-
derivative filename/jpeg
-
363-01300 to 363-01308.pdf
-
Digital Object Identifier
-
363-01300 to 363-01308
-
Title
-
Article about Khe Sanh escalation
-
Description
-
Original caption: "khe sanh." Article about the Khe Sanh escalation for the Christian Science Monitor
-
AI Usage Disclosure
-
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
-
Transcript
-
--------------------
- Page 1
--------------------
2000 sag
Jy 1jp
kho sanh 1 (normass/deepe)
RIS=
SAIGON, APRIL 12-An escalation towards heavier fighting is expected
soon in the battle around Khe Sanh.
But, the form of the fighting by both sides has changed taotically,
reliable sources report.
The spectre of a massive Communist ground assault in the setpioce
fashion of Dion Bien Phu has vanished at this point, these sources said.
First,
because of the immensity of American military power and mobility there,
second, becauso the American command is reportedly turning the DATO
shifting the holding power of the base from American Marine to Vietnamese
regulare and even these regulars Vietnamese forces could be withdrawn. Third,
The significance of Khe Sanh for the Communists has consistently been measured
by official sourcos as a hinge dramatic hinge to swing the American
political party conventions,
if not the election, which meant their grand
assault should have come in July, when the monsoon rains also bogan to shift in
their favor. But, President Johnson's April 1 eliminated the American
conventions and election as the pivot decisive point in the Communist timetable-
and honce the political sin significance of the ico Khe Sanh also vanished.
from the Communist, viewpoint those sources report.
==more router
--------------------
- Page 2
--------------------
zcze sag
yy ljp
khe sanh 2 (normass/deepe)
In the wake of the 120,000-man Allied operation around the combat
base,
the Communists have reportedly shifted from positional warfare,
once used to besiege the former Marine base, to mobile warfare of
harrassing and briefly contesting the Allied forces. In short, they
have shifted to a mobile, momentary frontline, rather than a
rigide one encircling the base camp.
American bb tactics have also shifted from the Marine concept
of holding a static, fixed position--a concept ordered by their
suported superior headquarters-to the Army concent of highly mobile,
heliborne operations covering wide exponea expe
expanses quickly and
with more flexibility. The Army concet concept is essentially the classical
search-and-destroy operation General William C. Westmoreland has espou
the
implanted consistently attempt to employee.
more router
--------------------
- Page 3
--------------------
2020 seg
yy 1jp
kho sanh (normass/deepe)
The relative mildness of the contacts thus far-relative
compared to the spectre of Dion Bien Phu--has lead to the conclusion
among many leading Vote Vietnamese saloh salon politician
politicians hore that diplomatic a taotic tacit diplomatic do
doal had been made between Washington and Hanoi to militarily
disongage in the Khe Sanh area. This viow-while widespread in
Nitate D
sophisticated circles hore-however appears to be perpetrated by
pro-French, if not pro-Communist elements striving to widen the
misunderstanding and speci suspicion and cleavage between the
American offioil officialdom here and the Vietnamese government.
The gist of this line is that Washington and the Communists have already
made a deal for a pro-cooked peaco, in which South Vietnamese would be
sold out by the Americans. This line of reasoning appears to be an
All ACOUS
Lethal
extension of the propaganda circulating in saigon, Hue
and other cities during the Tet offensive, inin intimating that the
American command had deliberately let the Communist troops into the
cities as a means to force the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu
to negotiato. The result of this whirlwind of in propaganda ha has
been a not lack of confidence on the part of Vietnamese leaders in
the Americans, a great deal of confusion in the mn minds of pro-American,
anti-Communists. Significantly, neither the American command nor mission
spokesmen are countering this prepe propaganda,
AUTORIZED to discuss
saying they are not
diplomatic develop
more
--------------------
- Page 4
--------------------
2020 sag
ᎩᎩ .jp
cho sinh
#
(normass/deepe)
However,
more studious and informed sources here believe
that no tacit Hanoi-Washington understanding had been reached about
Khe Sanh for these three reasons:
1. The Communist strategy is not to de-escalate the
military war while negotiating-but to escalate it. This position;
wab clearly expressed in a mammoth Co captured Communist document,
states that "Fighting continues until the emergence of a situation
where both sides are fighting indecisively. Then, a situation
where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneiously man
may emerge. In fighting while negotiating, the side which fights
more strongly will cole compel the ad adversary to accept his conditions."
more router
--------------------
- Page 5
--------------------
BOC 06
yy 1jp
khe sanh(normass/dcope)
20 Both Radio Hanoi and the Liberation Radio i forho
Viet Cong have commented at length about Operation Pegasus/Lom Son 207
which they call the "Flying Horse" operation. They have claimed
victories there, which seen exaggerated in Western eyes, and
to such an extent that it appears the lifting of the siege around
Khe Sanh has put them on the propagande defensive.
This Their
broadcasts foro forecast more fighting and are especially vitrolic
about Gonorel Westmoreland.
The Liberation Front Press,
similar to radio broadcasts from
Hanoi :'
said, "The fighting and victories at Khe Sanh are a s/big
slap in the mouth of defeated General Westmoreland when he loft Vietnam
for Washington and boasted the military situation of the Americans in the
South has improved. With our trend of one victory after another victory
(around Khe Sanh), the poople and the military forces in Quang Tri province
(along the demilitarized zone) will move forward to gain bigger
victorios,
push the Americans th and their puppets down into an
abyss of comp,e complete defcat."
#more reuter
--------------------
- Page 6
--------------------
zC2c sag
ᎩᎩ l.jp
khe sanh (normass/deepe)
sanh
3. The classical Communist military tactic that they have used
for years has been to withdraw in the face of summer superior forces.
or when the military disadvantages prevailed against their staying
at the SA partial
Hencey
in some victorious manner.
the
* if in fact they have withdrawn-would
thdrawal Communist withdrawal.
suit them tarify without
bee
Ngoitiful Angement with Washington to militarily disengage.
Just how many Communist troops were ever around the Khe Sanh
base was ant matter of conjecture ee, even a month ago--when and if they
Specula
have withdrawn and why is still a source of
ning hereed The Marines
at Khe Sanh consistently maintained that two divisions were no r the base,
including some in Laos, and that they had captured prisoner's and defectors
who verified this.
Others, however, believed that only "elements"
of
two divisions were in the area.
The Washington statement by Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford
# month
A90
that the Communist divisions withdrew before President Jonson's April
addres
mamam because of overwhelming American firepower is also
contredited here.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 7
--------------------
2020 sag
JJ 1jp
khe san 8 (normass/deepe)
sanky
"We know there were two full (Communist) divisions around
Khe Sanh by March 30, with enough people to mount an off offensive,
whether they chose to assault or not," one high-ranking American officer
explained.
"We don't know whereth they've gone now--or even if they've
gone any anywhere. But, if thx anyone made them leave, it had
to be airpower and artillory. There was certainly no one on the ground
to make them leave before that the Fi ground
moved in."
more reuter
First Air Cavalry and Vietnamese
--------------------
- Page 8
--------------------
2020 sag
Jy 1jp
kho sanh 9 (normass/deepe)
4. For the Communists, Khe Sanh lost its polition
with President Johnson's April 1 speech.
political significance
The prevailing view of officials in Saigon was that Khe Sanh was
important to the Communists only as a hinge to swing the American
political nominations or the elections. Hence, their attack grand
ground assault-if actually planned-would have been launched in July
or August, for maximum impact within Amorica.
settlemont.
But, on April 1, President Johnson in effect assumed the
Soffline
Kennedy position by undertaking negotiations and pr proposing a political
And by refusing to accept a rem renomination for the Presidency,
Mr. Johnson increased the likelihood for Hanoi it would Hanoi might
be faced with a hard-line Richard Nixon as the next prosident, rathor
than a soft-line Robert Kenney. Kennedy.
more reutor
--------------------
- Page 9
--------------------
2020 sag
yy 1jp
khe sanh (normass/deepe)
Richard Nixon is much more important d symbol to the Hanoi
leadership than many Americans at home may conceive.
The Hanoi leadership
now the ones that fought the Fo French nearly more than a decade ago-
were aware that Nixon as Vloe American Vice President in 1954
advocated tho that American atomic bombs be used in support of the
French at Dien Bien Phu, reliable sources report.
Hence
as a means to stimulate political agitation,
Viet Cong propaganda agents in Huejare reportedly saying,
which has already been badly hit by American firepower, are reportedly
"We just as well fight in the streets because the Americans
saying,
are going to drop an atomic bomb on Hue anyway."
There's
(Hank: my apologies for getting this to you so late.
very little access to information about s Khe Sanh from here. I suggest
that next week end I pop up to that operation for several days.
then,
we can do a better job following and analysing it.
Even if there's not a spectacular action story by
What do you
think?
Regards Bev).
end router
-
Date
-
1968, Apr. 12
-
Subject
-
Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Strategy; Escalation (Military science)
-
Location
-
Saigon, South Vietnam
-
Coordinates
-
10.8231; 106.6297
-
Size
-
20 x 26 cm
-
Container
-
B11, F6
-
Format
-
dispatches
-
Collection Number
-
MS 363
-
Collection Title
-
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
-
Creator
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Collector
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Copyright Information
-
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
-
Publisher
-
Archives & Special Collections
-
Language
-
English
