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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-01289 to 363-01299.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-01289 to 363-01299
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Title
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Article about Khe Sanh
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Description
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Original caption: "offensive. This is the last of a series on the mood, preparedness, strategy and significance of Khe Sanh." Article about Khe Sanh for the Christian Sceince Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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offensive 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the mmmmmm last of a series on the mood,
preparedness, strategy and significance of Khe Sanh).
KHE SANH, VIETNAM, March 22-Military
sources here
are un pressing for a king-sized American offensive operation
around Khe Sanh--and a possible a sweep into Laos, along the southern
Ho Chi Minh invasion trail.
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No one here is predicting if and when either the
America American offensive or a sweeping operation through Laos will
take place first because the political decisions for such a mog move
rest in Washington and second because, for security reasons,
military
officers as a matter of practice do not refuse to discuss future
operations.
NEW
"We thought maybe with the Secretary of Deinese Defense,
we'd be allowed to go into Laos," one source explained.
"But so far
we haven't seen anything. Laos holds the key to the Communist invasion
and to their supply lines and until those supply lines are cut, we're
not going to get anywhere here.
Obviously, the American air raids are
taking tolls--but not enough of to make much different. We must send
ground troops in their there to make the Communists bunch up and concentrate--
then airpower will mean something."
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offensive 3 (normass/deepe)
overtones,
Clearly,
Americen
the military options-with their ringing political
break into these three rigid categories: to retreat,
to sit, or to advance.
1.
Almost all American military leaders here--the
country's frontline hawks-follow the Joint Chief of staff
Staff!
Pentagon's Joint Chief of staff's statement that Khe Sanh should be
held. This is true both in their official and private discussions.
northwestern
Among the
At this time, there seems to be no consideration among military leaders
to withdraw the American Marines and to abandon the
corner of Vietnam to further Communist invasion.
officers and men in Khe Sony Sanh, the JCS recommendation is commonly
used in jest. One officer, trapped in his bunker most of the day
because of incomn incoming Communist artillery and mortars,
mused:
Things could be worse. Think how you'd feel if the Joint Chiefs
bandmem and President Johnson n had not said Khe Sanh would be
held at all costs."
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Given its political build-up by the President's and
JCS statements, Khe Sanh could probably not be abandoned without
rather widespread, adverse repercussions inside the United States
inside South Vietnam. A Marine reat retreat from
and politically su cushioned,
and, secondarily,
there, however, could be camouflaged,
by makxmxx mamm using them to link up with other American
units on a search-and-destroy operation-and then being returned
to another base, rather than Khe Sanh, later.
Some American civilian officials, however,
either question
.
or die with the strategy of
The Sany sanh.
"At General
what is so
Westmoreland's headquarters the other day, I sixxx asked
important about Khe Sanh'," one civilian explained.
"You'd have thought
I'd asked to see the doctor's certificate about the Virgin Mary."
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offensive 5 (normass/deepe)
2.
Continuing the present course of the Marines
sitting and waiting for a Communist assault is becoming less and
less militarily attractive to the leadership level here,
and is it is
100 likely to become and more and more difficult politically to
hold to this line. The longer the Marines must wait before
Hope
the Communists assault-when they hold to gain a stunning victory-
the more attrition of forces, material and prestige they suffer,
counter-balance of actually knowing how many Communists
without the
are being killed or wounded by the American counter-punch of air and
artillery power.
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Even
worsened markedly.
within recent days, the situation here has
For the first time,
the drop-zone,
$
where
most of the Marines urgently needed supplies slimmer down
from parachutes, has come under sustained Communist attack-with
seteral several hundred rounds of close-in mortars and recoilless rifle
rounds striking daily. The supply crisis was one of the crit most
critical ones faced y by the French at Dien Bien Phu--and one on which
hinged many of the other factors leading to their defeat there.
While
the Americans are not yet in such a perilous stance, because airdrops
WONDER WORSE
CAN BE
Part of The
11 being made, the dangerous and difficult job is picking up
MARINES.
and moving the supplies by the ground creve
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offensive 7 (normass/deepe)
one
"Charlie has changed his tactics in the past few days,"
American officer explained, referring to the Communist North Vietnamese.
"Instead of simply dumping in artillery and mortars on us constantly,
he's starting to maintain a withering blanket of machine gun and ri
rifle fire across the whole base. At some times, it's virtually
impossible for anyone on in the perimeter to stand up and get
out of their holes. As Also, before, Charlie would aim in areas,
IS
against concentrations of troops or trucks. Now, heлstarting to
aim at one jeep or one Marine walking along. We're increasingly getting
that hemmed-in feeling.
His trenchlines are getting so close, I can
could hit them with a five-iron on if this were a golf course and for
the first time re x Charlie/maintained an all-night firefight with the
Mainres Marines.
We've just gotten in 1000 Bru hillsmen fleeing into
Khe Sanh fe from west near Laos-which means they must have gotten the
word either something's going to happen or else more NVA are moving in."
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3. Unwilling to retreat and being eroded by just sitting,
some military officials
the Americans should launch a massive offensive,
argue.
"The only purpose of Khe Sanh now is as a springboard
"Khe Sanh has lost its
for an offensive,"
one official explained.
original purpose--we are no longer stopping any invasion,
and in fact from the tops of bunkers, we can see Communist trucks
NIGHTLY
moving along Route 9 with their n lights on.
Los Angeles freeway.
Kho canh.
And there's
It looks like the
And there's an estimated 100 t Communist tanks aroun
"When the Communists seized The Lang Vei (Special Forces
age Marines were ordered to stop
camp on astraddle Route 9 in early February) and overran Khe Sanh
district town, the s
patrolling, then the Communists got exactly what they wanted-
into
South
VIETNAM
to open up their goa the roads and supply trails around without
detection and we became sitting ducks."
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Among
The three original arguments against an American-initiated
offense offensive were first, M American troops would be fighting in
the Communist's Khe Sanh--the miniature of defn defensive fortresses
sprinkll sprinkled dispersed and sprinkled through the jungled hills,
FIND
In Which high American casualties would result. Second, it would be
better to let the Communists assault Khe Sanh, which the Marines would
be counted on holding, and then American ground troops would be rushed
in as a reaction, giving chase to the retreating Communists. Third,
H
if General William Westmoreland commits large numbers of American
battalions, presumably from the U. S. Army 1st Air Cavalray airmobile
division for from the 101st Airborne Divisions then he will be in
a weak position to react if the Communists should strike again in
northern
the/coastal cities, such as Hue and Quang Tri.
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their
These arguments are losing some of merit, in official
Allie
eyes, now as the Marines at Ken Allies at Khe sah sanh muse
too long for the attack and receive heavier, deadly shellings.
waited
Some sources argue that a major American search-and-destroy
operation around Khe Sanh would be pointless without seei sweeping (and
perhaps an staying) across the border into Laos. The 1 location of
MAN
Khe Sanh-always of per main point of criticism about Westmoreland's h
whole strategy of holding there--has forced the tactical commanders into
an oo impossible job, they argue. Khe Sanh is situated
seven miles
from the Laotian B Laos on the west and 14 miles south of the
demilitarized zone and North Vietnam.
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offensive 11 (normass/deepe)
Militarily,
restrict American
these two political boundaries give tactical
in maneuvering their troops,
commanders zya
especially if the American airborne, for example, is used to drop behind
Communist Tines
the enemy lines to surprise them. Also, sources argue, the supply and
SME
artillery enuman bases lie in Laos; the long-range Communist weapons,
Clandestine
used with forward observers for visible spotting, could rain heavy
shells upon American ground troops, WHIO operating around Khe Sanh, who
would not even have the trenchline trenchline protection offer inside the
besieged Marine base.
us a
"Our overwhelming military presence in South Vietnam allowed
small military presence in Laos for some time," one
military source explained.
"Without that small Laotian presence, we
could not have remained in South Vietnam as strong as we
we
have. But now,
without a stronger military presence in
in
ye still not be able to
HOWEVER
hold South Vietnam. Khe Sanh is our key to the Communist invasion--
the doorway of the invasion is Laos."
==end reuter
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Date
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1968, Mar. 22
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Strategy; Military readiness; Morale; Military morale
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Location
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Khe Sanh, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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16.6193; 106.7323
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B11, F6
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections
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Language
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English
