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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05356 to 363-05365.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05356 to 363-05365
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Title
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Article about the failed Communist assault on Saigon
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Description
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Original title: "shift", Keever's title: "Allies Blunt Communists' City Assault on Saigon", Article draft about the failed Communist assault on Saigon, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-10
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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2050 sag
yy nam
shift 1 (normass/doopo)
SAIGON,
SEPTEMBER 9-Allied military successes have induced the
Communists to shift the timing, sequence and style of their current third
off offensive. But, the heart of their Communist strategy remains
unchanged the eventual assault into South Vietnam's major cities,
sources report.
informed
The Communists' ground offensive thus far has been seriously-but
not decisively-weakened by Allied defensive actions and maneuvers
especially the Allfo U. S. Navy capture of the Communist battle plan to
atta ck Saigon.
But,
no repeat no Allied officials here are so optimistic as to
state that the Allied success thus far have totally "pre-ompted" the
Communist Soity-assault,
or that the Communists are so weak and
confused they have definitely chosen to call off indefinitely their
big-unit ground thrusts into the cities.
future
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2030 806
yy nam
shift (normass/deepe)
Up to this point, however, the Communist, the ground actions
have been so uncopul and unsuccessfully nebulous that some
pro-neutralist diplomats and non-aligned military observers are
debating whether this is a tire of true offensive,
a pouto put
pseudo-offensive, a quasi-offensive or simply the first phase of an
offensive. Yet, most of those informed sources of varying political
colorations agree that the Communist offensive thus far has been relatively
a relatively weak show of force in which the Communists have suffered
a substantial number of casualties without a proportionato political-
psychological gain either internally or internationally.
These intellectual debates, however, center around nuances of
esoteric military definitions and attempts to second-guess Communist
future moves. More significant is that Communist radio broadcasts,
some captured documents and prisoners explicitly state that the third
offensive has begun-and that the Communists intend to keep it rolling
for "bigger and bigger victories."
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2020 sag
yy nam
shift
(normass/deepe)
But, if the Allied troops have not repeat not totally blooked
the Communist roll-in it for their city-attacks, they have done the
second best thing captured a document revealing koy portions of the
Communist battle plan for assaulting Saigon. The document was invaluable
to the Allied commands heroit revealed the Communist intention of moving
ba ttalions, sapper and commando units into Saigon and its fringes, their
routes of entry into the city, and it also specified the time frame of
the attack. Ita The third offensivo was set for early August
es presumably to attempt to influence the American political part
party conventions during the that pivotal month.
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Seso: 806
Jy nnm
shift 4 (normass/deepe)
L.get
te
In the lift of "retrospectability" as one American intelligence officer
MED
called appraising Communist past actions--informed sources hor now believe
the Allied capturo of the document forced the Communists to make a stratogio
Their most probably options aro considered be
reassessmonto
EVEN though the Allies we propor & for t
The Communists tried that option
1. Launch the m offensive enny
during the May offensive-Thon the Allies had also boon bequeathed the Communist
battle plan by a defenisz. high-ranking defector.
The Communists chose to
attack anywayprobably to dramatize their position as the Paris peace talks
opened. So, they attacked--and they lost thousands of troops without
Commun. S75
compensating political-paychological gains. (Official American sources
claim they lost 30,000 mon around Saigon alone du
six weeks during
May and June). For their August offensive, the Communists rejected this
option.
Countryrics
Str. Aegy.
2. Concol the whole city-battle plm This would have been an all-round
AN
catastrophe They had promised their troops in the field, their negotiators
HAD
in Paris and their vissen warned the Vietnamese nationalists and
Allied politicians that 1968 was they their year of of decision.
"Just for the Communists to sit still indefinitely is for them to lose,"
one informed source said.
Ex
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2020 sag
yy nim
shift 5 (normass/deepe)
The quintessence of 1968 for the Communists was to shorten the war-
either through victory on the battlefield, U. S. capitulations in Paris
or at the ballot box. If they fail in 1968, in this decivis de
their decisive year of 1968, their two most probably alternatives are
to sottie and the war through the best possible negotiations they can
get in Paris-but far from victory or else to protract the war on and on
and on..
war
3. To continue the stra with their planned third strategic
offensive targoted against the cities--but to shift the timing,
sequence and style of the tactical at the tactical level.
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2020 306
Jy mnn
shift 6 (normass/deepe)
Now is Considerd
this Now.
f
IN A
Arcoptions the COMMUNIST det p
As to the ohnin ohange of the timing of the offensive, informed
sources here believe the Communists delayed their the beginning of their
offensive from early Angust to August 15. the new targe target date of
their
August 15. In fact,
they seemed to have begun on August 18th with
coordinated attacks in Tay ninh /p provincial attacks in Tayninh, and
concentrations of atteo attacks in pockets of the northern half of the
country.
Prent
NOW A MORE Rec
Am
Another captured document suggests that the "first ya phase"
of their third offensive runs from August 15 to September 15; the
geone second phase of their git offensive runs from September 15
onwards.
Vietnamese government sources place more oredonce in this
document than does the American command. The American command takes a
more conservative view that the Communiste oan will attack anytime;
and many Americans wish officers wished the Communists would have
pro cue progu produced the main thrust of their attacks in early September
so they would have run out of steam by the time of the American elections
But
Pel UE
in November.
offensive
The Vietnamese government officers seem
ew the Communist
"second climas" of the Commi "climax" of the third offensive
will be timed to mesh with the American elections although it is debatable
hero what the that will gain them.
go
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2020 sag
yy num
shift 7 (normass/deepe)
W
A fringe viewpoint held by o qualifit qualified "outsidors such
as Mink "think-tank" analysists and diplomatic military oxports is that
the pivotal political period for them to make a spectacular battlefield
push is not the American elections--but the inauguration of the now
American President in January. Hence, the main-thrust of the
real Communist /t extravaganza em will not be oponed until January of
next year.
asto the shift in the sequence of the offensive, was probably more
significant than the timing and this has led to some of the confusion
about the definiton of the offensive. The orgin original sequence;
according to captured documents, including the prize x ono,
strike a lightning blow into the major urban centers, hold as long as
possible, and then as the troops withd withdrew book into the countryside,
AND
to crush isolated Vietnamese government outposts, Allied installations/
and
Countryw
AND
was to
the
Hence, the first battlefield
smash the pacification program governmont's pacification program
and over-run government-held towns and villages.
was the cities and the second was the countryside. Now,
obviously been reversed-and has been since August 15.
is the countrysido; the second the cities.
this sequence has
The first battlefield
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2020 888
Jy nnn
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The Communist requiromonts for this phase beti beginning August 15
were deliniat delineated in this high a high-e high-level document this
way: #l. ennihiliate and wear down the enemy war potential.
The
such as: aircraft,
principal targets are the puppet armed forces at the grass-roots level,
Strive to destroy
the puppet main forces and the U. S. mobile forces.
war fecilities, and toon technical installations a
mechanized vehicles, ships, artillery pieces....2. continue to encircle
the enemy and incite the uprisings. Step up the political and military
proselyting in torms, cities and district toms...enlarge liberated areas
by making use of the people's forces and local armed forces,
unceasingly strongthen the liberated rural areas."
end
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soze sag
yy n
shift 9 (normass/deepe)
Con
This is precisely what the Communists have been doing inx since
their offensive began on August 18; just how much success they have had
IN
in the quasi-military areas is difficult to judge. On the purc-military
battles, they seom to have lost nazo botthon than a number of tactical
Personnal
Som
battles, but they havpb been inflicting material ages and property losses
the Allied
ho in the Allied sectors as well.
The Allies can and do claim credit for slowing down the bene
love inin diminishing the level of the Communist offensive,
but even for
чид ир
A
the American command here
seems to have diffic
difficulty t
in aceeing ther
win-loss balance shoot.
"We know how many Communist units we pin down and how many we kill,"
one i Allied source explained. "But we don't know how many eu are
CommuniST
slipping around our units. We know how many rockets and mortar ehte
Do Not capture.
oaches we capture, but we don't know how many we
Are
we catching 10 per cent or 90 porcont of their men and supplies moving
in apin around the cities? We don't know. It is very difficult to judge
the order of magnitude at this time."
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zcze sag
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Onoo thin phase of th
Could Not
Once the Communists judge they have accomplished-or fed to
accomplish these requirements during the current this phase of the
third offensive,
then presumably they will roll in to attack the cities--
if the Allies have not smashed them in the meantime.
CHANGE IN
the Commun. ST
The timing and squen sequence of ovente darings offensive seem
slightly more.
CHANGE IN current
significant than the style. Their tactical style is the
to concentrate their military activities in the countryside,
while
harrassing the ur major urban centers with rockets, mortars and-s
CommANDO.
And raids of commandes.
and an increase
Spectacular the
terroris
spectacular type of blowing up buildings and the in minute type of
AND UN-Noticed
assassinating Vidingammanam government workers a
than forgetting about the urban centers, as they did befere
ating
IN the Countryside,
WHill
ties. Rather
Eve periods, the Communists seem to be softening them. up.
(Hank: I'll file several more peice pieces early in the week,,
but unless there's a change in the situation, I thought I might visit
Long An province outside Saigon Friday, returning Saturday.
What do you
think? Regards Bev).
==end reuter
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Date
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1968, Sep. 9
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Subject
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Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Tet Offensive, 1968; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--United States; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Vietnam (Republic); Urban warfare
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F39
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
