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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-02088 to 363-02100.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-02088 to 363-02100
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Title
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Article on the tactics of the 1st Brigade, US Army 9th Infantry Division
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Description
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Original title: "psyops." Keever's title: "U.S. Troops Use Bull Horns, Flashcards, Loudspeakers to Woo Communists to Depart." Original caption: "This is the last of a two-part series on the synchronized military encirclement and psychological warfare operations of the 1st Brigade, US Army 9th Infantry Division." Article by Keever about the tactics of the 1st Brigade, US Army 9th Infantry Division, especially the use of psychological warfare
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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zczc sag yy nnm psyops 1 (normass/deepe) Long An (This is the last of a two-part series on the synchronized military encirclement and psychological warfare operations of the 1st Brigade, U.S. Army 9th Infantry division). TAN AN, SOUTH VIETNAM SEPTEMBER 27--The 1st Brigade's ground units go into battle carrying bullhorns and flashcards for broadcasting face-to-face to Communist units that they should surrender and they will be well-treated. The flashcards, written in Vietnamese and in English, list pre-planned messages appropriate for varying battlefield situations. But, when the American ground units form a donut-shaped encirclement around a Communist uh unit, then more centralized and sophisticated psychological warfare method is used--1000-watt loudspeaker dangling from a helicopter. ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm psyops 1 (normass/deepe) The 1st brigade, which concentrates its psychological operations on capturing the Communists, has developed several battlefield techniques. One is called "instant psyops." If one Communist prisoner or voluntary defector is taken by the brigade during a battle, he is asked fly over the war zone in a helicopter and broadcast an appeal to his comrades below, telling them he has been will-treated by the American troops. In other cases, "instant psyops" is especially tailored to that the Communist unit that is encircled; recently, for example, intelligence information indicated an encircled unit was low on food and ammunition. The airborne loudspeaker reminded the Communist troops of this and emphasized the futility of continuing to fight when they were completely encircled without hope of escape. ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm psyops 3 (normass/deepe) Another technique is called "psyops with a punch." The heli-borne loudspeaker messages to the Communists below that the unit surrounded--and that "this-is-your-last-chance" to surrender or defect before the next air or artillery bombardment is directed onto their positions. "We try to fight this war with every angle," one brigade officer explained. The brigade's officer in charge of psychological operations is First Lieutenant James MMM. Kilcrease repeat Kilcrease Junior of Nashville, Tenn. (900 Smiley Street). A young, sensitive Negro who was wounded as a platoon leader last month, he was then assigned to the staff position of the brigade headquarters. He also served in Vietnam in 1963 with the U. S. Special Forces and he speaks a smattering of Vietnamese. ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm o psyops 4 (normass/deepe) "The hardest part of this war is finding the enemy--not fighting him," Lt. Kilcrease explained. "And after finding him, then try to stabilize the enemy--to make him stand still so that we can talk to him without our loudspeakers. If he isn't interested in listening to us, then we unleash our firepower We try to use our firepower to get a psychological response from him--rather than to kill him. We give him the choice of surrendering or dying." Thus far, the battlefield s psyops program has had marginal success--but the brigade is continuing to experiment to get better results. Since arriving in Long An province in mid-June, the brigade has received eleven voluntary defectors and 300 prisoners, all of them a direct result of psychological operations made during battlefield contacts. Many Communist defectors prefer to turn themselves into Vietnamese government units rather than the brigade, yet roughly 40 per cent of these 127 defectors in July were induced to surrender because of the American psyops program. ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm psyops 5 (normass/deepe) When the American brigade has encircled a Communist unit in a donut-shaped formation, then Lt. Kilcrease flies over the Communist-held hole of the donut several hundred feet above the Communist positions to appeal for their surrender. He h as been shot at so many times, he has lost count "It's just a common thing," he laughed. "The donut confines the target," he explained. "When the enemy is not encircled, we are talking to the target blind. Without the donut, the confusion of battle does not afford the enemy a chance to escape from his own comrades who watch each other in their s-moucells. The Communists sometimes shoot their own comrades in the back rather than letting them surrender, but if there's enough confusion from our donut encirclement, then they can escape. "When the donut is formed and the encirclement is complete, then I helicopter over the hole of the donut broadcasting to the Communists below with my 1000- from my loudspeaker." ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm psyops 6 (normass/deepe) Speaking softly, but confidently, he continued to detail battlefield psyops mission: "When the brigade first has contact with the enemy, we put on an artillery display for psychological purposes for the Communists. Then the brigade commander orders a complete stop to all firing. There's no firing from anywhere--from the artillery down to the lowest private with his M-16. Then, I fly over in the helicopters with an interpreter who is often Communist defector. He explains to the Communists why the firing has stopped, that they are surrounded and that it is senseless to keep fighting x and that they can rally to us through the Chieu Hoi program. We give them specific directions of on how to rally--like moving toward a river or a road. Then we give them a time period to decide. In the daytime, it may be as long as 30 minutes, but near darkness it is about ten minutes. We have to watch their reaction carefully, to be sure they do not try to break out of the donut when we have stopped all our firing." ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm psyops 7 (normass/deepe) If there is no move by the Communists to rally, then more artillery x is called directed into their position. The firepower is so massive, that "sometimes I wonder how they live through it because the fires are so thoroughly inter-locking," he said. "Then after awhile, the firing is stopped again. We emphasize to our troops an timed immediate stop to all firing Because we don't want to tilt the psychological balance. We want the enemy to realize our weapons fire is a controlled thing. And then I make another appeal to them--this time not to rally under the Chieu Hoi program, but to surrender as a prisoner of war. If there are a lot of North Vietnamese troops in the unit, we assure them they will be treated According to the Geneva Conventions, so we just assure them they'll be treated well. WE always try to use military power to psychologically convince the enemy to give up, rather than to kill him." ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm psyops 8 (normass/deepe) American officers concede they face many problems in their psychological warfare campaign. Many Communists would simply fight to their death--much to the astonish bewilderment of American commanders--rather than surrendering or rallying to Allied units. When they do rally to the Allies, many Communists prefer to come into Vietnamese government outposts and installations, rather than American units--and some governments units are none too enthusiastic in welcoming them. Some Communists prefer to rally to Vietnamese government units because of the language barrier with American troops--and also because of Communist propaganda, which as convinced them that the American troops are more vicious than the Vietnamese troops in maltreating, killing or torturing them on the spot. American commanders have taken great pains to disprove this point; American troops are specifically ordered to make sure the Communist defectors and prisoners are not roughed up or shot during the battlefield confusions. Sometimes, wounded Communists are given medical treatment on the battlefield so that their comrades can witness it. Even when American troops have had their buddies killed by the Communists, they often show the prisoners some kindness by giving them water, food and gum on the battlefield. ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm psyops 9 (normass/deepe) Some Communist defectors and prisoners have expressed amazement that the Americans have treated them so kindly with superb medical care, food, boots and clothing. Still, many Communists are afraid to surrender or rally to Allied units, even when faced with death on the battlefield. Communist cadres have tightened their control over the troops by countering the Allies psyops program. Communist cadre say American leaflet drops in Communist areas about winging defectors are poisoned and should NOT repeat NOT be picked up by the Communist troops. After American loudspeaker missions are heard by a Communist unit, the Communist troops are given impromptu indoctrination sessions and hold self-criticism meetings because they listened to the "imperialistic propaganda." ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm psyops 10 (normass/deepe) Also, the growing influx of North Vietnamese troops and hardline commanders in Long An province had decreased the prisoner and defection rate. The North Vietnamese are much more likely to fight to the last man--while the Viet Cong locals generally try to break off contact and evade the American units. Also, the Communist terrorism made surrenders and defections less attractive and more difficult. The Cheiu Hoi ralliers have been specific targets of terrorism by the Communists since the Tet offensive; prison camps were also battlegrounds during and since Tet; some ralliers or prisoners are shot in the back by their comrades rather than being allowed to cross to American lines. "Hence, we're not getting as many alive as we'd like," Lt. Kilcrease said. "The Communists may be afraid of our artillery and air bombardments, but if their comrades right net to them are going t shoo them, too, some of them are better to take a chance of jumping in a foxhole to try to escape our firepower. ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm psyops 11 (normass/deepe) In one battle field case, two ralliers came to the First Brigade, then volunteered to return to the Communist area to convince their comrades to either surrender or r voluntarily rally. But, the Communists killed one and wounded the other rather than listening to their surrender pleas. Once the prisoners and defectors are returned to base camp, American Vietnam and Vietnamese interrogators explain in detail and again ask each individual if he choses to be classified as a prisoner of war or a rallier under the Vietnamese government's Cheiu Hoi program. A prisoner of war is placed in a designated barbed wire, well-guarded camp until the end of the war and is treated--by American units at least--according to the Geneva Conventions. For North Vietnamese troops, it means they can return to the North at the end of the war. In the Cheiu Hoi program, however, many defectors must again take up arms within a year's time to fight their former comrades. The advantage , is, however, they can live with their families in the South and they are given full rights of other Vietnamese citizens, rather than living out the rest of the war in a concentration camp. ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm psyops 12 (normass/deepe) One North Vietnamese who rallied to the Americans under the Chieu Hoi program later said he wanted to be classified as a prisoner of war--he was tired of killing and risking being killed. Also, there are vague indications, but no specific statements, that North Vietnamese troops fear reprisals against their families in North Vietnam if it is publicized they have voluntarily defected to the anti-Communist side. Another psyops technique that has been initiated is helicoptering the wives of Viet Cong or ex-Viet Cong over a Communist base and having the woman loudspeaker to them to surrender. Interrogations have shown that many of the Communist troops are lonely for their families and wives, some of whom have been separated for years. Generally, the wife of the Viet Cong appeals to the fighters to return to their families and promises they will be treated well when they rally. Last week, a Viet Cong rallier and his wife broadcast loudspeaker appeals over the target area where his comrades he had once fought with were hiding out. The next afternoon, four of the Communists from the unit rallied to a Vietnamese government outpost; American officers considered the rallier's wife more articulate and imaginative in drawing up her appeal for the Communist troops than was her husband who had served with the unit. ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm psyops 13 (normass/deepe) "My dream and the dream of other officers in the brigade is to get a whole unit to come in," Lt. Kilcrease said. "We're concerned about the results of a psychological operation especially when the Viet Cong are so badly hurt and we wonder why don't these guys come over to us?'" ==End Reuter
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Date
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1968, Sep. 27
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; United States. Army. 9th Infantry Division. 1st Brigade; Psychological warfare; Tactics
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Location
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Tân An, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.5383; 106.4051
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections
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Language
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English