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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04324 to 363-04339.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04324 to 363-04339
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Title
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Article about a North Vietnamese defector
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Description
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Original title "dac", Keever's title : "Viet cong Turncoat: Battlefield Determines Political Negotiation." Article about a press conference with Tran Van Dac, a North Vietnamese defector. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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zcze sag
yy 1jp
dac 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, MAY 16--The most important Communist turncoat to date
in the war was presented before a barrago of klieg lights and a full battalion
of Vietnamese and foreign journalists. In the small cramped, sweltering
conference room, amidst the flairing tempers of his inquisitioners,
His Presed but
Communist political commissar seemed to remain the coolest
the
creature in the roam,
a
The ex-Communist, named Tran Van Dac,
government side-l on April 19-and by doing so,
had defected to the
had tipped off the
Allied command about the Communists May offensive which dovetailed with
the announced
scheduling of the Washington-Hanoi peace talks in Paris.
His appearance beckoned not only a large number of Saigon's press corps,
but also several military policemen, moram one of which wore a
pair of sunglasses dangling from' one side of his shirt and a mack
snub-nosed machinegun on the other side.
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zcze sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
dac 2 (normass/deepe)
and his
The 44-year-old commissar talked with his hands, his eyes
Soft-spoke N
hardened dimples, like giant parentheses,
eyebrows as well as with words;
framed his lips, whether he was talking or smiling.
almond-eyes danced through his inquistioners;
he
His intense, narrowly
retained
med a confident,
if not superior or condescending attitude, though under his chair, his
in a
sandalled feet pivoted into the
worn floor boards. He was dressed
simple brown sports shirt,
but he sported a wrist watch. His
hair bristled out of his head like that of an overgrown crewcut.
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2020 Bag
Jy 1jp
doc 3 (norma ss/deope)
remarks;
holding rank of 1t. col.,
Somo Vietnamese journalists thought the commissar sincere in his
some Western journalists thought the whole press conference a
ruse played by the Vietnamese government to squeeze propaganda value
from his words. Whichovor the case, many seemed to sonso that his
was a defection from the Communist side which may have the the
swayod
fulcrums of history on the battlefield as the Paris peace talks wore
scheduled to bogin. Two other lieutenant colonols have defected
to the Vietnamese government since Dac's
action.
Flanked by a dozen radio and topo recorder microphonos, the
officer answered questions for an hour.
Excerpts of the most important
questions,
based on official Vietnamo se
government translation, follow
N
Se
ce;
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zcze sag
Jy 1jp
doc 4 (normass/deepe)
Communists'
That was
Thoro did not soon to be a single objective at all to the
second effi offensive (beginning May 5).
the single objective?
Thore was a military objective and a political objective for
the Communists.
Which do you mean?
Wheat was the military objective?
Ao The military purpose of the second Communist offensive was an
effort to reoccupy the positions they the Communists) had held during the
first offensive (called the Tet offensive, beginning January 29). They
made an effort (during the May offensive) to concentrate their troops
in the A, B, C zones 02
of Saigon, but this time the deployment of their
troops is different and the direction of penetration is different (from Tet).
==more reuter
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sese sag
yy 1jp
dno 5 (noma (normass/deepo)
How many troops were involved in this second offensivo?
A. I don't know the entire troop strength for the whole
In the flank I was personally involved in, the troops
included at least three infantry regiments, one artillery regiment and
a number of local units. We were to attack the military installations
offensive.
north of Saigon.
Will he confirm or deny the that many Communists units at this
time did not know the objective? Does he know that?
Aa It was possibly very true some Communist units did not know
what their targets were. However, the Communists had scorets
teams and andre go into the city to make reconnaissance of the target areas
in the city, but this was not onough. It is easy for the Viet Cong units
to get lost in the city for two reasons.
First, because the olomonts
in charge of loading the penetration into the city wore not (my)
numorous enough.
Second,
the Viet Cong are used to fighting in the rice
paddios and the jungle, rather than the cities.
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8030 986
yy 1jp
dac 6 (normass/deepe)
Did the Communists get much help from the people of Saigon?
A. During the Tot offensive, the Viet Cong were hoping
they would win militarily, but actually they have failed and they did not
receive any cooperation from the people of saigon. In the soconf offensive,
the failure was even worse.
°
and if so,
Was the offensive designed to coincide with the Paris posce talks,
was this the reason for the delay in the offensive?
Ao I know the Communists planned to launch their offensive on April 27,
but they waited until May 5. One reason for the dolay was the Communists
wanted to be better prepared for the socond offensive be because they had
faced many difficulties during the first offensive, because of difficulties
of supplies of weapons and ammunition and the operations of the government and
Allied troops. The second reason for the delay, it should be because of
my rallying to the government side, The third reason possibly should have
been concorned with peace talks,
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zC2c sag
Jy lip
dac 7 (normass/doope)
Q. Did you personally participate in proparation of the second offensive
in one way or another?
units
Ao I was involved with the preparation of the second offensive in
many ways. I was ordered to make an effort in commanding the Viet Cong
operating around Saigon. Second, I sent Viet Cong cadre
into sigon capital to reconnassiance the targets. Third, I was also
taking care of the transport of weapons into Saigon for the second
offensive. That was just the properation on the material side.
I also worked on the spiritual side. I was ordered to give indoctrination
to may troops, such as, they say the Communists had killed 50,000 enemy;
they destroyed two-thirds of South Vietnam's wor facilities and they have
liberated 1.6 million South Vietnamese people--but I don't agree with that kind
of indoctrination and I didn't give my troops that kind of indoctrination.
That's one of the reasons I rallied to this side.
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2020 306
yy ljp
doc 8 (normass/
s/deepe)
What was the political objective of the Communist second offensive?
the Communist objective during the socond
Polt Politically,
offensive was they were hoping if they won militarily,
the people
of Saigon would go down the streets and demonstrato and uprise, and also
if they won militarily, they would have advantages in the peace talks.
Qe
Do you believe the Viet Cong are preparing a third general
offensive sometime,
somehwere?
Ao Since I rallied to the government side, I don't know anything
about a third general offensive.
We should wait and sec.
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2020 986
Jy 1jp
dac 9 (normass/deope)
Q. Do you
Is a
military
solution possible in Vietnam if the peace talks fail? Could the Allies
or the Communists win the war militarily in three to five years?
Ao The Pro Co Communists have three types of capabilities.
first is military,
the second is political and the third is troop
proselytzing. If they fail in their first two capabilities,
thon
The
the Viet Cong and North Vietnam must go to the negotiating table. But if
negotiations fail, the Communists last resort is to protract the war because
the battlefield determines the political situation.
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zcze sag
Jy 1jp
dac 10 (normass/deepe)
Go
Is this just what you say now, or is this what you learned from
political indoctrinations or what you told your troops?
A. This is a problem the Communist high-ranking officials have
carefully studied. This subject is not publicised to the
lower ranks.
have
Q. How effective h the Communist first and second offensivos
been against Saigon. How would you assess it?
A Hanoi considered the offre two offensives as the biggest victory
that any Communist country has ever achieved in the world. But, for
mo,
I considered it the biggest failure. Boo use militarily,
the
Viet Cong troops could not occupy many important targets and
politically the people did not cooperate with the Communist troops..**
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3020 86
Jy lip
dac 11 (normeas/doepe)
Q. How would you approach A Hanoi at the bargainint bargaining table,
since you know their way of thinking and their psychology.
Ao The Communists used to lie systomatically about the results of
their military actions, but sooner or later they will be unmasked.
The only measure to fighting against the Communist propaganda lies is to
Liko the battle of Phu Tho
let the people know all about the battles.
Or toll tho
people about the impossibility of Viet Cong units gotting into Saigon.
Hoa (ner Saigon). Many Viet Cong wore lying doad there.
the thing we should let the people know all about.
That's
The Communist propaganda
was very well-done. The low-ranking troops believe anything the
high-ranking officials
says,
even when they lie.
So, I have sont
lotters (ir-dropped leaflets) to my comrades to for them to realize this
and to do what I have done.
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S020 ses
Jy 1.jp
dac 12 (normass/deepe)
What about the transportation of heavy weapons into Saigon?
As There are two kinds of weapons.
Heavy weapons and small arms.
The heavy weapons include 122 mm. rockets, 81 and 82 mm, mortars and 75
mo
recoiless rifles. The were transported into saigon by waterway
and the small arms wore issued porsonally to the troops,
thoma
who carried
11 Particularly for the second offensive, they mado
more effort in resupplying the artillery, mostly to be used in support
of infantry movoments.
==nore reuter
Gonore Yogayon Glap, (rth vietnamese com no
ས་ཤིང་ཕྱི་་ཤིས་ག་ཆོས་ཚ་དང་
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280
2020 986
Jy 1jp
dac 13 (normass/doope)
There is a rumor that you're the eighth highest-ranking member
of the COSVN (the Viet Cong high military command). Is that true?
A.
NO...
D.
Where does the Viet Congope replacement strength come from aftor
the first offensive?
A. Communist troops were reinforced by three elemonts for their
second offensive. Most of the reinforcing troops were from North Tietnam.
The second clement were youngstors abducted by the Communists wherever they
Gould. The third eloment was
from the go guerrilla ranks.
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5020 986
yy 1jp
dac 14 (normess/doope)
Q. How much time did you speak with General (William C.)
Westmoreland (commender of Amerig n trop troops in Vietnam) and
what did you talk about?
CUT
I'The first time I was deeply honored to meet with General
Wostmoreland on April 19, the day I defected. It was of only a
briof talk. He asked me why I defected and the battlefield situation.
I said I defected because I was faced with so many difficulties in
commanding my units and I know the Communists won't ever be able to
achieve their purposes militarily. That's why I ralliod to the
government side. I enjoyed my conversation with Goa Gonoral Westmoreland
and he treated me well.
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2020 886
Jy ljp
dac 15 (norme as/deepe)
Q. Why doos Hanoi always refuse to dowlo admit they've sent
their regular army into South Vietnam?
As you know, North Vietnam sends a continuous flow of troops
and weapons to the South, but they don't admit it because they consider
the of moving men from North to the South is not an act of
aggression,
They consider North and South Vietnam as one country.
Yet, the call the act of moving troops from the United States to
South Vietnam as an act of
aggression. Hence, they deny sending
troops to the south so they won't be labelled as aggressors.
A.
Will Ke serve the Vietnamese government?
Since I've left the Communist ide, I docided to serve the
South Vietnamese government as much as possible as soon as possible.
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2020 986
yy 1jp
dac 16 (normass/deepe)
What do you think of po 11
coalition governmont? for
South Vietnam?
સરના
When the Communists talk about coalition, they mean just a
cover (or camouflage). But, in fact, doep in their hearts, they they
do not think of coalition at all. They are trying to gain coalition so
they can seizo more power.. They will tryin time to g in all the power.
We high-ranking officers do not discuss this matter; this problem should be
discussed at a higher level, but wo know the Communists will try three
stops. The first step is military-political. If they fail in this,
they will accept a transitional government and then they will try to
gain e much power as possible until they have all the power. So, I
believe a coalition government is just a camouflage to cover the intime to
foelings of the Communists to gain power. They will talk about the
coalition goverment only at the central government. But, thoy think they
will have full power at the district and village level.
(Hanks I went to the delta yesterday and will file that story plus
a long economic story friday and saturday. regards bov).
==ond reuter
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Date
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1968, May 16
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Subject
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Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam (Republic). Quân lực; Defection; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Defectors--Vietnam; Intelligence service
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6320
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Size
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29 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F32
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
