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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04537 to 363-04545.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04537 to 363-04545
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Title
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Article about Vietnam press' effect on American politics
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Description
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Original title: "politics", Keever's title: "News Management and Psycological Warfare Upend Vietnam's War." Article draft about the media's reaction to the war in Vietnam and how that has effected American politics. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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zcze sag
yy nnm
politics 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, AUGUST 2-More than ever before, the politics of the
Vietnam war has overshadowed the war itself.
President Lyndon Johnson's tough-line political appraisal of the
battlefield situation here indicates he made a very crucial choice
in selecting some facts to reveal publicly at his impromptu press
conference earlier this week, while simultaneously covering up equally
significant and substantive evidence.
indicates
N
His public statement that there is evidence Hanoi is making
massive preparations for a new offensive in the South--undoubtedly true-
obscures the equally significant current stu situation that Hanoi,
as of
late July, had withdrawn from South Vietnam a "large proportion"
of its North Vietnamese main force units--poossibly up to fifty per cent
of its big-unit formations. This military de-escalation--which
produced the July lull im the big-unit war-is openly discussed here in
WAS
official, private and diplomatic circles. The July lull is as apparent
as crystal-balling preparations for an August offensive.
==more reuter
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zcze sag
yy nnm
polition 2 (normass/deepe)
The President's sharp warning that
the Americans might take
"additional military measures II measures" if such a new offensive
+AngiBLE
is launched is simply the counter-point to an equally real option of his
making concessions to Hanoi in return for the July lull-an option he
chose to discard at this time.
The President's statement that North Vietnamese infiltrators
are flowing into South Vietnam at a record level of 300 30,000 men
in July fuzzes over the battlefield situation that Allied units have been
unable to to find them. At an unprecedented rate in the war, Allied
forces are launching small-unit patrols, long-range patrols and reconnaissance
operations to find these big-unit formations--but without success.
the demilitarized
In
the two nor thermost northernmost provinces
vinces
along the/RoNiC Gadgets
zone, for example, four Allied divisions are literally scouring
gulone
the jungles and valleyes to find gither old North Vietnamese units or
APPREC
new arrivals--but without er contect.
Senior commanders there beideve
have told reporters they believe several of the North Vietnamese divisions
have withdrawn across the demarcation line. One to basic difference
is that a southward flow of 30,000 men from North Vie Vietnam-
RONIC SENSORS #WO
information probably based on aerial reconnassaince--is quite different
from confirming 2011 presence of these HOTF T
Contacts
the Bouth by ground
rops the presence of these infiltrators in the South,
La os or Cambodia.
as distinct from
==more reuter
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zczc sag
yy nnm
politics 3 (normass/deepe)
From this remote vantage point, it appears the President has
conditions
stiffened his demands for peace at the Paris conference table. The
press reports received here indicates that Washington officials have not
publicly denied that Hanoi has withdrawn some troops and de-escalated
AND StiffENED
the war.
But, Washington has re-defined) its demands for de-escalation,
or "serious restraint"
on the part of Hanoi in return for stopping the
bombing over North Vietnam.
One key remark open to this interpretation here was made this
week by Secretary of State Dean Rusk when he told a news conference
that what is important is "not what happened yesterday but what will
happen tomorrow,
next week, next month."
Simply
In short,
serious
restraint by Hanoi is not so much a current de-escalation of the
ba ttlefield war,
S/
but assurance of not future re-escalation as well.
== More Renter.
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2020 sag
yy nnm
politics 4 (normass/deepe)
While the Washington officialdom has not publicly denied
there has been a withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the South,
they have tended to obfuscate this point. This has been done in
MND offeally
two ways refusing to a specify publicly how substantial the withdrawal
has been and second to camouflage the groundwa ground-war lull with
frequent predictions of another Communist offensive.
In the past, these pelial official pronouncements of the
battlefield situation Ifs have been far out of step with the realities
on the ground. One frustrating,
and myty mystifying case of this
occurred for correspondents covering the Vietnam visit of Secretary of
Defense Clark Clifford in mid-July.
Upon departing Washington, he
at the same
again predicted a Communist offensive, but authoritative sources here
were noting that the Viet Cong High Command had held a major policy-making
session in early July--and that it would be at least six weeks before
they would be able to organize and instruct their troops for the o
No offensive. Also, in Washington, the Secretary
mentioned a sizeable buildup of forces of eight or possible more Communist
There HAD BEEN telling
divisions in the five northern provinces, but ground commanders
CORRespondanks
said the North Vietnamese had vanished. Upon arriving in the headquante
the northern headquarters of Danang,
the Secretary backtracked,
12
said that North Vietnamese had withdrawn "some of their divisions
BUT
à out of the South. He again predicted an offensive, which caught the
headlines, and mentesep spoke of a Communist build-up of forces towards
Saigon--just at the time field commanders in the Saigon area had specifically
been telling correspondents the Communists were withdrawing from the capital.
==more reuter
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5020 886
yy nam
politics 5 (normass/deepe)
DISCREPcy.
MND
This obfuscation of at the high-level pronouncements out of stop
with direct reports of field commanders load one veteran journalist to
"Something's fishy hore. It's all to easy to get dates for
conclude,
The
the next offensive and the latest infiot infiltration figures.
officials are setting up their own straw mon; if the offensive conos
off, they can say
that we told you so. If the offensive
does not come off, it shows the quality of effectiveness of the B-52 raids
and the aggressiveness of the ground troops."
more router
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zozo sag
yy nnm
politics 6 (normass/deepe)
This delicate mixture of what might be called low-key news management
and high-intensity pyschological warfare has been a marked feature
OUTSIDE
in relations between the officialdom and the Saigon press corps here since
the May offensive. At that time, the military decision political decision
was made to inform the press about the impending offensive-revealed by a
Communist defector-rather than let the Saigonoce and world suffer another
traumatic shock, as what happend in during the Tet offensive when the Allied
command here was as surprised as everyone else, The les
Militame lesson learned from Tet was whatever military
success the Allies)
gain is lost in the psychological upheaval of even knowing the Communists
can attack the cities at will. Hence, with constant predictions of an
offensive, some of the phy psychological sting is sapped from the
Communist attacks.
But, there are also other advantages.
It keeps
on their toes and the
the Allied troops, especially the Vietnamese,
recurring frequency on which they are order into 100 per cent alert status
not repeat not that an offensive is necessarily coming,
but that
indicates they dod not know 'spe their commanders do not know specifically
when the offensive is coming.
In addition, as one American officor
explained, "If the American command officials keep predicting an offensive
every day, then they just might be right some time."
==more reuter
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zozo sag
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politics 7 (normass/deepe)
The coolest head in the military crowd, from this vantage point,
Public
tel.
He
incurred B
is General Creighton Abrams, who refuses to make any predictions
reportedly remembers the fatality problems of prediction at his
predecessor, General William Westmoreland, incorrect-but General Westmoreland)
is still predicting another offensive now in Washington, is still predicting
another Victim Sive
Communist offensive.
Now, just at this time the time ren President Johnson makes another
prediction of a new Communist offensive,
gamimm the
om highest levels military circles and the
Saigon diplomatic set are beginning to speculate there may not be another
offensive until the end of the year. There are two schools of thought
on this: the prevailing one, with the abundance the predominance of
military evidence, is that there will be another Communist offensive,
probably sometime in August, and probably directed at district and provincial
cati capitals or Saigon. This gordit this line of reasoning
Rationale
maintains Hanoi'sr reasoning is the attacks would enhance their
disenchant
bargaining position/and further deteriorate thre
IN PARIS
with The WAR.
electorate/
effort with the American
more reuter
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zczo sag
yy num
politics 8 (normass/deepe)
for the first time.
Now, a second school is beginning to sto sprout here--and in
the highest military circles--that the possibility exists there
the Communists will not launch another offensive u
next year.
"Because
"I can tell you there is not repeat not going to be another
Communist offensive until January next year--when the new American
President takes office," the exponent of this view explained.
politically, the last thing Hanoi wants is to create a Pearl Harbor
mentality in the United States. And second, militarily, they are not im
a position to have another aj major offensive. The withdrawal of their
units from the South is-making-a-political nee y serves for them making
a political virtue out of a military necessity.
There's nothing on
we (the Allies) can foresee at this time that would cause Hanoi to launch
an offensive at this time."
==more reuter
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2020 sag
ᎩᎩ Mrim
politics 9 (normass/deepe)
HAUE
These games of second-guessing Ho Chi Minh hes not humanlyxatin
influenced the readiness of the Allied commands here to meet any situation
thrust upon them. "We hope we've kept all bets covered,"
one source
explained.
Sontinues
But, while the second-guessing here, one embarrassing fact for
emand has emerged. For the Communists to have their
ground units prepared and ready for an offensive is like having American
B-52 strategic bombers constantly alerted and ready to fly anywhere at
anytime. The significant thing is not the military readiness--thoug
a
but the political green light to use them.
He major
Communist policy decision regarding the new offensive was thought to have
in the South
In this case,
been made at two significant policy meetings, one held in early July
by the Communist Politiburo in the South and the second held by the
Central Committee of the National Liberation Front in mid-July. But,
thus far,
none of the multitudes of Allied intelligence agents have been
able to discover the closed-door-substance of these decisions-and whether
NfAct
the Communists have turned on the political green g light for
the next offensive.
(Hank: Thanks for your query. I hope this sheds some light on the
matter. I'll try to cable another military story tomorrow. I've airmailed
you another piece. The press corps here was severely ridiculed for
over-writing predictions of a July offensive and so my idea is to be very
cautious until it happens. And when it happens, I suspect you'll be able
to see the flames in Bostom.
Right now,
there's all too much hysteria here
Regards Bev).
and too much official propaganda to do otherwise.
==ond reuter
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Date
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1968, Aug. 2
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Press coverage; Public opinion; Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; United States--Politics and government; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Protest movements--United States
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F38
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
