Article about a Việt Cộng defector

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363-04207 to 363-04222.pdf
Digital Object Identifier
363-04207 to 363-04222
Title
Article about a Việt Cộng defector
Description
Original title: "turncoat", Keever's title: "Turncoat Reveals Viet-Cong's Battle Extravaganza for Vietnam." Article draft about a Việt Cộng defector revealing an immanent Communist offensive against Saigon. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
AI Usage Disclosure
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript
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2020 sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
turncoat 1 (normass/deepe)
two)
SAIGON, APRIL 30-Nearly me weeks ago, a diminative Viet Cong
, WEARing BLACK PEASANTS PAJAMAS,
political commissar) defected to a dusty,
remote Vietnamese government
police post more than twenty miles north of the capital--and thus
sensation al
became the most
turncoat known to date in the Vietnam war.
Surpassing even the Hollywood thriller suspense of Alfred Hitchcock
Dv
and James Bon, the Viet Cong officer simply revealed vast portions
The
of an imminent Communist plan to launch a military extravaganza against
Saigon even more spectacular then their surprise Tet offensive.
prodigious battle plan revealed by the commissar called for the
equivalent of at least one and half divisions (15,000 men)-and
possibly to two and half divisions (25,000 men) Viet Cong converging
to assault Saigon and its outskirts,
rocket attacks on ammunition depots,
orchestrated with artillery and
gasoline tank farms, the
American embassy and military billets, the American military command
and Saigon's airport, the Vietnamese Presidential Palace and High
Command.
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turncoat 2 (normass/deope)
The resulting military fireworks would have to ricochetted
politically around the world, especially at a time when Washington
and Hanoi vore doadlocked on a meeting site for peace talks. The
revelations of the Viet Cong commisser indicated that if the Communists
had succeeding in launching and implementing their large-scale battle
plan, washington would have had li lost so much of its bargaining
position, it would have had little to talk about with Hanoi.
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zcze sag
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turncoat 3 (normass/deepe)
The Viet Cong political commissargen
April 19 and since then, Saigon has been suspended
his State
expecg expece expected
defected on Friday,
in a suspended stat frenzied state of pandemonium,
to continue until at least May 19,
Prexi President Ho Chi Minh.
78
the a birthday of North Vietnamese
After his defection, the commissar was
transported from the police post to Bien Hoa, the corps headquarters 2
twenty miles north of Saigon, and then to Saigon, where Vietnamese
interrogators immediately began to glean information from him. The
government interrogators in decided the 42-year-old Communist was not a
hoax and that his information had tipped them off about the impending
Communist offensive. On the Vietnamese government side,
things happened immediately:
several significant
all Vietnamese forces in the Saigon area
were placed on alert, wity with one hundred per cent confinement to barracks,
MORE
Vietnamese troops were rushed into the to Saigon defense perimeter,
government employees got wind of the scoop and began telephoning their
friends to stockpile rice, milk, cooking fuels and other necessities.
Then,
government sources leaked the story of the coronel commissar
to the Vietnamese and Western correspondents,
and the fort imminent attack on So
erection
defection
of the commisgar's te
Se Rc
Saigon, later climate climaxed
by similar statements pronouncements to the press by the Vietnamese Prime Ministe
Nguyen Van Loc, and President Nguyen Van Thieu.
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Not until the following Wednesday, five days later, did General William
C. Westmoreland's American Military Assistance Command (MACV), swing into
action.
American interrogators, aided by lie detectors, also placed
credence in the Gemm commissar's story. Alerts to American forces
were immediately issued. Bas Weapons were issued to headquarters officers,
American civilian government employees were told to stockpile two weeks
of rations, some military officers were ordered to sleep overnight at the
o large military command complex, called Pentagon East; American
billets were placed on 'white'
alert.
✓✓aunched
MACV also reported launched
who had leaked he story to the press.
special operation to find out just
But, the command failed; for
ASSA
while MACV wanted the story kept secret so that the Viet Cong would at
WHEN
ware Readi
the Allies veldbe alerted for the attack, the Vietnamese government
sources was deliberately feeding more and more information to the press,
these sources argued that the political-psychological shock of another
Viet Cong assault into sai gon-1 even if the Communists lost huge numbers
of men would outweigh any military gains.
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turncoat 5 (normass/deepe)
But, while MACV officially was trying to squelch leaks to the
press about the expected imminent attack, its headquarters officers
the within hours the word had
were tipping off their friends about it,
swirled all the way down to the level of mini-skirted American
BOUNCED
the
secretaries. The most open secret in Saigon WIFIed through command and
FROUND
through the city.
Later, Brig. Gen.
w.
Sidle, General
Westmoreland's officer in charge of public information, gave a sketchy
briofing of the impending attack to several dozen correspondents, but the
briefing was "off-the-record," meaning it could not be published.
Christian Science Mr Monitor was not present.
The
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turncoat (normass/deope)
Vietnamese intelligence sources list the commissar's name as
Ha No. 8 and
Tran Van Dac--Dac means "achievement"--and his codenames as
Hanoi No. 8. But the sa semi-official Vietnam Press identified him as
Colonel Tom Ha, and he was still later identified as Can Colonel Pham
Ven Theche It is not unusual for Viet Cong officers to accrue a number of
m Press termed him "the most high
aliases. Vien noi
ranking VC agent who has ever rallied to the national cause,"
the news
official
military,
and
e service bestowed him with the rank of colonel, but other
sources said that since he was a political, rather than
1 officer, he held only the equivalent rank of lieutenant colonel.
Two other Viet Cong high lieutenant colonels have previously defected to
the Vietnamese government--but none bringing sue pinpoint intelligence
information as sensation sensational as the Communist battle plan for Saigon.
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Jy 1jp
turncoat 7 (normass/deepe)
for
The sources said he was the political commissa
commissar of tho
Viet Cong 9th Division Division, based northwest of Saigon, and deputy
political commissar of sub-command 4 of the T-700 region, a now command
controlled directly by the Viet Cong supreme command headquarters
controlling dry military and political activities in Saigon and
surrounding provinces, operating directly under the Viet Cong high command,
called COSVIT.
The commissar, aged 49, was rpour reportedly born and raised
in Binh Dinh province of central Vietnam. The son of a middle-class family,
he completed roughly the equivalent of junior high school, and then
in 1947, he joined the pro-Communist Viet Minh to fight the French
during the French Indo-China War.
Colonial
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turncoat 8 (normass/deepe)
The reaso two reasons he gave for his defecion defection were
reportedly highly personal ones. First, he said, he know alot of
civilians had been killed or wounded in saigon during the Tet offensive-
and the upcoming attack would be even worse for the civilians because
of the heavy weapons bombardments planned during the attack.
He sad
said he couldn't take it any more; his morale broke; and he hoped
that by com coming to the government side, he could foil the plan and the
Communists would not attack. The second reasons' was much more of a
long-standing grievance--the Communist Party gave preferential treatment
to working-class cadre from the working-class of over those of mid-
middle-class status, such as himself. Hence, he said, Colonel Hoang
Cam had been given command of the Viet Cong 9th Division because he come
from a working class family, but when Dac was a major Cam was only a
S
lieutenant and now Cam had risen much faster.
Colonel Cam was killed
they
as his units withdrew from saigon during the Tot period, Dac said, and other
Viet Cong officers are now disgruntled because they are being
severely
criticized, and some
replaced, because their units suffered such heavy
casualties during Tet,
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turncoat 9 (normass/deepe)
The Communist timetable for the executing of the battle plan was
imprecise, but the commissar's information was detailed enough to give
The commissar said
Allied interrogators rough estimates at the time.
the first orders he received from the Viet Cong command were that
the assigned units should be ready to move by April 16, but that,
April 19 when he defea defected,
as of
no exact date for the assault had been
transmitted down to the field echelons.
Come
He "guessed" the attack might have
come o last week-end, but if not, he thought it certainly would come
before May 1, a re red-letter Communist holiday.
He said that some
of the assigned units already had "advance party" officers and xx
A
forward obar observers for artillery in the areas in which their units
were to move. Some observers here believe that while Dac's information
may have tipped the Communists timetable, they no longer need the element
of surprise, which they utilized so much during the Tet offensive,
and that if they should attack when the Allies already are tipped off
they may be able to gain even more psychological shook than otherwise.
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turncoat 10 (normass/deepe)
The battle
tactical
plan
and precise information.
revealed by the commissar reve included both vague
unconfirmed information concerned
The vague,
Rom
Saigon
his believe that the spearhead of the Saigon attack would be started by
a division of Communist troopers now resting in the Plain of Reeds area
southwest of Saigon, near, if not on the other side, of the Cambodian
border, at its closest point to Sargent or only thirty miles away. A
He said he had heard about this division, which would use Lin Piao's
tactics called "Bon-Tap"--run-attack-to race from the Cambodian
area to Saigon in a matter of hours, and then attack. But, he
said, he had only heard about this division,
of his
Respons.blity.
and since he it was outside
area of command, he could not confirm this information,
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tactical
His other information was more precise. The battle plan he know of
included the use of at least six infantry regiments-one and half divisions
plus one heavy-weapons regiment.
The latter consisted of one battalion
of 28 tubes of f 122 mm. rockets,
rifles and one battalion of 82 mm,
one battalion of 57 and 75 mm.
recoilless
mortars. These heavy weapons battalions
were to be used north and nor ao north-northwest of Saigon to harrass
American infantry units and installations running from the fringos of Tan
Son Nhut Airbase to the Iron Triangle thirty miles away.
The infantry regiments included the 271 and 272 of the
Viet Cong 9th Division, the 101st Regiment of the Viet Cong 7th Division,
the 274th of the Viet Cong 5th Division, the autonomous Dong
Regiment, and the 88th North Vietnamese
Ngai
Army Regiment when was to act
as a reserve outside of Saigon while lying in ambush position along
Provincial Route 8, or geographically running through rubber plantations
between Chu Cu Chi and Binh Duong and militarily running through the
operational areas of the U. S. Army 25th Division and 1st Division,
might be expected to travel the road to reinforce Saigon.
which
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In addition,
six Viet Cong authomo autonomous battalions from the
Gia Dinh pe, the province surrounding Sougong wore to be used along with
the 125th sapper and reconnaissance battalion of the F-100 regiment, which
attacked the American Embassy and other installations during the Tet
offensive.
Dac said the four of the six mainforce regiments had withdrawn
into the jungled Iron Ti Triangle area, shortly after the Tet offensive,
where they had undergone rest, reconditioning, retraining, criici
criticism and self-criticism sessions, brainwashing, reviews of lessons
learned and had received replacements for their Tet losses. They were now
十
The ser regiments, under the direct command of General Tran Van Tra of
thepe
feeds COSVN), were now ready to attack
again, the defector said.
He said the 272 Regiment of the 9th Division was to drive down
to attack Vietnam's biggest boot camp at Quang Trug Trung, on the fringes
of Tan Son Nhut airbase, while the 101st Regiment of the 7th Division
was to spearhead the drive into the airbase proper. The 271st sistor
regiment of the 9th Division was to reinforce its sister regiment during the
Quang Trung battle and then both were to smash into Saigon proper. If
necessary, the 88th North Vietnamese Regiment would steal out of its ambush
position to reinforce the two regiments at Tan Son Nhut airbase, Dac said.
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To bettalions of the 274th Regiment of the Viet Cong 5th Division
ordinarily based in Phuoc Tuy province, have already moved into Thu Due
province,
district, from which their total 500 men would launch their attack,
the sources said.
Inside the ous outskirts of Saigon, these infantry regiments
would be sidded and guided by the Gia Dinh autonomous battalions and the
local Dong Ngai regimont--the hometown cadre who knew the terrain and the
people outside of Saigon, and who in turn would also concentrato
on specific targets in the fringes of the city, especially i
Vietnamese gofr government district capitals in Gia Dinh province and
Vietmo Vietnese goverment outposts and installations.
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One special feature of the assault came from other informed
sources, who reported that the North Vietnamese Army had stationed
a regiment of armored vehicles across the Cambodian border lateral to Saigon.
Other sources said simply that North Vietnamese armored specialists
were based there--and that during the ground assault attempt attempts
would be made to seise control of Vietnamese government armr armored vehicles,
which the North Vietnamese would then drive into saigon. As incredible
as the plan sounded, Amei American sources said the Communists during the
Tot offensive had a similar planto seize the Vietnamese government armor
at Thu Duc district--and then use it in turn to capture other armored
vehicles to move into Saigon. The plan fi failed during the Tet attacks-
LE
A
but it has load to giving to similar information credence at this time.
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The Viet Congre, known to be carrying out extensive propaganda
among Vietnamese armor and artillery units. Before Tot, a number of
Viet Cong agents would oulled out of the armor unit i Vietnamese
unit south of Saigon, and in the Mekong Delta during the Tet offensive
several Vietnamese government tracked vehicles defected to the Viet Cong side,
only to be destroyed later by airs airpower.
an
Reliable sources here believe to the Communists would seek three
possible military objectives by the launching this new offensive,
offensive they call the "third wave," The first wave was the ground assaults
during Tet, the second wave was the rocket and artillery barrages which
followed country-wide in February and March and the third wave would
may involve both ground assaults and artitiory indirect weapons bombardments.
The Communist optimum objective would be the simultaon simultaneous ground
attack and artillery bombardment cordi coordinated countrywide. The
second, less ambitious objective,
hit key installations and buildings in the center of the Saigon, and
possibly other cities as well, while using their ground assaults only
to sweep clean the government presence in a five or six 1 mile radius
outside each urban center. The least ambitious objective would simply
wipe out soloog selected, strategic outposts of government
would be to use artillery and rockets to
troops,
who will not accommodate with them, without necessary assaulting on the
ground the government-hold towns and cities.
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The political objectives, or reperous predictable
the commune favor
repercussions, would be to influene influence the course of Wirquing
Washington-Hanoi peace talks, on the diplomatic front. Internally,
1 the military offensive, if successfuly, would f
Among
Popul
deteriorate
to the anti-Communist spirit in the urban centers, weaken the government
of President Nguyen Van Thieu, and also enhance the prestige of the
Communis
nog inspired organization called the Alliance of
National Democratic and Peace Forces of Vietnam.
(Hanks I hope you can print this as soon as possible,
since MCV still thinks there will ben an attack on May 1, though I've
tried to play down the specific dates. I've cancelled by Kien Hoa
trip for today, but am trying to interview set up interviews in the Delta
for this week-end. Ro I'll try to file tomorrow on the now
Peace Alliance. Regards Bev)-end retuer
Date
1968, Apr. 30
Subject
Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam (Republic). Quân lực; Defection; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Defectors--Vietnam; Intelligence service
Location
Saigon, South Vietnam
Coordinates
10.8231; 106.6311
Size
20 x 26 cm
Container
B10, F22
Format
dispatches
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
Language
English