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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06527 to 363-06536.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06527 to 363-06536
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Title
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First article about developments since the beginning of the Tet Offensive
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Description
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Original title: "impact", Keever's title: "Communist Tet Blitz Risks U.S. Losing Its First Major War", Article draft about the immediate effects of the Tet Offensive, suggesting America may lose the war, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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zozo sag
yy 1jp
impact
1 (normass/deepe)
☑
(This is the first of a three-part series appraising the
many-spec spectrumed developments following the Communists' three-day
blitzkrieg criss-crossing South Vietnam. This article assesses the
impact on the American position within the South).
SAIGON, february 2--The Communists three three-day
blitz war--actually a war within a war--has opened up the possibility
of America losing her first major war in history.
An American defeat in South Vietnam is not necessarily
inevitable,
to be imminent.
officialdom has once predicted.
as the Communists have long maintained,
nor is it likely
But it is no longer an impossibility as
the American
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zczc sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
impact 2 (normass/deepe)
In a nutshell, the Communist blitz war has sommersaulted
FAVORAble
rapidly, though perhaps impermanetly, the politico-military
balance of forces within the south from the Allied Allied side towards
the Communist camp.
The United States, the most powerful nation militarily
in h history, has become the underdog in at this time in this multi-faceted
war of politics, psychology, military battles and xenophobia.
Hence, the
internal options open to the United
States has shifted dramatically in the past week.
The original policy
choice of fighting for a battlefield victory or negotiating at the
flip flopped
conference table has sommersaulted into the choice of either
negotiating or boing defeated.
Also, within the negotiations option,
the choice has shifted from negotiating on terms favorable to the Allies
to negotiating on Communist terms.
Whether this balance of force can be reversed across the board
by the American officialdom and government of South Vietnam is highly
debatable;
few weeks.
is the center of the most significant question in the next
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impact 3 (normass/deepe)
"Of course,
no one things thinks the Communists will pushi
can even now push the Americans into the sea for a classical military
defeat," one knowledgeable Vietnamese observer explained. "But,
the Americans can become so politically isolated and militarily
humiliated, they will be sucked out politically by Washington or else
asked to leave by the Vietnamese."
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zcze sag
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impact 4 (normass/deepe)
In more specific casual terms, the Communist blitz has at
Held hard-shelled hawks here
least temporarily snuffed out the last hope for an American military victory.
mmmmm pre-blitz pessimistic view is today's
Yesterday's
optimistic view. The pessimists who once termed Vietnam
"can't win" war, are now terming it a "might-lose"
America's
war. The
who once
premiumm skeptics who once said the tide had not yet turned in Vietnam
are now questioning if there is even a tide to turn. The cynics,
officially countra contradicted by the Johnson Administration,
said the Americans were heading for a stalomate in Vietnam are now
they're not heading for a dead
wondering if zm240x
end.
Those who said they could not see a light at the end of the tunnel
now ponder if there's even a hole or exit at the end of the tunnel,
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zcze sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
impact 5 (normass/deepe)
The blitz war in Vietnam is not considered decisive mx nor
ended the Middle East
final here anymore than the Israeli blintz war
crisis last year.
But, the three-day beginning of the Communist "general"-
or countrywide offensive is considered to be the am pivotal
preko prelude to the last act of the p
high drama.
The worst is yet to come.
offeei officials and common citizens,
Americans and Vietnamere,
agree on this point. But they
look at the gravity of the upcoming situation in different terms.
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impact 6 (normass/deepe)
General William C. Westmoreland, head of the American
military command, la has predicted ✓ full Phase Three position
positional warfare along the Demilitarized Zone and the northernmost
provinces. Vietnamese and Americans both look for another swooping
attack coordinated between cities in the future. Vietnamese sources,
but not Americans, are predicting soon the beinn beginning of the "general"
(country-wide) uprising of political demonstrations, economic strikes,
and violent anti-Americanism, an
Others predict the
Communists will launch an international and internal peace offensive
to dovetail with their hattlefield campaigns.
And a few sophisticated
Vietnamese familiar with Communist strategy foresee all of these
mam probabilities climaxing simultaneously, perhaps during the
American election period.
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2020 seg
ᎩᎩ ljp
impact 7 (normass/deepe)
In short,
the blitz war has a positioned the Communists
all of which are somewhat disadvantageous to the
at a crucial crossroads,
American posture here, although in varying degrees. They are:
1. A massive military push in positional warfare pattern
along the Demilitarized Zone or a number of other places.
This push,
by itsolf, would probably not be decisive against the preponderance of
American firepower and manpower, adt long as the intr
Washington
REMAINED
wwww determined.
2. The state of general uprising in which political
Pivotalo
agitation among the Vietnamese population becomes both ugly and decisive,
By itself, it is doubtful the Communists could seize power solely
but this depends--not on the American
with a people's uprising,
on as on the future performance of President Nguyen
strength-
Van Thiou,
his government and armed forces.
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zcze sag
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impact 8 (normass/deepe)
3.
A "peace"
offensive in which international
and internal developments would inter-act for both psychological
and political advantages of the Communists.
4. More military attacks into the urban centers
designed to erode the Vietnamese government's support in the cities and
among the middle and upper classess--their last shreds of internal
support among the populations and to wear down the will of the
governmental apparatus to resist the Communists.
5. All four of these, or some combination thereof, in
which the American military preponderance would be outflanked
on the battleground, xx which the blitz war temporarily accomplished-
outmaneuvered on the negotiations issue or neutralized by political
chaos in the Vietnamese cities.
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zcze sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
impact (normass/deepe)
The blitz war dramatically illustrated-at least to
the
Vietnamese spectators--tiris neutralization of American military power
well-timed
by a, across-the-board orchestration of political factors and
military actions, operating a various levels. With regimental or
battalion attacks, some of the Allied airbases were assaulted and
partially destroyed. At a lower level, some of the dirt-strip airbases
in provincial capitals were not assaulted, but simply held under siege
by a hand-ful of snipers. Other airbases, u major ones, such as Danang,
were not assaulted with close-in combat troops, but were simply rocketed
and mortared from long-range. Saigon's sprawling Tan Son Nhat airbase,
for example, was subject to pitched battles, mortar fire, sniper siege
and guerrilla raids.
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zcze sag
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impact (normass/deepe)
More significant, however,
American servicemen in Saigon
they were politically isolated
A few billets came under sniper siege
were bottled up in their billets for days;
and militarily neutralized.
and tedious harassment. The American officialdom ofere ordered the
servicemen to remain in their billets for fear of the grave political
consequences of an anti-American incident in the highly emotional ato
"hazardous" conditions
atmosphere as well as the
2
throughout the city.
some
After 48 hours of American-ordered siege,
servicemen were transported to work under armed escort; but
for days,
American troopers and airmen, ordinarily frontline fighters,
iES,
watched the war from their rooftops and balconers as they listened
to rock 'n roll music and wrote letters home.
Militarily, the Communist forces could never have defeated
so many American servicement at one time--but at a critical moment,
and negated.
servicement were simply neutralized
the
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Date
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1968, Feb. 2
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Tet Offensive, 1968; United States. Armed Forces
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B9, F12
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
