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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04509 to 363-04524.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04509 to 363-04524
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Title
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Second article on military strategy and tactics, focusing on Communist forces
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Description
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Original title: "strategy", Keever's title: "Communists Split with Main-Force units in Strategical Retreat; Guerrilla Offensive with Defection[?]" Article draft about Communist strategy in August of 1968. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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zezc sag
yy nnm
strategy 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the filast of a two-part series on the military
situation in the Vietnam war. This article discusses the war from
the Communist viewpoint).
tumultous
SAIGON, AUGUST 6-A few weeks after the rampagous Communist
Tet offensive, a ver veteran journalist, who had also covered the
French Indo-Ching War,, made one of his many visits to Vietnam. $ He
shook his head lamented, "No one here has read Truong Ching Chinh.
"The whole Tet offensive is spelled out in his book-lightning attacks
into the cities. But, no one has read him."
The journalist referred to the 60-year-old militar militant
Communist who has served as the chief ie ideologist of North Vietnam.
In 1945, at the close of World War II, he played a leading role
of events which culminated with the general insurrection and the people's
seizure of power from the defeated Japanese army. These tactics of
take-over are chronicled by him in a short study called "The August
Revolution" and should be read as a blueprint for ✓ Communist
Hugue
Now
They
seizure of power as applicable today as/23 years ago in August when
it was successfully employed.
==more reuter
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2020 sag
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strategy 2 (normass/deepe)
Truong Ching Chinh's writing maps out the political strategy
of Communist revolutionary warfare--but the great rhythms of military
strategy are still best defined, systematized and articulated by
Mao Tse Tung,, who left on an indelible print stamp on the military thinking
of North Vietnamese strategists and tacticians. Truong Chinh, swoll
a s other Ho Chi Minh and other Party leaders, all fled to China st
various times when suppression campaigns exiled them from Vietnam.
The name Truong Chinh is simply & Party alias which itself ez means
"The Long March."
==more reuter
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2020 sag
Jy nnm
strategy 23 (normass/deepe)
Read together, Mao and Truong Chinh, their writings provide not
-Ace
only complementary political and military components of revolutionary
warfare of a buy by-gone era--but components still applicable,
as the
ver veteran journalist indicated indicated, in providing a sense of
direction for the future. So specifically, Mao's guerrilla warfare
principles-the dynamics, movements and progressions of this
unconventiona 1 and complex kind of warfare--is still the foundation
of the Communist military policies of fighting in the South,
in general the
use of peasantry waging warfare in the countryside as a means to encircle
and finally defeat the urban centers. But, Truong Chinh's political
strategy of the August Revolution is much closer to the Russian pasch
inciting
Communist putsch of 1917, by applying the power of the urban working class
to seizure power in the streets of the cities.
These two Mao-ist-
Moscow components thus seem to reflect be equal or urma unequal parts of
the whole embodied in today's current Communist appeal in the south:
a call for the "general offensive and the general uprising."
==more reuter
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2020 sag
Jy nnm
strategy 4 (normass/deepe)
This duality of stre strategic lines in achieving victory now gives
the Communists a split-level war as me in the South--a differentiation
between the big-unit military formations and the imperceptible, yet
omnipresent clandestine and quasi-military structures which are necessary
in igniting an uprising.
As of this writing, the Communist big-unit formations-mostly
of North Vietnamese origin-are on the strategic retreat;
the hidden half
of the split-level war, forming the insurgency side,, are on the strategic
The North Vietnamese have reportedly withdrawn up to possibly
offensive.
as many as fifty per cent of their main-force strength from the South,,
thus creating the conspicuous lull in this strata of the war.
Truong
Chinh's book does not mention strategic retreats, but Mao defines them
with clarity and precision. He wrote:
==more reuter
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zcze sag
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strategy 5 (normass/deepe)
"A strategic retreat is a planned strategic step taken by an inferior
force for the purpose of conserving its strength and biding its time to
defeat the enemy.... The object of strategic retreat is to conserve military
strength and prepare for the counter-offensive." He identifies the two
stages of revolutionary warfare as the strategic offensive and the strategic
defensive, within the defensive is contained the two stages of the
strategic retreat and the strategic counter-offensive. /
MORE REUTER
"To prepare for a counter-offensive, he continued,, "we must
select or create conditions favorable to ourselves but unfavorable
so as to bring about a change in the balance of forces,
to the enemy,
before we 60
to the x stage of the counter-offensive....During the
stage of retreat we should in general secure at least two of the following
conditions before we can consider the situation as being favorable to us
and unfavorable to the enemy and before we can go over the counter-offensive.
These conditions are: 1. the population actively supports the Red Army
The terrain is favorable for
(the most important condition, he says) 2.
operations (the current rainy season in the South might be considered
an untao unfavorable condition until October) 3. All the main forces of the
Red Army are concentrated 4. The enemy's weak spots have been discovered
5.
The enemy has been reduced to a tired and demoralized state and 6.
The enemy has been induced to make mistakes."
==more reuter
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yy num
strategy 6 (normass/deepe)
Mao's elucidation of the great military ebbs and flows of revolutionary
warfare provides an historical skeleton for the steady progression
of the war in South Vietnam. In 1960, the Viet Cong's homegrown
guerrillas
began fighting after four years of unarmod political
subversion and agitation by Communist cadre. The guerrillas began in
1960 and continued on the strategio defensive until late 1963, when a
પૂ
military oo ooup d'etat by nationalist generals overthrew President
Ngo Dinh Diem and thus provided the conditions for the Communists
to shift into the strategie offensive.
Through 1963 and 1964, as the
Tietnamese nationalist covernmental and military situation continued to
detsori deteriorate with successive coups and counter-coups, the guerrillas,
escalating into regular formations, snel mashed the government's strategic
hamlet program through most parts of the countrysido. By late 1964, the
Guerrilla movement had escalated into Phase III their final Phase III
with positional warfare battlos against olite government troops,
more router
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strategy 7 (normass/deepe)
Then came the buildup of American combat troops in 195 1965. The
relative balance of forces against shifted against the Communist guerrillas
and rougulers) the Communis ts again become the "inferior force" in
relative terms of manpower and material. They again shifted to the strategio
defensive, specifically to strategie retreat.
This posture of
st5 strategic retroat was the period of preparing for the counter-offensive,
which was offcoted with a world-wide sensational impeat during late January
of this year. As the veteran journalist had lamentod,
ruong Chin
ha d articulated the counter-offensive two twenty years before with
such precision that the Communist Tot thrust this year appeared to be
simply copied from his manual. He wrote:
more reuter
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ZCZO sag
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strategy 8 (normass/deepe)
"Our troops concentrate rapidly and actively launch planned lengin
lightning attacks on the cities and the enemy positions to encircle and
annihiliate them. In brief, we throw all our forces throughout the
country into the battle to crush the enemy completely and win back the
whole of our territory...."
Tet counter-offensive did not succeed in the totality of seizing
power by the use of military force; in fact, military commanders here
believe the Communists suffered a military defeat of great magnitude,
although they effectively gained some political and psychological &
advantages as byp by-products of their military defeat. Thus, the
Communists have again refented reverted to the strategic retreat-and if
Mao is appropriate accurate, in this circumstance, they are again preparing
for another counter-offensive. Some cumho euphoric military sources believe
that the Communist military defeat at Tet was decisive and final--that they
Now
must de-escalate their total strategy to one of a lower-level of activity.
PRECEDER t
more pertinent, would he the historical fact that the
But,
Seems
Communists North Vietnamese Communists launched three general
counter-offensived against the French--and completely failed in each--
until they were victorious with their ge fourth counter-offensive at the
most sensitive political moment of peace negotiations.
==more reuter
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5050 pag
Jy numm
strategy 9 (normass/deepe)
Truong Ching Chinh specifically forecasts the possibility of holding
negotiations while fighting, saying, "T "In that case, our long resistance
will be interrupted by new talks, and that is prooi soly on of its characteristics
However However as long as the French colonialists live in our country, and
we have not yet completed the third stage (of the general counter-offensive),
we cannot obtain genuine independence and unification." If applicable
currently, his words would continue to imply that since the American
neo-colonialists are still in Vietnam and since the Communists have
not successfully completed the general counter-offensive, they will continue
fighting for their political objectives.
more router
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zozo: sag
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strategy 10 (normass/deepe)
(In a nuances of definition, both Mao and Truong Chinh
speak more of a strategic counter-offensive by the Communists than of a
strategic offensive. Mao wrote: "Whether in a counter-offensive or im
an offensive, the principles with regard to these problems do not differ
in their basic character. In this sense we may say that a counter-offensive
is an offensive. Still, a counter-offensive is not exactly an offensive.
The principles of the counter-offensive are applied when the enemy is on
the offensive (as that Allied troops were before the Communist thrust at Tet
Them which would make their Tet action more of a counter-offensive than
an offensive). The principles of the offensive are applied when the enemy is
on the defensive (as is now the case with the Allied strategic posture.). In
this sense,
there are certain differences between a counter-offensive and
an offensive."
more reuter
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2020 sag
Jy nnm
strategy 11 (normass/deepe)
At this most peculiar moment in the Vietnam war, the Communist
some of them across the borders of
big unit formations have retreated,
South Vietnam, the Allied Allies are on the strategic defensive
But,
until the American elections--waiting for the Communist counter-offensive.
under this Communist big-unit layer of the war in their split-level
war, the Viet Cong remain on the strategic offensive, which is explained
by Mao in terms directly reflective of what is happening in Vietnam nows
When the "enemy" is on the strategic defensive ath and "we are on
the strategic offensive, at such times our operational policy is not to
attack enemy forces which are entrenched in defensive positions and which
we are not sure of defeating, but systematically to destroy or drive
which are
out the small enemy units and puppet forces in certain areas,
our guerrilla units are strong enough to deal with, and to expand our areas,
arouse the massess for struggle...replenish and train our troops and
organize new guerrilla units
==more reuter
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2020 60s
yy num
military 12 (normass/deepe)
This lower level of the split-level war, conducted with a mixture of
continuous, 100 irregular warfare fought by local guerrillas and
militia, is directly related to the Communist big-unit var; it serves
as the essential springboard, providing a paramilitary, political, economic
and googpigeon geographic foundation for the Communist big-unit formations
to cease their strategio retroat, about face, and hurl themselves forward
into a sensational strategio offensive.
This lower echelonn/of low-level guerrilla warfare also provides the
many-faceted base for the Communist "general uprising"--the line between
low-level guerrilla activity and ammod political activity becoming relatively
obnource The "general uprising" is now interpreted here as monning the
seizure of power from the Vietnamese governmont and its affiliatos into
the hands of the people, who are protected in this process off by bande
of armed insurrectionists or guerrilles. Students seize power from the school
principle principals and university administrations. The citizens seise
control of outposts, government offices, police stations, military
institutions and then the Presidential Palace and the oleoted legislat
legislature. Hence, the Vietnamese government end its appendages is destroyed
OR OUTA
by a popular inquamoodion-amod instrootion in the cities, which negates
at least partially conventional military power.
more reuter
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zcze sag
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military 13 (normass/deepe)
Currently, the Communists are not only consolidating power in villages
under their control, but continue to fan out with precision into
to
the contested and government-controlled areas, including the urban centers,
to terrorize and neutralize selective pro-government officials, newspaper
offices, businessmen,, to weaken the will of pre government-controlled towns
by reing raining in harrassing fire by mortars and rockets,
over-run or reach an accommodation with government outpost militiamen,
to ewe proselytze politically Vietnamese organized units affecte
in the countryside and senior Army officers in the cities and to fragment
Vietnamese government reservoirs of political strength and economic
buoyancy.
more reuter
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zcze sag
yy nam
military 14 (normass/doepe)
There is overwhelmingly one overwhelmingly significant and conspicuous
political similarity between August of 1968 and the agust Truong Ching
Chinh's August Revolution of 1945. This revolves around the formation
people's liberation councils and poople's liberation committees in the
villages and hamlets either subject to their current control or penetration.
Currently these existimo are to serve "as a fighting machine and not a
purely administrative machine as in peacetime." The formation of those
committees, set up through a retire highly regulated form of election poCE
Est be s
were to be in accordance with a high-level directive issued March 5;
the Communists now boast 26 of these people's liberation committees on
the outskirts of Saigon..
itself.
==more reuter
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2020 606
yy muum
military 15 (normass/deape)
dunum in foxm,
Those committoos are duplicates mix
mission purposo, character and name to what Truong Chinh ostablished
before the gonoral insurrection in August of 1945. No vites that a these
committees: wore used first as "transitory organization fomme" to gain on
enony power and paralyze its administrativo machine. These organisations
were effective. They gave the people the occasion to realize universal
suffrage and become actuat acquainted with administrative affairs, led them
to discot henceforth their own destiny.... In offect, after the August
General Insurrection, these different Liboration Committees became real
administrative organisations. To use People's Committoos and Liberation
Committees as springboards for the direct transition to the democratic
republican regime was an extremely interesting characteristic of the
Communist too tios in the repro-insurrectionary peri period."
VOLVED
These "at "transitory organizations" with their "pro-governmental
character" gave way to the provisional government and finally became
the
LED POWER
Communist government when their enemy-had-bean-Gestaoyed.--
more ruet router
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zcze sag
Jy nnm
military 5 (normass/deepe)
However,
There is over one over overwhelmingly significant and conspicuous
political difference between August of 1968 and Truong Chinh's August Revolution
of 1945. The 1945 insurrection was waged against the Japnee Japanese,
who had been internationally defeated, but still held weapons and power in
Vietnam, The purpose of the general insurrection was si simply to seize
their weapons and their power to preclude a return of the French colonialists.
Military
Currently, the Allies are in the strongest defensive postten position to
SINGLE-TRACKED
r general uprising would only moan wanton massacre.
Hence, the dual nature of the current Communist appeal for obtiree
"general offensive and general uprising" or else the total merger of the se
CONVERTING
de their main-force and local force units into
this woul D
a means
date in the war and a
two indo by au
Politi
armed insurrections insurrectionists in the ofte cities,
as
of out-flanking the Allied military power machine while enacting,
Truong Chinh did in 1945, "the general form of struggle of the armed
demonstration,"
BE
The Allied war machine here is fully alerted to the predicted Communist
MAY
general offensive, but they find approaching as well what
Tryong
Chinh described as the "zero hour of insurrection."
However,
(Hank: This is all I'm definitely planning to file this week.
I've requested to see the foreign minister and that might come through this
week. I'm also attempting to wrap up a political situationer on the Huong
government, but I doubt that if finished by weekend. Regards Bev).
==end router
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Date
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1968, Aug. 6
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Subject
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Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam (Democratic Republic). Quân đội; Strategy; Tactics
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F38
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
