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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-01380 to 363-01393.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-01380 to 363-01393
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Title
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Article about demilitarized zone tactics
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Description
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Original title: "dmz tactics." Original caption: "This is the second of a two-part series on developments along the demilitarized zone, Vietnam." Article by Keever about military operations around the demilitarized zone. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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2020 sas
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tactics 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the second of a two-part series on developments along the
demilitarized zone, Vietnam AS Speculation Reigns of AN
American bombing Halt just north of the line.),
WITH THE U. S. THIRD MARINE DIVISION, ALONG THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE,
VIETNAM,
OCTOBER 16-Marine units operating around the former
combat base of Khe Sanh have developed unique and highly mobile
tactics-helicopter hopscotching along the mountain hilltops.
For roughly thirty miles along the Demilitarized Zone--from the
beginning of the northern hill-lands westward towards the Laotian border-
the Marines have dotted the tops of razor-back ridgelines and isolated
Whole
peaks with a checkerboard of artillery bases, helicopter landing zones
the size of three pingpong tables and bunkered patrol basos that look
like igloos of green sandbags y silhouetting against the jungle.
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tactics 2 (normass/deepe)
More than 135 landing zones--some only large enough to land one
orethan
hellot helicopter at a time--and more than 15 fire support bases for artillery
and infantry units have been hacked on the
out of the ridgelines and
On top of mountain peaks. The terrain is cleared either by chain saws or
air-dropped demolitions,
EVEN RANDom
and occasionally evey bomb craters are
once;
used.
Not all these hilltop bases are utilized at one many are vacated by ground
as area,
When the
Thus,
troops as they are helicoptered from one hilltop to another.
Morinos leave, they denude the sandbags from the tops of the bunkers-so
that American aircraft can keep the positions under observations.
far, the Communists have not boot booby trapped or occupied any of the
Marine-created positions.
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tactics 3 (normass/doepe)
observation
Some strategic positions are manned constantly--but with a rotation
AS
of uniteren Marine units. Some bases were held by the Marines
loci look-outs even during the siege of Khe Sanh. One of these bases is
atop Hill 950, where minefiled minefields laid by the French, the Communists
and the Americans engulf the Marines into an area the size of a football field;
ad Hg 11 950 is considered strategic because it over-sees the northwest
CommuniST
passage for infiltration inte from Laos into South Vietnam.
Monkey-like animals harrass the mar Marines on Hill 950 by throwing
baseball-sized rooks at them; the Marines call them "rock-a apes."
wooden platform half the size of a tennis court serves as the holipad;
of the bigger helicopters can land only on their rear wheels,
the passengers out the rear gate, as the nose and front wheels of the
a
helicopter is tunedeskyward powered skyward.
A
some
while letting
One helicopter carrying a
Marine brigadier general has already crash-landed at the mini-pad and the
officer was returned to the United States for medical care.
The 150-some landing zones and fire support bases have all been given names,
SUCH AS CATES AND SHEPHARD
several al named after xmamamamautem former Marine Corps commandants,
SUCH AS MARGO AND BECKY, AND
several after girls,) several after birds, such as Robin and Havis and
Mallard. One is also named Winchester, which caused the Navy chaplain to
erect a simple altar amidst the jungled trees near the base and exclaim,
"Ah, what could be b better. Winchester Cathedral!
"
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tactics 4 (normass/deepe)
WHICH take two days to prepare,
The small hilltops clearings enable the Marines to employ a sort of
as distinct from the ground
shotgun,
or splatter-e type of mobility,
mobility the Marines failed to achieve at Khe Sanh before it was besieged
by larger Communist formations.
"Since the Khe Sanh siego was lifted," one senior Marine officer
explained, "the Marines have i doubled the their helicopter-lift
capabilities up here.. The U. S. Army's 1st of the 5th Mechanized Brigade
has taken over responsibilities along the DMZ near the seacoast. The Marines
have large, heavy ground maneuver elements that can defeat the enonyashew
even when he's in the moutains and in the jungle, even though he can move
susenetueri in on us from his sanctuaries in Laos or North Vietnaam.
Enemy
"The Marines are convinced the only way to keep them from threatening
other points in the populated areas of Quang Tri province is to move Marines
Where
EL
out when and whenever we can find the enemy. We concentration on finding the
enemy from out-clear-out landing zones-and then wo put Marines in the
Him.
middle of the enemy
enemy
g this area..
BE
We have cleared and now maintain landing zones all over
marinder.
If a bette battalion runs out of t'enemy and
sometime-is-more productive elsewhere,
Would
the Marines are moved. We move these
battalions around helter-skelter. We try to pull back the Marine troops for
rest for one or two days out of every eight or nine days--but the main thing
for us is to keep after the enemy."
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tactics 5 (normass/deepe)
Other tactical features in this ridgeline-leapfrogging operation include:
1. The integration of artillery and infantry units in the same
frontline location. As one officer explained, "This is the first time a
infantry and artillery have been togo so close together in one fire support
base since the American Civil War, when the artillery accompanied the
infantry to the battlefield. We have found that we can not maintain
forward infantry pobl positions without the artillery and we can't leave
the artillery alone without infantry protection from seepens a Communist
GROUND
sappers and me units. So, we have put them together on one hilltop.
But, neither the max infantry nor the artillery units can go anywhere from
here without the helicopters-which is the key to the operation."
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tactics 6 (normass/deepe)
2. In the three-dimensional jungled terrain,, the Marines now
are heli-dropped on the hilltops and begin patrolling downwards into the
3. NCR
xin This is a rather significant change from the past,ap
valleys.
with
time
прив
the lifting of the Khe Sanh siege in A. From the beginning of
the DUIZ operation in 19 mid-1966, the Marines
heli-bedrops were
captives of suitable landing zones-mostly in the valleys and then the
often
troopers were often forced to marching uphill against sometimes against
Communist dug-in positions.
an
The difference between marching from the hilltops downwards instead
of the valleys up the jagged hillsides to the peaks is saving the Marines
incredible amount of time and energy. One Marine battalion commander
pointed out one of his company positions only sax half mile away on the
map--but a tangled, steep ridgeline away. He said it took his company
445 minutes to walk down the hill-but eight hours to walk back up it.
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tactics
(normass/deepe)
initiative
Dm2,
on the western flank of the
These mobile tactics have enabled the Marines to regain the tactical
One other helpful factor for
them is that the Marine line companies are now at their greatest strength
EVEN
to date in the war; en many Marine companies wore understrength/as the
Marines landed in Vietnam in 1965; now the companies are up to strength,
informed sources reporty up to a 150 to 180 men per company because
on-700-4 The reason has been that only 700 W Vietnam-veterans & of
the 27th Marines were withdrawal in September, and the rest of the
regiment was assigned to Marine units along the DMZ.
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tactics 8 (normass/deepe)
Further east, on the seaside flank of the DMZ, the introduction of
the U. S. Army 5th Mechanized Brigade has also enhanced Allied mobility,'
there, thus freeing Marines and Vietnamese troops from their bunkered
outposts and barbed barb-wired installations such as at Con Thien.
Initial reports indicate that the 5th Mechanized Brigade,
which replaced the
27 ty th Marines, is having trouble with Communist land mines and ambushes.
Some fear the monsoon rains in the sand-dune and shaggy brush environment will
further hamper the tanks and other tracked vehicles in the brigade. Already
operation to join up with Marines in the rolling "peidmont" hills into
one
the DMZ has been cancelled, informed sources report, because the Army's armor
could not cope with the terrain.
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tactics 9 (normass/deepe)
Like the Communists,
the Marines are faced with two immediate
problems the monsoons and malaria. Malaria is considered far worse a
problem for the Communists than it is for the Marines Many aen Communist
prisoners talk of heavy losses to their units because of fevers. But, it
is serious for the Marines too. Casualties from the "fever of unkown
unknown origin"--which turn out to be malaria 80 per cent of the time-are
WAR.
equal to combat casualties during quiet days of the way At times,
the fevers run so high that Marines are given emergency helicopter evacuation
Ale
off the frontlines for treatment; there have been several fatalities
Allied military personnel in the two northern provinces are taking daily
supplemental anti-malaria pills, which has resulted in a 50 per cent drop
in the casualty rates and lessened the seriousness of the disease.
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tactics 10 (normans/deope)
Just how much the monsoon "goo"--as piloto call it will reduce the
Marine mobility, heliborne operations and resupply missions is open to question;
commanders say the monsoons will definitely reduce the coale and efficiency
of the mobile operations. The northeast monsoons will probably prove less
disasterous to the Communists than the outgoing monsoons, which have for
the past ocveral months drenched their roads on the Inotion aido of the
mountains.
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tactics 11 (normass/deepe)
One can not but sense the profound irony of the new Marine operations
along the DMZ, and the Army operations in the province just south of it,
in comparison with previous periods of the war. When the Marines landed
in the populated coastal lowlands in 1965, they sought to fight the
Against local guerrillas
counter-insurgency war and to secure the local population. They
A.
pooh-poohed the Army's hectic holiborne search-and-destroy operations
into the remote, jungled and spare sparesely populated areas. The Marines
resisted operating along the DMZ in search elusive North Vietnamese units--
until directly ordered by General William C. Westmoreland in 19 mid-1966.
Now, the two services up here have changed roles--with neither the Marines
nor the Army seeming to realizing it. Now, in Thua Thien province, the
Army's two elite, airmobile divisions-the 101st and 1st Cavalry-are
in the lowlands and the Army commanders are as enthusiastic about weeding
out the Communist "infrastructure" and protecting the local population as
the Marines were in 1965. And, the Marine commanders along the DMZ
into Remotearess
Helicopter
are now enthusiastic about) operations) that they had once criticized the
Army for launching.
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ta oties 12 (normass/deepe)
While the Marines have regained the tactical offensive along the DMZ,
the Communists continue to hold the strategic initiative. The D
DMZ
has consistently been one of two places where the Allies have been on
the strategic defensive, the second place being the long defense line
of the U. S. Army 4th Infantry Division stretching fire le fanning out
from Pleiku and facing the Cambodian-Laotian borders. The political
rules of engagemont under which the Allied commanders have been ordered
their
to fight have prohibited from crossing the Ben Hai river into North
Vietnam and into Laos and Cambodia, where the Communists softer skitter
to seek refuge while retraining and regrouping.
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tactics 13 (normass/deepe)
the following
This strategic initiative gives the Communists the advantages, which
could cause the tactical situation to flipflop significantly
vå thout a cessation of the bombing over North Vietnam,
atopia of wide speculation.
een in Saigon:
with or
currently
widelyay
1. The proximity of North V Vietnam gives the Communists their
shortest supply routes for war materials and their fastest replacement
capability.
AND
"I'll tell you how fast the Communists can replace their castutie
casualties along the DMZ," one Marine officer explained. "We completely
battered the 320th Division this summer, they rece it broke contacty
exfiltrated from South Vietnam. Then the 320th was re-introduced with the
same cadre but fresh troops and re re-established contact. All of this
happened in 11 days-and to the best of my knowledge that is a record. "
2. The second advantage is that from North Vietnam the Communists
can employ their tube artillery with more intensity and effectiveness than
e from any other place into the South. Their ammunition
supply lines are shot shorter, which gives them leeway for heavier bombardments,
and they face fewer problems in moving their artillery into their invisible
positions inside the ses of mountains.
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tactics 14 (normass/deepe)
It is not only the intensity of ar Communist artillery fire in the past,
but also its accuracy on fixed Marine instellion installations which
causes concern among the Marines. During the summer months, Communist
artillery fired into the Marines' huge logistical base of Dong Ha three
times. The first round of each barrage hit a prime target. Once, the first
round hit a Marines ajuri ammunition dump; the second barrage, the first
round hit a fuel supply point; oné the third barrage, the first round hit
another ammunition dump.
Here
Marine commanders recall here that the siege of Khe Sanh began, not with
an intense Communist artillery barrage, but with an embarrassingly accurate
SHEL
one-the first res hit the Marines ammunition dump, which send "hot rounds
cooking off" around the Marines for 12 hours.
Likewise, one of the first
rounds in mid-May against the U. S. Army 1st Air Cavalry ignited the R.
Depot
American ammunition dup-which in turn destroyed and damaged more than
1 roughly 100 helicopters.
Marine commanders and troops "just feel" the Communist artillery is
being positioned still being positioned in North Vietnam and Laos to
at any time.
"zap" at their "sitting-duck instation installations, "/No one is
predicting when it happen,
4
==end reuter
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Date
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1968, Oct. 16
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam Demilitarized Zone (Vietnam); Strategy
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Location
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Demilitarized Zone, Vietnam
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Coordinates
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17.0021; 107.0509
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Size
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21 x 27 cm
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Container
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B6, F10
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections
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Language
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English
