Article on Lyndon B. Johnson's bombardment descalation

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Title
Article on Lyndon B. Johnson's bombardment descalation
Description
Original title: "LBJ Peace talks - air." Keever's title: "LBJ's Reducing North Vietnamese Pounding Irks U.S. Military." Original caption: "Lyndon Johnson's announced de-escalation of the air and naval bombardment." Article by Keever on Lyndon B. Johnson's de-escalation of North Vietnam bombardment
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript
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SAIGON, APRIL 24-President Lyndon Johnson's annoumped
de-escalation of the air and naval bombardment brought squeals of
dismay and bitterness within re American military circles here.
Air commanders especially were
tactically critical of the
President's move even though the first airraids since the de-escalation
announcement have been flown as far north as two hundred miles north
of the 17th parallel dividing north and south Vietnam.
Initially,
air commanders thought they would be alow to continue air strikes
only as far north as the city of Vinh, 145 miles north of the
seventeenth parallel.
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Political observers here believe-and air commanders fear-
that the 200-mile bombing limit will be rolled back, gradull
gradually be rolled back, closer and closer to the demilitarized
zone at the seventeenth parallel. They These sources justify
the bombing as high as 200 miles on the majp map because they
view President Johnson as facing two main difficulties: not only
to persuede North Vietnam to negotiate-but also to keep the
up the morale of the anti-Communist government and its army
in Saigon in c case Hanoi rejects negotiations.
In short, the President Johnson now has the option
of de-escalating further within his er already announced policy
of de-escalating, these sources believe.
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Vietnamese politicians here, without knowledge of peace
attempts outside the country, believe Hanoi will reject President's
Johnson of negotiating with his 90 per cent de-escalation of the air
and naval bombardment. "Hanoi wants 100 per cent de-escalation,"
one source explained.
A Western diplomat ventured,
"What the bombing reduction means
to me is that in about two months, you and I in Saigon are going to
be receiving Communist rocket and artillery fire every night. I've
calculated that two months is about what it will take them to move
Plac
down their supplies with the reduced bombing. We'll be lucky to get
WEARING
Saigon w
our skins."
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Reliable sources report air American air reconnaissance
missions are scheduled to be continued oe over the entire country
of North Vietnam, such as was done during other bombing past bombing
"Stand-downs." Air commanders here believe it critically important
these non-violentaf air mass missions be allowed to continue since
it will provide the United States government with virtually its
sole means of minute-to-minute intelligence of whether North Vietnamese
men and supplies are continuing to flow southward from the Communist
Chinese border and the Hani Hanoi-Haiphong complex.
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Informed sources, speaking either officially or privately,
refused to discuss the effect of the President's de-escalation over
North Vietnam on the bombing missions in Laos, never officially admitted
here.
"The official position of air officers here has always
boen against a bombing pause," one source explained. "But that is
speaking as strictly a military guy. Once the political decision is
made we press on as best we can."
f Mir CommnDERS,
Their basic conclusion, however,
more retter
1
was that the President's
bombing de-escalation would make it more much more difficult to st in the
INTER
air to stop North Vietnamese men and supplies from getting into the
Vie
South where the ground war is at a critical point and where the Allies
Cons.Dere to BE
are on the strategic defensive.
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Officially,
the American military mer kept a stiff upper
ABOUT THE JERIS to inquisiti
lip. Officially, the answer to inquisitive newsmen and senior commanders
was the same: "The President's announcement
outlined clearly the
reduction of bombing over the North, We have no comment."
02 # "We are behind our President 100 por cont--no matter
what his decision."
when asked about what their public reactions should be
before American television camors, Am cameras, American troopers were
told: "You are free to say whatever you want-but remember you're
wearing a uniform--and you took an oath before entering the military
service."
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American commanders
Senior American commanders were notified of the bombing
de deescalation roughly twenty four hours before the President's speech,
but were not informed about his decision to refuse a second nomination.
But, beneath this crust of military men oboying their
without question the orders of their commander-in-chief erupted subdued
verbal dissent, especially fre among officers involved in air operations
which were so greatly affected by the President's order.
Suboonstonely
Bealizing
Subconsciously and without
Rit, air officers
initially
referred to the President's decision as a "bombing pause," and then
later began calling it a "bombing back-drop."
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air
among
Even / American civilian officials, speaking privately,
the de-escalation brought a ponderous shake of the head and "I hope
Johnson knows what he's doing."
The dissent articulated by to senior military officers here
was based on a number of arguments,
to
Actical
the employment of air power.
ranging from political evaluations
The first revolved around the sincerity of North Vietnam
in desiring real peace and reciprocating the President's bid for a
negotiated settlement.
hold the initiate Un
Hence their fear that while the Communists
initiative on the ground in the South, the
President's unilateral retraction of American air offensive will not
necessarily lead to peace, but instead of more disadvantages for the
Allies in the military fighting.
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The military mon here consider themselves
themselves as somewhat
expert judges of the North Vietnamese intentions--and double-crosses,
as they say. Their trump-oard argument is that the bombing pause and
ground ceasefire agreed to during Tot, when, in the mñ minds of
American generals down the ranks, the Communists flagrantly took
their
advantage of the situation to launch of astonishingly successful
lunar new year offensive.
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"Our last bombing pause was at Tet," one officer recalled. "And
remember we really got zapped them."
039
as another explained, "If Hanoi wants to play a bad game-
if they're not sincere and they've not shown shown themselves to be
in the past then they can step up their infiltration of men and supplies
into the south considerably. We'll make every effort to stop this in-flow
in the South--but we're already on the defensive on the ground in the South."
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airbase,"
An Air Force officer museds based, at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut
eda
"I was listening to the President's speech re-broadcaste
at 3 i the three o'clock in the morning. and the Viet Cong se started to
morter the base. We didn't like that one bit. I wish the President
would stop giving those speeches of his."
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SENIOR
officiees
The second argument of the military mo against the
Hov!
de-escalation centered on how airpower oot be employed most effectively
to interdict the North Vietnamese movement of supplies sand men
southward. The air commanders wanted to hit concentrations of supplies;
the President's order now forces them attempt to interdict supplies
after they have been dispersed along jungle canopied trails and waterways.
These air commanders argue that even given the same number of airstrikes
as before the de-escalation in a more compact, geographic aros north of
the demilitarized will not produce as much interdiction as before when
VE
they could hit supply depots and concentrations in the Hanoi-Haiphong
complex.
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"Since we can't hit the targets of concentration in the Hanoi-
Haiphong area, which is where the bulk of their supplies comicome
into, we j hust face the problem of interdicting them as they are
dispersed along those many little trails and inland waterways just from
Vinh south, one Air Force officer explained.
And,
as a Western diplomat explained: "The American air strikes
are not going to as effective as before, now many how many stxxxxx
missions they fly in a smaller area north of the DMZ. It's logical.
Before, the American fighter-bombers were hitting the maybe 400
miles-worth of roads snaking roads, and they could hit a supply
convoy traveling say four-hundred miles of snaking roads from Hanoi ad
and Haiphong Now, they're going to be able to hit the convoys
on two hundred miles of roads."
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A third argument that disgrunted the air officers was they
had estimated half million to 700,000 North Vietnamese, and some
Communist Chinese, had been tied down on re-construction projects just
to keep the roads and railroads open, as well as providing air defense
measures in the North. Now, these persons would be able to re-construct
the raillines and roads "without impunity."
"It's not a question of whether Hanoi cen move five times
or hundred times more supplies with this de-escalation," one officer
explained. "The fact is Ho Chi Minh can do as much as he wants-without
any threat of air to stop him effectively."
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Other officers were irked that just as the President's order
was received limiting their bombing raids, the weather had turned in the{
pilot's favor in the Red River Delta area around Hain Hanoi and Haipong.
"Our most effective air strike are those visually in which we visually
mon
"For weeks the past now, the
see the target," one officer explained.
HAVE
rainclouds of hung over the Red River Delta, so we couldn't see
what was happening on the ground.
And we estimate the Rods increase
their movements by three to five times during bad weather. But, just
now we're coming into the southwest monsoon over the Red River Delta)
which would give us good weather-and the President says we can't fly
up there."
Most officers agreed, however,
would reduce a American air losses,
that the de-escalation policy
as, the Communist concentrations
the currer
of firepower around the demilitarized zone was less than in the Hañol-Haiphong
Red River Delta areas. "And I don't think Hanoi will move their
sam's and anti-aircraft southward right now. After all, the President
was smart enough to leave this de-escalation open-ended.
flying over Hanoi again."
We still might be
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(Hank:
I'll file a
nother piece tomorrow,
will be either reaction or local in nature.
but all my pieces
We can not get a scrap of
R
information on peace attempts here either from Americans,
diplomats and the Vietnamese officials thus far have not been informed.
Honce, I hope you can arg arrange for other
of peace. and all its associate developments
Regards Bev).
cover progress
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Date
1968, Apr. 24
Subject
Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes; Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; Bombing, Aerial
Location
Saigon, South Vietnam
Coordinates
10.8231; 106.6297
Size
20 x 26 cm
Container
B11, F7
Format
dispatches
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Collector
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections
Language
English