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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06202 to 363-06210.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06202 to 363-06210
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Title
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Article about the odds of another Communist offensive
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Description
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Original title: "offensive", Keever's title: "Communist Offensive in South Vietnam? A lot of Guesses", Article draft about an analysis into the likelihood of another Communist offensive like Tet in the near future, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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zozo sag
Jy m
offensive 1 (frier/deep) NORMASS/DEEPE)
SAIGON,
offensive,
DECEMBER 20-In assessing prospects for another Communist
these three related questions must be weighed simultaneously:
CAPABLE DO
ING
1. Are the Communists militarily prepared to launch another
offensive?
2.
What is meant by another offensive?
3. What is the best political moment which the Communist
Politburo i decide to Reyer an offensive to be unrolled.
Since Communist political decisions consistently dictate Communist
military strategy and tactics, this last question--the most significant
one is also the most difficult to assess because it involves second-guessing
Assess Ne
or interpreting Communist political intentions rather than the more specific
date on their military capabilities.
==more reuter
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- Page 2
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20 20 sag
yy NNM
offensive 2 (NORMASS / DEEPE)
(+/dcepty
On the first question,, both the American and South Vietnamese
military commands believe that the Communists have the capability
But,
of launching (ital) another Tet-styled, cross-country blitz war.
ATED
Tw these Tied commands are confident that the Communist units
will suffer a devastating military defeat. Unlike the January Tet
offensive in which the Communists were handed political and psychological
laurels simply for attack in their surprise attacks on the cities-even
though they failed in accomplishing her attaining the military
objectives the Communists now are in a position whereby they must
not only also succeed in their attacks.
Succeed
off they
Alas
"Attempt their offensive
more reuter
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- Page 3
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zcze sag
yy twx
—NN M
offensive 3 (friar/deepe)
(NormAss Hepe)
Speciall
Currently, the Communists are building up pressure in the outer
Saigon area. At least one regiment of the North Vietnamese 1st repeat
1st Division, which was soundly battered in the battle of Duc Lap
in September, has been confirmed in Tay Ninh province, northwest of
Saigon along the Cambodian border. In short, while Washington
policymakers talk optimistically about North Vietnamese units which
have moved back into North Vietnam, the Allied commands here are worried
Through
CAMBLA
about the North Vietnamese units that have moved further south to the
while WASHING TON
outer Saigon perimeter.
talk optimisticale,
wit
from
policymakers
units that HAVE
==more reuter
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- Page 4
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2020 sag
yy twx
NNM
offensive 4 (Triar/deepe)
(NORM ASS Heape)
To counter this buildup, the American command moved the elite
U. S. Army 1st Air Cavalry Division--a heliborne division--straight into
the Communist stronghold areas of War Co Zone C and the the jungled
areas further north-- not far from the ve Viet Cong high command.
By doing so, the framantam Americans have brought in not only additional
ground troops, but also long-range artillery, which consistently
pounds z Communist-held areas heretofore out of the range of Allied
While the Americans have seized the tactical initiative
weapons.
in this border area
m the Communists are regularly
counter-attacking and sharp clashes have occured continuously in the
past weeks. Further south in the marshlands the along the
Cambodian border, the American-South Vietnamese "little boat navy"
has also moved in for intensive patrolling along border waterways
Been
through which Communist supplies had previously moved from Cambodia
into the Con Cholon area of the capital.
==more reuter
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- Page 5
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zC2c sag
JJAN M
offensive 5-(esp) (NORMASS /upe)
TROUND NAVAL
Behind this border screen designed to interdict Communist movement
of men and supplies across from Cambodia, the Allied commands have been
able to compress their other regular units into a small
space for
more intensive patrolling and for wedding wedding weeding out the
Viet Cong infrastructure in the villages.
With the Communist main-force
units still fairly well contained the to the border areas, Allied
Now BE
regulars can fragment air conventional formations into a string
of small patrols.
One battalion commander outside of Saigon told this commops
His Unit Nige
correspondent that his unit could be broken down into 18 to 24
He
nighistime patrols and ambushes nightly, with each patrol covering
Stude
as much as a "grid square" (one square kilometer on maprès) in flat
terrain.
== more reuter
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zo zo sag
yy nnm
offensive 6 ( (normass/deepe)
On the second question--what is meant by an offensive--there is little
evidence that the Communists have forèsaken their overall policy of
"fighting while negotiating", nor or that they have given up their
designs and desires of overthrowing the elected, American-suppored
Saigon government--which would be out politically catastrophic for the
Allied position both in Paris and in Saigon. Nor do they seem to have
veered from their strategy of attacking Sai South Vietnamese cities--a
Steptegy
tacit admission that Mao's the tum of using the countryside to enoriole
WORK IN VIETNAM.
DID
encircle the cities still
not repeat not bring them
Daily, Communist radio broadcasts
and general uprising,"
talk of the "general uptsin offensive
and since their so-called third offensive
seemed to fizzle for them in August, they have refrained from numbering
Deer.
this predicted next wave.
Speculation.
But, there is considerable debate here that the Communists herewean
may be changing the form of next offensive and hence changing their tactical
deployment of military big-unit formations.
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2020 sag
yy nnm
offensive (normass/deepe)
Instead of pushing their big-unit regiments and battalions into a
rather conventional-styled attack against the cities,, as they attempted
unsuccessfully in doing in during Tet and May, the Communists may be
shifting into fragmenting their military power-or using only-
Spactem
end of their military organization,
the lower p
such as their guerrilla formations.
While this tak xx shift--rolling back from their Phase 3 peak-
would be essentially a sign of inherent military weakness on the part of
the Communists,
to the Allies.
CUN
this would not repeat necessarily bring much consolat:
Poll- BACK
What Any military lot-down in pure military power
would be made up by political and payo psychological gains--during an
exceedingly sensitive political and psychological time period.
DEREATING
The
Allied troops, instead of combatting Communist regiments and battalions,
find it more difficult to counter
might be faced 1 th coping with waves of terrorism, sniper squads from
Saigon forooftops, high-intensity propaganda, political agitation,
labor strikes and student for Buddhist demonstrations.
==more reuter
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- Page 8
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Zo zo sag
yy nam
B
offensive 8 (normass/deepe)
There is also some indication that the Communists may be putting
intense political pressure on Saigon's whole body politic-and that the
Attempting to
Sign nationalists of the Americans may serve Communist ends by overthrowing on
the Saigon government. Certainly, the strains and tens diplomatic
strains and tensions between the American and South Vietnamese officials
Creative
are now becoming a serious consdi consideration internally, bringing a
mark drop of confer confidence both in the American committment here and
ETHA
the Saigon government. There is an erosion of anti-Communist strength
here in recent days; there is a noticeable rise in anti-governmentism,
which may reflect Comith Communist or French-inspired propaganda, but which
is not nonetheless draining morale. Whether or not this is convertible
into a wri
something close to the Communist "general
is also debated here.
Breat
Certainly,
SigNi
or not
realy really disasterous
political crisis between the Saigon government and the American officials
or between the Saigon government and the Vietnamese population would be
diasterous for the Allies would be more beneficial for the Communists
than a general offensive (which serves to momentarily unity the nationalists).
the Communists would undoubtedly abort their offensive just to watch
Reworks
and
the intra-mural Pight on the Allied side.
==more reuter
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20sc sag
yy offensive
zozo sag
yy twx
tria de
MASS
offensive (12) mass (deeps)
Others predict the Communists will attempt to overrun a number of
provincial and district capitals before making any spectacular
moves
in AAINST
Saigon.
Hence, the form of the next offensive remains very much in a topic
of debate and speculation here, but there is a consensus that the
Communists will attempt something within the broad lines of their
"general offensive and general uprising" strategy.
the
As to the third question on what is the best political moment for
2
Communist Politburo tooide to launch another offensive is the
most difficult to answer. The dilemma for the Politburo, as seen from
here, is that if the Communist launch a major spectacular big-unit
offensive and lose, then they have very little to negotiate in Paris.
Get
The prevailing view here is that the Communists will attempt some sort
Perhaps Not o
A
of extravaganza to welcome in the new American administration in mid-January,
the
might
may also coincide with the beginni formal beginnings of the
expanded Paris peace talks.
Others, however, believe that the
DECISIVE Pilita
UNIT Stwdown
Communists
Have been
may delay any spectacular military moves until after (ital) American
from VIETNAM
Seme
the
first
American troops bel begin withdrawing here and the over-all American
Months Away.
Then, the
combat level is substantially reduced--which may be years.
Communist forces would escalate attempting to produce a Dien Bien Phu-
Cranese government units per Hops
type battle th Vietnamese
Streets
Saigon.
= =end reuter
in the
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Date
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1968, Dec. 20
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Strategy; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Offensive (Military science); Tet Offensive, 1968
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B11, F2
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
