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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06936 to 363-06944.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06936 to 363-06944
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Title
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Article about the strategic revolutionary development program
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Description
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Original title: "Development", Article draft about the strategic revolutionary development program, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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SAIRAD
Prorouter Tokyo
Development 1 (normass/deepe)
saigon, May 4-The strategio Revolutionary Development program
JottRing Hi
the crucial key to an Allied victory or a camouflegod dofeet hero-is on
CallAPSEQ
the verge of completo failure.
This is tho s grin assessment of experts olosoly involved in tho
crucial program, mostly Vietnamoso officials who are substantially more
pessimistic than the American officialdan.
More Router
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Seired
Prorouter Tokyo
Development 2 Saigon (nommass/deepe)
From Vietnamese province chiefs and battalion commendors in the wor
sone to Saigon officials bohind cluttered docks, maps and progress charts,
the "gloom and doom" over the program is common growing. One Viotnomoso
officer explained the problem briofly this ways
"The R. D. (Rovolutionary Development) program has failed. It's
It can still appear to work: for menhile but it is
Cup R. D. tome are not good enough-they are supposed to
too late to salvago it.
only on illusion.
be revolutionaries, but they're only draft-dodgors. And now we have problem
recruiting enough to meet our 1967 quote.
Evon vors0, thore is no security in the villages or for the cadro to
to
work. To nood an new strategy of how to in secure the countryside end
win over the peasant. But no repeat no Amorican or Vietnamese loader
has even started to think about that yet." More Router
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Sairad
Proroutor Tokyo
Development 3 Saigon (noruass/doopo)
Contributing to, but not a cause of, the gain assessment was today's
onactment of the final phases of the union "LBJ coup d'etat"-a
Vietnamese expression for the President Lyndon BBB. Johnson's whirlwind
change-over in the American civilian leadership hero, which vill affoot
the Rvolutionary Development program.
This
Today, President Johnson's special assistant, Robert Konor, arrived
as part of the "now team" to replace Deputy Ambassador William Portor, who
mes in charge of Revolutionary Development on the American civilian side
of the organisational ledger. Porter is scheduled to leave tomorrow.
important change of leadership, coupled with the introduction of
brunimahlph Looke, a friend of President Johnson's, has added to the
confusion of the Alliod's most coniunio confusing program in the war.
it comes
प
And,
at andaia on of the most uncertain political periodo--the
prelude to Vietnam's Presidential elections in september.
More Reuter
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Seired
Prorouter Tokyo
Dovolopment 4 Saigon (nommen/deepo)
Informed sources believe a contributing, porhaps docisive, factor
in the bureaucratic confi confusion is that no "supreno" or "boss man"
spomen yot appears to have been appointed by the Procident to quoll the
vicious, countor-productive in-fing in fighting botwoon American military and
civilion clcments. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunkor is regarded as a "peace-foolos
with the Communists and a Vietnam-persuader with the mtionalists--but not as
a powerful enough policymaker to counter-balence or over-ride Gonoral Willion
C. Testmoreland, commander of Amorioen forces. Furthermoro, those informed
sources believe that Bunicor was nover koon about assuming the Ambassadorial
post horo and that he is currently planning to leave shortly aftor tho
Vietnamese elections this fall. tifoz Moro confusion arr arises, they say,
ha within the Amorican civilian establishment, since thus for thoro is no
clear definition of duties,c and authority between Komor, Looke and Bunker.
"Bunker will soon find himself a figurehead to moot VIP's at the
airport, ono informed American source explained. "Ho'll find ho
at the top of his caroor pedostal vith only one way to go-down.
expoot b hm him to stay hero long?"
como hero
Sho can
Horo Reutos
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sairad
Proroutor Tokyo
Development 5 Saigon (nozmass/deepe)
Vietnamese sources say thore are three than simple, but
xinin "hard-core" reasons for the current failure of the Revolutionary
Dovolopment program.
First, the villages can be secured, protected and economically
doveloped if the Communist main force unite aro thod down or knockod out,
which is the responsibility of norioen offensive operations. But, tho
sources sayg
the American combat units, despito a string of succ08000,
is barely breaking ovon against the increased infiltration from North
Viotnon plus tho Communist rooruitment is within the South.
UN, TS
Honce, the norioan tootioal victorios are miningum still only
marching on
trondmill,
Pand honce, Conoral Westmoreland's urgont
need for more morioan troops, ospecially before the unfavorable monsoon
June
raino bogin in July. These sources say that roughly covon thousand
North Vietnamose troops a month are flooding into South Viotnom and that
Soviet-nado trucks and bulldosers, elephants and bicycles are brining in
the Lootien panhandlo
supplies from by road from toponom Communist-hold Attopoau in Laos
to the frontier of South Viotnom. American commanders say the real
Communist escalation in the war is coming in heavior, more sophisticated
woepons, including longor-range rockets, artillory.
More Routar
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Gairad
Proroutor Tokyo
Development 6 saigon (nommass/dcope)
Second, while the American troops are confronting the Communit
mein force unite, thu exity battalions of soutimi ARVI's
(Army, opublic of Vietnam)--roughly twenty thousand regular troops-are
supposed to oloar out looal Communist companies so that the B. D. toads
can wood out the Fia Communist infrastructure, organise the pup villago
population and economically dovolop the villago with schools, wolls,
dispensaries and the like. This, however, is on t one of the weakent
links in the strategic concept.
As in the past, the ARV's are reluctant, if not totallu totally
unilling, to do the nox necessary night patrolling and ambushing to stave
off attacks on the lightly-armed R. D. teams, numbering only 59 men when at
full strength.
As a 00204 consoquonoo,
the officialdom oorkong working on
Revolutionary Development was inti initially shocked and is now dismayed
at the ferocity of the Communist attacks against tho R. D. tooms.
"to did not expect the T. C. (Communist Tiet Cone) to attack the teams
until late this year," one informed source caid. "But, instead they started
in January."
More Reuter
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Seired
* Proroutor Tokyo
Development 7 saigon (normass/deope)
the R. D.
In four months since the boinnin beginning of the yoor,
casualties aros 218 killod, 299 wounded, 51 missing in action, out of a
total of roughly thirty thousand. In four months, the Viot Cong have
launched 309 incidents or attacks against the teams, an compared to
twenty five attacks xxx all ov of last year.
"On tho V. C. brownied point list, to knock off on R. I. cadre
is as good as to knook off an American," one source explained, "and that's
a high rating for any Vietnamese worker.
Another sousco, dicoussing the consequences of this, innanf explained,
"If those teams aron't given soourity fast, the whole program will stop
dond in ig it's trooks."
Moro Iloutor
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Sairad
Prorouter Tokyo
Development 8 saigon (nozmass/deepe)
Even on the outskirts of Saigon, where six morican combat battalions
and one Korean combat battalion are based, the security is still not
considered tight enough to allow the R. D. toomate to function anno
properly oi ithout Saminyum pz worrying about their own lives.
toam workora
Third, the quality of the R. De teams is not considered
to bo good onough-yot, even now the government in finding it diffioult to
recruit saxo the nooossery quotas. A critical manpower vacuum has developed
in the thin slivers of government-controllo zonos after the years of fighting
that has noorly bled Vietnam white. The gx Vietnamese government regular
CADRE
troops rogard the R. D. tunnum toon-workers as draft-dodgers, with
an easier job than fighting Viet Cong companies and platoons. Furthermore,
mony of the government soldiers, long the king of their chunk of countryside,
view the R. D. cadre as intruders into their corruption rockets of gambling,
shold chokd shakodovno and living off the peasants.
Moro Router
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Sairad
Proroutor Tokyo
Development 9 faigon (normann/deepe)
One of the roouring examples of the varied theme of unsatisfactory
calibro of R. D. team-workors occurred outside the district town of Lei Thiou,
12 miles northoast of Saigon. Once the D. toom moved into a homlot to be
dovoloped,
ADRE
the some of the team-orkors began to woo the village girls.
The Viet Cong cent in two female oadro to rooipt reciprocate with dinnor and
drinks in one of the homon. Then the
covermont workors more woll
inobrieted, the two girls slipped avey id the Viet Cong strung up
and detonated two oljnor claymore mines, killing and wounding a dome
AD
dozen of the workers and oeptru capturing their weapons.
End Reuter
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Date
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1967, May 4
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; United States. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Civilians in war; Economic assistance
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B7, F5
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
