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mpacino (normass/deepe)

(This is the first of a three-part series appraising the many-spice spectrumed developments following the Communists: three-day blitzkrieg criss-crossing South Vietnam. This article assesses the impact on the American position within the South).

SAIGON, february 2—The Communists three-day blitz war-actually a war within a war-has opened up the possibility of America losing her first major war in history.

An American defeat in South Vietnam is not necessarily inevitable, as the Communists have long maintained, nor is it likely to be imminent. But it is no longer an impossibility as the American officialdom has once predicted.

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impact 2 (normass/deepe)

In a nutshell, the Communist blitz war has sommersaulted But apply, though perhaps impermanetly, the politico-military balance of forces within the South from the Allied Allied side towards the Communist camp.

The United States, the most powerful nation militarily in has history, has become the underdog in at this time in this multi-faceted war of politics, psychology, military battles and xenophobia.

Hence, the are internal options open to the United States has shifted dramatically in the past week. The original policy choice of fighting for a m battlefield victory or negotiating at the conference table has compressed into mitter the choice of either negotiating or being defeated. Also, within the negotiations option, the choice has shifted from negotiating on terms favorable to the Allies to negotiating on communist terms.

Whether this balance of force can be reversed across the board

by the American officialdom and government of South Vietnam is highly is the center of the most significant question in the next debatable ; few weeks.

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impact 3 (normass/deepe)

"Of course, no one things thinks the Communists will push can even now push the Americans into the sea for a classical military defeat," one Vark knowledgeable Vietnamese observer explained. "But, the Americans can become so politically isolated and militarily humiliated, they will be sucked out politically by Washington or else asked to leave by the Vietnamese."

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impact 4 (normass/deepe)

In more specific casual terms, the Communist blitz has at Hell Effor hard-shelled howks here least temperarily snuffed out the last hope for an American military victory. Yesterday's proving the pessimists who ence termed Vietnem America's optimistic view. The pessimists who ence termed Vietnem America's "can't win" war, are now terming it a "might-lose" war. The provinces who ence said the tide had not yet turned in Vietnem are now questioning if there is even a tide to turn. The cynics, officially country contradicted by the Johnson Administration, who noe said the Americans were heading for a stalemate in Vietnem are now wondering if intermediately could not see a light at the end of the tunnel now pender if there's even a hole or exit at the end of the tunnel.

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impact 5 (normass/deepe)

The blitz war in Vietnam is not considered decisive ar nor final here anymore than the Israeli blintz war ended the m Middle East crisis last year. But, the three-day beginning of the Communist "general"-or countrywide offensive is considered to be the production pivotal preluce to the last act of the transfer high drama.

The worst is yet to come. Americans and Vietnamere, officials and common citizens, agree on this point. But they look light at the gravity of the upcoming situation in different terms.

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impact 6 (normass/deepe)

military command, laster has predicted a full Phase Three positional markers has predicted a full Phase Three positional positional warfare along the Demilitarized Zone and the northernmost provinces. Vietnamese and Americans both look for another swooping attack coordinated between cities in the future. Vietnamese sources, but not Americans, are predicting soon the belief beginning of the "general" (country-wide) uprising of political demonstrations, economic strikes, and violent anti-Americanism. Americanism. Americanism Others predict the Communists will launch an international and internal peace offensive to dovetail with their hattlefield campaigns. And af few sophisticated Vietnamese familiar with Communist strategy foresee all of these probabilities climaxing simultaneously, perhaps during the American election period.

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impact 7 (normass/deepe)

In short, the blitz war has an positioned the Communists at a crucial crossroads, all of which are semewhat disadvantageous to the American posture here, although in varying degrees. They are:

- along the Demilitarized Zone or a number of other places. This push, by itself, would probably not be decisive against the preponderance of American firepower and manpower, ask long as the International and Washington position and determined.
- 2. The state of general uprising in which political agitation among the Vietnamese population becomes both ugly and decisive.

 By itself, it is doubtful the Communists could seize power solely with a people's uprising, but this depends—not on the American man be strength—as much as on the future performance of of President Nguyen Van Thieu, his government and armed forces.

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impact 8 (normass/deepe)

- 3. A "peace" offensive in which the international and internal developments would inter-act for both psychological and political advantages of the Communists.
- 4. More military attacks into the urban centers designed to crode the Vietnamese government's support in the cities and among the middle and upper classess—their last shreds of internal support among the population—and to wear down the will of the governmental apparatus to resist the Communists.
- 5. All four of these, or some combination thereof, in which the American military preponderance would be outflanked on the battleground, xxxx —which the blitz war temporarily accomplished—outmaneuvered on the negotiations issue or neutralized by political chaos in the Vietnamese cities.

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impact/4 (normass/deepe)

Vietnamese spectators—this neutralization of American military power well-timed by a process the board orchestration of political factors and military actions, operating a various levels. With regimental or battalion attacks, some of the Allied are airbases were assaulted and partially destroyed. At a lower level, some of the dirt-strip airbases in provincial capitals were not assaulted, but simply held under siege by a hand-ful of snipers. Other airbases, the major ones, such as Danang, were not assaulted with close-in combat troops, but were simply rocketed and mortared from long-range. Saigon's sprawling Tan Son Nhut airbase, for example, was subject to pitched battles, mortar fire, sniper siege and guerrilla raids.

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impact (normass/deepe)

More significant, however, American servicemen in Saigon were bottled up in their billets for days; they were politically isolated and militarily neutralized. A few billets came under sniper siege and tedious harassment. The American officialdom office ordered the servicemen to remain in their billets for fear of the grave political consequences of an anti-American incident in the highly emotional ato atmosphere as well as the "Example of the grave conditions throughout the city.

After 48 hours of wint American-ordered siege, some servicemen were transported to work under armed a escort; with but for days, American troopers and airmen, with ordinarily frontline fighters, watched the war a from their rooftops and balconeys as they listened to rock 'n roll music and wrote letters home.

Militarily, the Communist forces could never have defeated so many American servicement at one time—but at a critical moment, the and negated.

servicement were simply neutralized and in contract to light the 2 Communists.