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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-03979 to 363-03991.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-03979 to 363-03991
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Title
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Article about General Westmoreland's reassignment
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Description
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Original title: "westy", Keever's title: "Gen. Westmoreland Lacked Counterinsurgency Strategy and Machine." Keever's article draft about General Westmoreland's reassignment after counterinsurgency failures. He eventually went to serve as Army Chief of Staff. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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2020 sag
Jy 1jp
westy 1 (normans/deepe)
KHE SANH, VIETNAM, MARCH 25-In the annals of recent
the signature imprint of General William C.
Vietnam warfare,
Westmoreland, whose reassignment from here as over-all-
AND PA fort on
Dilif
American
Commander has been recently announged announced by President Lyndon B.
Johnson, is most indelibly etched here at this besieged American Marine
outpost.
more reuter
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- Page 2
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2020 seg
Jy 1jp
westy 2 (normass/deepe)
Khe Sanh represents the dead end, or the self-destruction)
of Westmoreland's search-and-destroy strategy--the futility of his soo
his selection of mo
so-called forward strategy.
WAS
But
Strategy
etmoreland's was not his foremost
downfall as much as his military objective--the Communist main force
either North Vietnamese or Viet Cong.
The
WESTERN
"hardhat" units,
Westmoreland strategy was based on the oxasd classical doctrine
studied by young cadets at Westpoint where the general was once
superintendent-namely,
to aggressively and offensively carry the
war to his main-force enemy, to search, find and then destroy him and
his material.
The anh,
search-and-destroy operation,
this,
a miniature of his, was born from a
but now the American ground troops here
are being destroyed without destroying
are sitting rather than searching,
their enemy. Instead of moving forward,
the American elements are
Khe
us immobilized in one four-square-mile base. +15
the exception to the Westmoreland strategy,
but
Sanh is not
its extreme,
terminal version of it. There are many other The Sanhs in Vietnam,
More Touter
created for other s reasons in other regions.
==more reuter
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- Page 3
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Jy 1jp
westy 3 (normass/deepe)
To se succeed fully,
Westmoreland's strag strategy would
policy.
have contradicted directly the stated war of the American government.
For,
the militarily logical
extension of Westmoreland's strategy
Westmoreland's
had be to search where most of his main-force enemy was most of the time
in their greatest mass. This demanded the invasion of North Vietnam-
or any other country where they sought sanctuary.
strategy ob would obviously fail if he searched for his enemy where they
did not exist; at best it could only partially succeed if he searched
for his enemy where only some of them existed some of the time in their
most scattered form. But, the Johnson Administration was opposed to
the extension of the ground war. The Administrations escalation
initial escalation of the war with the air three-year air bombardment
of North Vietnam did not solve General Westmoreland's main-force
problem in the South.
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yy 1jp
westy 4 (normans/deepe)
contradiction.
Khe Sanh is the precise miniature of this contradoitio
To continue his forward strategy with any purpose
around Khe Sanh, Westmoreland is logically forced to oross the border
into Laos or into the North. But, the this is also unacceptable to
the stated air aims policy war policy of the American government.
Unlike Horace Greeley, Westmoreland can not go west-or Em north.either.
In short, Westmoreland attempted to employ a conventional
war strategy, which the
his own government negated by never stating or
possessing the conventional war aim of victory.-the final or decisive
destruction of the enemy.
#more reuter
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- Page 5
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2020 sag
yy 1jp
westy 5 (normass/deepe)
Logically,
policy
Clearly, something has to give.
Bi the
Government's
war aim is changed has to ohange--or Westmoreland's strategy has to change.
To re-replace Westmoreland does not necessarily man change his strategy.
Westmoreland's search-and-destroy strategy was nurtured
The Westmoreland
by his obsession and shaped by his double dilemma.
obsession was the invasion by North Vietnamese battalions and regiments"
across the 17th parallel. This was not Westmoreland's obss obsession alone-
it was the fear of every American general here who advised and trained the
Vietnamese army since 1954. Westmoreland, xxXXMMMhXTURAM as
the first American commander of American combat troops here, simply gave
it an American overlay. Because of this obsession, Westmoreland, like
his predecessors wanted a highly mobile, heavily armed conventional
force to meet the invasion, which they was envisioned in Korean War-
styoe terms of the Korean War nightmare.
==more reuter
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2050 sag
yy 1jp
westy 6 (normass/deepe)
estmoreland's obsession evolved into a reality, but
dissimilar to the nightmare of the Korpan invasion.
a mass of men marching unsamassed
Vietnamese invasion) dopended on the support of their insur
The
apparatus and machine; in Korea, it depended solely on a mass of
men and material.
Yet, when the North Vietnamese invasion was
first confirmed in mid-1964, Westmoreland's command deiend its
existence. When the invasion began to rl flourish in 195 1965-1966,
Westmoreland was unable to stop it.
Khe Sanh epitomizes the
ultimate frustration of that obsession, as the North Vietnamese,
with tanks, trucks and artillery,
American base camp.
And now,
swirl in the environs of this
==more reuter
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Bezc sag
yy 1jp
westy 7 (normass/deepe)
03
that the criticism
It was during the initial buildup of American forces
in 1965, when the Allied held the balance of forces,
of Westmoreland's obsession, mi main-force obsession held by Westmoreland
and his preocessor predecessors was most intense.
Westmoreland at the that time and since does not seem to appreciate
his double dilemna.
The criticism of
His first dilemna, which shaped his conventionzlied
conventionalized w strategy,
was that he had to fight with the
military machine he was given to command.
"He obv "Westy obviously
one Western diplomat
"And he doesn't have the political-
noted during the buildup period.
economic-military counter-insurgency machine he needs to wage this war."
can not fight with a machine he doesn't have,"
At a higher level, this was not simply Westmoreland's dilemna in Vietnam,
but it is America's dileman in o dilemna in other under-developed countries
for the next decade. The current criticism of Westmoreland here is tat
or de-conventionalize,
that he never attempted to adjust,
American
military power here.
==more reuter
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2020 Bag
yy ljp
westy 8 (normass/deepe)
His second dilemna was that the Vietnamese army and
-para-military forces, delegated to try to control the insurgency aspects
were
of the situation was outside his control and command, although not ot
outside his pocketbook and persuasion. If American troops were
assigned to it control the insurgency--even if they had the capabilities
of doing so--then they could not ally hallay his main-force obsession.
Rxxx And, if he attempted to command the Vietnamese army, then he
again contradicted America's political aim-to support an independent
government (of which the army is the most powerful part), rather than
imposing the colonial will of the French in another era.
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zozo sag
ᎩᎩ l.jp
westy 9 (normass/deepe)
And, so Westmoreland,
in his hands,
having to fight with the machines
tossed the American units into the mainforce battle
arena
of which Khe Sanh is the dead-end, and he gradually shifted the
Convention Ale
RAIN, Vietnamese in forces
R
into, the au
quasi-cou
Without
quasi-insurgency arena,
the ruj unins ruins of Hue symbolize his miscalculation.
In Hue,
the extreme symble symbol of the Vietnamese failure, North Vietnamese
The battle came as they
units marched into the city without a battle.
the North Vietnamese held the city and the Allies attempted to retake it.
Hue then logically symbolised the final failure of the Westmoreland
the enemy battalsions were tax ex
they were
seach search-and destroy strategy;
battalions and regiments slipped under the nose of their seekers
and appeared in the heartland of the "frei "friendly"
areas;
destroyed not in North Vietnam, nor in the jungles of Khe Sanh, but in
the streets of Hue where they also sparked the destruction of a Vietnamese
city.
==more reuter
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2020 sag
vy lip
westy 10 (normass/deepe)
Conventa / lox ANNitlinto
In short, Westmoreland based his strategy
on the resources and military machine had had to command-he did
of attention
base his strategy on meeting the Communists' strategy acros
Through
of revolution revolutionary warfare.
But, in 1965-1966, when
the balance of forces lay in Westmoreland's hands, critics did
propose an admustm adjustment of the American military machine-
a different del deployment of American troops rather than in the
jungles searching for main-force units.
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ZCZO sag
yy 1jp
westy 11 (normass/deepe)
These critics argued that the strategy of Westmoreland',
negative, destruction strategy of annhiliation of his enemy should give
that the military
way to the protection of the Vietnamese population;
objective was not the eney enemy's main force, but the local guerrillas
Sustaine
and political cadre who fed nurtured the o in and supported the invasion;
that instead of fighting the the in the jungles,
American troops
should be forging a shield around a perimeter of the people. For without
the people, the Viet Cong could not win, even with a Korean-styled
invasion.
more reuter
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- Page 12
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zcze sag
yy ljp
westy 12 (normass/deepe)
But Westmoreland overruled them, specially specifically
ordering large-scale ofbe offensives around the demilitarized zone,
with the end result of a mm number of Khe Sanhs.
Presently
, the concept of the people- perimeter is quicksty
le-
losing its validy validity, for the Communists are not only massing
but in the suburbs and the city proper.
around the perimeters,
these critics, if Westmoreland has not a lost their people's war,
he has at least lost time.
То
For,
under Westmoreland,
the Vietnam war has come
full-circle from one low point to another.
On a tri-dimensional,
vential vertical spiral,
Westmoreland's war escalated wildly,
in the air over North Vietnam and Laos with high-altitude B-52's
and double-the-speed-of-sound Phantoms,
and of the ground with more
than a half million American troops. But, horizontally,
on a flat,
one-dimensional plane, Westmoreland's war has come full circle.x
The Westmoreland of 1964, when he assumed command here in mid-year,
PARATROOPERS
AND MARINES
saw the Vietnamese strategio reserve momentarily encircled and then
defeated by Viet Cong regulars using Phase II O Mobile warfare tactics.
airborne
The Westmoreland of 1968 sees more and more of the American) strategic
as American Marines in Khe Sanh are encircled
reserve rushed to Vietnam,
by North Vietnamese units using Phase III positional warfare tactics.
The Westmoreland of 1964 saw the Viet Cong seizing control of the
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zC2c sag
yy 1jp
westy 13 (normass/deepe)
The Westmoreland of 1968 sees the Commurs Communists suffocating the cities
and strangling the pacification program.
Will the Westmorel nd strategy survive without Westmoreland?
Or will the Westmoreland's successor, still und un-announced,
reconsider the people's perimeter concept?
Or is it too late to change?
"If it's not too late, it's certainly getting later,"
one officer
explained.
Vietnam has now maintained its traditional
heritage as a graveyard for generals, governors, governor-generals and
Nereas
ambassadors. And it has
becoming a limbo for military strategies.
In this "Easty versus Westy" conflict, the illogic of the Occident
hash momentarily, at least, been outflanked by the
dialectics of the Communists.
(Hank: I'll pretty probably file only one more story
this week.
I feel in need of some rest.
However,
April first is
first year anniversary of Vietnamese constitution.
Do you want a two
or three part series, using this as a pivot, to appraise the Vietnames
government developments? Do have we had enough series for awhile?
Appreciate cable. Regards Bev).
=-end reuter
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Date
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1968, Mar. 25
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Subject
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Westmoreland, William C. (William Childs), 1914-2005; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Counterinsurgency; Command of troops; United States. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
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Location
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Khe Sanh, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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16.6193; 106.7323
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F1
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
