

Beverly A. Deepe
38, Vo Tanh
Saigon, Vietnam

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SAIGON--In the outer peripheries of this capital, the Communist Party in South Vietnam is urgently striving to expand its membership.

To do so, the Communist Party has even taken the unprecedented step of authorizing battlefield Party promotions for low-ranking guerrillas who have fought valiantly. ~~in the past~~

In the past, the Communist Party required a ~~3~~ three ^{to two-year} month period of probation before ~~admission~~ admission into the Party was allowed.

The longer period of probation was required for persons from the upper-class strata of society and the shorter period for persons of working-class backgrounds.

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The Communist Party in South Vietnam, called the People's Revolutionary Party, is considered by most officials here as an extension of the Communist Party in North Vietnam, called the Lao Dong Party. *ORGANIZATIONAL FILE*

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In the South, the Communist Party is considered to be the ~~inner-structural~~ core masked by the National Liberation Front, which contains non-Party elements. The Communist Party in the South also contains the key decision-making members in such affiliate, or satellite, organizations as the Front's Women's Association, the Farmer's Association and the youth organizations.

The call for an expansion of the Communist Party membership was made in an April directive, subsequently captured by Allied units, from the supreme political and military headquarters called Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) to the six subdivisions surrounding and including the capital of Saigon.

Among the many obligations entrusted to the Communist Party members was the instruction:

"You should educate the (Viet Cong) troops to have the spirit of resilience to overcome all difficulties. Even if they are forced to eat only rice soup or to eat the leaves of the trees, they have to fight and win over the Americans."

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The recruitment and "ideological training" of new Communist Party members is to be carried out on such a scale that "there should be at least one Communist Party member in each squad," the directive states. A squad ranges ¹⁵ generally ~~is~~ about ten ~~men~~ men.

"So far, ~~that~~ a number of squads do not have the leadership of the Party," the directive continued. "And at least forty per cent of the leadership of each company (roughly 100 men) should be Party members. Sometimes, now each company has only ten or twenty per cent of its leadership from the Party membership."

The directive also lays down specific regulations and allotments for the promotion of Communist Party members.

"On the promotion of the cadre, you have to promote from the bottom up," the directive states. "The cadre who has good character is given first priority and second priority is his competency and the third priority is for the combination of the competency and character of the cadre who can achieve his mission given him by higher headquarters."

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By the end of June, ^{to military units} the scheduling of promotions and apportionment of Party members was specified in the directive as follows: one Communist Party member for each squad; three Communist members for each platoon (roughly ^{AN Additional} 30 men); ^{more} six to eight Party members for each company; ~~six or~~ six or ~~seven~~ seven Communists for each battalion headquarters staff; and six or more Communists for each regimental headquarters staff.

In the political chain of command, each of the Communist-controlled villages were to be lead by four to six Communist Party members, of which one or two were to be women cadre. At the next higher district headquarters, five or seven Communist Party members are to be in charge, of which at least one or two are to be women Communist members. At ~~the~~ political levels above the district, the number of Party members assigned "depends on the situation. It should be organized in a rational way and ~~they~~ they should try to have more than a minimum of cadre so that they can satisfy all the requirements."

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The expansion in Party membership is regarded as significant here because the Communist Party is the organizational backbone ~~is~~ running the Communist side of the war being fought in the South. Its disciplined organizational machine and indoctrination techniques ~~involving~~ producing a high-quality Party members is regarded here as a distinct strong point, even surpassing its ideological programs, ~~in the eyes of~~ some observers, believe.

But, in what way the expansion of membership is significant is open to varying ~~interpretations here~~, although not necessarily contradictory interpretations here. Some Vietnamese sources believe the Communists may be ~~also~~ attempting to expand ^{their} membership in the urban centers, especially Saigon, and if successful, this would represent a substantial political achievement.

Allied field commanders outside of Saigon, however, view the move as a momentary sign of weakness. These commanders ~~do~~ have said that before and during the Communist Tet offensive in late January, many of their ^{Communist Led} village guerrillas were shifted into regular provincial battalions-- and then into regular main-force units. These units suffered heavy casualties during the battles with Allied forces around Saigon, leaving a vacuum of armed Communist strength in the villages, although not necessarily a vacuum of Communist tax-collectors, propagandists, political and cultural cadre to influence the ~~rural~~ peasants.

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Hence, these sources maintain, the Communist must recover these losses of their guerrilla base and numerically increase their Party strength among the guerrilla ranks to insure better military results in the future. These sources note that ^{IN} captured ~~so~~ documents appraising ^{Reck} ~~the~~ military affairs, the Communist commanders often complained that inadequate preparation was made on the political-propaganda side in order to create conditions favorable for "the general uprising."

From the Communist viewpoint, however, the reason stated in the captured directive is: "Our military strength is getting bigger and bigger every day and the development of our strength is very ~~so~~ fast, therefore, we should have a big political force of cadre to satisfy the demand of the military forces. ~~The~~ This body of cadre should be enough, not only in number but also in quality. The mission of the Communist Party is one of the most important ^{of} ^{ING} ~~facts~~ factors which has a decisive significance ~~to~~ carry out the mission properly ~~and~~ and correctly."

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The directive also includes a wide-range of specific requirements

Necessary
~~needed~~ to mold the new Communist Party recruits into dedicated cadre--which is considered an important step in making their organization tick. These techniques of molding their cadre--specifically their minds--includes the ~~following~~ following:

1. All the cadre must understand clearly they are to be tempered to become very serious, to become determined to carry the mission to the end... to be determined to win the biggest victory, the continuous victory under any hard circumstances, to raise very high the ~~high~~ ideology of heroic ~~re~~ ~~revolution~~ revolution, to play up the good side of our traditions, to play up the excellent showcases of heroism through examples ^{of} ~~to~~ courageous sacrifices. All of these actions lead toward ⁵ limelighting the traditional character of a revolutionary person, ~~the~~ ~~same~~ character of not surrendering ideologically to the enemy, not ~~to~~ ^{ing} ~~surrender~~ during the fighting, not ~~to~~ ^{ing} ~~shirk~~ in carrying any mission."

2. ^{"they"} ~~you should~~ should make propaganda on all kinds of victories won by us. The cadre should organize a kind of briefing with the troops as well as with the ~~guerrilla~~ guerrillas about the events and the news, so that ^{they} ~~you~~ help them to judge the situation at the same time ^{AS} ~~you~~ encourage their intellectual curiosity."

3. "All kinds of organizations should center around consolidating the supreme nationwide leadership of the Party, and the direct leadership of the Party in the armed forces at all echelons. To do this they have to reinforce the leadership of the Party, ^{AND} re-educate the Party members about ideology."

4. The members of the Communist Party should set the example for all the followers; they should organize a three month course, and the course should be named after the heroes or leaders who have died.

5. While increasing the number of Communist Party members is necessary, the most important factor is not the recruiting of new members, but the political education of new members. To do so, the cadre at all echelons should organize political education courses for the members, ~~and to open tutoring sessions for the new members.~~ ^{AND tutoring sessions} The cadre should emphasize criticism and self-criticism of the new recruits....

6. ^{they should} ~~Launch an emulation~~ campaign to emulate exterminating the enemy ~~enemy~~ ^{AND} to contribute to the revolution. ^{they} ~~You~~ can use any title for the campaign, particularly ~~the use of~~ the most recent historical image or slogans such as:

"To revenge your home.
"To Pay your debt to the country
"To exterminate the enemy."

Or:

"The whole country competes to exterminate the enemy to win the war."

7. The campaign is to be launched for the whole year, but in two phases. After the first phase, the cadres are given a grade or preliminary evaluation and at the end of 1968, the final evaluation is made as to which cadre and unit ⁵ ~~winning~~ the yearly campaign.

8. ^{ARE to BE PROPOSED} ~~Propose~~ decorations and promotions according to achievements so as to strengthen ^{EN} the courage, and initiative in carrying out all missions, ^{AND} increasing leadership techniques and ^{SKILLS} ~~specialties~~ ^{specialities}.