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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05065 to 363-05080.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05065 to 363-05080
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Title
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Article about disagreements about peace for the Vietnam War
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Description
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Original title: "dialogue", Keever's title: "'What Kind of Peace' Issue Intensifies Between U.S., South Vietnamese Officials", Article draft about disagreements regarding a potential peace for the Vietnam War, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-16
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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zcze sag
yy nnm
dialogue 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, OCTOBER 31-A major Allied confrontation on the war-peace and
what-kind-of-peace issue has been evolving and worsening in the past two
weeks of dialogue between American Ambassador Ellsworth S. Bunker and
South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, informed sources report.
Strains at the top levels of the American-South Vietnamese alliance are
reportedly more intense now than at any time since President Thieu was
inaugurated a year ago this week-on October 31--and more intense than at
any time since the American comitment of combat troops in early 1965.
The high drama of
meetings
Thieu-Bunker meets in
that
days seems to indicate the
enormous political stakes of the discussions are by the far the most signtr
the
ombat
significant ever to confront the t two Allies here since U. S. intervention.
with troops.
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zcze sag
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dialogue 2 (normass/deepe)
From
But, the face-downs between Thieu and Bunker are only the immediate
focal point of the confrontation. For a wide-angle vantage point, what
has shaped up is the classical hawk-dove controversy intensifying to its
shrillest "life or death" pitch. Polarizing around President Thieu and
his government are the eben emotional sympathizes of a ma number of
Amorten American military and civilian officials, as well as dee
FIND Support
direct political encouragement from user some of the other Allied embassies
with troops serving in South Vietnam. These American and other Allied
hardliners solidifying around the Thieu government maintain that this is
Now.
Non UTNAM
the time to keep the military pressure on Hene and the Viet Cong-rather
than taking it off and giving them time to regroup their military forces or
to win at the conference table what they have already lost on the
Should made
battlefield. If there is to be a peace settlement, it would simply
rubber-stamp the favorable Allied military position in the South, they
maintain.
"In this mess,
More reuter
Thieu is simply the mirror of the American conscious,"
one Western diplomat told an American.
"You told the South Vietnamese you were
going to come here to save them; they cut all their ties and decided to sink
or swim with you. Now you tell them the war costs too much and you want to
pull out with war only half won. Everyone knows when the first G. I. is
pulled out of South Vietnam, it is only a question of time before the Communists
take OVER. Obviously, Thieu thinks he's fighting for x the whole future of
This country in these sessions with Bunker. "
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zozo sag
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dialogue (normass/deepe)
American-South Vietnamese high-level relations have yet to reach
a super-crisis stage,
informed sources report,
Obstacle
because the problems of
reaching an agreement between Washington and Hanoi are still considered
even more of an obstance than the U. S. headaches in Saigon. But,
diplomatic difficulties in Saigon are also substantial.
the
Like a teeter-totter,
the Saigon government has effected a
hard-line counter-barging bargaining, counter-balancing weight to any
Hanoi move to get Washington to soften its position.
It is difficult to tell
ing
at this point if the Saigon government is simply maintaing a tough
bargaining posture until Hanoi agrees to Allied demands--which would be
e expected-or if it will continue to remain adamant even
at the risk of seriously fracturing future American-Saigon relations.
==more reuter
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2020 sag
Jy nnm
dialogue 3 (normass/deepe)
Publicly and officially, President Thieu has said the South
Vietnamese and American officialdoms are in complete agreement on the issue
of kin halting the bombing over North Vietnam. But informed sources
Shemy
say this is an inaccurate presentation of some of the story sessions between
the American Ambassador and Saigon officials.
These sources say the points of American-Saigon disagreement are as
follows:
1.
Conditions for and the official joint communique on halting the
bombing over the North Vietnam. This has yet to be amtasty finally settled
since the first Bunker-Thieu meeting on October 116 when the American
Ambassador drove to Independence Palace at six in the morning
Both sides
2. What happens after the bombing is halted, with specific reference
to the respective roles and status of the delegation of the Saigon government,
Allies
as separate from and independent from the American delegation.
agree that the National Liberation Front can sio sit mit at the conference
table as part of the Hanoi delegation, but Thieu insists that Hanoi head that
delegation and that the NLF will not repeat not be allowed to speak on matters
in the South Hanoi must speak for the NEF. NLF.
more router
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zcze sag
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dialogue (normass/deepe)
3. While not repeat not directly related to the Palace discussions,
the Saigon officials see a bilateral American-North Vietnamese troop
withdrawal shaping up soon after the new phase of the peace talks begin.
The government is not particularly worked a worried about that--since the
balance of military power would still remain preponderantly on Saigon's
But,
this withdrawal of foreign troops would be accompanied by
either a de facto or announced ceasefire--and the Saigon officials are
opposed to this at an early date because it would erase their military
side.
superiority, because the Viet Cong would scatter all over the country,
INTO
Also, the Vietnamese
government remembers all too well its last ceasefire with the Communists-
during Tet, when the Communists unleashed their smashing offensive into
including in the cities and chaos would reign.
the cities.
==more reuter
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zcze sag
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dialogue 6 (normass/deepe)
But rippling out from these specific disagreements,
wester
the Saigon
officials and some observing diplomats-believe that what is at stake in the
these behind-the-secene confrontations is the future of South Vietnam as an
independent can non-Communist country. There is a perceptible
crescendo ofxmitinham Vietnamese political wails that the Americans
are about to "sell-out" South Vietnam. Even Western diplomats note the
growing impression that American policymakers seem more interested im
extricating U. S. stroops from a costly war than they are insuring the
Non-Communis
independent survival of South Vietnam to which they originally committed
their troops to defend.
Some South Vietnamese politicians as well as
editorials in leading Saigon newspapersy are inerei increasingly
accusing President Lyndon B. Johnson of using the peace initiative as a
political gimmick to tal influence the American election and to insure
glamorous
himself a place in it the history books.
==more reuter
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zcze sag
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dialogue 7 (normass/deepe)
Some Americans agree with this Vietnamese view, as the political
climate even within the Ameri U. S. community is becoming super-charged
with emotion..
"I'm one of the first Americans to say we should put the screws to
the GVN (the Vietnamese government) when they are sloughing off at the
ministry level," one civilian who professed to be a "dissatisfied Democrat"
said. "But, in these meetings between Thieu and Bunker, we're obviously
twisting the Vietnamese arms until it impinges on their own sovereignty.
And what for? /So LBJ can go down in bold-face print in some history book!
But, who care about this his history book when 28,000 Americans have already
died here."
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5050 086
Jy nnm
dialogue 8 (normass/deepe)
Within the Vietnamese community, only Thiou and porhaps a dozon
in the National Security Council
senior members of the government have been kept fully abreast of all the
peace developments; the oven the Cabinet af has not repeat not been fully
informed as a gou body. Thieu and the upper-chambors of the government
have thus maintained an unprocedented degree of Saigon secrecy about the
details of the talks. Vietnamese newspapers are urging the government to
keep the population more informed.
Outside observers, including anti-Saigon members of the diplomatic
and the other leaders their
set, complimont Thieu for playing his cards extremely well and for keeping
their
his head during what one Saigon newspaper called "their gravest hour."
The Thieu-Bunkor confrontations have instantly mended the split between
Thieu and his flamboua flamboyant, hard-line Vice President Nguyeb Nguyen
Cao Kya feat that Ambassador Bunker had been trying to do for the past
year without success. Other Vietnamese upper-class politicians, who long
thought Thiou would buckle under American pressure, at last began to
praise him. But, under the crust this political orust of the elite, the
issue of peace- or continuation of the war-remains political dynamite
among the masses of Vietnamese who are becoming increasingly war-war weary.
more reuter
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zcze sag
yy nnm
dialogue 9 (normass/deepe)
The peace issue internally is highly inflamable inflammable
By
open to exploitation among the gifted Viet Cong propagandaists,
BY
as the left-wing nationalists,
and is
as well
areer who are already beginning to
accuse Thieu and Ky of seeking to prolong the war so they can "maintain their
lur luxury life," as one Vietnamese laborer explained.
Other sources,
with access to information in the upper-chambers of
the Thieu government,
indicate that the Saigon leadership is becoming
badly un-nerved by these continuing confrontations with Bunker.
#more reuter
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zo zo: sag
yy nnm
dialogue
(normass/deepe)
"The GVN is beginning to lose its crackers over these sessions with
Bunker," one informed source explained. "There's a hysteria setting in and
the Americans aren't helping it any by leaping around all the time.
"Evidence of this hysteria is a senior Vietnamese official's bib
blabbing around town that the Americans here had received directar
orders from Walt Rostow (senior Vietnam planner to President Ly Johnson) the
that the Thieu-Ky regime should be dumped out of office by January.
"Everyone knows that's politically unfeasible,"
he continued.
"The Am Vietnamese believe that because they have no knowledge of world
affairs and are totally unprincipled themselves.
Everyone knows that if
the American dump Thieu and Ky, it would be the most unbridled act of
cynicism and treachery in history--as well as unveiling a total American
defeat for the whole world. But, that's what's going around the town-from
government officials.
"Then,
you m meet another Vietnamese official that tells you Thieu
just received word from the (Richard M.) Nixon camp to stand firm--and when
Nixon is elected President, he'll back Thieu's position. No one
that
believes all this--but it's an indication pretty soon the whole town will
be fighting shadows and looking under their beds. Here you have half the
American support Thieu, instead of LBJ, and half the Vietnamese are
supporting Nixon,
aly Happen in VIETNAM,"
instead of Thieu. "It Could only Happen
==more reuter
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2020 sag
yy nnm
dialogue (normass/doope)
The details of the hard-line stand of the Thiou and the National
Security Council are relatively complex and technical.
First, on the
official American-South Vietnamese communique to declaring a cessation
to the halt of the bombing over North Vietnam, Hanoi domanded that the
document would specifically refer to an "unconditional" halt. The
to use the word "unconditional"
Vietnamese refused this terminology,
saying it would be an unprecedented
political victory for the Communists, not only in South Vietnam but throughout
It would mean that Hanoi had been right, that the Americans, rather
than North Vietnam,
Asia.
was the aggressor, that it would make the South
Vietnamese appear as U. S. puppets, just as Hanoi had always maintained.
more reuter
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2020 sag
Jy nnm
dialogue 12 (normass/deepe)
Secor D
Besides, the Saigon government officials argued, the three concessions
Hanoi had supposedly agreed to give up in return for a bombing halt were very
hollow. The restoration of the Z demilitarized zone was not much of a
ge concession from Hanoi because the American Marines and Vietnamese First
Down
By Division had consistently beaten the Communist advances dem across the
series of victories since the siege of Khe Sanh was broken in Apri
April. Besides, restoring the DMZ did not repeat not stop the Communists
from shuttling down enormous quantities of men and supplies tr further
Current
west through Laos, and with a bombing halt and the dry season on the Laotian
ABLE
line in a
side of the hills, they would be in the best pet position to do it with
maximum efficiency.
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zcze sag
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dialogue 13 (normass/deepe)
Thieu and other
The second concession Hanoi was also supposedly making was the
cessation of attacks on South Vietnamese cities. But,
officials were told this meant only artillery and rocket attacks-fo but not
repeat not ground attacks on the pi principal cities. They argued this was
since the Allied defense of the cities
not repeat not much of a concession,
had been fairly successful in preventing these and sine since these attacks
were political liabilities for the Communists anyhow. If the Communists
gave up group ground attacks as well as indirect fire attacks not only on
the major cities, but also on the 44 pogi provincial capitals and 250
HANG
district capitals--where they could really do some damage--then would be
Conce
Somethin
considered an outright concession, but not pe repeat not the flimsy on
Concess
one they had agreed to.
Supposedly
oly
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zozo sag
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dialogue 14 (normass/deepe)
The third concession from Hanoi--accepting the Saigon government at the
expanded peace talks--was not repeat not a concession at all, the Vietnamese
officials argued. The South Vietnamese government was legally elected and
S
was sovereign-so it's right to represent South Vietnam at the next phase
of the peace talks was beyond discussion.
is then leadt into disagreement about the roles of the two Southern
components at the next phase of the Paris talks.
Thieu and the others
held to their previous decision that the N National Liberation Front
Saigon
could join the Hanoi delegation--but they wanted further assurances
the NLF would not repeat not be allowed to speak on matters of the South.
The Saigon government reportedly reportedly could see that after Hanoi and
the Americans had agreed on the withdrawal of their respective troops,
Exit
they would walk out of the meeting--thus leaving Saigon faset face-to-face
with the NLF. If that happened, Saigon would simply walk out,
it was
reported.
#=more reuter
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zcze dag
yy nnm
dialogue 15 (normass/deepe)
tham
ABOUT
But, the even more complicated half of the problem came down
thenfimenxindagain on the Allied delegation.
wanted to have a separate, independent delegation with its own
Saigon
Both of these luned
sitting across
cheri chairman, while the Americans would have the same,
from the Hanoi merged Hanoi-NLF delegation, which would be chaired by
Hanoi. This concept of the "three-legged conference table"
have been even more difficult to resolve than the role of the NLF.
ARRANGement
seems to
officials reportedly told Thieu and Ky this would be unacceptable to
Hanoi;
12.
American
WANT
that if Saigon had a separate delegation then the NLF would have
Recent
one also. Various ways to resolve this have been suggested in past days
including that Saigon would head the Allied delegation, with Mssrs.
Harriman and Vance taking a second role--which seems to be unacceptable
to the Americans. The latest proposal-which would be a classic--would
be that the hawkish Vice President Nao Ky would lead the Saigon
delegation-no matter where it was assigned to sit.
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zcze sag
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dialogue 16 (normass/deepe)
The question of the ceasefire is only beginning to shape up as the
Saigon government projects developments after the bombing halt, after the
next phase of the talks begins and after the Americand and Hanoi agree to
bilateral disengagement of foreign troops. At that point, the Saigon
government would be "nose-to-nose"
Communist infrastrace infrastructure in a number of villages throughout the
OVER VAST Areas of the Coun
country ceasefire would freeze the political control of the Viet Cong
Sen OR U. ETNAM
with a highly deep disciplined
and,
es one official explained, "instead of having two Vietnams, we'd
have hundreds. The map of South Vietnam would be freckled with hundreds
of separate entities.
"If the American force us to have an early ceasefire," he continued,
"we'11 just give the whold country to the Communists because they'll
get it anyway. They'll lay down their weapons and run into the cities.
They'11 we be everywhere, the government won't be able to stop them
and you'll have chaos instead of peace. We need time to weed out the
infrastr infrastructure or else there will be red flags all over this
country."
END
==mare reuter
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Date
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1968, Oct. 31
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Subject
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United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic); Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Diplomacy
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F39
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
