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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05395 to 363-05401.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05395 to 363-05401
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Title
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Article about Việt Cộng criticism of subordinate units
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Description
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Original title: "criticism", Keever's title: "Viet Cong High Command Issue Scathing Self-Criticism", Article draft about Việt Cộng criticism of subordinate units, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-7
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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2020 seg
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criticism 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON,
SEPTEMBER 3--The Communists,
Mil. ARY
now winding up for a third
offensive/drive, have concluded some scorching criticisms of their previous
country-wide thrust in May.
FIN
These criticisms of subordinate units range from chewing out
RECO.LESS Rifle,
individual gunner who wasted ten round of 75 millimeter the fire by missing
His
a unit which went "on a walking exercise
tire assigned targets,
in the jungle" rather than rushing in to reinforce its comrades in battle,
units
fleeing in battle leaving munitions, heavy weapons and wounded soldiers
Execute
behind,
refusal of commanders to cut orders "without hesitation"
BR.cating
and senior unit commanders in their battlefield reports to superior
By
headquarters minimizing Communist casualties and exaggerating
Allied losses.
==nore reuter
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criticism 2 (normass/deepe)
A major part of the Communist dir difficulty in the May offensive
was the defection of a senior Communist Party officer, Lt. Col. Tran Van
Dac, who outlined portions of the Communist battle plan to the Allied
command shortly before the assault. Since then, the Communist command
has taken steps for intensive indoctrination session of th of their troops
as a means to prevent defections to the Allied side.
However, Allied intelligence sources report ath following the May
offensive, a number of Communist cadre and officers have continued to
voluntarily defect to the Allied side or have been captured on the battlefield.
More significantly, these sources report that since the May offensive,
as many as ten to twenty per cent of the troop strength from some badly
battered Communist units have deserted the Communist ranks,
their homes.
returning to
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criticism 3 (normass/deepe)
At the strategic level, the four major weak points stressed by
the Viet Cong High Command following the May offensive were:
"Militarily,
whereas secondary
our attacks were concentrated upon main targets,
tre terge towere neglected.... The uprising of the people was slow and
scattered. Troop proselyting was deplorably weak. Development of our
political and armed forces and the strengthening of rear areas was poor."
The usual Communist procedure is to follow-up a military action
with criticism and self-criticism sessions at each echelon as a means of
correcting mistakes in the future. s
As the Allies wait for the Communist third offensive to roll in-a
key question will be if the
previously analyzed weaknesses.
Communists have corrected enough of their
==more router
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criticism 4 (normass/deepe)
During the May offensive,
the 1st Viet Cong Regiment, was hospi
CRITICIZER a pivotal spearheading unit, was sharply critiqued by
its superior headquarters. One Communist gunner was criticized for firing
ten rounds of 75 millimeter recoiless rifle fire at the Allied shipping and
w warehousing complex outside Saigon and "he missed all the targets and then
abandoned his weapon and ran," one captured document revealed.
The criticisms of the document continued:
"The forward command post changed position without informing
its subordinate units. It was supposed to be at the head of the
formation and it switched to the tail. As the first rounds opened the
battle, the commanders of the subordinate units could not communicate
with the command post. When the command post gave the signal to begin
the battle, the
fire; some did not;
subordinate units were not ready-some units opened
some ran in disarray, abandoning their dead,
wounded and equipment. That's how we lost 400 sampansy plus rockets
and heavy equipment.
more reuter
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criticism 5 (normass/deepe)
"The commander of one unit of the 1st Regiment was told to
back and fight; he said he could not because he did not have a sampan.
When a subordinate found him a sampan, he said he was sick. The set
RE
N
subordinate asked if he would designate someone to replace himself an
commander.
Lying
a
Lyeng on the bed, the commander just rolled his heavy body
to the wall and refused to answer. "
Another unit of the lat Regiment responsible for attacking the huge
Bien Hoa bridge leading into Saigon was also subjected to soaring criticism
"Not only did the unit delay its after-action report
by its superiors.
following the attack,
Actual
"
the captured document said, "but it lied in its
report. Our autron personnel casualties were ten times higher than the
report stated; our weapons and munitions b abandoned on the battlefield
was ten times higher than the report stated; the loss of enemy (Allied)
casualties and sp equipment was eg oxaggerated in the report.
report claimed to have destroyed alot of equipment and hardware at the
Newport installation--but in fact all rounds missed the target."
The
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criticism 6 (normass/deepe)
The document, however, praised one squad leader who,
initiative,
on his own
blew up a segment of the Bien Hoa bridge while he and some of
Their bodies were also
his squad were standing atop the structure.
disintegrated in the explosion.
But,
and its units,
the senior commanders of the Communist sub-region four, were
given a sizzi sizzling critique in the document.
These commanders were
"fraid of being killed and they were afraid of the vill violence of war...
This is the decisive period of the war and its always more violent than
These commanders dared not to fight during the second
normal times.
offensive.
"The commander shifted position without informing his subordinates.
The subordinates withdrew without orders from their superiors, instead
the enemy's
of hanging on. A number of units assigned to slow down
counter-offensive, did not bother to slow down the enemy's sweeping
operations, but reat retreated before the enemy even showed up.
example, the headquarters of the sub-region found out a number of
The cadre of the Party
orders were not carried out during the attack.
as well as military commanders of cat the company, battalion and regimental
EVEN
level dared to discuss the order. This is not a period of discussion.
is a period of execution. And they dared to discuss
superiors in order to
Teluse the end to asse And, not only did they
This
discuss the order of their superiors, but they refused to carry out the order,
making up all kinds of excuses.
==more reuter
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criticism 7 (normass/deepe)
we found out alot of cadre
"So to conclude this session of criticism,
lost morale, became init undisciplined; they lack efficiency and their
determination is bankrupt."
"That
Another unit was criticized for being reluctant to cross the Dong Nai
River, in order to reinforce other units fighting closer to Saigon.
the document read, "and it dare
unit walked ten times around the jungle, "
These regulars were
not to cross the river to reinforce others others.
a
the battlefield is
D
just wandering around in the jungle for fun. But,
not the period of a walking exercise--they should have crossed the river."
SEVERAL MORE TIMEs
this
WEEK;
days,
We'll probably try to cable regularly for the next two
(Hanke Wat
then we 11 see if military action resumes around Saigon.
Cable
I'll send in a military analysis,
Tomorrow,
but a rather ces cautious one,
wrapping up the past events, at rather than trying to predict if and when
this
BASED
the offensive happens. Some of this is the Bien Hoa story and some of this
BASED
is/Saigon interviewing.
I think we can resume making quick trips out of
Saigon for
if there's a good story
==end reuter
shapes up. Regards Bev).
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Date
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1968, Sep. 3
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Guerrilla warfare; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Tet Offensive, 1968; Tactics
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F39
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
