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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06385 to 363-06394.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06385 to 363-06394
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Title
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Second article about revamping the South Vietnamese armed forces (ARVN)
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Description
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Original title: "forces", Keever's title: "Revamping South Vietnamese Force in Limbo", Article draft about the effort to improve the ARVN provincial forces, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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ZCZC sag
yy-1.jp
forces 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the last of a two-part series about revamping the
670.000
650.000
000 man Vietnamese armed forces, the effects of which will partly
determine whether American combat troops can begin their withdrawal
in at least two years as General William C. Westmoreland has predicted).
SAIGON, January 22--While concentrated efforts are being made
to improve Vietnam's 300,000-man provincial forces, their newlyp
newly-appointed commander has protested Saigon snafus and military
in-fighting by resigning and taking annual leave.
E
The resignation of General Nguyen Duc Thang-Saigon's most
controversial, competent and dynamic generals-has yet not yet been
discussion
accepted and considerable debate has arisen here over whether it will be.
General Thang is currently on leave for an unspecified duration. Although
he has submitted his resignation from the Vietnamese army a number of times
HAS
in the past, General Thang continued to rise in thx either military or
governmental circles; yet hi if it would be considered a serious
blow to the effaux
rock-bottom limits of the Army's leadership
BE DROPPED from
if he were to deoff the military roster.
He is currently the no. 2 officer
at the Vietnamese high command responsible for the provincial forces plus the
revolutionary development care cadre, who implement the critical pacification
program.
(More Reuter)
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zczc sag
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forces 2 (normass/deepe)
The appointment of General Thang as commander of the provincial forces
was considered here to be one of the most clean-cut, significant in steps
The 1968 program
in improving the combat effectiveness of these units.
•
ffecti, venous
for revamping the 650,00-m 650,000-man armed forces will concentrate on
Hemy
* these provincial forces-equivalent to 25 ginigion conventional/divisions
in strength-rather than in the regular armed forces. These provincial
forces, are compaised composed of two para-military groupings: the 150,000-man
farmers i
Popular Forces, who are part-time fighters and part-time fighters in at the 250
districts throughout the countryside, and the 150,000-man Regional Forces,
WH
which operate at the provincial level in the countryside.
These two groupings, often affectionately called "Ruffs" and Puffs" for
their RF and PF designations, us sustain heavier battlefield casualties and
desertion rates than the regular forces they
also kill a higher proportion of
Communists. Yet, they are paid lesser amounts, have fewer fringe benefits
and have the lex poorest grade of weapons.
The salary of a Popular Forces
private is 2200 piastres amo month (roughtly $22) plus 200 piastres ($2) a month
in rice allowances for each member of his family.
Throughout the 650,000 armed forces, heavier mainpower drains result
from desertions than from battlefield losses.
Report
official SOURCES
(More Reuter)
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ZCZC sag
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forces 3 (nromass/deepe)
General Thang is the first officer at the central government level to
have centralized operational control of the Regional and Popular Forces. In
the past, generals at the Sa
Saigon level have assumed only logistical and
administrative responsibility for the sx widely-scattered forces,
considered
Round
by some to be the "unsung heroes" of the war. At the lower levels,
a new deputy has been appointed to each province chief to look atxex after
the interests of the Regional and Popular Forces.
"This is mostly a psychological play to make the little RF and PF
HAVE
feel they had a daa daddy," one reliable source reported.
Most of the other improvements in the Regional and Pro Popular Forces
center mostly in the logistical and administrative fields. Ana administrative,
support and logistical unit has been set up in each of the 44 provinces
Better
OPERAY
tailed tailored to serve the needs of the Regix forces bt better. This has
thus replaced the regular army division commander as the logistical and
administrative superior for the forces which are widely scattered and sometimes
miles away from headquat headquarters cities. In some provinces,
element of the Regional and Popular &
a small
PHOTO will be held in reserve
so that in times of trouble, it can reinforce a sister-unity without
aid of the Vietnamese regulars.
(More Reuter)
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zczc sag
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forces 4 (normass/deepe)
Beginning this year, plans were being made to computerize the accounting
system of the laxat Popular Forces by starting a "by-name"
punch-card
IBM system to keep better track of the individual trooper. This system
has been started with the Regional Forces in July, 1966, and in exriy January,
of that year the regular army initiated it. This would presumably eliminate
the past pro practice of "phantom soldiers" --names on payrolls of persons
who either never exisi existed, or else had been killed or wounded months
before.
(More Reuter)
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ZCZC sag
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forces 5 (normass/deepe)
/AC
ED
Thang's disappointment, which lead to his submitting his resignation,
center on the greater command and responsibility for the administration of
the provinces,
the changing and training of new province chiefs, and the
increased authority for the province chief, excommand rather than the
S
division commander, to control the regular army battalions assigned to
a province for pacification-support missions. These pacification-support
forces-xxx now include elements of the 960 Regional Force companies,
now under the day-to-day
the 4,300 pax Popular Force platoons,
operational control of the province chief, plus the 50 to 60 regular
battalions of regular Vietnamese army troops,
5
from the province chief,
who take orders w either
9
or sometimes both.
or their division commander,
*More
Hore
Reuter)
A fourth component-but not for security--is the revolutionary
WHO
development cadre, which are the activists to build schools, marketplaces,
and dispensaries at the hamlet level for their pacification assignments.
These 20,000 cadre are now under the control of Thang,
at the military
command, rather than under the government's Ministry of
Revolutionary Development.
(More Reuter)
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ZCZC sag
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forces 6 (normass/deepe)
General Tahn Thang,
a
37-ye
-year-old Nothe Northerner, is one of
the most controversial,
and most progressive-thinking generals in the
Vietnamese commen command. But, he is commonly identified with Vice
President Nguyen Cao Ky-certainly on issues of radical change--and hex this
has not endeared him to President Thieu, who is in disagreement with Ky
on may many points. Thang has in the past been closely identified with
retired Air Force general Edward Lansdale, the so-called king-maker of
Ramon Magsaysay during the Philippine insurgency, and this has not endeared
Anti-Lansdale
Thang to many of the more traditional-minded, American generals. Thang
is also often identified with Robert Komer, the deputy commander in the
American military establishment for pacification,
who is also known to
have considerable disagreements with the more conventional approaches
of the American generals. Thang was known to have supported the
radical reform proposal in which the polito politico-military powers
of the ten Ve Vietnamese division commanders and four corps commanders would
have seriously been substantially reduced; thus, Thang lost the
enthusiams of enthusiasms of this powerful clique of generals.
(More Reuter)
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zcze sag
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forces 7 (normass/deepe)
These conservative-styled Vietnamese generals charge
Thang with "empire-building" and "chasing after the Americans;" they
whom they say, as an
also resent the support Thang has from Ky,
air force general "is not military-minded and has not commanded
infantry troops in his whole life."
been blocked by
Then, they wanted
The Ky-Thang-Komer hope was to move the Vietnamese
division and corps commanders out of the politico-military chain
of command; this hashing for the time being,
*x some pivotal American and Vietnamese general s.
to establish a dry direct link between the central government in
Saigon and the 44 province chiefs, who are both the political heads
and military commanders of Thang's Popular and Regional Forces.
wanted the pine province chiefs, rather than division commanders,
Thang
to control those regular army battalions assigned to pacification within
in given instances-
a given provinces--but this also has been blocked by the generals at this
time.
(more Renter)
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zcze sag
yy-ljp
Forces 8 (normass/deepe)
More important is who appoints and trains the province chiefs--
high-level intrigue on the Vietnamese
and for the past two months
side has revolved around this point. Thang drew up a list of the
province chiefs, 15 now in that post, and 29 new ones who have been
appointed from other positions. These 44 were to be trained beginning
Dec. 4 at the Vung Tau school where Thang's revolutionary development
cadre are tutored, but first the Vietnamese corps commanders "torpedoed"
the project; it was rescheduled for late December, and then the Ky-Thieu
conflict against postponed it. This disgusted Thang, who submitted his
resignation in early January. Thieu has since told Thang to set up
the training course for the second of Febuary. But Thang has reportedly
refused and most of the training is now scheduled to take place in
Saigon instead of at the Vung Tau school,
de the Saigon government in the past has formally appointed the
unr countryside, but in
44 province chiefs throughout
practice the job has often been sold by the corps commander, sometimes for as
much as, five million paistres--roughly five thousand unistates dollars.
The subordinate job of district chief was often sold by the division commander-
BY
the net effect was rampant corruption from these officers recouping their
losses plus a paralysis of government with the district chiefs often
quarreling with the province chiefs. In the past several months,
Thang was responsible for selecting the 29 newly-appointed province chiefs--
which cut into the financial benefits of the corps commander and he
wanted to move them into their new jobs in "blitz fashion. Nov,
the central government has, however, decided on a slow-motion change of
provinon shi
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zczc sag
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Forces 9 (normass/deepe)
Thang was also eager to begin training the popular forces
not simply as security forces, but also as an integrated part of the
revolutionary development cadre program, in which they would assist
with the construction of schools, wells, marketplaces. But this plan,
while reportedly approved by Komer, has been blocked by both the
American generals, by President Thieu and the corps commanders.
consequence, the program to begin re-training 1000 of the 4300 platoons
of popular forces, even in their security mission, has been delayed for
at least a month and the decision as to what kind of training they should
receive has yet to be made.
As a
"Across th board- There's no question but what changes and progress
are being made," one knowledgeable American source explained.
the current rate it will take us 20 years to get very far."
(C
But at
MORE
End Reuter
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zcze sag
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forces 10 (Normass/deepe)
(Hank: I'll send you tomorrow a story on the weapons escalation,
tieing in Khe Sanh air raid. The military command here refuses to
give briefing x re-capitulating three years of bombing North Vietnam
as part of my February seventh series. Suggest Pentagon man re try to
get that. Also military command here is edgy about bombing pause;
suggest Washington watch this, which is where decision will be made.
Regards Bev).
End Reten
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Date
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1968, Jan. 22
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam (Republic). Quân lực; Vietnam (Republic)--Armed Forces--Reorganization
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B9, F3
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
