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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04166 to 363-04176.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04166 to 363-04176
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Title
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Article about Communist opinions on fighting during peace negotiations
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Description
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Original title: "negotiate", Keever's title: "Communists Weigh Fighting While Negotiating." Article draft about communist discussions about continuing their offensives while peace talks are underway. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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zczc sag
yy 1jp
negotiate 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON APRIL 26--The unpublicized Communists'sx philosophy or strategem
ON
about pace fe peace negotiations-as distinct from their official, public
postrens positions regarding negotiations--appears to be a tactic geared towares
towards weakening, if not destroying, the South
Vietnamese government,
while, in turn, escalating militarily to enhance their political bargaining
position at the conference table.
Western sources here draw a sharp distincgi distinction between the
Communists' offical official, prog propagandistic pronouncements on the agenda, sites
and standpoints regarding negotiations as against their sensitive in-house documents
revealing the thinking within the Communist structure.
Two extremely illuminating documents have been captured which partially
reveal some of the long-range Communist objectives to be gained by participating in
peace negotiations. These documents illustrate simply a glimmeri into, the complex
thinking of the high-echelons of the Communist organization about negotations
over the past few years regarding the role of negotio negotiations in the
freaker framework of the Vietnam war.
L
--more reuter
ZCZC sag y
yy 1jp
negotiate 2 (normzss/depe normar (formass/deepe)
The relevant portions of the captured documents were released by
the U. S. mission here in 1967, but the information emanated from Communist
sources earlier. No repeat no subsequent information has thus far been released
regarding the Communists's neg negotiation strategy.
The two documents rel reveal the following significant points:
1. The Politburo in Hanois "entrusted" by the Communist structure to carry out
ther their peace negotiations stratet strategy and to decide the time for
negotkat negotiations.
2.
A "stage of fighting while negotiating," representing a "principal
step in the eve evolution of war," pre will prevail before the signing
of the peace agreements.
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zczc sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
negotiate 3 (normass/deepe)
3.
Peace negotiations will wear down the political unity and
cohesiveness of the anti-Communist Vietnamese government and army,
especially in the cities, the Communists believe,
and this in turn will
aid the Communists in their attempts to destroy the "puppet admiser
administration."
The Communists have r already contempd contemplated the
possibility that war might resume after the signing of peace agreements.
The most revealing and detailed document, released to the press here
on March 30, 1967, was based on the summary of a speech made at the
Viet Cong supreme headquarters meeting in April, 1966, by a North
Vietnamese Army general identified by the U. S. Mission as Nguyen
Van Vinh, chairman, of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party Reunification
HE
Departments who apparently is suspected of traveling from North
Vietnam to the South to attend the meeting.
Some Vietnamese sources
identify the general as Tran Quoc Vinh, alias Tran Do, acting political
The South
commissar of the Southern Liberation Armed Forces Command.
Vietnamese government "claims to have killed Tran Do during the Tet offensive
on the outskirts of Saigon.
==more reuter
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zezc sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
negotiate 4 (normass/deepe)
The highly analytical and illuminating text of General Vinh's
speech relating to peace negotiations from the Communist viewpoint follows.
Translation additions are indicated by editor's notes within brackets.
"The resolution of the Party's 11th conference clearly stated that
in the process of achieving success a situation where fighting and
negotiations are conducted simultaneously may a arise. At present, the
situation is not yet ripe for negotiations. Fighting while negotiating
is aimed at opening another front with a view to making the puppet
army more disintegrated, stimulating and developing the enemy's
internal contradictions and thereby making him more isolated in order to
deprive him of the propaganda weapons, isolate him further, and make a
number of people who en misunderstand the Americans clearly see their
nature.
==more reuter
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zczc sag
yy 1jp
negotiate 5 (normass/deepe)
"In a war between a
powerful country which waged aggression and a weak
Then a situation
In fighting
country, as long as we have not yet acquired adequate strength, a situation where fighting
S. MULTANEOUSLI
and negotations are conducted simultaenously does not exist. Fighting continues until
the emergence of a situation where both sides are fighting indecisively.
where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously may emerge.
while negotiating, the side which fights more strongly will compel the adversary to accept
conditions. Considering the comparative balance of forces, the war proceeds
its
through the following stages:
The fighting stage.
The stage of fighting while negotiating.
Negotiations and signing of agreements.
- more reuter -
zczc sag
yy 1jp
negotiate 6 (normass/deepe)
"Whether or not the war will resume after the conclusion of agreements depends upon
If we are capable of dominating the adversary, the war
the comparative balance of forces.
will not break out again, and conversely, Therefore, fighting while negotiating also
represents a principal step in the evolution of the war. Thus, a situation where fighting
and negotiations are conducted simultaneously will unmistably emerge.
resistance, there were also times when fighting and negotations were conducted
simultaneously. The same situation emerged in China.
In our anti-French
- more reuter
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zczc sag
yy 1jp
negotiate 67 (normass/deepe)
"At present, there are [different] (editorial brackets) viewpoints with regard to
war and peace.
"The Americans find it necessary to negotiate, but negotiate from a strong position,
partly because they have deceitful motives, and partly because the situation has compelled
them to negotiate. Yet, they want us to make concessions to them.
"A number of countries want us to enter into negotiations, ang form of negotiations
regardless of the
so that a big ward oes not break out and that the war can be ended
interests of Vietnam. Some other countries wonder whether we can defeat the Americans,
A number
and if not, they think] (editorial brackets) we should enter into negotiations. (Most
of these countries are nationalist countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.)
of East European socialist countries hold the view that [proper] (editorial brackets)
conditions [for negotiations (editorial brackets) do prevail, and are ripe for achieving
success. (The Americans would withdraw their troops, and we will continue the struggle
to achieve total success.
s.
) These socialist countries also pose a number of conditions:
cessation of the bombing of the north; gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South.
- more reuter
zczc sag
ᎩᎩ lpj
negotiate
(normass/deepe)
worse, seven years from now.
"--China holds the view that conditions for negotiations are not yet ripe, [and will]
(editorial brackets) not [be] (editorial brackets) until a few years from now, and, even
In the meantime, we should continue fighting to bog down the
enemy,
and should wait until a number of socialist countries acquire adequate conditions
for strengthening their main force troops to launch a strong, all-out, and rapid offensive,
using all types of weapons and heeding no borders. What we should do in the South today
is to try restraining the enemy and make him bogged down, waiting until China has built
strong forces to launch an all-out offensive.
more reuter
170-469
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zczc sag
yy 1jp
negotiate (normass/deepe)
"-Our policy;
to continue fighting until a certain time when we can fight and
negotiate at the same time.
"This is also a fighting method: repulsing the enemy step by step, and nikexing
achieving decisive success.
"The Party Central Committee entrusts the Politburo with the task of deciding on
the time for negotiations.
"The problem of choosing the opportunity and deciding to negotiate: (editorial note:
this line should be underlined)
"Basing ourselves upon the actual situation in the South.
"Considering the opinions of the friendly countries which have provided us with
quite a large volume of assistance, in order to gain their maximum support.
- more reuter
megatitexxf
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zczc sag
yy 1jp
negotiate 8 (normass/deepe)
"The future situation may lead to negotiations. Yet, even if there are negotiations
they are [to be (editorial brackets) conducted simultaneously with fighting. While
negotiating, we will continue fighting the enemy more vigorously. (It is possible that
the North conducts negotiations while the South continues fighting, and that the South
also participates in the negotiations while continuing to fight.) Those who are in
charge of conducting negotiations negotiate and those in charge of g fighting continue
fighting, because the decisive factor lies in the battlefield. The enemy wants us to
stop fighting, for his advantage. But we have to fight. Therefore, the enemy also
fights. We must fight to win great victories with which to compel the enemy to accept
our conditions. If we stop fighting (at that stage), no considerable success can be
achieved in negotiations. If we conduct negotiations while fighting vigorously, we can
also take advantage of the opportunity to step up the political struggle, military
proselyting, and activities in the cities. Thus, we will take advantage of the
opportunity offered by the negotiations to step up further our military attacks,
political struggle, and military proselyting. At present, the Americans have put forth
deceitful arguments. Therefore, we must put forth conditions to prove that we fight
for the aspirations and interests of the people and thereby win the support of various
countries.
- more reuter -
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zczc sag
yy 1jp
negotiate (normass/deepe)
"If the enemy wants to negotiate, he must accept a number of conditions, such as, to
permanently cease his war of destruction against the North, xic withdraw his troops
from the South, and dismantle his military bases. The failure to pose the above conditions
is tantamount to implicitly accepting the Americans' presence in the South.
For
"Depending on the situation prevailing at the time, we will impose conditions.
example, the puppet forces must be concentrated in barracks, must not repress the people,
must not carry out espionage activities, must allow the people to move about freely or
choose their places of residence, must not herd the people into strategic hamlets and
concentration centers; the American troops must be stationed at the wharfs.
more reuter -
zczc sag
yy 1jp 12
negotiate 10 (normass/deepe)
"The basic situation prevailing in the South for the past years requires that we
attack the enemy more vigorously. This front involves millions of people. While
attacking, we must concentrate all our forces on fighting the enemy."
The second document, shorter and less articulate and direct, was contained in a
captured letter written by Le Duan, First Secretary of Lao Dong (Communist) Party to
the late General Nguyen Chi Thanh, Viet Cong Commander-in-chief in the South. Extracts
of the letter explained resolutions of the Communist Party Central Committee in Hanoi
concerning the Vietnam war. Text of the captured document was issued by the U.S. Mission
in Saigon in March, 1967. The date the letter was written was not revealed. Taxixaf
The text of the extracts of the captured letter follows:
- more reuter
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zczc sag
yy 1jp
negotiate 11 (normass/deepe)
"When speaking of defeating the U.S. imperialists, we mean we are advocating the
policy of destroying as much of their potential as possible, checking their military
purpose, crushing their aggressive scheme, thus preventing them from enlarging and
protracting the war of aggression, and forcing them into submission on specific
conditions and finally getting them out of South Vietnam...
"But the basic problem is to defeat the imperialists on the battlefield, to foil their
political and military plan, to destroy as much of their potential as possible, and
undermine the puppet army. Only when we comply with the above requirements can we break
up their plan of aggression.
- more reuter -
zcze sag
yy 1jp
negotiate 12 (normass/deepe)
"As far as the general strategy is concerned, we are advocating that the revolution
in South Vietnam has to pass through several transitional phases prior to advancing
toward national reunification and a socialism. With regard to struggle, we stand
for joint political and armed struggle, that is to say, the armed struggle must be
simultaneously conducted with the political one. Heavy emphasis is to be placed on the
political struggle which includes the diplomatic struggle, which is of prime importance.
As a consequence, the strategy on var and negotiation must be properly used to efficiently
serve the political and military aims of our strategy on pitting the weak against the
strong.
-more reuter.
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zczc sag
yy 1jp
15
negotiate 13 (normass/deepe)
of
"The problem or war and negotiation is not quite new in the history of our
country. Nguyen Trai had once used such a strategy to defeat the feudalist elements
of Ming's dynasty. Our comrades in China had also adopted the "fight-and-negotiation"
policy in their struggle against the U.S. and Chiang (Kai Shek). The same strategy
was used in the Korean War.
"However, this problem is very complicated considering that, at present, when
speaking of negotiations, the views are quite divergent. The U.S. views hold that
Some countries which sincerely
negotiation is to be conducted from a strong position.
support our struggle but, in view of diplomatic reasons and their domestic administration
and misunderstanding of the situation in our Ex country want to see us at the
conference table in order to forestall aimless sacrifice on our part. There are those
who hold the view that the political struggle is of major importance, but such a view
is different from ours as to degree and time to use this strategy.
- more reuter
zczc sag
yy 1jp
16.
negotiate (normass/deepe)
"At present, the U.S. imperialists, on the one hand, are attempting to x widen the
war in a move to save them from the sad predicament and quagmire but, on the other hand,
As for us,
are trying fax to force us to the negotiation table for some concessions.
we must constantly take the initiative, our strategy on negotiation must serve in a
For this reason, the Party Central
practical manner our concrete political aims.
Committee has unanimously entrusted the Politburo with the task of carrying out the
above strategy in conformity with the policy of our Party and on the basis of the
situation between us and the enemy whenever necessary..."
== more R
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zczc sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
negotiate 17 (normass/deepe)
(Hank: I'm submitting the texts of this as a zeepager;
we've found
them invaluable to assess the couse of negotiations here. If you don't think
this is worth a zeepapger, maybe your editorial people will find them
useful.
you
There's a great deal of panic and speculation in Saigon that the
second Communist offensive will hit here over the week-end;
might want to notify John Hughes. I think we can handle the initial writing
okay, but I'm worried about another communications blackout, since weapons
were recently seized in the area
e the transmitters a
I suggest John or you attempt to telephone me at Saigon 25010.
In that event,
We are tentatively planning to drive to Kien Hoa province on Tuesday,
returning Tuesday night, but this may be scuttled if Saigon is attacked.
I'll notify Doctor Dan regarding your cable.
For Beb: Kirk says will send money.
=send reuter
letter follows. Regards Bev).
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Date
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1968, Apr. 26
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Vietnam--Foreign relations--United States; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam (Democratic Republic)
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F18
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
