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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05356 to 363-05365.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05356 to 363-05365
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Title
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Article about the failed Communist assault on Saigon
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Description
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Original title: "shift", Keever's title: "Allies Blunt Communists' City Assault on Saigon", Article draft about the failed Communist assault on Saigon, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-10
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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SAIGON, SEPTEMBER 9--Allied military successes have induced the Communists to shift the timing, sequence and style of their current third offensive. But, the heart of their Communist strategy remains unchanged--the eventual assault into South Vietnam's major cities, informed sources report.
The Communists' ground offensive thus far has been seriously--but not decisively--weakened by Allied defensive actions and maneuvers--especially the (deleted) U.S. Navy capture of the Communist battle plan to attack Saigon.
But, no repeat no Allied officials here are so optimistic as to state that the Allied successes thus far have totally "pre-empted" the future Communist (deleted) city-assault, or that the Communists are so weak and confused they have (deleted) chosen to call off indefinitely their big-unit ground thrust into the cities.
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Up to this point, however, the Communist (deleted) ground actions have been so (deleted) unsuccessfully nebulous and happy that some pro-neutralist diplomats and non-aligned military observers are debating whether this is a (deleted) true offensive, a (deleted) pseudo-offensive, a quasi-offensive or simply the first phase of an offensive. Yet, most of these informed sources of varying political colorations agree that the Communist offensive thus far has been (deleted) a relatively weak show of force in which the Communists have suffered a substantial number of casualties without a proportionate political-psychological gain either internally or internationally.
These intellectual debates, however, center around nuances of esoteric military definitions and attempts to second-guess Communist future moves. More significant is that the Communist radio broadcasts, some captured documents and prisoners explicitly state that the third offensive has begun--and that the Communists intend to keep it rolling for "bigger and bigger victories."
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But, if the Allied troops have not repeat not totally blocked the Communist roll-in for their city attacks, they have done the second best thing--captured a document revealing key portions of the Communist battle plan for assaulting Saigon. The document was invaluable to the Allied commands here--it revealed the Communist intention of moving battalions, sapper and commando units into Saigon and its fringes, their routes of entry into the city, and it also specified the time frame of the attack. (deleted) The third offensive was set for early August-- (deleted) presumably to attempt to influence the American political party conventions during that pivotal month.
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In the (deleted) light of "retrospectability"--as one American interlligence officer (deleted) termed appraising Communist past actions--informed sources here now believe the Allied capture of the document forced the Communists to make a strategic reassessment. Their most probable options" (deleted
1. Launch the offensive (deleted) even though the Allies were prepared first. The Communists tried that (deleted) during the May offensive--when the Allies had (deleted) been bequeathed the Communist battle plan by a (deleted) high-ranking defector. The Communists chose to attack anyway--probably to dramatize their position as the Paris peace talks opened. So, they attacked--and they lost thousand of troops without compensating political-psychological gains (Official (deleted) American sources claim the Communists lost 30,000 men around Saigon alone (deleted) in six weeks during May and June). For their planned August offensive, the Communists obviously rejected this option.
2. Cancel the whole countrywide city-battle (deleted) strategy. This would have been an all-round catastrophe for them. They had promised their troops in the field and their negotiations in Paris, (deleted) had warned the Vietnamese nationalists and Allied politicians that 1968 was (deleted) their year of decision. "Just for the Communists to sit still indefinitely is for them to lose," one informed source said. (deleted)
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The quintessence of 1968 for the Communists was to shorten the war--either through victory on the battlefield, U.S> capitulations in Paris or at the ballot box. If they fail (deleted) in (deleted) their so-called decisive year of 1968, their two most probable alternatives are to (deleted) end the war through the best posible nogotiations they can get in Paris--but far from victory--or else to protract the war on and on and on.
3. To continue the (deleted) war with their planned third strategic offensive--targeted against the cities--but to shift the timing, sequence and style (deleted) at the tactical level.
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this now is considered in formal circles the options the Communist (unintelligible)
As to the (deleted) change of the timing of the offensive, informed sources here believe the Communists delayed (deleted) the beginnings of their offensive from early August to (deleted) the new (deleted) target date of August 15. In fact, (deleted) their offensive began on August 18th with coordinated attacks in Tay ninh provincial attacks in Tayninh, and concentrations of (deleted) attacks in pockets of the northern half of the country.
(deleted) Now a mere (unintelli8gible) captured document suggests that the "first (deleted) phase" of their third offensive runs from August 15 to September 15; the (deleted) second phase of their offensive runs from September 15 onwards. Vietnamese government sources place more credence in this document than does the American command. The American command takes a more conservative view that the Communists can or will attack anytime; (deleted) many Americans (deleted) officers wished the Communists would have (deleted) produced the main thrust of their attacks in early September so they would have run out of steam (deleted) before the American elections in November. (deleted) But, Vietnamese government officers (deleted) Believe the (deleted) "climax" of the third offensive will be timed to mesh with the American elections--although it is debatable here what (deleted) that will gain them.
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A fringe viewpoint held by (deleted) qualified "outsiders", such as (deleted) "think-tank" analysts and diplomatic military experts is that the pivotal political period for (deleted) the Communists to make a spectacular battlefield push is not the American elections--but the inauguration of the new American President in January. Hence, the main-thrust of the Communist extravaganza (deleted) will not be (deleted) started until January of next year.
(deleted) The shift in the sequence of the offensive, was probably more significant than the timing--and this has lead to some of the confusion about the definition of the offensive. The (deleted) original sequence--accordine to captured documents, including the prize one--was to strike a surprise lightning blow countrywide into the major urban centers, and then hold as long as possible, and then as the Communist troops (deleted) withdrew back into the countryside, they (deleted) would crush (deleted) Vietnamese government outposts, and Allied installations, smash the (deleted) government's pacification program and over-run government-held towns and villages. Hence, the first battlefield was the cities and the second was the countryside. Now, this sequence has obviously been reversed--and has been since August (deleted) 18. The first battlefield is the countryside; the second the cities.
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The Communist requirements for this phase (deleted) Beginning August 15 were (deleted) delineated in (deleted) a (deleted) high-level document this way: "1. annihiliate and wear down the enemy war potential. The principal targets are the puppet armed forces at the grass-roots level, the puppet main forces and the U.S. mobile forces. Strive to destroy war facilities, and (deleted) technical installations such as: aircraft, mechanized vehicles, shifts, artillery pieces....2. continue to encircle the enemy and incite the uprisings. Step up the political and military proselyting in towns, cities and district towns... enlarge liberated areas by making use of the people's forces and local armed forces, and unceasingly strengthen the liberated rural areas."
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This is precisely what the Communists have been doing since their offensive began on August 18; just how much success they have had in the quasi-military areas is difficult to judge. In the pure-military (deleted) confrontations, they seem to have lost (deleted) a number of tactical battles, (deleted) in turn, they have been inflicting some material, (deleted) personal and property losses (deleted) in the (deleted) Allies.
The Allies can and do claim credit for (deleting) diminishing the level of the Communist offensive, but even (deleted) the American command here seems to have difficulty in (deleted) drawing up a win-loss balance sheet.
"We know how many Communist units we pin down and how many we kill," one (deleted) Allied source explained. "But we don't know how many are slipping around our unit. We know how many Communist rockets and mortar (deleted) caches we capture, but we don't know how many we (deleted) do not capture. Are we catching 10 per cent or 90 percent of their men and supplies moving in (deleted) around the cities? We don't know. It is very difficult to judge the order of magnitude at this time."
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(Deleted)
Once the Communists judge they have accomplished--or (deleted) could not accomplish--(deleted) their requirements during the current this phase of the third offensive, then presumabely they will roll in to attack the cities--if the Allies have not smashed them in the meantime.
The change in timing and (deleted) sequence of (deleted) the Communist offensive seem (deleted) slightly more significant than the change in style. Their current tactical style is (deleted) to concentrate their military activities in the countryside, while harrassing the major urban centers in rockets, mortars, (deleted) commando raids, (deleted) spectacular and un-noticed assassinating (deleted) of government workers (deleted). Rather than forgetting about the urban centers, as they did (deleted) before while fighting in the countryside, the Communists seem to be softening them. up.
(Hank: I'll file several more peice pieces early in the week, but unless there's a change in the situation, I thought I might visit Long An province outside Saigon Friday, returning Saturday. What do you think? Regards Bev).
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Date
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1968, Sep. 9
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Subject
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Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Tet Offensive, 1968; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--United States; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Vietnam (Republic); Urban warfare
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English