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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04552 to 363-04559.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04552 to 363-04559
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Title
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Article about the Communist Party of South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "Party", Keever's title: "Communist Party in South Vietnam tries to Expand its Membership." Article draft about the Communist Party of South Vietnam's attempts to increase its membership and influence. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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Beverly A. Deepe
3, Võ Tanh
Saigon,
Vietnam
August 1, 1968
Party-page 1
SAIGON--In the outer peripheries of this capital, the Communist
Party in South Vietnam is urgently striving to expand its membership.
To do so, the Communist Party has even taken the unprecedented
step of authorizing battlefield Party promotions for low-ranking
guerrillas who have fought valiantly.inform
to two-year
month
In the past, the Communist Party required a three
period of probation before an admission into the Party was allowed.
The longer period of probation was required for persons from the upper-opl
class strata of society and the shorter period for persons of working-class
backgrounds.
More)
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Deepe
Party-page 2
called the People's
The Communist Party in South Vietnam,
Revolutionary Party, is considered by most officials here as an extension
of the Communist Party in North Vietnam, called the Lao Dong Party.
In the
,
ORGANIZAtional
South, the Communist Party is considered to be the immer-str
core masked by the National Liberation Front,, which contains non-Party
elements. The Communist Party in the South also contains the key decision-
or satellite, organizations as the
making members in such affiliate,
Front's Women's Association, the Farmer's Association and the youth
organizations.
The call for an expansion of the Communist Party membership was
made in an April directive, subsequently captured by Allied units, from
the supreme political and military headquarters called Central Office of
South Vietnam (COSVN) to the six subdivisions surrounding and including
the capital of Saigon.
Among the many obligations entrusted to the Communist Party members
was the instructions
"You should educate the (Viet Cong) troops to have the spirit of
Even if they are forced to eat
resilence to overcome all difficulties.
only rice soup or to eat the leaves of the trees, they have to fight and
win over the Americans."
(More)
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Deepe
Party-page 3
The recruitment and "ideological training" of new Communist Party
members is to be carried out on such a scale that "there should be at
least one Communist Party member in each squad," the directive states. A
squad ranges generally is about ten mom men.
"So far, thx a number of squads do not have the leadership of
"And at least forty per cent of
the Party," the directive continued.
the leadership of each company (roughly 100 mon) should be Party members.
Sometimes, now each company has only ten or twenty per cent of its
leadership from the Party membership."
The directive also lays down spoodfic regulations and allotments
for the promotion of Communist Party members.
up, "
"On the promotion of the cadre, you have to promote from the bottom
the directive states. "The cadre who has good character is given
first priority and second priority is his competency and the third
priority is for the combination of the competency and character of the ondre
who can achieve his mission given him by higher headquarters."
(More)
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Deepe
Party page 4
By the end of June the scheduling of promotions and apportionment
to military units
of Party members was specified in the directive as follows:
Party member for each squad;
W Additione
30 men);
one Communist
three Communist members for each platoon (roughly
six to eight Party members for each company; six or
seven Communists for each battalion headquarters staff; and
Communists for each regimental headquarters staff.
six or more
In the political chain of command, each of the Communist-controlled
villages were to be lead by four to six Communist Party members, of which
one or two were to be women cadre. At the next higher district headquarters,
five or seven Communist Party members are to be in charge,
of which
at least one or two are to be women Communist members. At political
levels above the district, the number of Party members assigned "depends
on the situation. It should be organized in a rational way and
should
try to have more than a minimum of cadre so that they can satisfy all the
requirements."
(More)
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Deepe
Party--page 5
The expansion in Party membership is regarded as significant here
because the Communist Party is the organizational backbone running
the Communist side of the war being fought in the South. Its disciplined
organizational machine and indoctrination techniques-
producing a high-quality Party members is regarded here as a distinct
strong point, oven surpassing its ideological programs,
some observers
believe.
But, in what way the expansion of membership is significant is
open to varying, interpretations-hone.
contradictory, interpretations here.
although not necessarily
Some Vietnamese sources believe
e tname se
the Communists may be pa attempting to expand its membership in the
urban centers, especially Saigon, and if successful, this would
represent a substantial political achievement.
Allied field commanders outside of Saigon, however, view the
move as
a momentary sign of weakness. These commanders
have said
that before and during the Communist Tet offensive in late January, many
Com MUNST bed.
of their village guerrillas were shifted into regular provincial battalions-
and then into regular main-force units. These units suffered heavy casualties
during the battles with Allied forces around Saigon, leaving a vacuum of
armed Communist strength in the villages, although not necessarily
a vacuum of Communist tax-collectors, propagandists, political and
cultural cadre to influence the rural peasants.
(More)
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Deepe
Party-page 66
$6
Hence, these sources maintain, the Communist must recover the se
losses of their guerrilla base and numerically increase their Party
strength among the guerrilla ranks to insure better military results
in the future. These sources note that captured to documents
appraising the military affairs, the Communist commanders often
complained that inadequate preparation was made on the political-propaganda
side in order to create conditions favorable for "the general uprising."
From the Communist viewpoint, however, the reason stated
in the captured directive is:
"Our military strength is getting
bigger and bigger every day and the development of our strength
is very ac fast, therefore,
we should have a big political force
of cadre to satisfy the demand of the military forces.
The This
body of cadre should be enough, not only in number but also in quality.
The mission of the Communist Party is one of the most important
ING
facts factors which has a decisive significance to carry out the mission
properly ad and correctly."
(More)
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Deepe
Party-page 7
The directive also includes a wide-range of specific requirements
Necessary
needed to hold the new Communist Party recruits into dedicated cadre--which
is considered an important step in making their organization tick. These
techniques of molding their cadre-specifically their minds-includes the
e following:
1. All the cadre must understand clearly they are to be tempered
to become very serious, to become determined to carry the mission to the end."..
to be determined to win the biggest victory, the continuous victory under any
hard circumstances, to raise very high the 18h ideology of heroic
Peroul revolution, to play up the good side of our traditions, to
play up the excellent showcases of heroism through examples 0 courageous
sacrifices. All of these actions lead toward limelighting the traditional
character of a revolutionary person, the konec character of not surrendering
ideologically to the enemy, not surrender, during the fighting, not b
shirk in carrying any mission."
they
2.
boned should make propaganda on all kinds of victories wom
by us. The cadre should organize a kind of briefing with the troops as
well as with the guerill guerrillas about the events and the news,
they
that your help them to judge the
their intellectual curiosity."
SO
situation at the same time you encourage
3. "All kinds of organizations should center around consolidating the
sumpreme nationwide leadership of the Partys, and the direct leadership of
the Party in the armed forces at all echelons. To do this they have to
AND
reinforce the leadership of the Party re-educate the Party members about
ideology."
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Deepe
Pa rty-page 8
4. The members of the Communist Party should set the example for
all the followers; they should organize a three month course,
course should be named after the heroes or leaders who have died.
and the
5. While increasing the number of Communist Party members is necessary,
the most important factor is not the recruiting of new members, but the
political education of new members.
To do so,
the cadre at all echelons
AND tutoring
should organize political education courses for the members,
tutoring sessions for the new members.
d-be-open
The cadre should emphasize
criticism and self-criticism of the new recruits...0
the
6. Launch
Lati
tion campaign to emulate exterminating the
they
enemeny enemy, to contribute to the revolution can use any title
for the campaign, particularly the of the most recent
historical image or slogans such as:
"To revenge your home.
"To Pay your debt to the country
"To exterminate the enemy."
Or:
"The whole country competes to exterminate the enemy to win the war.
20
7. The campaign is to be launched for the whole year, but in two
phases. After the first phase, the cadres are given a grade or preliminary
evaluation and at the end of 1968, the final evaluation is made as to which
cadre and unit wing the yearly campaign.
FRE to Be Proposed
8. Propose decorations and promotions according to achievements so
as to strength courage and initiative in carrying out all missions,
increasing leadership techniques and specialtiespecialition
Skills.
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Date
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1968, Aug. 1
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Subject
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Dảng Nhân Dân Cách-Mạng; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Communism--Vietnam; Party affiliation
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F38
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
