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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05037 to 363-05047.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05037 to 363-05047
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Title
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Article about the Nixon campaign's communication with South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "nixon", Keever's title: "Nixon Camp's Purported Encouragement led Saigon and request(?) them to Forgo Paris Peace Conference", Article draft about the Nixon campaign's efforts to sabatoge negotiations in Vietnam to benefit their candidate, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-10. The article starts with a note from Keever to her editor for following article, page 1. The note explains why the following article is long and defends the need for details to convey the diplomatic confusion around the Paris peace talks.
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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zcze sag
yy nnm
editorial note 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, NO VEMBER 4--We have avery detailed playbyplay of the
final bunker-thieu confrontations and the precise reasons why the
Vietnamese backed out of going to Paris. It is very dramatic
and fascinating stuff--and is one of the Exis worst periods
im American diplomacy.
However,
There was an incredible mixup in it all.
to make it comprehensible it needs word length to
capture the full drama tand the intricate singinificances of
the details. It impinges on the elections and Johnson's whole
scheme of as well as developments in Paris--and the whole political
point of the bombing halt as being xxxx nearly a giveaway to
Hanoi. I suggest a series of several articls of about 1200
words each, if you can squeeze all this in during the electiom
spree. But to do a really good job, we have to have the
space to get the quotes, fax flavor and description to make the
story come alive. What do you think? Eagaxdxmx@xmxm Please urgent
your reply. Regards Bev.
=end reuter
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- Page 2
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zozo sag
yy nnm
nixon 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, NOVEB NOVEMBER 4-Purported political encouragement from the
Richard Nixon camp was a significant factor in the last-minute decision of
President Nguyen Van Thieu's refusal to send a delegation to the Paris peace
talks--at least until the American Presidential election is over.
In a wide-angle view, one of the most decisive moments of the
Vietnam war--settling the conditions for ending it is thus moving in
parallel with the most indecisive moments of the American democratic process--
Presidential election time. For the Allies here--this is one of the gravest
moments--because the anti-Communist alliance is momentarily blown sky-high
at a time when
MAXIMUM
1800
test unity is needed to meet a solid position STAND
from Has the Vietnamese Communists.
==more reuter
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- Page 3
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8050 sag
yy nnm
nixon 2 (normass/deope)
Informed sources report the Saigon government understood that the
Half D
Nixon camp had urged it to maintain a firm position and that when the
Republican candidate was elected President, he would support President
STAND
Hence, at least in the eyes of the
Thieu's Ishinomn strong position.
Vietnamese government, the American Presidential election determines for
them, timimmatum part of their potential role at the Paris peace talks--
and the future of t: South Vietnamese South Vietnam. The Saigon government
Report B
vious that President Lyndon Johnson virtually gapitulated to the Communists
Es part
by allowing the coprauto seating of the National Liberation Front delegation
in Paris against the son consistent refusal of Saigon to accept its because
it would à probably lead to a col coalition government and an eventual
Communist take-over in Geowth South Vietnam.
more reuter
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- Page 4
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2020 sag
yy nnm
nixon 3 (normass/deepe)
Nixon has publicly vetoed a coalition government errage arrangement for
South Vietnam senior Vietnamese government officials say they can not
repeat not understand Vice President Humphrey's Hubert Humphrey's "double-talk"
Herce
on Vietname who
1
By was
on Nov. 5.
Saigon, HAS Nothing to Lose
Eleste & Presid
Informed sources say that during the more than two weeks of sessions
these
between the Thieu government and American Embassy officials, two
official:
points became increasingly clear to the Vietnamese govermen
1.
Hanoi was not making any real concessions in return for the
bombing halt at boat there might be some vague understanding between the
Americans and Hanoi-which Hanoi could twist and back out of when it wanted
to.
The Saigon government wanted concrete pledges from Hanoi-in writing
as to what the North Vietnamese were giving up. The American officials
could not repeat not produce it and one sy simply said, "We can not
forms
repeat not expect anything definite from Hanoi." in And
more reuter
Report
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- Page 5
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2020 Sag
yy nnm
nixon 4 (normass/deepe)
2. The Thiou government was never told explicitly by the American
Allow
representatives that President Johnson had agreed to alow the National
Liberation Front delegation as a separate delegation at Paris. The American
officials would only say the negative-that--not the could not repeat
not guarantee Saigon the National Liberation Front would not repeat show up
as a separate delegation. It was not repeat not real really
until President Johnson's halt-the-bombing speech that the Vietnamese, offices
reading between the lines, realized that Johnson had virtually capitulated
to Hanoi's demand for a separate NLF delegation.
Then, shortly before
Thieu's speech on Saturday, radio reports broadcasts here carried the
North Vietnamese press conference in Paris, saying that Hanoi was preparing
for a four-power conference with a separate
turned out to be the firmest
and this the heel confirmation
delegation frej from the NLF.--
HAD Receive D.
the Saigon government The 1050
tim Saigon government had na consistently told the American
officials here it would refuse to sit with the delegation a separate
Sagon offe
NLF delegation-and when President Johnson put them on the spot, they defied
hime thus putting Washington in an even more glazing more embarrassing
position.
more reuter
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- Page 6
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2020 sag
yy nnm
nixon 5 (normass/deepe)
Throughout the bargaining sessions
As the bargaining sessions on progressed from October 15 16,
the South Vietnamese started asking more and more questions--and began
receiving vaguer and vaguer answers from the Americans.
The pivotal
week was the last week of October-and this is when the reports of Nixon's
support started coming into Saigon. At the same time--and probably even more-
significant the Vietnamese government itself was becoming more and more
unified in refusing to make too many concessions to Hanoi. And, with
the encouragement from Nixon, Saigon-gra the Saigon government gradually
decided to call President Johnson's bluff and refuse to send the delegation
to Paris.
more reuter
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- Page 7
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zozo sag
yy nnm
nixon 6 (normass/deepe)
The only known written report about the alleged Nixon support for
the Thieu government was a cable from Bui Diom, Vietnamese Ambassador to
Washington, which was received at the Foreign Ministry in Saigon on October
sources close to the Ministry report. In it, Th the Vietnamese
ambassador said that the Nixon camp had urged Saigon to maintain a firm
stand and when elected President, Nixon would further support the Saigon
government's position. The cable damax reportedly does not specify that
28,
Bui Diem had seen Nixon personally, nor does it mention the name of any
Nixon aide. Nor, does it specify just what the conversation and Nixon's
ED.
support actually covers As often hepers happens here in many, dele
delicato Vietnamese-American discussions, just what an American says and
means is sometimes vastly different than the Vietnamese interprete
what is said and meant.
more reuter
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- Page 8
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2020 886
yy nnm
nixon 7 (normass/deepe)
But,
verbal
aside from the cable to the Foreign Ministry, there were also
verbal messages that filtered into Thieu. One of these messages Came
messages came from an official Vietnamese delegation, which had been in
the U. S. since early September. Besides it official duties, Thiou had
also detailed the delegation to contest both Nixon the Nixon and Humphrey Date
camps to forret out what might happen to South Vietnam no matter which was
elected the next President.
This delegation, which was originally scheduled
to remain in the U. S. until after the election-rushed back to Saigon the
final wook in October. It also made an assessment to the government on the
American election prospects and also reportedly urged the government to
pporte
remain firm because of the alleged backing from the Nixon camp.
semore reuter
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- Page 9
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2020 sag
yy nnm
nixon 8 (normass/deepe)
Just how substantive and specific these puport purported assurances
from the Nixon camp were in fact is not repeat not exactly known here. But,
the significant things point is that the Thieu government interpreted them
as meaning something substantive. And hence, 1 Thiou decided inextr
boxone to rebuke Johnson, to refuse to send the delegation to Paris,
and to make his next move after the election when Nixon might be the
In the eyes of the Saigon officials, consider
Presidential-designate.
Johnson as a lame-duck President-they call him a "dead-duck Pi, President-
Cent
and do not repeat not believe he will have a full authority to a make decisions
without consulting his successor after the elections.
AND
1100
In short, the Saigon government reportedly thought decided it could
not repeat not lose any more than Johnson had already given away to Hanoi-ad
they fix might have alot to gain if Nixon were elected. Also, Thieu's
highly nationalistic speech, and-position of refusing to send the delegation
No
to Paris has enhanced his position to the point where, if nonese, he can afford
internally to make some concessions. But, serious observers here believe
it is still virtually impossible for Thieu to make an about-face and sit
down with the National Liberation Front as an independent delegation.
= more reuter
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- Page 10
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2020 886
yy nam
nizon 9 (nozmass/doope)
Even so,
the whole decision to refuse to nond the delegation to Paris
was dangling in mid-air until virtually the last minute before Thieu's
mid-morning specch last Saturday before the joint session of legislatures.
Earlier in the morning, the Foreign Ministry had eo evon issued a mild
Am
formal statement withdrawing Saigon's opposition to Wah Washington's unilateral
cessation of the bombing. Western diplomats believed that Thiou had
"caved in" to pressure from Bunker. The key factor seemed to be a
-to the American officials
last-minute compromise proposal made ix by the government, at the suggestion
of Vice President Ky Nguyen Cao Kys
that a Saigon delegation go to Paris
and consult privately with Hanoi's delegation before any formal opening of
thexxx now phase of the peace talks.
The Saigon government wanted
to establish with Hanoi "the rules of the game;" Saigon was afraid Hanoi
would simply uno the Paris peace talks as "an insulting platform" to
donegrate the South Vietnamese and other Allies. But, the American
DEPORTEDLY
officiale vetood the plan, saying these preliminaries could go on for years
and that Washington was in a rush.
more reuter
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- Page 11
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2020 986
yy nnm
nixon 10 (normass/deepe)
After t & l.s. Resection,
509'
thon Thieu unleashed his bombshell speech on November 2.
Unable to get anything concrete in writing from the American officialdom
here, Thiou buttressed his position by simply pulling out the joint
HAD
communique of the last time he personally had met with President Johnson
in Honolulu less than three months ago. The joint & hic communique
int on the Thieu-Johnson talks specifies "that the Republic of Vietnam
should be a full pa rticipant playing a leading role in discussions
concerning the substance of a final settlement." The more significant phrase
is in the next to last paragrair paragrph paragraph specifying that the
Paris talks "should lead to negotiations involving directly North Vietnam
Would Not
and South Vietnam," which implies that the National Liberation Front is
not repeat not represented as a separate delegation.
Thieu pointedly recalled the Honolulu communique in his bombshell
speech, implying that President Johnson had reneged on his previous promises
and a dramatically ropudiated Johnson while waiting to see who the nort
whom American voters would elect as the next American President.
==end router
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Date
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1968, Nov. 4
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Subject
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Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913-1994; Presidents--Election--1968; United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic); Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Peace treaties; Diplomacy
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F39
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
