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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04574 to 363-04582.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04574 to 363-04582
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Title
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Article about US-funded South Vietnamese re-armament
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Description
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Original title: "forces", Keever's title: "U.S. to Upgrade South Vietnamese Arms - But will it Help?" Article draft about the U.S. funding a massive arms purchase by the South Vietnamese. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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forces 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, JULY 24-A multi-million-dollar venture for American
taxpayers, the re-equipping of the Vietnamese armed forces is
skeptically regarded here as unlikely to produce sensational
improvements in its fighting effectiveness.
While the cost-accounting for re-equipping the Vietnamese forces
is still being computerized, the incoming inventory is known
two squadrons of F-5
to include these new and expensive items:
light jet "Freedom Fighters" to supplement the present one; five
companies of the "Huey" helicopter, either theo UILD model,
now used by Americans in Vietnam, or the newer I UKLE model,
which American companies have yet to receives and three battalions of
HAWK surface-to-air defense missiles to protect Vietnam cities from sneak
air attacks.
Currently, American forces operate a classified number of these
HAWK sites, but the Vietnamese have yet to be allocated them.
Training
of Vietnamese personnel to man, maintain and utilize the missiles is
expected to require two years sehol schooling in the United Sates.
Vietnamese sources report the Vietnamese High Command wants to train
Ime
artillery servicoment during a shorter period, but the American command
is reported to want to train civilians Tietnamese from scratch civilian
Vietnamese with proficiencies in mathematics and sciene sciences.
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MANY
The se
However, may sources here believe at least two half-truths, if
not myths, have been propagated about this complex issue, probably
designed to sugarcoat the Vietnam war for the American electorate.
two half-truths aret that more and bettor equipment will sove t
solve the essential problems of the Vietnamese armed forces; in fact,
the far more critical necessity is leadership; and second, that onde
the Vietnamese armed forces will improve enough to permit of American
fighting troops, as distinct from logistical troops/
On the first point, one knowledgeable American source explaineds
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forces 3 (nozmass/deepe)
"It's wrong to harp on the message that the Vietnamese are have been
out-gunned.
The problem is that they've been out-led by the Communists;
and so few recognise this problem. We can say that on a selective
basis, the Vietnamese may have been out-gunned, that the M-1 can't
outfire the (Communists) AK-47. But, that's only for a short time
in a given locale. But, within minutes, li look at the firepower that
the government troops can call in to help tye them--artillery, American
helicopters,
taot aircraft.
"The fact is we must improve the Vietnamese regimon Army's
regimental and division leadership. We are only talking about 150
officers not improving the whole lot of 800,000. It would take only
150 good mon to take care of the Vietnamese and make it a fighting army-
and I know 150 good Vietnamese officers myself who could do it. But,
no few Americ foous on to that; if we put together the collective
knowledge of the American and Vietnamese staffs,
ha ve
a manageable and solvable problem."
they would see wo
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The Vietnamese High Command has recently setup a study committee
headed by Major General Cao Hao Hon repeat Cao Hao Hon to review the
ro-organization of the Vietnamese armed forces. But, this problem
has been the basis of countless studios by both the American and Vietnamese
commands in the past--the proper decisions have yet to be taken and enforced.
Currently, the lower-ra young, lower-ranking Vietnamese officers
have become such a cauldron of disgruntlement and disillusionment.
the the corruption and incompetency of the sonior leaders that some
sources fear and a leftist, possibly Communist-inspired coup d'etat
could possibly be immohod attempted by them. Within recent
weeks, a handful of mide- middle-level Vietnamese officers, including
some who work at the Vietnamese High Command, have been arrested for
colloboration and contacts with the Communists.
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forces 5 (normana/deepe)
On the second point, that the Vietnamese armed forces can shoulder
enough of the fighting so as to replace American fighting troops-this is
unless there's very
regarded here as a possibility only in the 1970's,
very little fight the bottom fighting in the interim.
"Let's face it," one long-time ober observer here explained.
"Even if all the North Vietnamese units withdrew from the South, the
government's army still could not repeat not even defeat the
weakened (Southern-born) Viet Cong without American tro
of American troopers."
the help
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Some Vietnamese strategic reserve units have conssi tontl consistently
maintained excellent aggressiveness and battlefield performance for
several reasons. The Vietnamese airborne and Marine officers volunteered
as a team-
for their service and have worked with each other for years-sometimes
for decades, unlike American units which has a shifting personnel
policy. In fact, one young American radio operator near Dak To
recently explained to this correspondent he would felt safer with
on an operation with the Vietnamese airborne than he did with the
American airborn paratooper paratrooper units because "they Vietnamese
airborne aroxjums
man sneak around lige like the North Vietnamese,
they think like the Comm can think like the Communists do tactically
and they charge the Communists when there's contact instead of just
calling in artillery like the Americans do."
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Of the ten regular Army divisions, the Vietnamese First
Infantry Division has for the past several years consistently been
rated the best. Thoi Its area of responsibility covers the two northern
provinces, from Hue city north to the demilitarized zone.
Americans
both in Saigon and advisers serving with the unit speak of it gonu
Some of its elements are positioned
honestly in glowing terms.
electri
in "listening post" statio positions, surrounded by
electri
"MCNAMARA
eming the
electronic sensors and minofields others serve on search-and-destroy
operations in conjunction with Alli American Marines.
Buts as the
one American adviser with the unit recently explained, part of the
confidence and high morale from those First Division units along the
DZ is maintained by the quick and lethal reaction of American-supplied
American Marine fighters and
firepower once the unit is in trouble.
artillery react as quickly to the Vietnamese call for help as they
do for their own Marine uni ground units.
The adviser noted that if
the division hadto to rely on Vietnamese artillery and Air force support,
TENUOUS
it would be in a difficult position along the DMZ.
And, in Vietnam,
it will be long remembered that the First Division was responsible for
NUMBERS
the security of Hue when overwhelming Communists flooded into the city
to
undetected-some of them marching four abreast in company formation as it
began seizing control of the former imperial capital.
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The matter of an American troop reduction in Vietnam has been
a matter of controversy within the American co official American community
here fro some time. Some argued before the Communist Tet offensive
that the American forces,, now totalling 536,000, could be drastically
reduced-by at least 100,000-without seriously imparin impairing the
The reduction of forces would
combat effectiveness of front-line units.
have "sliced off the fat" of the huge logistical and headquarters staffs
in the rear areas, which feast on their own paper-world of bureauoratio
ritualism. These rear-echelong had become so numerous "the t the
logistical tail of the American effort is wagging the dog, instead of the
reverse," as one source explained.. "There's six troops in the rear
to support one on the front lines-and that's too much." This controversy
came into the public spotlight late last year when Robert Malamara,
then Secretary of Defense, use urged that some of the rear-echelon
troops be conf converted into combat-bound line companies, si instead
of simply increasing the levels of the American buildup. But, his
viewpoint was largely ignored here by the American command.
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Currently, however, reliable military sources believe the
All American and Vietnamese commands are facing a critical shortage
of fighting troops to combat the Communist offensive which began
in January and is expected to accelerate.
The Vietnamese High Command has also set up a study committee,
headed by Lt. General Vinh Loc, to draw a detailed contingency
plan in case there is a ceasefire,
and Allied forces would be regrouped,
detailing how/the Communist
and how the Vietnamese troops
should conduct the war in case there is a reduction in American
troop strongth. However, informed sources report that no repeat
no joint American-Vietnamese committoo has been established to
coordinato an American phase-out o troop phase-oute
Bev
(I'll try to airmail Saigon mood seepager this weekend. Regards
send reuter
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Date
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1968, Jul. 24
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Subject
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Vietnam (Republic). Quân lực; Military assistance; Arms transfers; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam--Foreign relations--United States
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F38
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
