched--and Viet Cong squads took one-half hour [insertion: without detection] to cut a hole in the [deletion: doubled-] double rows of wire. According to American military spokesmen there were trip flares along the fence, but “none of these were activated.” There were eight German shepherd scout dogs in [insertion: the] Pleiku area, but none of these were assigned to the protection of the base. There were also, he said, flood lights along the barbed wire fence, but none of them were strong enough to see the intruding VietCong, dressed in [deletion: black] pajamas. [deletion: like] as black as the night. deepe security--2 feb. 16, 1965 deepe security--2 feb. 16, 1965 And there were no mines, he said, between the barbed wire fences and the billeting area for American advisors to Two Corps headquarters, which would have impeded or alerted their approach. On one side of the airba a Vietnamese ambush patrol withdrew into static bunker only one hour before attack. In the last analysis, the problems of security are the result of the half-government which has prevailed in Vietnam since the November, 1963, coup d’etat against Ngo Dinh Diem and the half-way methods of mainly the Vietnamese armed forces and to a lesser degree the American armed forces. Yet there is no total guarantee of security, for the alarming advantage of the Communist guerrilla is to strike by surprise where American and Vietnamese guards are absent--and they can not be everywhere. Militarily, the dilemna is how many Vietnamese troops should be tied down in either static positions or mobile patrols to defend major installations, such as airbases, which diminishes the number of troops necessary for totally offensive operations against Viet Cong bases and concentrations. Politically, the dilemna is how much control of the civilian population should be maintained--the more the control the more the chances of alienating them to the extent of openly or secretly opposing the government. But population control in the provinces is ineffective without a stable efficient government in Saigon--which is still the major problem of of the country. deepe security--3 feb. 16, 1965 In the six Viet Cong anti-American attacks and acts of sabatoge within the past year, there are three pertinent points: 1. While [deletion: the major a these] six major attacks grabbed world-wide headlines--and two of them touched off retaliatory bombing raids on North Viet Nam--the Viet Cong launch these attacks in miniature every night of the year against isolated outposts and villages throughout the country. 2. While these six attacks appear disastrous in newspaper accounts, American advisors who have been hit feel they were relatively lucky. In the mortaring of Pleiku, for example, 21 of the 54 mortar shells fell short of their targets and did [illegible] [insertion: [illegible] American guard prematurely triggered the suicide]. In the mortaring of Bien Hoa airbase on November 1 last year, American pilots and advisors felt they came off lucky--with only four killed and 72 wounded. 3. While American policymakers retaliated [deletion: against] by bombing North Viet Nam for two of the recent attacks, they rejected for unknown reasons [deletion: the] to send American [XXXX indicating deletion] combat teams to defend these bases. While there has been an increase of American security personnel, [insertion: [illegible]] [deletion: in December, 1963,] one American military police company were among the 1000 military which were withdrawn. Three months later, the Viet Cong began their acts of sabatoage [deletion: against Americans] [illegible]. deepe security--4 feb. 16, [deletion: 1963] 1965 The six [XXXX indicating deletion] anti-American attacks and acts of sabotage within the past year accounted for at least thirty one killed (nine in the Qui Nhon billet rubble still are unaccounted for), and 336 wounded. These six incidents fall into three separate categories--with different problems and different attempted solutions--direct mortar attack, acts of sabatoge and a combination of both. The acts of sabatoge were last year the blowing up of American bleachers during softball game (2 killed; 23 wounded on February 9); the [XXXX indicating deletion] blowing up of American theatre (3 killed and 49 wounded on February 16) [deletion: and the] blowing up of American officers quarters on Christmas eve (2 killed and 62 wounded) and recently this year the [XXXX indicating deletion] exploding of the Qui Nhon enlisted men’s villa in which 12 were killed, 22 wounded and nine still unaccounted for in the mass of rubble. The attack on the Bien Hoa airbase on November 1 is an example of direct mortar attack (4 killed and 72 wounded plus destroying virtually full squadron of American B-57 jet-fighters); the Pleiku attack is an example of combined mortar attack plus acts of sabatoge. (More) deepe security --5 feb. 16, 1965 There is a tacit agreement between the American and Vietnamese governments that American military police and security officials are [XXXX indicating deletion] partially responsible for the helping in the guarding of American installation inside the fences of compounds, But [XXXX indicating deletion] the quick, surprise nature of sabatoge makes even the most alert American MP helpless to prevent the act. Hence, at the bombing of the American theatre a year ago this week, the American MP shot one of the two sabateurs, but still the attack could not be prevented. The [XXXX indicating deletion] Christmas Eve explosion at the Brink officers quarters is still presumed to be a mystery; a truckfull of explosive charges--either tnt or plastique--was driven inside the compound which was to be guarded by American MP’s, and simply exploded. In the other three cases of direct acts of sabatoge, indirect complicity by the Vietnamese population or police was implied, though never officially given as a reason [deletion: f all] permitting the [XXXX indicating deletion] sabatoge. [XXXX indicating deletion] This does not necessarily imply that the population or the police were directly supporting the Viet Cong terrorists; it means simply that they looked the other way--and this habit of the Vietnamese [deletion: has] existed during the French Indo-China War. A classic case then was when the French security chief was assassinated coming out of his office on the main street of Saigon--and two Vietnamese police simply walked away. deepe security--6 feb. 16, 1965 And so it was, that in the case of the bombing of the American theatre, two white-uniformed Vietnamese police assisting an American MP to guard the theatre simply walked away minutes before the [XXXX indicating deletion] Viet Cong terrorists [XXXX indicating deletion] set a satchel-ful of plastique in the doorway. In the case of the blowing-up of the American bleachers during the American softball game--the Viet Cong terrorists had planted twenty-pound bombs (fragments of 100-pound Air Force bombs) under the bleachers the night before and [XXXX indicating deletion] then electronically detonated them. But these were planted directly in the rear of the Vietnamese High Military Command Headquarters--and in an area housing Vietnamese military dependents--yet no one admitted seeing the planting of the bombs. In the case of Qui Nhon, an American sergeant who survived the blast expressed the opinion that the Viet Cong terrorists had used the houses of the civilian population across a narrow street to hide in until they emerged for the attack. Despite the alertness of the Americans inside the building and bristling security [deletion: precautions of the Americans--and despite the killing] of the three of the terrorists--still the attack act of sabatoge could not be prevented. (More) deepe security--7 feb. 16, 1965 [insertion: [illegible]] If these acts of sabatoge can [deletion: be] not be prevented, the chances of Viet Cong success can be reduced by the fetishly meticulous control of the population. It means the stopping of busses, caro [insertion: [illegible]], trucks [deletion: traffic] coming in and leaving Saigon, the provincial capitals and [insertion: [illegible]] district towns. In the case of Pleiku, one high ranking [deletion: offic] American officer suspected that the Viet Cong had carried their mortars and explosive charges into the city during the Chinese lunar New Year season when [deletion: security] government security agents were lax. While traffic control of the population has increased around Saigon in the past few months, with the introduction of a massive pacification program in the surrounding provinces, still the fact that the Viet Cong terrorists could bring truckloads of explosives--either collectively or in small packets--into Saigon [XXXX indicating deletion] is evidence the controls are not strict enough. The Viet Cong have through the years been masters of this dangerous smuggling--government agents have found grenade rolled up in the bun [deletion: in] [illegible] Vietnamese women’s hair, have found guns and [deletion: annu amj] ammunitions in the false bottoms of fruit crates, have found discovered rifles brought into Saigon in [deletion: the] bullock carts of [deletion: hair] hay. deepe security--8 feb. 16 The foundation of this population control is the government in [deletion: the] at the central level, which is the fundamental importance of the [deletion: efficient] efficiency, success--and continuity--of the Saigon government newly named this week. The problem of direct mortar attacks on major installations is neither simple nor easy to solve. It is reasonably certain, however, that the American casualties were inflicted by American-made mortars using American ammunition, [deletion: all of] which had been given to the Vietnamese forces years ago and since been captured by the Viet Cong guerrillas. Low-echelon American [XXXX indicating deletion] ground advisors--and especially American helicopter pilots--are openly critical that these heavy weapons were given to the Vietnamese in the first place. “When we (the Americans) started helping the Vietnamese militarily in 1956-57, we gave [XXXX indicating deletion] the Vietnamese army battalions the same equipment our battalions used; we gave Vietnamese marine battalions the same as American marine battalions--simply because it was the American military charts that way,” one irritated American advisor [insertion: [illegible]] explained. “But we did not consider that we were fighting guerrillas--we gave them .81 mm. mortars to hit pillbox positions, but the Viet Cong didn’t use pillboxes; we gave them .57 recoiless rifles [XXXX indicating deletion] but the Viet Cong didn’t have tanks; we gave them .50 calibres machineguns for large troop concentrations, but the Viet Cong then were in small bands. How they are using all of that to fight us.” deepe security--9 feb. 16, 1965 One American advisor who had survived a mortar attack on his district headquarters--only 20 miles from Saigon--complained bitterly “that Uncle Sam is equipping both sides, but giving advice to only one side.” [XXXX indicating deletion] American helicopter pilots openly cringe when they hear a .50 calibre weapon has been captured. “The Viet Cong put a home-made viewfinder on those .50s,” one American pilot explained, “and can shoot down American helicopters as easy as breathing.” A year ago, American military spokesman estimated that only two per cent of the weapons captured from the Viet Cong were made in Communist countries; the remainder were either old French weapons or newly-captured American weapons. Since then, however, the statistics have become unavailable. One effective defense against American-made mortars now in Viet Cong hands is [XXXX indicating deletion] by patrols and static positions in a radius of at least two miles--the range of an .81 mm. mortar--around the installation. But [deletion: even with effective patrolling, this also] The outer perimeter during the Bien Hoa attack, however, was defended by only an irregular battalion that was twenty percent understrength. But even more troop patrolling and securing of the outer perimeter is limited by the [XXXX indicating deletion] jungled mountain terrain and the number of troops that can be tied down for airbase security. deepe security--10 feb. 16, 1965 “It would take 10,000 troops to [deletion: securi] secure [insertion: totally] this airbase,” the American security advisor at Bien Hoa explained pointing to the junged rolling hills, [deletion: the] and the palmtree covered river banks surrounding the airbase. “Obviously the best defense is to be out on patrol, but they can still slip through [XXXX indicating deletion] our rear--you can’t stop them all.” One of lethal qualities of a mortar is that there is no flash of light nor sound when the mortar round is fired--the noise comes on impact at the target. Hence, [deletion: at Bien Hoa,] during the Bien Hoa attack, American aircraft and helicopters poured thousands of rounds of ammunition into suspected areas--but did not kill one Viet Cong. If mortar attacks can not be totally eliminated--though there are certain to be more of them--their success also can be reduced. One of these [XXXX indicating deletion] [illegible] is a “counter-firing device” which automatically calibrates the position of the attacking mortars [XXXX indicating deletion] and pinpoints the position for government mortars to counter-attack. These devices, used in Korean War and discussed after the November 1 [insertion: [illegible]] attack were described by American Military Commander Gen. William C. Westmoreland as “pretty good if fire is sustained so one can get the data,” but he said were “still being tested.” They have got to be shipped to Viet Nam. #

Date

1965, Feb. 16

Subject

Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Pleiku (Vietnam); Operation Long Reach, 1965; Security systems; United States. Air Force; Vietnam (Republic). Quân lực; Air bases

Location

Saigon, South Vietnam

Coordinates

10.8231; 106.6311

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B4, F10

Format

dispatches

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Collector

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries

Language

English