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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04302 to 363-04315.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04302 to 363-04315
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Title
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Article about the successful Allied counteroffensive around Saigon
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Description
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Original title: "steel", Keever's title: "Allies Pierce Communist's Arc of Steel Around Saigon." Article draft about the Allied counteroffensive that had broken through Communist encirclement of Saigon. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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zcze sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
steel 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, MAY 11-In early May, Communist big-unit forces had formed
"an arc of steel" around the northern tier of Saigon and Tan Son Nhut
airbase.
This movement of Communist steel-power thus began the dramatic
PREdiction
enactment of the first of their foreboding slogan-jingle which had swept
Suburg suburban Saigon a month befores "poow "Blood will flow in May.
Peace will come in June."
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LATR,
But, ten days after their arcing do doployment of
roops
20 Allied
Military
operations had turned this deployment of trope in "an ero of aluminum,"
as one senior Alliod officer explained.
While the are of Communist
strength is still present, it's big-unit combat effectiveness has been
substantially tempered, Allied military sources believe, as has its capability
of a roaring into Saigon proper and the airbase.
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steel 3 (normass/deepe)
A goodly chunk of the succ200 success to dete of the Allied
military operations is openly creditod to an obere obscuro Viet Cong
political comminax who defected to the Vietnamese government on April 19
and outlined a blip blueprint of the Communists second attempted give
s big-unit thrust into
Thus far, Allied milit ry sources
say, the blueprint outlined by defector Tran Van Dac has provod gonerally
accurato as the deme of the
Saigon.
www. full
equiv
drama of the Communists May offensive of more than three ferry division
250,000/mon-ravelled in all around
suburban districts,
AND
RURAL
Saigon, and its
Provinces:
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BENT Communists; attempted May offensive is considered here to
stratogio political purposes one internal international and
have
ono internal,
The international one-to use their military power to grab
a psychological victory as a means of enhancing their bargaining position
in Paris as Washington-Hanol peace talks begin-has been widely discussed
and officially confirmed here by Communist prisoners and documents.
Some diplomatic sources hore believe that with or without negotiations,
the Communists still would have tried to penetrate the urban centers--though
they may have changed the timing of the offensive.
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BACKED
The second political objective-the internal one--is to consi
regarded here as to designed to isolato-pumps the American position
and the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu more and more from the
Vietnamese people. Then, ultimately, perhaps in a slow-motion,
multi-phased attrition process, to Collapse the Communists would destroy
the Thieu government, seizing power in the name of the Commu
allegedly Communist inspired Alliance for
National, Dopcoratio
Ponco Forces. The Communists would then negotiate a settlement with the
Alliance which the Communists/themselves had created, and evict the
Americans from Vietnam in the most ungracious manier.
preceded
The Communist small-unit actions which preluded the Hey offensive
soon to be clearly designed to effect this internal have havoc for the
the Communists failed in their attempts.
Thieu governmnt government--but,
The most significant was the terrorist attempt to on the o
oh national
radio and television studios, wher duri in which a blue-and-creme colored
DROUE
taxi lo ded with plastique puffed near the studios, but not near enough.
to blow the stations off the air. If the Communists had succeeded, they
communication moans of the government to talk to its own people during the
critical days ahead would have been temporarily scissored. During the Tot
offensive, also, the Communists made concerted efforts to capture the
government radio stations in the protinces and in saigon-and they met with only
varying degrees of succes. success.
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Likewise, Communist attempts, which filed, to blow up two
main x bridges near the Saigon would have served to isolato Saigon
geographically from the suburban sections of the province of Gia Dinh,
made it more difficult for the government to governmon govern outside
the city and more difficult to sustain city life without commer
ECON
azord produce from the countryside.
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Thus far,
the Communist May offensive around e Gaigon has
gnificang significant military tactical and strategio
surfaced three
factorna
Rocause
1. The Communists demonstrated they did not nood the olement
of surprise to launch their ba offensive against the ci capital.
of the blueprint revealed by the Communist defector, the Communists
know the Allies were already informed about thoir attack and alerted for
their advance. They chose to attack anyways thus no gating the arguments
HAVE
of the American military command that they Could not succeeded ar
attacked or succeed succeeded in attacking at Tot without the advantago
element of surprise given them during the announced truco period.
2, The Communist time table appears to have shifted from a long-term
wer of attrition to an all-out, urgent military showdown in which they are
prepared to risk heavy manpower losses militarily in exchange for politival
political-psychological gains during pivotal porious of her international
Periods.
or internally.
time
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3.
The Communists have made a pivotal switch in their battlefield
strategy. The cities are now the frontline-no longer the jungles and rice
HAVE
ed
paddies. In effect, the Communists appear to by entire synthesising the
Mao-ist strategy of using the countrysido to encircle the cities, along
with the Moscow-type strategy of sparking revolution and uprisings within
the cities.
this May offensive is a continuum of their Tot offensive,
but with less scope countrywide and for loss psychological political success
Honce,
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Reliable sources here believe the Communists had three layers of
achievement or limitod objectives in attempting their military mission
of pushing into Saigon. The first mission--and by
their
most ambiou ambitiouswas to attempt a Huo-styled seize seizure of portions
of the city and hold it for as long as possible, as they did for 25 days
in the old imperial capital during the Tet offensive. If their big-units
had so succeeded in pontot ponetrating substantial portions of the city and
key installations, they would have been joined by terrorist suicide squads
to destroy other installations such as American billets, the Saigon prot port,
the Vietnamese High Command, the American Embassy. American military
field commanders believe they have the Communiss Communists have thus
far virtually failed in this prodigicus plan and that their mein-force
units have been d so badly manglod on the outskirts of Saigon that there
is little hope for them to try again for such spectacular ventures again.
in the nor nor futuro.
Comm
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Failing this, the Communists second and more realistic military
to outside the city harrass and
aim would be to pin down, Americ
attrite American units outside the city capital while also creating an
increasing amount of turmoil and vic havoc within the city. Failing
military
thiR DOR
this objective,
soured's the Communists wet these sources believe,
pull back slightly from the city limits ad and condo concentrate on the
rural districts immediately outside the capital, where they would attempt
to uproot government outposts, assassinate government district and village
councils, 2 revolutionary devolopment teans--and in effect, to strangle
the capital while preparing to assault it at again at a later date. Most
of the Communist activi bi activity--whichever of the three missions they
decided to attempt-would concentrato in a twenty 15 to 20 mile redus
radius from the Saigon city lim, limits these sources said,
this distance they would attempt to set up their Communist-
controlled revolutionary governments in villeges abandoned by the government.
s These sources also believe this st stratagem to conquer Sio Saigon
would also be the pattern for slow-motion seizure of power in other urban
centers.
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Just how much success the Communists have had to dato on their
latter two endeavors is difficult and probably promar promature to
assess. Unable to push their main-force units into the city itself,
the Communists are expected to continue their lower-level harrassing
small-unit military activities and propaganda work.
activities
The Communists seem
$2
determined to continue their efforts to
sp rk a general uprsi uprising" in the cities. IN A radio broadcast
on May 9 communicated the appeal of the Central Committee of the National
Ia beration Front to the people of the saigon capital region. It said:
"The people have to th join the Revolutionary Forces, not only to uprise
where possible, but to help the Revolutionary Forces destroy all military
installations ad and any other facilities which help the enemy,
such as
electrical plants. The people should help the Revolutionary Forces
pull down the electricity polos, to destroy the warehouses of military
materials, to arrest the reactionaries,
liberatod or occupied by Revolution Forces,
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to seize power anywhere it is
such as offices and factories.
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The broadcast continued,
"The peoplo must destroy all documents
used th by the government to pince the people; they should destroy the family
identification lists at the proc sub-procinot politie po. police stations
and any other filos used police files about the people.
"This attack (into Saigon) is going to continue and the people are
encouraged to move forward in order to overthrow the puppet government.".
The term "Revolutionary Foo Forces" has sprin sprung into use
Suct
since the Tet offensive indicating pro-Communist troops-uch as hel
hooligans, government deserters and draft-dor dodgers-hoe have allied
themselves with the comun Viet Cong.
An earlier address, on May 6, from the contral committee to the
people and revolutionary soldiers explained: "During these minutes and
hours of heroic fighting of all of our people today,
we have to clock
With stool determination,
grasp ol clearly the purpose of the revolution.
and super effort, the courage to overcome all difficulties and without
hesitation to carry out the continuous offensive and all-out uprising--to
fight the Americans, to overthrow the puppets, to seize power into the hands
of the people, to re-take independence and national sovereigh sovereignty,
democracy and happiness for the people."
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"309
all the cadre and soldiers should fiercely assault...overy
mini minute and every hour...in order to win completo victory... he
people in the city and in the countryside who are still tomporarily under the
control of the enemy should uprise with arms,
Those who have weapons
Those
use weapons.
Those who have knife, use if knivos, use knivene
who have hammer use hammer...in order to establish the revolutionary
government.
And the people who live in libero tod res (of the countryside)
should carry out h the slogan everything is for the frontline (the oition)."
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In Cholon, Viet Cong troops were reported to call at the homes
of the population and seize their fai Covoitong government family lists,
which records the each member of the family in government files. And
Viet Cong teenagers have been reported calling at the homos of government
officials, uring t urging them to join the pro-Communist Alliance.
But, with the rapid influx of refugees into Saigon,
the civilian casualties,
the growing rod-tape-the difficulty of keeping tract of who is friendly
and who is onomy in the city-and the general feverish pitch of
Communist propaganda,
a key question internal question for South
Vietnam is whether or not the Communists succeed or fel feil in promoting
their
general uprisings."
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Date
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1968, May 11
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Subject
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Saigon (Vietnam); Vietnam (Republic). Quân lực; Siege warfare; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F30
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
