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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04190 to 363-04196.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04190 to 363-04196
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Title
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Article about the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister's opinion on peace talks
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Description
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Original title: "minister", Keever's title: "Saigon's Foreign Minister: 'Hanoi's Talks With U.S. Will Drag On For Months.'" Article draft about Foreign Minister Trần Văn Đỗ's view on the potential results of Hanoi-Washington peace talks. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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2020 sag
uu 1jp
minister 1 (normass/deepe)
222
SAIGON, ARPIL APRIL
South Vietnam's Foreign Minister said
the tangled difficulties of choosing a site for preliminary talks on
the Vietnam war was evidence of Hanoi's "stalling for time"
the American Presidential election picture became clearer.
until
Doctor Tran Van Do, the elder statesman of the South Vietnamese
government, refused to predict when preliminary talks would begin.
"You'd better ask Hanoi that," he smiled. He indicated, however,
that
he considered the preliminary Washington-Hanoi x talks as simply the
first of a four-stage process of securing peace in South Vietnam and
throughout South East Asia. The whole process would be long and drawn-out,
he said, and very difficult. He said the American and South Vietnamese
governments had placed no
limit on the time they would wait for Hanoi to
braids over North Vietnam.
respond before escalating the bombing.
==more reuter
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- Page 2
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zcze sag
uu 1jp
minister 2 (normass/deepe)
Regarding the American elections, the foreing mi foreign minister
said, "This is just one interpretation. Hanoi might delay until August to
wait for the Democratic convention and to see more clearly the (American)
Presidential candidates." He said he did not foresee any "substantial
negotiations"
about the war in South Vietnam "at least before August."
This interpretation send seemed partially to p rest on the growing
fear among South Vietnamese leaders that Senator Robert Kennedy might
succeed in gaining the Democratic Party nomination and be elected as the
next President of the Unied United States, which south Matnamese leaders
see as a major advantage for Hanoi because of the Senator's Vietnam stand.
President Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky have voiced
publicly similar fear, though they did not specificalo specifically
i link this with Hanoi's
so-called delaying tactics.
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2020 sag
uu 1jp
minister 3 (normass/deepe)
You can have
The so soft-spoken, mild-mannered diplmat became rather
emotionally antimated when he began discussing Senator Kennedy. "Yes,
the American people want peace--but what sort of peace?
You can have
peace tommorrow if you give all they (Hanoi) asks for.
peace tommorrow if you want to sacrifice South East Asia and South
Vietnam. You remember the main objective of Hanoi is to have a
coalition--it is the best political way take over the South.
you will have peace, but that will xxxmm not fool anyone.
a camouflaged peace.***
Then
the
That's
"Will Senator Robert Kennedy accept this kind of pepeace and
enter history as the first American president to lose a war,"
delicately-framed foreign minister asked. "Will he accept to betray
the promises of three American presidents, promises to help the government
of Vietnam to preserve its independence and protect its people. That's
what President John Kennedy wrote in 1961 to South Vietnam.
Is it
possible for Robert Kennedy to surrender South Vietnam and betray his own
brother?"
The foreign minister then quickly walked from the air-conditioned
where he picked up a large
reception room into his innner working office,
volume of official documents to the South Vietnamese government. He leafed
on December 14, 1961,
through the volume until he found the letter written
by President Johns Kennedy to then South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.
He showed in the Tetter the words he had just quoted,
"We are
prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to
preserve its independence."
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zcze sag
uu 1jp
minister 4 (normass/deepe)
WA
SR
The Foreign Minister said he did not think "anything serious" would
begin on the neogrta negotiations front before the American elections.
"You think Hanoi wants to negotiate po peace with President Johnson,
"Hanoi may want to negant-
who has only nine months left?" he asked.
negotiate with the next Administration to see whom they will negotiate
with. They must hope that Senator Kennedy will be elesgeved elected
also.
But,
if the trend swings towards Mister (Richard) Nixon,
instead of Kennedy, and the strength of our war effort here is increased,
then they might negotiate negotiate before the elections.
But, I don't
You
think it is possible to end negotiations before the elections.
will see the
difficulties--the negotiations will drag on for months
and months."
He said he believed Hanoi was in a difficult position
on negotiations. "Hanoi can not reject completely the preliminary
talks without losing world opin the world opinion turning against it,"
he said, "but it is reluctant to have some productive talks at
has reached no decision
this time, so Hanoi is stalling for time,
and the difficulty of the choice of the site is an evidence of this."
HANG
19
He said he believed that if Hanoi "drags on the preliminary
talks and resumes the fight" then Mr. Nixon would have more chance to be
elected and that they would have "nothing to win with Mr. Nixon, who is
But, the Foreign Minister s smiled,
generally known as a hawk."
"maybe Hanoi will miscalculate because what Senator Kennedy says is an
election platform, but if he's eleve elected then as President he
The promise of a Gem candidate is.
might adopt another point of view.
GRINNED,
He did not finish the sentence, but just shrugged his shoulders and Smed.
==more reuter
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2020 sag
uu 1.jp
minister 5 (normass/deepe)
The Foreign Minister said he believed negotiations would
evolve into a four-stage affair. The first stage of preliminary talks
between Hanoi and Washington would not ental entail political matters, but
would be limt limited the to the military questions regarding the
cossation of the bombing over North Vietnam. He said the South
Vietnamese government wanted to send a "person to those talks just to
maintain at contact with the American delegation to know what's going on."
appoint
He said this person, yet to be cod by the government, would
not technically be considered "an observer" at the meeting. Hence, he
said the South Vietnamese government was interested in a "neutral" site,
for which he expressed no preference for the fifteen proposed by the
American side. He believed Warsaw and Phnom Penh were not "fair proposals,"
REFERRING
HANOS
ggested sites.
he said.
to
The second phase, which might take place at another site,
would discuss negotiations to end the Vietnam war in the South, with the
participation, on one hand, of South Vietnam and her allies and on the other
hand, North Vietnam and her allies. These, he called "substantial
negotiations", which he did not envision beginning before August. He
said he thought the war in the South would continue until final agreement
would be reached, though perhaps the scale of the fighting would diminish.
Oer Clearly, what South Vietnam wanted from Hanoi on during one of these
these two phases appeared to be a guarantee that North Vietnam would stop
por supporting and formenting the National Liberation Front in the South.
==more reuter
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2020 sag
uu 1jp
minister 6 (normass/deepe)
twist for negotiations on Vietnam,
believed that a big po "big power"
In what appeared to be a new
the foreign minister, said he has also
many nation conference/be held to discuss the security of all of South
East Asia. This conference would have more nations involved, particularly
America and the Soviet Union, but he noted the "difficulty on the
question of the participation of the Chinese (Communists), not simply because
the United States does not recognize China, but also because of "the
dissension between the Russians and Chinese in the Communist world."
He said "it's very logical that security for South East Asia
lies not on only between North and South Vietnam, but it depends on the
big powers too....We must see Vietnam in the context of South East Asia and
Clearly,
in x context of world competition between the two blocs,"
the foreign minister was advocating some agreement between Russia
the Soviet Union and the United States to guarantee security in Asie even
after the Chinese Communists could deliver power nuclear weapons.
"This
It's far beyond the will
We must depend off more or less-and more
The
is up to the big powers--American and Russia.
and capability of South Vietnam.
rather than lesson the agreement between the big powers.
Chinese Communists even with nuclear weapons would have to take into
consideration the position of America and the Russians if they wanted to
start an nuclear war."
more reuter
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zczc sag
uu 1jp
minister 7 (normass/deepe)
He said even if peace talks broke down, "no one has agreed on the
use of nuclear weapons...because it is too dangerous for everyone, even for
the Chinese."
-Negotiations
an
He said he viewed the fourth stage of/ would deal with the internal
South Vietnamese problem of the relationship between the government and the
"The
National Liberation Front. "This is an internal question," he said.
National Liberation Front always says they are an indigenous movement,
autonomous movement in the South, so in other words they are rebels and it's
up to us (South Vietnamese government) to deal with them. What is
acceptable to us and what's acceptable to them?....We do not want to destroy
They simply must choose between North and South Vietnam.
Communists (in the National Liberation Front) want to, they can go to the
North. Of if they want to lay down their arms and join us, they'll be
citizens."
offered the rights of other c
Asked whether c
them.
If the
would be
some of these non-Communist elements who laid down their arms
accepted into the
government, he said it "depends on the competency
of the individual." he named several examples of ex-Viet Cong who y
positions in the government's administration.
He cautioned about the use of the words "Cert
government."
"coalition
He said "sometimes it isn't the right word. You can have a
coalition in a country with political parties--but not with political parties
that have an armed force. If they have an af armed force, can we accept to
it's
have a coalition with them,
unless they arop
No,
unconstitutional and unlawful CNLESS they drop thEIR MAMS.
-end reuter
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Date
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1968, Apr. 27
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Vietnam--Foreign relations--United States; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam (Democratic Republic); Vietnam (Republic); Foreign ministers
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F20
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
