-
derivative filename/jpeg
-
363-07376 to 363-07383.pdf
-
Digital Object Identifier
-
363-07376 to 363-07383
-
Title
-
Sixth article in the "Why Vietnam" series
-
Description
-
Sixth of a seven article series called "Why Vietnam" analyzing the importance of the Vietnam War in world politics. This article focuses on land reform, for the New York Herald Tribune
-
AI Usage Disclosure
-
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
-
Transcript
-
--------------------
- Page 1
--------------------
deepe
series--article 6 of 7 article series
page 1
May 19, 1965
SAIGON--"The most important question in the
Vietnamese countryside besides security is land reform,"
a low-echelon American technician explained. "Yet virtually
nothing has been done about it. The Viet Cong are gaining
alot of browny points with the peasants by simply issuing
land titles--and it costs them nothing. They simply take
the land from the landowner and give ink it away. Nothing
we give to the peasants--like pigs, insecticides or
fertiliser-is as important as land."
Low-echelon American thchnicians and provincial
officials for the past several years have urged the implemen-
tation of an effective land reform program. Two land
distribution schemes have currently been written, but
neither have been accepted. Upper echelon officials in the
American Embassy and in the Agency for International
Development (USAID) believe "land reform is not the pandbas
for Vietnam's problems."
A program for the training of land-roform cadre
is under consideration; but the program would not be instituted
until "the other day"-when the Viet Cong Communists have
been defeated.
--------------------
- Page 2
--------------------
doopo
series--article 6 of 7 article series
page 2
However, one Vietnamese general recently warned
American generals and a member of the Henry Cabot Lodge
party that the American-backed efforts to pacify the provinces
would fail unless wore linked with land reform.
"When the Vietnamoso national army goes back to
pacify areas from the Viet Cong, the local landowner goos
back with them, offering to serve as intelligence agent,"
額
The general explained: "Obviously he wants to collect his back
taxes. So once the army pacifies the area--he pacifies it
for the landowner and not for the peasant. Of course, 358
of the peasants are landless--they become fanatics and vill
fight for the land given them by the Viet Cong because it's
as important to them as their life."
One U.S. official labelled as "Horror stories"
the actions of some landowners to collect back taxos, once
government forces pacified Viet Cong areas.
According to reliable sources, in other cases,
when the Vietnamese government army attempts to pacify the
area, the commanders simply ignore the problem of land
reform, refusing to collect back rents and taxes--but also
refusing to confirm the land ownership rights, in some
In Vict
casos, peasants family offer to give land back.
Cong controlled areas, if landowners or their agents return
to collect back taxes--the matter is simple. The peasant
screams to the Viet Cong--and the agent is shot?
--------------------
- Page 3
--------------------
doope
serios-article 6 of 7 article series
page 3
American officials who have talked with large numbers
of Viet Cong prisoners and returnees, believe the Viet Cong
recruits within South Vietnam are almost entirely from the
rural population, rather than the cities, probably indicating
not the strength of the Viet Cong appeal so much as the
accessibility of rural masses for Vommunist recruiting.
Furthermore, an estimated 30 percont of the Viet Cong strength
recruited within the South are considered to belong to the
"farm labor class,"
which is the lowest class in the comi
Confucianistic, rigidly-stratified rural society.
The five rural classes in Vietnamese countryside
area are: the landowners (who rent all the land they own);
the rich peasants (who own moro land than they till, and rent
some of it), the middle-class peasants (who owns all they till);
the tenant farmors (who rent all their lands); the farm laborers
(who can not rent land, but are seasonally hired for planting
and harvesting).
#The
"The question of land reform is quite simple," one
low-ranking Vietnamese provincial official explained.
government represents the landowners; the ministers and
generals are either landowners or friends of landowners.
The Catholic Church owns land. The Buddhist Church owns
land. Nobody is interested in fighting for the poor peasant.
And the top Americans--well, they talk to only the ministers
and rich people so they don't push it either."
--------------------
- Page 4
--------------------
deepe
sorios-article 6 of 7 article series
pago 4
One Vietnamese general recalled that during the war
with the Communists against the French in early 1950's, he
was ordered by Imperial Decree to have landowners in his
security district in North Viet Nam divide up the land with
the peasants. There were two large landowners in the area,
he recalled, one of thom a Catholic Bishop and the second
was a relative of the finance minister.
"The Catholic Bishop refused to divide the land because
he said he had to support 2500 seminary students with the
ront nonoy; the big landowner also refused. The general
explained: I warned them both if they didn't give the sit
land to the peasants the Communists would take over not only
the land, but also the seminary and the landowner's house.
But they wouldn't listen. The big landowner told the Finance
minister what I was doing; I was quickly transferred to
another place--and three years later the Communists took over."
The land reform issue in Vietnan--involving not
only issuing of land titles, but also law enforcement on
land ronts, land security for tonants, fixed rates on the
interest of borrowing of money--is not considered as acute
The Japanese say, for example,
as in other parts of Asia.
that a peasant without land is like a man without a soul.
The victory of Chinese Communists in taking over mainland
was achieved not so much by armed guerrillas as by the promise
of land to the poverty-stricken, landless peasantry.
--------------------
- Page 5
--------------------
deepe
series--article 6 of 7 article series
page 5
"The land for the landless" campaign in the Philippines
virtually broke the back of the Huk insurrection in early
1950's.
According reliable sources, the Viet Cong guerrillas
in Vietnam have a haphazard, inconsistent land reform program
which varies from area to a roa in sections of the country
they control. However, the current government has virtually
no program at all. One American provincial official estimated
that the Viet Cong had issued land titles to 50% of the
peasant families in his province; the government had issued none.
In some area, the Viet Cong take some of the land from
the rich peasants and given it to the land-less tenant-who
still pays rent.
So far, the Viet Cong have not killed or harrased
the rich peasants as they did before their seizure of power
in North Viet Nam.
In some cases, the Viet Cong program in the rural
areas is considered self-defeating. They have made definite
push for higher rents and taxes as they move towards the Mobile
Warfare Phase. In some areas, Viet Cong taxes and indirect
taxes in rice have doubled over that of last year. In othor
areas, the Viet Cong are known to have redistributed the land,
lent increased the land tax from 100 to 900 piastros and
increased the rice tax from 50 to 300 piastres. In the country-
sido umilk outside of Hue, which has recently fallen under
--------------------
- Page 6
--------------------
deepe
series-article 6 of 7 article series
page 6
their control, the Viet Cong are attempting to collect 10-15%
the
of what the peasants have raised during past decade, whon
they lived in peace. The peasants are considered to be discon-
tented about that; in isolated cases, the peasants have burned
their own crops rather than pay Viet Cong taxes.
In the mid-50's, President Ngo Dinh Diem attempted
to correct the injustices in the countryside. But his
effectiveness was limited. A U.S. government bulletin published
in January this year explained:
"Under the ordinances approved in 1955, a program was
being carried out to regularize tenancy agreements through
written contracts. The contracts established minimun and
maximum rents of 15 and 25 per cent, respectively, chargeable
by the landlord against the tenant's main crop. While a start
has been made in land reform, real progress has been negligible
and a review of the entire program needs to be undertaken."
One American advisor in the provinces explained:
"The Viet Cong had passed out their land titles before Diem
did, The poasant then grabbed one of Dien's titlos for the piece
of land titled by the Viet Cong--he figured he would be able
to retain his land no matter which side won the war."
--------------------
- Page 7
--------------------
deepe
series--article 6 of 7 article series
page 7
One American provincial official in Viet Nam, who
had served in the Philippines during the Hul rebellion said
that in the early 1950's, more than 80,000 armed guerrillas
controlled virtually all of Luzon Island, and were fighting
on the outskirts of Manila. Then Magsaysay took over
as president and promised "land for the landless". He ordered
Army units to clear acres of forested land, to build houses,
and a number of the Iluk fighters laid down their arms and
took advantage of the offer to live peacefully.
"Magsaysay was just a dumb guerrilla fighter, he
wasn't brilliant," the American explained. "He once told the
Filipino Congress to repeal the lab of supply and demand
because it was creating problems for him. But he traveled
in the provinces; ho sacked colonels he say sleeping on the
post; he promoted on the spot sergeants who had fought well.
He instituted the Presidential Action Committee, where any
peasant for a few cents could send a telegram from any post
office complaining about anything. Within 48 hours there
was an investigating team out there to see what was the
matter."
In Vietnam, in 1965, a plan was forumlated whereby
Magsaysay's scheme of giving land to the Communists would
have been implemented. Great tracts of land in Vietnam
were to be cleared to induce the Communist fighters to accept
a better way of life
--------------------
- Page 8
--------------------
doope
series--article 6 of 7 article series
page 8
crisis.
But the plan fizzled during the turbulent Buddhist
"Last year alone there were 700 American tractors
of all varieties in the warehouses in Saigon," one low-
echelon American agricultural expert explained. "They had
been turned over to the Vietnamese government, which
refused to release them for use. If a province chief
wants a tractor, he has to rent it from the Saigon government
for $200 a hectare--but where would he got the money, except
from Saigon. Now those tractors should be in the mountains,
clearing land for the Communists.
/It's still not too late."
-
Date
-
1965, May 19
-
Subject
-
Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Strategy; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Vietnam (Democratic Republic)--Politics and government; Land reform; Villages--Vietnam
-
Location
-
Saigon, South Vietnam
-
Coordinates
-
10.8231; 106.6311
-
Size
-
20 x 26 cm
-
Container
-
B5, F8
-
Format
-
dispatches
-
Collection Number
-
MS 363
-
Collection Title
-
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
-
Creator
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Collector
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Copyright Information
-
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
-
Publisher
-
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
-
Language
-
English
