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(This is the last of a two-part series on the synchronized military encirclement and psychological warfare operations of the lat Brigade,
U. S. Army 9th Infantry Division).

TAN AN, SOUTH VIETNAM SEPTEMBER 27-The let Brigade's ground units go into battle carrying bullhor s= bullhorns and flashcards for broadcasting face-to-face to Communists units that they should surrender and that will be well-treated. The flashcards, wrt written in Vietnamese and in English, list pre-planned messages appropriate fro varying battlefield situations.

But, when the American ground units encircle on masse in a donut formation a Communist uh unit, then more centralized and sophisticated psychological warfers method is used—as heli-borne 1000-watt loudspeaker.

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psyops 2 (normass/deepe)

The brigade, which concentrates its psychological operations on capturing the Communists, has developed several battlefield techniques. One is called "instand psyops" (prometer If one Communist prisoner or voluntary defector is taken by the brigade during a battle, he is asked fly over the war zone in a helicopter and broadcast an appeal to his comrades below, telling them he has been will-treated by the American troops. In other cases, "instant psyops" is especially tailored to that the Communist unit that is encircled; recently, for example, intelligence information indicated the surrounced unit was low on food and ammunition. The fairborne loudspeaker reminded the Communist troops of this and emphasized the futility of continuing to fight when they were completely encircled without hope of escape.

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psyops 3 (normass/deepe)

Another technique is called "psyops with a punch." The heli-borne loudspeaker messages to the Communists below that the unit is surrounded—and that this-is-your-last-chance to surrender or defect before the next heavy bemberdment by air or artillery is directed onto their positions.

"We try to fight this war with every angle," one brigade officer explained.

The brigade's officer in charge of psychological operations is

Fire First Lieutenant James MMM. Kilcrease repeat Kilcrease Junior of

Nashville, Tenn. (800 Smiley Street). A young, sensitive Negro who was

wounded as a platoon leader last month, he was assigned to just the staff

position in the brigade headquarters. He also served in Vietnam in 1963

with the U. S. Special Forces and he speaks a smattering of Vietnamese.

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payops \$ 4 (normans/deepe)

"The hardest part of this war is finding the enemy—not fighting him,"

Lt. Kilorease explained. "And after finding him, then to stabilize the enemy—to make him stand still so that we can talk to him with our loudspeakers. If he isn't interested in listening to us, then we unlease our firepower We try to use our firepower to get a psychological response from him—rather than to kill him. We biv give him the choice of surrendering or dying."

Thus far, the battlefield s payops program has had marginal successbut the brigade is continuing to experiment to get better results. Since erriving in Long An province in mid-June, the brigade has received elevel eleven voluntary defectors and 360 prisoners, all of them a direct result of psychological operations made during battlefield contacts. Hany Communist defectors prefer to turn themselves into Vietnamese government units, rather than the brigade, yet roughly 40 per cent of these 127 defectors lest month were induced to surrender because of the American payops program.

When the American brigade has encirled a Communist unit in a donut-styled formation, then Lt. Kilcrease flies over the hol Communist-hold hold of the donut several hundred feet above Communist weapons to appeal to t for their surrendes surrender. He has been shot at so many times, he has lost count. "It's just a common thing," he laughed.

"The donut confines the target," he explained. "When the enemy is not encircled, then we are talking to the target blind. Without the denut, the confusion of bettle does not afford the enemy a chance to escape from his own comrades who watch each other. The Communists somtimes shoot their own comrades in the back rather than letting them surrender, but if there's enough confusion from our denut encirclement, then they can escape.

"When the donut is formed and the encirclement is complete, then
I helicopter over the hole of the donut broadcasting to the Communists below
with my 1000- from my loudspeaker."

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psyops 6 (normass/deepe)

Speaking softly, but confidently, he continued to detail the operation bettlefield payons mission:

artillery display for psychological purposes for them. Then the brigade commender orders a complete step to all firing. There's no firing from enywhere—from the artillery down to the lowest private with his M-16.

Then, I fly over in the helicopters an with an interpreter who is often a former Communist defector. He explains to the Communists why the firing has stopped, that they are surrounded and that it is senseless to keep fighting it and that they can rally to us through the Chieu Hei program. One the give them specific directions of on how to rally—like moving towards a river or a read. Then we give them a time period to decide. In the daytime, maybe it may be as long as 30 minutes, but near darkness it is about ten minutes. We have to watch their reaction carefully, to be sure they do not try to breek out of the denut when we have stopped all our firing.

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psyops 7 (normass/deepe)

If there is no move by the Communists to rally, then more artillery z is called directed into their positions. The firepower is so massive, that "sometimes I wonder how they live throught it because the fires are so thro thoroughly inter-locking," he said.

"Then after awhile, the firing is stopped again. We emphasize an imaed immediate stop to all firing, down to the privates because we don't want to tilt the psychological balance. We want the enemy to realize our weapons fire is a controlled thing. And then, I make another appeal to them—this time not to rally us i under the Chieu Hoi program, but to surrender as a prisoner of war. If there are alot of North Vietnamese troops in the unit, we assure them they will be treated by the Coneva Conf Conventions Conventions; the local Viet Cong don't know about the Coneva Confe Convention Conventions, so we just assure them they'll be treated well. We always try to use military power to psychologically convince the enemy to give up, rather than to kill him."

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psyops 8 (normass/deepe)

American officers concede they face many problems in their psychological werfere campaign. Hany Communists anniental manner would simply fight to their da death-much to the astonish bewilderment of American commanders-rather then surrendering or rellying to Allied units. When they do rally to Allied the Allies, many Communists prefer to come into Vietnamese government outposts and installations, rather than American units and maky many of the governmen uni governments units are none too enthusiastic in welcoming them. Some Communists profer to relly to Vietnamese government units because of the lenguage barrier with American troops-and also because of Communist propagande, which has convinced their troops that the American troops are more victous than the Vietnemese troops in maltreating killing or torturing them on the spot. American commanders have taken great pane pains to disprove this point; American troops are specifically ordered to make sure the Commutatiet defectors and prisoners are not ru roughed up or shot during ht the battlefield confusions. Sometimes, Commun wounded Communists are given medical treatment on the battlefield so that their comrades can witness it. Even when American troops have had their buddies killed by the Communists, they often butter up the prisoners and show the prisoners & some kindness by giving them waterk water, cigarec cigarec cigaretes food end gum during the battle. ==nore reuter

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psyops 9 (normass/deepe)

expressed emasement that the Americans trea have treated them so kindly with superb medical care, food, boots and clothing. Still, many Communists are afraid to surrender or rally to Allied units, even when faced with death on the battlefield; Communist cadres have tightened their control Communist cadre say over the troops by counter—countering the Allies payops program. Leaflet drops informin in Communist areas about on the progra Chicu not program are poisonous and should be picked up by the Communist troops. After loudspeaker American loudspeaker missions are heard by a Communist unit, the troops are given indoctrination see impromptu indoctrination sessions and hold self-criticism sess meetings because they listened to the "impera"

"imperialistic propaganda."

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payops 10 (normass/deepe)

Also, the growing influx of North Vietnamese troops and hard-line commenders in Long An province has decreased the rate of prisoner and defection rate. The North Vietnamese are much more likely to fight to the last men—while the Viet Cong locals generally try to break off contact and evade the American units. Alsok Also, the Communist commend has taken pains to make surrenders and defections less attractive and more difficult.

The Chie H Chieu Hoi ralliers have been specific targets of terrorism by the Communists since the Tet offensive; prison camps were also battlegrounds during and since the Tet; some ralliers or prisoners are shot in the back by their comrades rather than being allowed to cross to American lines.

"Hence, we're not geting as many alive as we'd like," Lt. Kilcrease said. "The Communists may be afraid of our artillery and air bombardments, but if the troop their comrades right next to them are going to shoot them, too, some of them are better to take the a chance of jumping in a foxhole to try to escape our firepower.

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pyops 11 (normass/deepe)

In one battlefield case, two ralliers came to the First Brigade, then volunteered to return to the Communist area to convince their comrades to either currender or r voluntarily relly. But, the Communists killed one and wounded the other rather than listening to their currender see please please.

camp. American Vietnem and Vietnemese interrogetors explain in detail and again ask each individual if he choses to be classified as a prisoner or a rallier in under the Vietnemese government's Chieu Hoi program.

The prisoner of war is placed in a designated bad barbed wire, well-guarded camp until the end of the war and is treated—by American units at least—according to the Geneva Conventions. For North Vietnemese troops, it meens they can return to the North at the end of the war. In the Chieu Hoi program, however, many defectors must again take up arms within a year's time to fight their former convendes. The advantage, is, however, they can live with their femilies in the South and he is given r full rights of other Vietnemese citizens, at rather than living out the rest of the war in a concentration do camp.

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psyops 12 (normass/deepe)

One North Vietnemese who rellied to the Americans under the Chieu Hoi program later said he wanted to be classified as a prisoner of we rathe was tired of killing and ricking being killed. Also, anishmapha there are vague indications, but no specific statements, that North Vietnemese troops fear reprisals against their families in North Vietnemese if it is publicated they have voluntarily defected to the enti-Sommunist side.

been initiated is helicoptering the wives of Viet Cong or ex-Viet Cong over a Communist base area and having the woman appeal to them through the loudspeaker to surrender. Interrogations have shown that many of the Communist troops are lonely for their families and wives, some of whom have been appeals to the fighters to return to their families and that they will be treated well when they rally.

Last wook, a Viet Gong rallier a rallier from the Viet Gong and his wife broadcast loudspeaker appeals over the target area where his comrades he had once fought with were hiding out. The next afternoon, four of the Communists from the unit rallied to a Vietnamese government unit unit; American officers considered the rallier's wife more articulate and imaginative in drawing up her appeal for the Communist troops than was her husband who had served with the unit.

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psyops 13 (normass/deepe)

whole unit to come in," Lt. Kilcrease said. "We're cons concerned about the results of an operation, especia our psychological operation especially when the Viet Cong are so badly hurt and we wonder why don't these guys come outs."...

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