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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04471 to 363-04482.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04471 to 363-04482
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Title
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Article about a military lull in South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "options", Keever's title: "Does Lull in Fighting mean New Offensive or Signal for Peace?" Article about the lack of military activity in South Vietnam and the American theories as to its cause. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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2020 sag
Jy nnm
options 1 (normass/deepe)
offensive,
SAIGON, AUGUST 14--Despite official predictions of another Communist
the Johnson Administration is known to be closely eyeballing and
carefully wie weighing other altemate interpretations of the current
military lull in South Vietnam.
although
Informed sources report that one of the explicit, unofficially
unannounced missions assigned to General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.,
commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, during his recent visit to Vietnam
was to attempt to appraise personally the "significance of the ground
lull in Vietnam."
==more reuter
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zczc sag
yy nnm
options 2 (normass/deepe)
President Lyndon Johnson and senior Administration officials have
a prelude,
publicly interpreted the significance of the ground lull as simply/ giving
the Communists time to re-wind for another military assault on Vietnamese
urban centers.
By
But,, other assessments are being made here in informed political
circles.
These assessments indicate that North Vietnam still maintains
a high degree of flexibility of mom potential actions.
one
"The Communists can exercise a series of options and none of the
indicators are conclusive to show which one Hanoi is pushing for,"
atmam knowledgeable source explained.
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5050 808
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options 3 (normass/deepe)
"Ilanoi still holds a series of options and various combinations of
hard
options,?" " he continued. "It's hard at this point to say what is
most likely. The indicators for a military attack are formidable, but
they have mainted freedom of action to move in other ways.
Knowledgeable political observers here believe Hanoi has probably
decided the American Presidential elections do not offor a prospect for a
major change in American foreign policy or a totally new approach from
the Johnson Administration in settling the Vietnam war.
However, many
senior Vietnamese governmont officials are known to believe the
dates of the
North Vietnamese regime will use the Ameri Deen Democratic Convention
late this month or the Nor November Presidential election as
timing for another major th military thrust.
#nore routor
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yy nim
options 4 (normess/deepe)
Knowledgeable sources hore believe the extreme options available
to Hanoi range from a major military offensive on the one hand to the
other alternativo of not attacking and making explicit that the current
ground lull is a deliberate if not permanent-action of de-escalation
RowS
and serious restraint. This broad spectrum of options hence runs from
hovy predominant omphasis on military notion to the other extreme of
PREVA
heavy emphasis on political action in the international
as internally.
as well
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2020 006
Jy nun
options 5 (normass/doope)
In between these two extremes arise a series of other options
consisting of murky mixes and combinations of military and political
actions of varied intensities, speeds and forms.
Of the two extreme options, the bulk of the official American
judgment here and the bulk of the intelligence evidence suggests another
military thrust. "The indications are not that Hanoi is not going to
attack and will propagandize their explicit military lull as de-escalation,
one informed source explained. "But this is still one option which Hanoi
Red."
has not yet lost.
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Jy nm
options 6 (norma ss/deepe)
Some noutralist diplomats here with accos sococs to Ilonoi's
stated intentions bevi believe North Vietnam has already shown deliberate
restraint by subduing the military actions in the south. But, in
South Vietnam,
Hanoi's words are still taken with an enormous dogroe
of bittor pe akcepticism, if not disdain. Americans and Vietnamese official
alike t remember too well the surprise and magnitude of the Communist
Few
Tot offensive when the Viet Cong/officially declared a unilateral truce--
and then used the holidays as a time of launch an offensive.
porsons outside South Vietnam can probably appreciate the traumatic
shock, croated here by the Tet attacks, it to an emotional reaction
of bitterness and wdr anguish thigh will not soon be forgotten by
American and Vietnamese 01110101s here and will probably remain, oven in
diplomatic circles a detracting 150tor in Paris as a factor detracting
rom inhibiting a moves towards mutual trust between the Allies and the
Communists.
More reuter
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2020 986
Jy m
options 7 (normass/deepe)
American, military sources here have said they traditionally judge
such situations on the basis of "enemy capabilities" instead of second-
guessing "enemy intentions." These officials maintain the Communists
still maintain the military capalb capability of launching some kind of
military action in Saigon, despite relatively heavy caseu casualties theiré
units have the takon in the ounir outskirts recently and as well as
significant losses of cached supplies. Many of the other Vietnamese
urban centers, mainly isolated provincial and district capitals, have
long been considered vuler vulnerable to enemy ground attacks and a number
of then them have been regularly, although relatively lightly subjected
to recent Communist rocketing and mortar attacks, often called "harrassing by
fire."
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5050 686.
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options 8 (normass/deepe)
There is official, but sketchy intelligence information now arriving
in Saigon indicating that some Communist units have been attempting, to pierce
the Saigon perimeter since early this month-but have been turn back
by aggressive Allied actions. One of these cases if the 1st Viot Gong
Regiment, operating north of Saigon in Communist sub-division 4. It had
been ordered to move towards Saigon on August 1, but was unsuccessful
because of bem.
cepted
A more recent example was the 506th battalion of long An province,
south directly south of Saigon, which was moving towards the capital
last weekend. But, on August 12, the U. S. Army 9th Infantry Division
48
engaged the the battalion in a bunkerline for a battle of nearly 24 hour S
duration.
engagedy
One hundred
17
Sixty four Communists and 15 Americans were killed in that
to
ich was officially announced yesterday.
The Communist
deputy battalion commander was also reportedly captured; his interrogation
might shed some light on future Communist plans.
#moro reuter
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zeze sag
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options 9 (normass/deepe)
S
Other captured documents,, prisoners and defections also indicates in
some detail that units aroun Communist units around Saigon are preparing
to make a push such details include how much ammunition and rice the
Communist troops should carry into the attack, how many platoons from
other special units--such as anti-aircraft teams--are to join them at
specific points. Some documents also carry detailed battle plans
of how the Communist units are to maneuver when they attack their
designated targets.
more reuter
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Jy nim
options 110 (normass/deepe)
necessari
Still clear-out evidence of isolated unit movements does not
confirm the intention of Communist strategists to mount a massive,
coordinated offensive. Much of the problem involves interpretation of
EVEN AFTER
intelligence information, as well as seizing first-hand sources, plus
Per a bottle of ene
projecting specific details into an over-all bettle plan potential
de Communists potential overall battle plan.
Aside from those two extremes, the Communist options at this time
are considered here by knowledgeable sources to include the followings
more router
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options 11 (normass/deepe)
1.
Establishing a "coalition" between the National Liberation
Front and the Alliance for Novdan National, Democratic and Peace Forces
This would be designed to enhance the Communist bargaining position in Paris
during the present phase of the bilateral talks, or perhaps evolve into
conference future phase of the conferenc
their political stence in a broader
conference involving more nations and elements.
This effort could do be
used to dovetail with the Communist move in the countryside of the South
to attempt to establish "revolutionary committees or councils" to function
as a Communist administration in villages and hamlets.
somo
officie
Informod sources here noto a growing inter-play in Communist
propaganda from radio brondeants and posts between the National
AND
Liberation Front, and the Gh alleged Communist-created Alliance in
Communist radio broadcasts ond discussions from Paris.
From this vantage
point, however, the inter-play seems so obscure as to defy any concrote
interpretations.
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sesc sag
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2. Low-level military attacks on some quarters with some political
moves to wipe up dissatisfactions with the present South Vietnamese government.
Or simply continuing the Communists can simply continue, or accelerate,
their prosent pattern of terrorism, sob sb sabotage and kidnappings, 08 8
to bits-
slow-motion means of attempting to shred the fe non-Communist fabric of the
society and government.
3. Also, to contiue continue their present course of attempting
among
to create divisions between the Vietnamese non-Communists, in one
instance, and between the cunt current Vietnamese government and the
American officialdom in another instance. Any weakening of American
support in the present supp political climate, or in light of future
4. NOT
steps towards peace, would serv probably critically/weaken the non-Communist
cause here. Monto Many observers here believe there are a significant
number of stresses and strains among the Vietnamo se nationalist groupings--
and between the Vietnamese government and American officialdom here--that
Now
the Communists are able to exploit the situation with ease, or develop
new divisions with ease..
ond reuter
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Date
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1968, Aug. 14
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Subject
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Vietnam (Republic); Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F38
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
