Article on withdrawal from the demilitarized zone

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363-01350 to 363-01362.pdf
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363-01350 to 363-01362
Title
Article on withdrawal from the demilitarized zone
Description
Original title: "withdrawal dmz." Article by Keever on the US and South Vietnamese withdrawal from the demilitarized zone
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript
zczc sag Sorry - could you please return this to me sometime. Thanks, Bev. yy nnm withdrawal 1 (normass/deepe) WITH U. S. THIRD MARINE DIVISION, ALONG THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, VIETNAM, OCTOBER 12--The Allied defense line all along Vietnam's demilitarized zone would probably be forced to make an orderly, but strategic RETREAT southwards if the bombing of North Vietnam ceases without adequate, iron-clad guarantees of tit-for-tat de-escalation by the Communists. This is the view of the senior commanders here in Saigon. Even if the North Vietnamese agree to the "restoration of The DMZ" by withdrawing their ground troops from the six-mile-wide zone in return for cessation of the American "acts of war Marine tactical commanders still would be unhappy. For, in their view, the real threat to Allied defenses along the DMZ is not a massive ground invasion through the DMZ--but it is Communist artillery from North Vietnam, across the 6 six-mile-wide zone and onto American Marine, Army and Vietnamese Army installations and mobile operations of BASES. Currently the Allies have quieted Communist artillery in North Vietnam and the DMZ by lightning counter-attacks of air, and artillery once it is fired. ==more Reuter. zczc sag yy nnm withdrawal 2 (normass/deepe) One Saigon-based officer close to American commander, General Creighton W. Abrams, opened up the possibility of an Allied withdrawal along the DMZ when he said: "You can not repeat not have Americans or Vietnamese near the DMZ with people shooting at them from north of the Ben Hai river (which separates North and South Vietnam) and we can not shoot back. You just can not have that. We've just got to be able to shoot back. It's a military rule and without that the situation is intolerable. You can not have Americans being shot at without letting them shoot back. You just can't run it that way." --more reuter zczc sag yy nnm withdrawal 3 (normass/deepe) Officially, there is yet no repeat no decision for an Allied retreat southwards in the event of a cessation of bombing over North Vietnam that would be disadvantageous to American and Vietnamese troops. "We'll make the necessary decisions when that time comes," one high-ranking source explained. Anyhow, for American tactical commanders along the DMZ, they know the decision will be made at much higher level than theirs. But, these tactical commanders along the DMZ are emphatic about the following poitns of the bombing of North Vietnam ceases without adequate guarantees for ceessation of Communist artillery and ground movements across the zone: --more reuter zczc sag yy nnm withdrawal 4 (normass/deepe) 1. In its current form, the Allied defense line along the 40-mile long DMZ clearly would be untenable without suffering heavy personnel and material losses. 2. Hence, a Lop-sided Halt to the bombing of the North would demand a critical, strategic re-appraisal of the Allied defense line all along the DMZ. 3. In making that strategic re-appraisal, there are only two options for the Allies--either to dig deeper or to retreat south out of the range of Communist artillery. But, even to dig deeper into bunkered positions does not strike the tactical commanders as a very probable solution--for they run the high-risk of intensive And accurate, artillery bombardment reminiscent of the Khe Sanh siege days. The Allied DMZ defense line is suspended into three sides of a strategic box; Allied troops can not move further east because of the South China Sea; they can not move further west or north because of the political boundaries with North Vietnam or Laos. Hence, then can only retreat south--or begin digging in deeper. ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm withdrawal 5 (normass/deepe) "If the government stops the bombing, we would have to have a very careful evaluation of our present dispositions," one tactical commander who had already thought out such consequences, explained. "We can't sit under bombardment from the North without hardened sites (manning brun Karry). They'd chew us up little by little. Now they can open up and we can immediately counter with our air and artillery because we maintain constant air cover over the North. "Otherwise, the Americans and Vietnamese would have to dig in deeper and take Communist fire as at Con Thien--or else to withdraw southwards. But, then one asks--how far south can we go? This decision would have to be made at a pretty high level--either to stay where we are in hardened sites or to withdraw." --more reuter zczc sag yy nnm withdrawal 6 (normass/deepe) Any strategic withdrawal from the DMZ would involve more than 20,000 American Marines and soldiers, plus Vietnamese infantrymen and armor, as well as additional thousands of support-type personnel in the headquarters-logistical complexes. The withdrawal would be designed to pull these Allied installations and units out of the range of the Communists' whomping 130-millimeter artillery, the Communists most dependable, accurate and long-range artillery used to date. It was this artillery directed from both the North and from Laos which pounded the American Marines at the Khe Sanh combat base earlier this year. The 130-millimeter artillery has a maximum range of 27,000 meters--or 16.2 repeat 16.2 miles. If the North Vietnamese based and continued to shoot their artillery from immediately north of the DMZ, then the Allies would be forced to withdraw from such major positions as the huge refugee resettlement and the district town of Cam Lo, the massive American artillery position at Camp Carroll, the forward supply base of Dong Ha, from headquarters command areas along Route 9, and from tens of smaller outposts tapping the electric sensors of the McNamara line and more than one Hundred mobile operational bases, which the Marines now use to enhance their heliborne mobility. ==more reuter zczc sag yy nnm withdrawal 7 (normass/deepe) For the Marine commanders, the immediate significance of the bombing of North Vietnam is that the Allies have fairly well suppressed the Communist artillery from the North and from the DMZ by quick-reaction air and artillery counter- strikes. The tactical mechanics of suppressing Communist artillery fire revolves around constant airborne alert of small, two-seater spotter plans which keep the whole DMZ Region under consistent observation. Whenever Communist artillery is fired, the little spotters try to catch a glimpse of the flash and smoke to detect the location while American ground units use the "flash-bang" system of computing roughly how long the artillery round is in the air and from the rough location that it was fired. Then American tactical aircraft as well as artillery are called to retaliate within minutes on the specific or general map coordinates from which the Communist artilery was fired. --more reuter zczc sag yy nnm withdrawal 8 (normass/deepe) "Cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam could be disastrous for us," said Maj. Gen. Raymond Davis, the Korean War Medal of Honor winner who now commands the Third Marine Division. "Most of our positions near the DMZ would be subject to Communist artillery without adequate capability for us to respond. We rely on our air observation and airstrikes to keep this Communist artillery down. "We aren't that worried about a Communist ground push. They enemy does not have enough ground forces at this time to cause us immediate concern. But, the enemy's artillery is different. It is clearly a fact--and we have gone through this before--that when we gain the upper hand along the DMZ the enemy calls for a cessation of the bombing--and then he increases his supply and troop movements. After every ceasefire during the past three years, the Communists have moved in their heavy artillery and we had to go in and bomb it out. Now, if the enemy agrees not to shoot over the DMZ, it would solve part of that problem." --more reuter zczc sag yy nnm withdrawal 9 (normass/deepe) During the past several months, the Communist artillery, which once consistently raked the whole DMZ area, has been relatively quiet not only because American tactical air and artillery firepower have acted in split-second fashion to counter it, but also because of B-52 Strategic Air Command raids along the zone as well as because of heavy flooding and muddy roads which prevented massive Communist replacement of supplies and destroyed artillery pieces. --more reuter zczc sag yy nnm withdrawal 10 (normass/deepe) Even if the bombing and "other acts of war" are ceased over North Vietnam, American commanders are along the DMZ are insistent they Should retain the option of using unarmed air reconnaissance. "The American government can never give up their right to air reconnaissance," one Marine aviator emphasized, "and we never will. Even though Eisenhower was embarrassed by it--we still kept our aur reconnaissance going. Anyhow, everyone uses air reconnaissance every day--the Soviets are reconning the United States every day with their satellites. We will just have to keep some reconnaissance of some sort over North Vietnam to see if they're massing southwards." --more reuter zczc sag yy nnm withdrawal 11 (normass/deepe) For the Marine commanders, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey's campaign speeches urging "restoration of the DMZ" by the North Vietnamese in exchange for American cessation of the bombing over the North seems extravagantly out of step with the tactical situation facing the Allies. Whether or not the Communist ground troops withdraw from the DMZ seems irrelevant to the Marine officers--the hectic battles result when the Communists push through the DMZ to South Vietnam. Even if the Communists would agree not to transit through the DMZ, they could still bring men and supplies in through Laos, and dump them in the rear of the Marines--behind the Allied DMZ line--or else move them further south even as far as the greater Saigon perimeter. This would not be much of a concession by the Communists, in the eyes of the Marines. Clearly, the Marines would want all this southward flow of men and materials stopped--whether it comes straight across the DMZ or through Laos. In addition, they want airtight guarantees the Communist artillery bombardments across the DMZ would cease. for Marines who remember all too well the artillery poundings at Con Thien and Khe Sanh, as well as sporadic fire at almost every other installation, this is a crucial demand. --more reuter zczc sag yy nnm withdrawal 12 (normass/deepe) One other immediate, significant point of concern to the tactical commanders is the shifting monsoon winds along the DMZ. Monsoon rains prevail along the DMZ during most of the year--but the important question is whether, as the in winds shift, they are advantageous to either the Allies or to the Communists. At this time, the Southeast monsoon rains are disadvantageous for the Communists; the Laotian side of the mountains are rain-swept; their supply trails and roads are wet and in some cases the rivers that must be crossed are flooded. But, within a matter of weeks, the Northeast monsoon begins, inundating the Allied-held populated coastal plains--where are also based logistical depots--and smothering the Marine-held mountaintops in clouds, fog and mist during most of the coming months until February or March. When these monsoons hamper Marine helicopter mobility and tactical air support, the Communist roads and trails are in good shape for rapid trafficking. if, the Marines argue, the bombing of the North is stopped at a disadvantage to the Allies along the li DMZ, then this plus the other two factors combined would further jeopardize prospects of holding the 40-mile-long muddy line. --more reuter zczc sag yy nnm withdrawal 13 (normass/deepe> Other military officers haven’t criticized the American cessation of the bombing over the northern portions of North Vietnam in March, just as the weather over Hanoi-Haiphong became most favorable for Allied airstrikes--and when the Communists were in the best position to import supplies. "The weather has consistently been a factor the Communists have played to their advantage and we have ignored," one senior military officer explained. "Now, there are so many supplies in North Vietnam the country is about to sink." --end reuter
Date
1968, Oct. 12
Subject
Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam Demilitarized Zone (Vietnam); Strategy
Location
Demilitarized Zone, Vietnam
Coordinates
17.0021; 107.0509
Size
20 x 26 cm
Container
B6, F10
View Folder in ArchivesSpace
Format
dispatches
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Collector
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections
Language
English