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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-07022 to 363-07029.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-07022 to 363-07029
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Title
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Article about conflicts inside and with the U.S. military
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Description
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Original title: "Military", Keever's title: "After Bitter Bureaucrat's Infighting, U.S. Takes a new Villian role in a Different Saigon", Article draft about conflicts inside the American military and the Saigon government, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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Sairad
Proreuter Tokyo
Military 1 (normass/deepe)
Saigon, May 12-Some of the bitterest bureaucratic in-fighting
America has seen in the history of any of its war has been term
reduced here when General William C. Westmoreland war was named yesterday
to assume responsibility from U. %. civilian civilians on the crucial
Vietnamese government pacification program.
More Reuter
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Sairad
Proreuter Tokyo
Military 2 Saigon (normass/deepe)
report
Informed source the decision to streamline the American advisory
effort by shifting responsibility from civilian to military hands is
the delayed reaction to a heated confrontation here last fall between
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and former Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge.
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Sairad
Proreuter Tokyo
Military 3 Saigon (normass/deepe)
command
During his last visit to Vietnam in October, McNamara argued
for and insisted upon a more efficient, uned unified chain of
with the American military rather than civilians calling the
shots. He also argued for the concept of a greater offensive role for
American combat units to be deployed against the Communist main force
units.
Lodge, however, argued as intensely for an integrated, coordinated
approach in which milita
military American civilians were
000 co-equals with the American field commanders. He also wanted to
shift the military concept whereby Amor.com a maximum--but not all-
of the American combat units would be securing the populated Vietnamese
villages, rather than conducting large-scale offensive operations in
the jungles. Lodge then wanted a concentration of American-VI
Vietnamese civilians to rebuild quickly the wartorn Vietnamese villages
and restore them to political normalcy.
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Sairad
Proreuter Tokyo
Military 4 Saigon (normass/deepe)
Reliable sources report that the discussions between Lodge and
McNamara became heated. At one time, according to these sony
sources,
Lodge refused to answer three telephone calls from McNamara.
McNamara left Saigon earlier than scheduled, cancelled an airport
news conference and "in general he left in a huff."
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Sairad
Proreuter Tokyo
Military Saigon (normass/deepe)
At least on the American management of the war, the McNamara
viewpoint prevailed over the Lodge, who subsequently resigned his post as
Ambassador.
On the surface, the I new Westmoreland responsibility is
regarded here as as the tam militarization of the American side of
But reliable sources regard this as simply a
the war.
superficial appraisal. Westmoreland's deputy for pacification is
dynamic, poly oocky Robert Komer, special assistant to President Lyndon
Johnson who has worked on the pacification program at the Washington level
While looked upon, with ill-regard by the military
for months.
establishment,
he appears to bring to the program the new sense of
urgency and direction that has been needed at the Saigon level by both
American civilians and military-and an urgency 180 long
advocated by
Americans in the provinces.
At the p policy level between the American
to
military at command and
the new Komer team, the in-fighting
on the American side may only be entering a new round rather than abating.
However, in administrative terms,
NEW
the Westmoreland responsibility
a move
streamlines the American chain of command and bureaucracy,
towards greater efficiency and unity which the American military command
has long advocated-in fact, advocated as early as the spring of
1964.
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Sairad
Proreuter Tokyo
Military
Saigon (normass/deepe)
The American military leaders have long regarded the American
civilian establishment here as operating without discipline, urgency
and systematic og organization, which would presumably be corrected
by the military take-over.
However, the civilian leaders, while conceding the short-run
tactical advantages of the military take-over, have long af loudly
which they
pointed out the long-term,, higher-level disadvantages,
LIVED CO. The
disadvantag
x must now be accepted. The first at abgunent was that
the American military take-over would be especially embarrassing at this
time, when official American policy is to encourage the formation of e
constitutional-possibly civilian--government on the Vietnamese government
side.
d.SAQUAtage
was to
The second argument was that the purpose of the Johnson Administration
om since the Honolulu Conference in February, 1966,
publicize the non-military "other war," and the civilian effort.
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Sairad
Proreuter Tokyo
Military Saigon (normass/deepe)
dis Advantage Argued
иде
The third and loudest
was that
vened by them, however,
at some point there would be negotiations with the Communists,
But,
a ceasefire and at least a phased American military withdrawal.
Child
an American presence in South Vietnam weld be maintained by the civilian
sector.
Hence, they consistently argued that the Vietn mese civilian
side, be braced up even though the nation was at war. For example,
instead of concentrating solely on training and advising a Vietnamese
army, esd resources--especially
Vietnamese manpower-should still
be delegated to the Vietnamese police, o would be responsible for
going during ser
One Western diplomat,
American side, commented:
watching the frenzied shake-up on the
"This militarization will go over like a
lead balloon internationally,
especially when President Johnson is trying
to convince others he's genuinely serious about negotiations."
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Sairad
Proreuter Tokyo
Military Saigon (normass/deepe)
While in Saigon some sources believe the militarization
of effort on the American side may not repeat not become total,
GENERAL
the
more serious question on the horizon revingertown icators here is this:
is the za militarization on
inmxxxxxxmmmm
of the American side of the war S
Beginning
simply a slow-motion prelude
Will more American
as a shield
to greater Aeriza Americanization of the whole war?
combat troops be deployed to secure the populated villages
for the pacification effort? Will the American military seize more direct
control of the Vietnamese armed forces, which is presently responsible
for securing the hamlets? Will the American military establishment swing
Become President
its weight for di Vietnamese general, instead of
American cimmmm candidate in the upcoming elections for
President this Sempte September?
the Vietnamoto
An End Reuter
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Date
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1967, May 12
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam (Republic)--Relations--United States; Diplomacy; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Public opinion
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B7, F5
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
