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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04003 to 363-04019.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04003 to 363-04019
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Title
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Article about the reorganization of the South Vietnamese Army
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Description
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Original title: "shakeup", Keever's title: "Shake-up Seen for South Vietnam Armed Forces." Article draft written by Keever about President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's government. Topics include the reorganization of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (AVRN), the immanent shuffle of the cabinet and dismissal of Prime Minister Nguyễn Văn Lộc, the solidification of the President's position against his main internal rival Vice President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, the rumored reassignment of General Cao Văn Viên, the commander of the South Vietnamese Army, and general anti-corruption drives in both civilian and military spheres. There is a postscript letter to Hank (Editor) asking for a renewal of the "London Edition" for Keever. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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2020 sag
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shakeup 1 (normass/deepe)
Saigon, March 30-President Nguyen Van Thieu has
initiated a modest reorganization of the Vietnamese armed forces and
the beginnings of a multi-phased shakeup of its command.
The military shake-up may possible reach all the way
to the top of the Vietnamese high command,
with the re-assignment
of General Cao Van Vien, reliable sources report.
more reuter
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shakeup 2 (normass/deepe)
The shake-up is also expected to spill over into the
civilian government. A major Cabinet re-shuffle, involving at least
is in the works,
informed
a quarter of the government's ministries,
sources report. Possibly even Prime Minister Nguyen Van Loc may be
replaced, these sources report.
Already, two of the four corps commanders have been
more route slated to go
and two
replaced; at least one more is
of the corps areas are to be subdivided so that two more corps
regions will be created and two more commanders appointed.
nine subordinate di ten subordinate division commanders,
yet been replaced, but changes are reported.
14
of the
none have
o be in the mill. of
the 44 province chiefs, 12 have already been changed and more are slated
to go.
A hirlwind of changes among the 250 district chiefs is also
hee scheduled,
reliable sources report.
==more reuter
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shakeup 3 (normass/deepe)
The shakeup is designed to galvanize the military and
administrative capabilities of the Thieu government in the wake of
the disruptive Communist Tet onslaught. It has had several
concomitant effects. First, it has enhanced the position of President
Thieu over his powerful field commanders-becas becauc because they
commanded the troops and guns that could overthrown the government-
by removing these g field generals from the political and administrative
decision-making process. Swann Thus, it has simplified the
Second,
administration of the government,
with orders. Saigon instructions
by-passing the fi corps commanders and moving directly to the 44
province chiefs, who weild both civil and military di powers.
the shakeup has also strengthened Thieu in his rivalry with his own
vice president, Nguyen Cao Ky.
Thiem
reportedly mo been momentarily at scotch-taped over, but not irro
irrevocably patched up, informed sources indicate.
The Thieu-Ky split has
==more reuter
i
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shakeup 4 (normass/de epe)
While American officials,
making ficially, are pleased
with the progress Thieu has shown in coping with the staggering
problems confronting his nation, many knowledgeable Vietnamese believe
he has moved too slowly and timidly. While the present President
has progressed in comparison to the pre-Tet Thieu, these sources argue
that the Communists have far outdistanced him since Tet in the political,
MND Military
economic, psychological gains.
General Vien represents a special problem for President Thieu.
Since assuming command of the Vietnamese armed forces--shortly after
his counterpart,
General William C. Westmoreland assumed command
on the AmAmerican side in 1964--General Vien has been under a steady,
but subdued stream of criticism within and without the Vietnamese military
His detractors and not question his competence in
establishment.
military affairs--but his control over his own wife,
pictured in Vietnamese circles as aparticuarly shrewd,
corrupt buen businesswoman.
HS
wiff is widely
bug but
Following the Communist Tet offensive,
Vien has been under about as much oriticism in Vietnam as Westmoreland has been
in the United States--but for a different reason. The looting of the Vietnamese
troops in the cities they failed in the first place to protect and then
ruined in fregaining has again highlighted the problem of corruption
and anarchy--which is in a way symbolized by the activities of Vien's
own wife.
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shakeup 5 (normass/deepe)
American civilian officials, spea ing in private, have been
increasingly critical of
of
Westmoreland for ignorming the problem of the
political may malpracticies of the Vietnamese armed forces--including those
of his own direct counterpart. However, Vietnamese junior officers un
unhappy with the state of the Vietnamese armed forces blame Westmoreland-and
not Vien--for the lack of reform in the military affairs, arguning that the
total financial support of the Vietnamese armed forces rested with the
Ameri and whoever controls the purse t' strings in Vietnam
controls about as much e fone chooses.
Not a politically inclined or ambitious general, Vien
was nevertheless xx one of the fidw mutual friends of both Thieu and
Ky their past bitter moje moments,
peacemaker between them.
and frequently served as a
==more reuter
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shakeup 6 (normass/deepe)
While Thiou has announced his current and upcoming reforms
as part of a broader anti-corruption or crusade, the drive has been
directed thus for mainly at captains and major who absooneded with
monies in the field,
if the anti-corruption crusade is to have
But,
Brusade
meaning to Vietnamese officers and the population, I must be given t
the exe--and not the traditional one of exrin exile to a an ambassadorship
wireve, in frot, Vietni has already requested
abroad,
quated as an escape for hisife
ife
and hor
war profits.
#more reuter
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C2C 8
Jy 1jp
shakeup 7 (normass/deepe)
If Generd General Vien is a biting problem, however, for
Thieu, however, he has already created other problems for
knowledgeable Vietnamese with his politicy of half-solutions!
regarding the dismissal of two corps commanders--important because
they were both his political supporters when Thieu succeeded in grabb
gaining the political nomination from Ky as a p the sole military
candidate during the p Presidential election last fall.
Americans
and Vietnamese sources alike note that Thieu strengthened his hand
and at the same time
own hand by his move against the two generals,
judiciously quieted the fears of general ky by dismissing his own
two supporters withu without their permission or k foreknowledgeab
These were the dismissals of General Vinh Loo
oreknowledge.
of the second military corps and General Nguyen Van Manh of
fourth corps in the Mekong Delta.
the
These two officers, long considered
by American offer officers to possess questionable military confi
OxLxtram competence
and highly almost ungestiona unquestionably
These views
were politic lly the most corrupted of senior field officers.
were also exacera exacerbated during the Tet offensive when General
Manh reported collapsed as a military commander,
when the Viet Cong
began attacking or overruning several of teci cities in his area and
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shakeup 8 (normass/deepe)
American
And,
commanding the whole corps which was
in the case of General Vinh Loc, he and his en senior
advisor reportedly hurled insulting shouts at each other as
save the city of Pleiku rather
falling around his ears,"
one
"Vinh Loc wanted to lead bw own squads
than
source reported.
Respect
while Thieu has removed them from their command positions--
he has negated
the
and their/satraps of con cornutie corrution corruption,
vigor of his anti-corruption drive by appoint the two generals to senior,
Astaff positions in Saigon. Most ironio was the appointment of
1, theoretically the
General Manh as Vietnam's chief inspector general
,
investigative arm for corruption and malpractices in the Army.
"Isn't that a paradoxical-Thieu appointed one of the most
who is supposed to investigate
corrupt generals to be inspector general,
corruption,"
one xxx source ventured.
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shakeup 9 (normass/deepe)
H
Nevertheless,
Practices
Thieu's attempts on paper to change the pres of
corruption are nearly historio--i in their own paper-world
perspective. Appointments of province chiefs are now controlled by
the Saigon government, rather than being bought from the corps
commanders. These province chiefs are being thrust into the
most difficult
administrative, political, economic and military situation
in the history of Vietnam's rice roots government--and they'll be making
mistakes, but, as one source explained, "hopefully they won't be
making kickback money like their peed predecessors."
Whether these newly appointed province of chiefs will be competent
RISK
enough in confronting the Viet Cong--and 6 dedicated enough to
their lives without see stashing away the b bank accounts of the
their predecessors is
most important questions of the
future.
"If they fail, Thiou is going to fall," one source explained.
"And if Thieu falls, the Americans go with him."
= more reuter
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shakeup 10 (normass/deepe)
While T Thieu's p political leadership in battling corruption
and the Communists is still open to question, his politics withingte
as daring
and superb. He has in effect implemented-only on paper thus far-the
military reform his critics have for so long sought. But, the reform
was pushed through when his primary critic, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Cu Duc
thong, was already transferred from the Saigon high command to a
ofthe fourth corps to replace General Manh.
the Vietnamese military establishmen t' is regarded here h
Thus, Thang, as a corps.
the power of Thang, as a corps commander, is ironciall
irongisidy tonically curtailed by the so very same reforms he had
once unaful unsuccessfully sought.
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shakeup 11 (normass/deepe)
Reliable sources here report that,
on the American side,
the
of
long overdue reorganization was pushed through at the
Generà Earl Wheeler,
area,
who
over rode Westmoreland's
1x,
ng
as well as that of his deputy,
in this
FBRAHMS
e for the
General Creighton Abrahms,
past year has been responsible for the Vietnamese armed forces and is now
rated as a likely successor to Westmoreland.
what troops..
The reorganization has come about in the apportionment of the
upcoming 135,000-man increase in the Vietnamese armed force--and who controls
with both political skill and military wisdom,
Thieu,
subordinate commands what they had long wanted-- to settle the continuous
bickering withing the military institution--and then,
so none were
totally happy, or too powerful,
Thieu took away from each a portion
of their respective empires.
gave all
==more reuter
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shakoup 12 (normass/deepe)
The province chiefs got an additional battalion per province
under their personal command, but they lost their hopes of controlling
the regular army battalions in their own province. The division commander
retains they authority. But, at least theoretically,
the province chief
is now expected net neither to buy his job nor to line his
rather than the prod province chiefs
pockets. The division commanders retain control of their battalions
and also even more important, four of t
are to be formed into a special mobile, highly
assigned to pacfiction,
division's
hitwelve battalions
trained divisional st striking force
supplied by the American government.
with new equp equipment su
The four corps commanders have thus
retained their military status with full control of their subordinate
divisions, rther than having their troop strength and staff headquat
headquarters radically shaved away from them, as Thang wanted.
==more reuter
ASH
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shakeup (normass/deepe)
Specifically,
armed forces,
the 135,000-man increased in the Vietnamese
raising the s scheduled total to 805,000 by the end of
1968, is slated to be apportioned in the following manner:
1.
Two new regiments;
one for the 23rd imat infantry
division headquartered in
Ban Me Thuot,
which with its two current
regiments is grossly understrength in covering its assigned eight provinces.
- BE
FORMED
The second regiment is to reinforce the authorized three
standard
three regiments of the 1st Infantry Division, which requires beefing up
to m meet its ca commitments in the tn tenuous provinces of Thua Thien
and Quang Tri bordering the demilitarized zone.
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14
shakeup (normass/deepe)
2.
Ten more batteries of Vietnamese artillery.
3. Replacements for battlefield casualties and desertions.
4.
An Additional strength for the regional and popular
forces, the paramilitary "Ruffs and Pus" Puffs"
protect the villages.
5.
assigned to preset
Increasing the authorized strength of each Vietnamese
infantry battalion from 650 men to 720 men.
With the authorized--and
largely theoretical strength of 650 men per battalin, only 300 to 350
men were assigned as a battlefield force at one time,
remaining behind for leaves,
the headquarters and
CASUAL
for combat wors
with the others
guards for the and typists clerks at
GROSS
Seresant lack of replacements
The increase would theoretomary theoretically
mean 450 to 500 men per battalion could be committed as a bee battlefield
unit-to bon counter a Communist battalion of the same strength, but
more heavily armed.
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shakeup
6.
(normass/deepe)
Fifty separate
"striking battalions"
of 700 men
each. Forty four of these are to be assigned as a provincial battalion
under he the control of the provincial chief for offensive operations
with each province. The remaining six are slated o be m fused with
to be used as a striking force for
three existing Ranger battalions
the defense of Saigon and its immediate environs.
the
are to be
a new kind of force,
These 50 separate battalions,
used only within their assigned provinces, unlike the role of the
Vietnamese divisional regulars. They are ated to be recruited
from the
will be assigned to fight also unlike the
same province in which they
regulars. They are a shoe scheduled to be paid, equipped and clothed
the same as the Vietnamese regulars, but are to be commanded by the
respective province chiefs, rather than the division commander.
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shakeup 15 (normass/deepe)
On paper,
these bo 135,000 upcoming trop troops are scheduled
to be recruited, trained and in their foxholes by September--in te
time to meet the "C next Communist winter offensive--and the American
election.
tthe
the at
But, to streal sr streamline the administrative structure,
to be stripped
Vietnamese division and corps commenders are scheduled
of their civil powers. As General Tahng wanted some time
orders from Saigon will be transmitted directly to the 44 province chiefs,
thus short-circuiting the previous system of moving from the central
government to the corps commanders,
at times throug
then,
and then to the province chiefs.
six admn administrative officers are to be
appointed
to the ten division commanders,
In addition,
by Thieu to fill this divi ci administrative vacuum t and to keep
DE
the for military command is honest and efficient.
==more reuter
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2020 986
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shakeup I (normass/deepe)
Whether theses acually transpire from their world
of p per into the sphere of reality, and whether, even if they do,
they will be a match for the momentum of the organizationally-minded
Communists is a question which partially determine the future of the
The Thieu government-and the American posture-in Vietnam.
(Hank My London edition supposedly terminated today;
can you arrange to kee
perhaps to send the Western edition
to my APO address instead. It would have been useful during the Tet
offensive to be getting the paper reguarly when the Vietnamese airport
and post office was closed. Also John Hughes suggested I get an
RAC RCA card which I can use to cable to all addresses, instead of
which might be useful in aner emergency.
just Boston Boston,
I've
also airmailed a lame mec nomo which is about as long-winded as some
of my stories.
I'll file three or four more stories this week,
but what depends on how the interviews fall into place. Regards Bev).
mend reuter
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Date
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1968, Mar. 30
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Subject
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Nguyễn, Văn Thiệu, 1923-2001; Vietnam (Republic). Quân lực; Nguyễn, Cao Kỳ; Cao, Van Vien, 1921-2008; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Political corruption; Vietnam (Republic); Cabinet officers
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6297
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F3
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
