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negotiate 1 (normass/deepe)

SAIGON? APRIL 26--The unpublicized Communists' ~~ex~~ philosophy or strategem <sup>2</sup>  
~~about peace~~ re peace negotiations--as distinct from their official, public  
~~positions~~ positions regarding negotiations--appears to be a tactic geared ~~towards~~  
towards weakening, if not destroying, the South ~~Viet~~ Vietnamese government,  
while, in turn, escalating militarily to enhance their political bargaining  
position at the conference table.

Western sources here draw a sharp ~~distinct~~ distinction between the  
Communists' ~~official~~ official, ~~prog~~ propagandistic pronouncements on the agenda, sites  
and standpoints regarding negotiations as against their sensitive in-house documents  
revealing the thinking within the Communist structure.

Two extremely illuminating documents have been captured which partially  
reveal some of the long-range Communist objectives to be gained by participating in  
peace negotiations. These documents illustrate simply a glimmer<sup>1</sup> into the complex  
thinking of the high-echelons of the Communist organization about negoti<sup>1</sup>ations  
over the past few<sup>1</sup> years regarding the role of negoti<sup>1</sup>ations in the  
~~framework~~ framework of the Vietnam war.

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negotiate 2 (normass/depe ~~normar~~(normass/deepe))

The relevant portions of the captured documents were released by  
the U. S. mission here in 1967, but the information emanated from Communist  
sources earlier. No repeat no subsequent information has thus far been released  
regarding the Communists' ~~new~~ negotiation strategy.

The two documents ~~rel~~ reveal the following significant points:

1. The Politburo in Hanoi is "entrusted" by the Communist structure to carry out  
~~their~~ their peace negotiations ~~stratet~~ strategy and to decide the time for  
~~negotiat~~ negotiations.

2. A "stage of fighting while negotiating," representing a "principal  
step in the ~~evl-evl~~ evolution of war," ~~pre~~ will prevail before the signing  
of the peace agreements.

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negotiate 3 (normass/deepe)

3. Peace negotiations will wear down the political unity and cohesiveness of the anti-Communist Vietnamese government and army, especially in the cities, the Communists believe, and this in turn will aid the Communists in their attempts to destroy the "puppet ~~administration~~ administration."

4. The Communists have ~~ear~~ already ~~contemplated~~ contemplated the possibility that war might resume after the signing of peace agreements.

The most revealing and detailed document, released to the press here on March 30, 1967, was based on the summary of a speech made at the Viet Cong supreme headquarters meeting in April, 1966, by a North Vietnamese Army general identified by the U. S. Mission as Nguyen Van Vinh, chairman of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party Reunification Department, ~~who~~ <sup>HE</sup> ~~apparently~~ is suspected of traveling from North Vietnam to the South to attend the meeting. ~~Some~~ Some Vietnamese sources identify the general<sup>s</sup> as Tran Quoc Vinh, alias Tran Do, acting political commissar of the Southern Liberation Armed Forces Command. The South Vietnamese government <sup>LATER ED</sup> claims to have killed Tran Do during the Tet offensive on the outskirts of Saigon.

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negotiate 4 (normass/deepe)

The highly analytical and illuminating text of General Vinh's speech relating to peace negotiations from the Communist viewpoint follows. Translation additions are indicated by editor's notes within brackets.

"The resolution of the Party's 11th conference clearly stated that in the process of achieving success a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously may ~~be~~ arise. At present, the situation is not yet ripe for negotiations. Fighting while negotiating is aimed at opening another front with ~~the~~ a view to making the puppet army more disintegrated, stimulating and developing the enemy's internal contradictions and thereby making him more isolated in order to deprive him of the propaganda weapons, isolate him further, and make a number of people who ~~can~~ misunderstand the Americans clearly see their nature.

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negotiate 5 (normass/deepe)

"In a war between a ~~powerful~~ powerful country which waged aggression and a weak country, as long as we have not yet acquired adequate strength, a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted <sup>SIMULTANEOUSLY</sup> ~~simultaneously~~ does not exist. Fighting continues until the emergence of a situation where both sides are fighting indecisively. Then a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously may emerge. In fighting while negotiating, the side which fights more strongly will compel the adversary to accept its ~~weak~~ conditions. Considering the comparative balance of forces, the war proceeds through the following stages:

- The fighting stage.
- The stage of fighting while negotiating.
- Negotiations and signing of agreements.

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negotiate 6 (normass/deepe)

"Whether or not the war will resume after the conclusion of agreements depends upon the comparative balance of forces. If we are capable of dominating the adversary, the war will not break out again, and conversely. Therefore, fighting while negotiating also represents a principal step in the evolution of the war. <sup>OK</sup> Thus, a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously will unmistakably emerge. In our anti-French resistance, there were also times when fighting and negotiations were conducted simultaneously. The same situation emerged in China.

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negotiate 6 (normass/deepe)

"At present, there are <sup>translation</sup> [different] (editorial brackets) viewpoints with regard to war and peace.

"—The Americans find it necessary to negotiate, but negotiate from a strong position, partly because they have deceitful motives, and partly because the situation has compelled them to negotiate. Yet, they want us to make concessions to them.

"—A number of countries want us to enter into negotiations, any form of negotiations — so that a big war does not break out and that the war can be ended — regardless of the interests of Vietnam. Some other countries wonder whether we can defeat the Americans, and if not, <sup>translation</sup> [they think] (editorial brackets) we should enter into negotiations. (Most of these countries are nationalist countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.) A number of East European socialist countries hold the view that <sup>translation</sup> [proper] (editorial brackets) conditions <sup>translation</sup> [for negotiations] (editorial brackets) do prevail, and are ripe for achieving success. (The Americans would withdraw their troops, and we will continue the struggle to achieve total success.) These socialist countries also pose a number of conditions: cessation of the bombing of the north; gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South.

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negotiate 8 (normass/deepe)

"—China holds the view that conditions for negotiations are not yet ripe, <sup>translation</sup> [and will] (editorial brackets) not <sup>translation</sup> [be] (editorial brackets) until a few years from now, and, even worse, seven years from now. In the meantime, we should continue fighting to bog down the enemy, and should wait until a number of socialist countries acquire adequate conditions for strengthening their main force troops to launch a strong, all-out, and rapid offensive, using all types of weapons and heeding no borders. What we should do in the South today is to try restraining the enemy and make him bogged down, waiting until China has built strong forces to launch an all-out offensive.

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negotiate ~~9~~ (normass/deepe)

"—Our policy; to continue fighting until a certain time when we can fight and negotiate at the same time.

"This is also a fighting method: repulsing the enemy step by step, and ~~achieving~~ achieving decisive success.

"The Party Central Committee entrusts the Politburo with the task of deciding on the time for negotiations.

"The problem of choosing the opportunity and deciding to negotiate: (editorial note: this line should be underlined)

"—Basing ourselves upon the actual situation in the South.

"—Considering the opinions of the friendly countries which have provided us with quite a large volume of assistance, in order to gain their maximum support.

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~~negotiate 9 (normass/deepe)~~

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negotiate 8 (normass/deepe)

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"The future situation may lead to negotiations. Yet, even if there are negotiations, they are [to be] ~~xx~~ (editorial brackets) conducted simultaneously with fighting. While negotiating, we will continue fighting the enemy more vigorously. (It is possible that the North conducts negotiations while the South continues fighting, and that the South also participates in the negotiations while continuing to fight.) Those who are in charge of conducting negotiations negotiate and those in charge of ~~g~~ fighting continue fighting, because the decisive factor lies in the battlefield. The enemy wants us to stop fighting, for his advantage. But we have to fight. Therefore, the enemy also fights. We must fight to win great victories with which to compel the enemy to accept our conditions. If we stop fighting (at that stage), no considerable success can be achieved in negotiations. If we conduct negotiations while fighting vigorously, we can also take advantage of the opportunity to step up the political struggle, military proselyting, and activities in the cities. Thus, we will take advantage of the opportunity offered by the negotiations to step up further our military attacks, political struggle, and military proselyting. At present, the Americans have put forth deceitful arguments. Therefore, we must put forth conditions to prove that we fight for the aspirations and interests of the people and thereby win the support of various countries.

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negotiate 9 (normass/deepe)

"If the enemy wants to negotiate, he must accept a number of conditions, such as, to permanently cease his war of destruction against the North, ~~withdraw~~ withdraw his troops from the South, and dismantle his military bases. The failure to pose the above conditions is tantamount to implicitly accepting the Americans' presence in the South.

"Depending on the situation prevailing at the time, we will impose conditions. For example, the puppet forces must be concentrated in barracks, must not repress the people, must not carry out espionage activities, must allow the people to move about freely or choose their places of residence, must not herd the people into strategic hamlets and concentration centers; the American troops must ~~be~~ be stationed at the wharfs.

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negotiate 10 (normass/deepe)

"The basic situation prevailing in the South for the past years requires that we attack ~~at~~ the enemy more vigorously. This front involves millions of people. While attacking, we must concentrate all our forces on fighting the enemy."

The second document, shorter and less articulate and direct, was contained in a captured letter written by Le Duan, First Secretary of Lao Dong (Communist) Party to the late General Nguyen Chi Thanh, Viet Cong Commander-in-chief in the South. Extracts of the letter explained resolutions of the Communist Party Central Committee in Hanoi concerning the Vietnam war. Text of the captured document was issued by the U.S. Mission in Saigon in March, 1967. The date the letter was written was not revealed. ~~Text of~~ The text of the extracts of the captured letter follows:

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negotiate 11 (normass/deepe)

"When speaking of defeating the U.S. imperialists, we mean we are advocating the policy of destroying as much of their potential as possible, checking their military purpose, crushing their aggressive scheme, thus preventing them from enlarging and protracting the war of aggression, and forcing them into submission on specific conditions and finally getting them out of South Vietnam...

"But the basic problem is to defeat the imperialists on the battlefield, to foil their political and military plan, to destroy as much of their potential as possible, and undermine the puppet army. Only when we comply with the above requirements can we break up their plan of aggression.

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negotiate 12 (normass/deepe)

"As far as the general strategy is concerned, we are advocating that the revolution in South Vietnam has to pass through several transitional phases prior to advancing toward national reunification and ~~socialist~~ socialism. With regard to struggle, we stand for joint political and armed struggle, that is to say, the armed struggle must be simultaneously conducted with the political one. Heavy emphasis is to be placed on the political struggle which includes the diplomatic struggle, which is of prime importance. As a consequence, the strategy on war and negotiation must be properly used to efficiently serve the political and military aims of our strategy on pitting the weak against the strong.

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negotiate <sup>15</sup> ~~13~~ (normass/deepe)

"The problem <sup>of</sup> war and negotiation is not quite new in the history of our country. Nguyen Trai had once used such a strategy to defeat the feudalist elements of Ming's dynasty. Our comrades in China had also adopted the "fight-and-negotiation" policy in their struggle against the U.S. and Chiang (Kai Shek). The same strategy was used in the Korean War.

"However, this problem is very complicated considering that, at present, when speaking of negotiations, the views are quite divergent. The U.S. views hold that negotiation is to be conducted from a strong position. Some countries which sincerely support our struggle but, in view of diplomatic reasons and their domestic administration and misunderstanding of the situation in our ~~own~~ country want to see us at the conference table in order to forestall aimless sacrifice on our part. There are those who hold the view that the political struggle is of major importance, but such a view is different from ours as to degree and time to use this strategy.

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negotiate <sup>16</sup> ~~14~~ (normass/deepe)

"At present, the U.S. imperialists, on the one hand, are attempting to ~~wid~~ widen the war in a move to save them from the sad predicament and quagmire but, on the other hand, are trying ~~far~~ to force us to the negotiation table for some concessions. As for us, we must constantly take the initiative, our strategy on negotiation must serve in a practical manner our concrete political aims. For this reason, the Party Central Committee has unanimously entrusted the Politburo with the task of carrying out the above strategy in conformity with the policy of our Party and on the basis of the situation between us and the enemy whenever necessary..."

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negotiate 17 (normass/deepe)

(Hank: I'm submitting the texts of this as a zeepager; we've found them invaluable to assess the course of negotiations here. If you don't think this is worth a zeepager, maybe your editorial people will find them useful.

There's a great deal of panic and speculation in Saigon that the second Communist offensive will hit here over the ~~week~~ week-end; you might want to notify John Hughes. I think we can handle the initial writing okay, but I'm worried about another communications blackout, since weapons were recently seized in the area <sup>Near</sup> ~~near~~ the transmitters <sup>Sites</sup> ~~at~~. In that event, I suggest John or you attempt to telephone me at Saigon 25010.

We are tentatively planning to drive to Kien Hoa province on Tuesday, ~~not~~ returning Tuesday night, but this may be scuttled if Saigon is attacked. I'll ~~notify~~ notify Doctor Dan regarding your cable.

For Beb: Kirk says will send money. ~~My~~ letter follows. Regards Bev).

--end reuter