Article on Viet Cong defectors

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363-01821 to 363-01836.pdf
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363-01821 to 363-01836
Title
Article on Viet Cong defectors
Description
Original title: "turncoat." Keever's title: "Turncoat reveals Viet Cong's Battle Extravaganza for Saigon." Article by Keever on Viet Cong defectors
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript
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2020 888
Jy 1jp
turncoat 1 (normass/deepe)
two)
Ste
SAIGON, APRIL 30--Nearly the weeks ago,
WEARING
BLACK PEASA
political commissar defected to a dusty,
adamantivo Viet Cong
romote Vietnamese government
police post more than twenty miles north of the capital--and thus
sensational
became the most phenomenal turncoat known to date in the Vietnam war.
Dy
Surpassing even the Hollywood thriller suspense of Alfred Hatohoock
and James Bong the Viet Cong officer simply revealed vast portions
of an imminent Communist plan to launch a military extravaganza against
saigon even more spectacular then their surprise Tet offensive. The
prodigious battle plan revealed by the commissar called for the
op equivalent of at least one and half divisions (15,000 men)--and
possibly to two and half divisions (25,000 mon) Viet Cong converging
to assault saigon and its outskirts, orchestrated with artillery and
rocket attacks on ammunition dopots, gasoline tank farms, the
American embassy and military billets, the American military command.
and saigon's airport, the Vietnamese Presidential Palace and ligh
Command.
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2020 sag
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turncoat 2 (normass/deepe)
The resulting military fireworks would have reko ricochetted
politically around the world, especially at a time when Washington
and Hanoi were deadlocked on a meeting site for peace talks. The
revelations of the Viet Cong commissar indicated that if the Communists
had succeeding in launching and implementing their large-scale battle
plan, Washington would have had li lost so much of its bargaining
position, it would have had little to talk about with Hanoi.
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5020 Sag
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turncoat 3 (normass/deepe)
The Viet Cong political commissar mod
defected on Friday, April 19--and since then, Saigon has been suspended
This
in a susperiod
frenzied state of pandemonium, expecg expece expected
to continue until at least May 19, the birthday of North Vietnamese
PO President Ho Chi Minh.
After his defection, the commissar was
transported from the police post to Bien Hoa, the corps headquarters &
twonty miles north of Saigon, and then to Saigon, where Vietnamese
interrogators immediately began to glean information from him. The
government interrogators in decided the
d the
49-year-old Communist was not a
hoax and that his information had tipped them off about the impending
Communist offensive. On the Vietnamese government side, several significant
things happened immediatelys
all Vietnamese forces in the Saigon area
were placed on alert, wity with one hundred per cent confinement to barracks,
Vietnamese troops were rushed into the fo Saigon defense perimeter,
government employees got wind of the scoop and began telephoning their
friends to stockpile rice, milk, cooking fuels and other necessities.
Then, government sources leaked the story of the colonel commiser defection
to the Vietnamese and Western correspondents, of the comminger's defection
Expected
and the fort imminent attack on ser Saigon, later cimme
climaxod
by similar was pronouncements to the press by the Vietnamese Prime Minister,
Nguyen Van Loc, and President Nguyen Van Thieu.
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Not until the following Wednesday, five days later, did General William
C. Westmoreland's American Military Assistance Command (MACV), swing into
action. American interrogators, aided by lie detectors, also placed
credence in the Gem commissar's story.
were immediately issued.
Alerts to American forces
Weapons were issued to headquarters officers,
American civilian government employees were told to stockpile two weeks
of rations, some military officers were ordered to sleep overnight at the
large military command complex, called Pentagon East;
billets were placed on 'white'
LV
alert.
MACV also reported Launched
who had leaked he story to the press.
American
ag special operation to find out just
the command failed; for
Assault
But,
while MACV wanted the story kept secret so that the Viet Cong would k
WHEN
ware Ready
the Allies be clerted for the attack,
the Vietnamese government
sources was deliberately feeding t more and more information to the press,
GOVERNMENT
the
these sources argued that the political-psychological shock of another
Viet Cong assault into Sai gon-even if the Communists lost huge numbers
of men--would outweigh any military gains.
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But, while MACV officially was trying to squelch leaks to the
press about the expected imminent attack, its headquarters officers
were tipping off their friends about it, the within hours the word had
swirled all the way down to the level of mini-skirted American
BOUNCED the
command and
secretaries. The most open secret in Saigon tried through com
FROUND
through the city.
Later,
Brig. Gen. W.
but the
Sidle, General
Westmoreland's officer in charge of public information, gave a sketchy
briefing of the impending attack to several dozen correspondents,
briefing was "off-the-record," meaning it could not be published.
Christian Science Monitor was not present.
The
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zC2c sag
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turncoat
(normass/deepe)
Vietnamese intelligence sources list the commissar's name as
Tran Van Dac--Dac means "achievement"--and his codenames as
Hanoi No. 8. But the sc
Ha No. 8 and
semi-official Vietnam Press identified him as
Colonel Tam Ha, and he was still later identified as Colonel Pham
W.
Van Thach. It is not unusual for Viet Cong officers to accrue a number of
Press termed him "the most high
aliases.
Vietnames
k ranking VC agent who has ever rallied to the national cause," and
the news
official
militaryy
service bestowed him with the rank of colonel, but other
sources said that since he was a political, rther than
1 officer, he held only the equivalent rank of lieutenant colonel.
Two other Viet Cong lieutenant colonels have previously defected to
the Vietnamese government--but none bringing pinpoint intelligence
information as some sensational as the Communist battle plan for Saigon.
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The sources said he was the political commiss
commissar
for
the
Viet Cong 9th Division Division, based northwest of Saigon, and deputy
political commissar of sub-command 4 of the T-700 region, a new command
controlled directly by the Viet Cong
controlling
surrounding provinces,
called COSVN.
sup
Command headquoning
military and political activities in Saigon and
operating directly under the Viet Cong high command,
The commissar, aged 49, was r
reportedly born and raised
in Binh Dinh province of central Vietnam. The son of a middle-class family,
he RP completed roughly the equivalent of junior high school, and then
in 1947, he joined the pro-Communist Viet Minh to fight the French
during the French Indo-China War.
Colonialis
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for
The reaso two reasons he gave for his defecion defection were
reportedly highly personal ones. First, he said, he knew alot of
civilians had been killed or wounded in saigon during the Tet offensive--
and the upcoming attack would be even worse for the civilians because
COMMUNIS
BEING
of the heavy weapons bombardments/planned during the attack.
He set
said he couldn't take it any more; his morale broke; and he hoped
that by com coming to the government side, he could foil the plan and the
The second reasons was much more of a
Communists would not attack.
long-standing grievance--the Communist Party gave preferential treatment
to working-class
cadre from the working-class
middle-class status, such as himself. Hence, he
over those of u
said, Colonel Hoang
Cam had been given command of the Viet Cong 9th Division because he came
family, but when Dac was a major, Cam was only a
from a working class
lieutenant and now Cam had risen much faster.
Subse
Colonel Cam was killed
thy
as his units withdrew from Saigon during the Tet period, Dac said, and other
Viet Cong officers are now disgruntled because they are being severely
criticized, and some
casualties during Tet.
replaced, because their units suffered such heavy
HE
SAID.
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The Communist timetable for the executing of the battle plan was
imprecise, but the commissar's information was detailed enough to give
Allied interrogators rough estimates at the time. The commissar said
the first orders he received from the Viet Cong command were that
as of
the assigned units should be ready to move by April 16, but that,
April 19 when he darea defected, no exact date for the assault had been
W
transmitted down to the field echelons. He "guessed" the attack might have
Comt
come o last week-end, but if not, he thought it certainly would come
before May 1, a re red-letter Communist holiday. He said
some
of assigned units already had "advance party" officers and
to
forward ober observers for artillery in the areas in which their units
sult
were to move. Some observers here believe that while Dac's information
may have tipped the Communists timetable, they no longer need the element
of surprise,
Effectively
which they, utilized so much during the Tet offensive D.
Still
and that if they should attack when the Allies already are tipped off
they may be able to gain even more psychological shock than otherwise.
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turncoat 10 (normass/deepe)
The battle plan revealed by the commissar reve included both vague
tactical
and precise information.
The vague,
unconfirmed information
concerned
his believe that the spearhead of the saigon attack would be started by
a division of Communist troopers now resting in the Plain of Reeds area
southwest of Saigon, near, if not on the other side, of the
border, at its closest point
He said he had heard about this division,
Cambodian
From
Saigon.
or only thirty miles away's
which would use Lin Piao's
tactics called "Bon-Tap"--run-attack-to race from the Cambodian
area to Saigon in a matter of hours, and then attack. But, he
said, he had only heard about this division, and since he it was outside
of his
Responsibility,
area of Command he could not confirm this information.
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tactical
His other information was more precise. The battle plan he knew of
included the use of at least six infantry regiments--one and half divisions--
plus one heavy-weapons regiment.
The latter consisted of one battalion
one battalion of 57 and 75 mm.
recoilless
of 28 tubes of 122 mm. rockets,
rifles and one battalion of 82 mm. ] mortars. These heavy weapons battalions
north-northwest of Saigon to harrass
were to be used
American infantry units and installations running from the fringes of Tan
Son Nhut Airbase to the Iron Triangle thirty miles away.
The infantry regiments included the 271 and 272 of the
Viet Cong 9th Division, the 101st Regiment of the Viet Cong 7th Division,
the 274th of the Viet Cong 5th Division,
the autonomous Dong Ngai
THE LATTER
Regiment, and the 88th North Vietnamese Army Regiment. en was to act
UNIT
as a reserve outside of Saigon while lying in ambush position along
Provincial Route 8,
r geographically running through rubber plantations
between Chu Cu Chi and Binh Duong and militarily running through the
operational areas of the U. S. Army 25th Division and 1st Division, which
might be expected to travel the road to reinforce Saigon.
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In addition,
Gia Dinh
six Viet Cong authomo autonomous battalions from the
the province surrounding Saigon, were to be used along with
the 125th sapper and reconnaissance battalion of the F-100 regiment, which
attacked the American Embassy and other installations during the Tet
offensive.
Dac said the four of the six mainforce regiments had withdrawn
into the jungled Iron T Triangle area, shortly after the Tet offensive,
where they had undergone rest, reconditioning, retraining, criici
criticism and self-criticism sessions, brainwashing, reviews of lessons
learned and had received replacements for their Tet losses. They were now.
Theser regiments, under the direct command of General Tran Van Tra of
at
SCOSVN).
او
were now ready to attack
again, the defector said.
He sasaid the 272 Regiment of the 9th Division was to drive down
to attack Vietnam's biggest boot camp at Quang Trug Trung, on the fringes
of Tan Son Nhut airbase, while the 101st Regiment of the 7th Division
was to spearhead the drive into the airbase proper. The 271st sister
regiment of the 9th Division was to reinforce its sister regiment during the
Quang Trung battle and then both were to smash into Saigon proper.
necessary, the 88th North Vietnamese Regiment would steal out of its ambush
position to reinforce the two regiments at Tan Son Nhut airbase, Dac said.
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Two battalions of the 274th Regiment of the Viet Cong 5th Division
ordinarily based in Phuoc Tuy province,
district, from which their total 500 men would launch their attack,
the sources said.
province, have already moved into Thu Duc
Inside the outskirts of Saigon, these infantry regiments
would be sidded and guided by the Gia Dinh autonomous battalions and the
local Dong Ngai regiment-the hometown cadre who knew the terrain and the
people outside of Saigon, and who in turn would also concentrate
on specific targets in the fringes of the city, especially
Vietnamese ger government district capitals in Gia Dinh province and
Vietna ese government outposts and installations.
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One special feature of the assault came from other informed
sources, who reported that the North Vietnamese Army had stationed
a regiment of armored vehicles across the Cambodian border lateral to Saigon.
Other sources said simply that North Vietnamese armored specialists
were based there--and that during the ground assault attempt attempts
would be made to seize control of Vietnamese government mr armored vehicles,
which the North Vietnamese would then drive into Saigon. As incredible
as the plan sounded,
American sources said the Communists during the
Tet offensive had a similar plan--to seize the Vietnamese government armor
at Thu Duc district--and then use it in turn to capture other armored
vehicles to move into Saigon.
LED
but it has led to giving
The plan failed during the Tet attacks-
similar information credence at this time.
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The Viet for 29 known to be carrying out extensive propaganda
among Vietnamese armor and artillery units
units
. Before Tet, a number of
Viet Cong agents would culled out of the armor unit i Vietnamese
unit south of Saigon, and in the Mekong Delta during the Tet offensive
several Vietnamese government tracked vehicles defected to the Viet Cong side,
only to be destroyed later by airs airpower.
an
Reliable sources here believe te the Communists would seek three
possible military objectives by the launching this new offensive,
offensive they call the "third wave," The first wave was the ground assaults
during Tet, the second wave was the rocket and artillery barrages which
followed country-wide in February and March and the third wave would
and
may involve both ground assaults and artillery indirect weapons bombardments.
The Communist optimum objective would be the simultaon simultaneous ground
attack and artillery bombardment copa coordinated countrywide. The
second, less ambitious objective, would be to use artillery and rockets to
hit key installations and buildings in the center of the saigon,
possibly other cities as well, while using their ground assaults only
to sweep clean the government presence in a five or six mile radius
outside each urban center. The least ambitious objective would simply
wipe out socce selected, strategic outposts of government r
troops,
who will not accommodate with them, without necessary assaulting on the
ground the government-held towns and cities.
BE TO
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The political objectives, or repels predictable
would be to influene influence the course of White
the CommunisT FAVOR
repercussions,
Washington-Hanoi peace talks on the diplomatic front. Invernally,
the military offensive, if successfuly, would deteriorate
Elmong the populat
the anti-Communist spirit/in the urban centers, weaken the government
of President Nguyen Van, Thieu, and also enhance the prestige of the
Communis
wong-inspired organization called the Alliance of
National Democratic and Peace Forces of Vietnam.
(Hank: I hope you can print this as soon as possible,
since MACV still thinks there will be an attack on May 1,
though I've
tried to play down the specific t dates. I've cancelled by Kien Hea
trip for today, but am trying to i set up interviews in the Delta
for this week-end. Roger. I'll try to file tomorrow on the new
Peace Alliance. Regards Bev)-end retuer
Date
1968, Apr. 30
Subject
Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Defectors; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Soldiers
Location
Saigon, South Vietnam
Coordinates
10.8231; 106.6297
Size
20 x 26 cm
Container
B32, F7
Format
dispatches
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Collector
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections
Language
English