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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04144 to 363-04159.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04144 to 363-04159
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Title
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Article about reduction of American bombing in Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "air", Keever's title: "LBJ's Reducing North Vietnamese Pounding Irks US Military." Article draft about President Johnson's reduction of air and naval bombardment in the Vietnam War, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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zczc sag
yy 1jp
air 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, APRIL 24-President Lyndon Johnston
of
de-escalation of the air and naval bombardment brought squeals of
dismay and bitterness within e American military circles here.
Air commanders especially were. tactically critical of the
President's move even though the first airraids since the de-escalation
announcement have been flown as far north as two hundred miles north
of the 17th parallel dividing north and
And south Vietnam. Initially,
air commanders thought they would be low to continue air strikes
only as far north as the city of Vinh, 145 miles north of the
seventeenth parallel.
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zozo sag
yy 1jp
air 2 (normass/deepe)
Political observers here believe-and air commanders fear-
that the 200-mile bombing limit will be rolled back,
gradull
gradually be rolled back, closer and closer to the demilitarized
zone at the seventeenth parallel. They These sources justify
the bombing as high as 200 miles on the map map because they
view President Johnson as facing two main difficulties: not only
to persuade North Vietnam to negotiate-but also to keep the
SAgo
up the morale of the anti-Communist government and its army
in Saigon in oz case Hanoi rejects negotiations.
In short, the President Johnson now has the option
of de-escalating further within his
of de-escalating, these sources believe.
mounded policy
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2020 888
yy 1jp
air 3 (normass/deepe)
Vietnamese politicians here, without knowledge of peace
attempts outside the country, believe Hanoi will reject President's
Johnson of negotiating with his 90 per cent de-escalation of the air
and naval bombardment. "Hanoi wants 100 per cent de-escalation,"
one source explained.
A Western diplomat ventured, "What the bombing reduction means
to me is that in about two months, you and I in Saigon are going to
be receiving Communist rocket and artillery fire every night. I've
calculated that two months is about what it will take them to move
down their supplies with the reduced bombing.
We'll be lucky to get
out of Saigon
our skins."
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zozo sag
Jy 1jp
air 4 (normass/deepe)
Reliable sources report air American air reconnaissance
missions are scheduled to be continued oe over the entire country
of North Vietnam, such as was done during other bombing past bombing
"Stand-downs." Air commanders here believe it critically important
these non-violentx air m ss missions be allowed to continue since
it will provide the United States government with virtually its
sole means of minute-to-minute intelligence of whether North Vietnamese
mon and supplies are continuing to flow southward from the Communist
Chinese border and the Hani Hanoi-Haiphong complex.
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zcze sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
air
5
(normass/deepe)
Informed sources,
speaking either officially or privately,
refused to discuss the effect of the Presidents/de-escala over
North Vietnam on the bombing missions in Laos, never officially admitted
here.
"The official position of air officers here has always
been against a bombing pause," one source explained. "But that is
speaking as strictly a military guy. Once the political decision is
made we press on as best we can."
of HiR Comm ANDERS,
Their basic conclusion, however, was that the President's
More Teuter
bombing de-escalation would make it more much more difficult to st
interdict
air to stuporth Vietnamese men and supplies from getting into the
VIETM
in the
South where the ground war is at a critical point and where the Allies
ConsiDERED TO B
are on the strategic defensive.
pn
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zcze sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
air (normass/deepe)
Officially,
the American military men kept a stiff upper
ABOUT the dε- Escalation.)
lip Officially, the answer to inquisitive newsmen and senior commanders
was the same: "The President's announcement
reduction of bombing over the North.
outlined clearly the
We have no comment."
Or: "We are behind our President 100 per cent--no matter
what his decision. "
Or,
when asked about what their public reactions should be
cameras, American troopers were
before American television
told: "You are free to say whatever you want--but remember you're
wearing a uniformw-and you took an oath before entering the military
service."
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zcze sag
Jy 1jp
air 4 (normass/deepe)
✓
Amorieen commanders
Senior American commanders were notified of the bombing
des deescalation roughly twenty four hours before the President's speech,
but were not informed about his decision to refuse a second nomination.
But, beneath this crust of military men obeying their
without question the orders of their commander-in-chief erupted subdued
among officers involved in air operations
verbal dissent,
especially
which were so greatly affected by the President's order.
initially
Subconsiously
Realizing
Subconsciously and without ITOWER
it,
air officers
and then
referred to the President's decision as a "bombing pause,"
later began calling it a "bombing back-drop."
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2020 sag
Jy 1jp
air & (normass/deope)
among
Even/American civilian officials, speaking privately,
the de-escalation brought a ponderous shake of the head and "I hope
Johnson knows what he's doing."
The dissent articulated by eso senior military officers here
was based on a number of arguments, ranging from political evaluations
to
the employment of air powor.
The first revolved around the sincerity of North Vietnam
in desiring real peace and reciprocating the President's bid for a
negotiated settlement.
hold the initist on
Hence their fear that while the Communists
initiative on the ground in the South, the
President's unilateral retraction of American air offensive will not
necessarily load to peace, but instead of more disadvantages for the
Allies in the military fighting.
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zcze sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
air
9 (normass/deepe)
themselves as somewhat
The military men here consider themset tes
expert judges of the North Vietnamese intentions--and double-crosses,
as they say. Their trump-card argument is that the bombing pause and
ground ceasefire agreed to during Tet, when, in the minds of
American generals down the ranks, the Communists flagrantly took
their
advantage of the situation to launch an astonishingly successful
lunar new year offensive.
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zcze sag
Jy 1jp
110
air (normass/deepe)
"Our last bombing pause was at Tet," one officer recalled. "And
remember we really got zapped them."
019
as another explained, "If Hanoi wants to play a bad game--
if they're not sincere and they've not showm shown themselves to be
in the past-then they can step up their infiltration of men and supplies
into the South considerably. We'll make every effort to stop this in-flow
in the South--but we're already on the defensive on the ground in the South."
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zczc sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
air 11 (normass/deepe)
An Air Force officer mused:
based, at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut
the three o'clock in the morning./ and the Viet Cong started to
mortar the base. We didn't like that one bit. I wish the President
airbase, mused: "I was listening to the President's speech re-broadcaste
at 3
#
would stop giving those speeches of his."
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zozo sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
air 12 (normass/deepe)
SENIOR
efficiors
The second argument of the military men against the
SHOULD
de-escalation centered on how airpower could be employed most effectively
to interdict the North Vietnamese movement of supplies aand men
southward. The air commanders wanted to hit concentrations of supplies;
the President's order now forces them attempt to interdict supplies
after they have been dispersed along jungle canopied trails and waterways.
These air commanders argue that even given the same number of airstrikes
as before the de-escalation in a more compact geographic area north of
Effective
the demilitarized will not produce as much interdiction as before when
they could hit supply depots and concentrations in the Hanoi-Haiphong
complex.
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zcze sag
vy imp
aiR 13 (NORMASS /DEEPE)
"Since we can't hit the targets of concentration in the Hanoi-
Haiphong area, which is where the bulk of their supplies com come
into, we must face the problem of interdicting them as they are
dispersed along those many little trails and inland waterways just from
Vinh southga one Air Force officer explained.
And, as a Western diplomat explained: "The American air strikes
NOT MATER
are not going to as effective as before, now many how many s
It's logical.
missions they fly in a smaller area north of the DMZ.
Before, the American fighter-bombers were hitting the
miles worth of roads snaking roads, and they could hit a supply
maybe 400
convoy traveling say four-hundred miles of making roads from Hanoi ad
South
wh
and Haiphong Now, they're going to be able to hit
on two hundred miles of roads."
the convoys
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zC2c sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
air 14 (normass/deepe)
A third argument that disgrunted the air officers was they
had estimated half million to 700,000 North Vietnamese, and some
Communist Chinese, had been tied down on re-construction projects just
to keep the roads and railroads open, as well as providing air defense
measures in the North. Now, these persons would be able to re-construct
the raillines and roads "without impunity."
"It's not a question of whether Hanoi can move five times
or hundred times more supplies with this de-escalation," one officer
explained. "The fact is Ho Chi Minh can do as much as he wants--without
any threat of air to stop him effectively."
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zcze sag
JJ 135
air (normass/deepe)
Other officers were irked that just as the President's order
was received limiting their bombing raids, the weather had turned in thei
pilot's favor in the Red River Delta area around in Hanoi and Haipong.
5/
"Our most effective air strike are those visually in which we visually
months
now, the
see the target," one officer explained. "For weeks the
HAVE
rainclouds hung over the Red River Delta, so we couldn't see
what was happening on the ground. And we estimate the Reds increase
their movements by three to five times during bad weather. But, just
now we're coming into the southwest monsoon over the Red River Delta)
which would give us good weather--and the President says we can't fly
up there,"
Most officers agreed, however,
that the de-escalation policy
would reduce a American air losses, as the Communist concentrations
are current
of firepower around the demilitarized zone we less than in the Henri Haiphong
Red River Delta areas. "And I don't think Hanoi will move their
After all, the President
sam's and anti-aircraft southward right now.
was smart enough to leave this de-escalation open-ended.
We still might be
flying over Hanoi again."
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zcze sag
ᎩᎩ
15P6
air 1 (normass/deepe)
Z
(Hanks
I'll file at another piece tomorrow,
but all my pieces
will be either reaction or local in nature. We can not get a sorap of
information on
peace attempts here either from Americans,
diplomats and the Vietnamese officials thus far have not been informed.
Hence, I hope you can arrug arrange for other bureas to govor progress
deve
of peace. and all its associate developments.
Regards Bev).
We can only cover the
end reuter
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Date
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1968, Apr. 24
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Subject
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Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; United States. Air Force; United States. Navy; Bombing, Aerial; Vietnam (Democratic Republic); Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam--Foreign relations--United States
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F16
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
