First article about Nguyẽ̂n Cao Kỳ

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363-07062 to 363-07074.pdf

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363-07062 to 363-07074

Title

First article about Nguyẽ̂n Cao Kỳ

Description

Original title: "Ky", Keever's title: "U.S. Foreign Policy Pivots on South Vietnam's Elections; but 'These Nationalists are Killing Each Other'", First of a two part series of articles about Nguyẽ̂n Cao Kỳ, for the Christian Science Monitor

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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.

Transcript

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- Page 1
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Beverly Ann Deepe
644 Hong Thap Tu
Saigon, Vietnam
July 21, 1967
Ky-page 1-Article 1 of two-part series
NI
SAIGON--Rarely in moder history has American prestige, power
election abroad as when
and foreign policy rested so much on an
Vietnamese voters trundle off to cast their ballots for President
and Senate on September 3.
And rarely has American foreign policy-or the visible absence
of a foreign policy--spun so many webs of uncertainty in an election
overseas.
The Vietnamese elections for President and the 60-man Senate
are regarded here as a major pivot point of the Vietnam war--
preceeded in significance, drama, and possibly controversy, only
by the American bombing of North Vietnam and the American commitment
of ground forces to the South.
Within Vietnamese political circles,
the heart of the
Vietnamese election rests on the major American policy decision of
whether to continue the war or to negotiate the peace with the
Communists. That decision,
still unknown here, adds to the
uncertainty in the Vietnamese political ageen arena.
(More)
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- Page 2
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Deepe
Article 1 of 2-part series
Ky-page 2
A few sophisticates, believei believing more American military
ESCALAtion
--section runs parallel with--and is not contradictory to--negotiations,
argue that the American policy might be to both prosecute the
war with more vigor, assuming that at this very moment the Allies
are in too weak a position to negotiate, while beginning the
beginning of behind-the-scenes discussions with the Communists.
If the American "war-peace" decision remains a mystery here, the
Vietnamese elections will be unraveled in their own way, which will
box in the alternatives of American policymakers.
"The Americans lose 200 GI's a week and $2 billion a month
here--they must have a policy," one well-placed Vietnamese
anti-Communist explained.
"President Johnson must have a policy in his mind--but so far
we don't know what that policy is. If the Americans want to try for
victory, they must back the Vietnamese military ticket. If they
want to try for peace,
flexible civilian--probably old Phan Khao Suu. The man of the
they must back a civilian--and a very
moment must be flexible. But so far, we don't know what President
Johnson wants-the Americans here are tight-lipped."
(More)
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- Page 3
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Deepe
Article 1 of 2-part series.
Ky page 3
From the beginning, the Vietnamese elections have been viewed
as a possible vehicle for a political break through leading to
negotiations with the Communists.
For the elections at least open
up the choice for a Vietnamese civilian government which might solve
the stickiest problem of nong negotiations--the role of the Southern-based
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL). Clearly,
America would admit a political defeat to recognize or talk directly
with the NFL-but a flexible government in Saigon could open up discussions
with them.
ticket.
The Vietnamese military ticket is considered here as a "war party"
Presidential candidate General Nguyen Van Thieu and his
running mate, Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, thus far have stated
they would be willing to talk with any Communists almost anywhere--
except the NFL, which at any rate would probably be unwilling to
talk with them anyhow.
(More)
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- Page 4
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Deepe
Article 1 of 2-part series
Lux Ky-page 4
true, although
The corollary that any of the ten civilian Presidential andra
E
candidates are a peace party is, however, not necessarily tra, though
it may be. But, the civilian candidates are also an agonizing gamble.
What if a civilian is elected on a pro-peace platform--and the NFL
still refuses to negotiate. Communist subversion into the weaker
civilian government could lead to an Allied defeat. The second gamble:
what if an anti-heg negotiation civilian President is elected--will
the efficiency with which the war is conducted on the Vietnamese side
thus demanding more and more American troops to salvage
diminish,
the situation?
The answer is probably yes, for the Vietnamese Army,
for all its numerous faults, is the only nation-wide apparatus which
can fill the political vacuum created by the lack of nationalist
political parties and a nationalist ideology, on one side, and
continuing Communist subversion on the other.
(More)
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- Page 5
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Deepe
Article 1 of 2-part series
Ky-page 5
While the honest Vietnamese view is that the official U. S.
"war-peace"
a position is unknown, and the honest anti-Communist
view is that American should make this decision known,
this is
not necessarily a prevailing view. For, the more numerous bush-league
politicians, each confiding to the others they have inside
PROCEED
information from the CIA, simply eed to invent their own American
policy. * Throughout the city, in political circles,
multipy in geometric proportions,
made a peace deel with Kosygin,
some saying President Johnson
some saying the Americans are
Even a naive observer may suspect,
rumors
secretly backing a civilian candidate, some saying that the
American officialdom here is split, with Ambassador Ellsworth
Bunker clandestinely backing a civilian and American commanding
general William C. Westmoreland supporting the Vietnamese generals.
if not presume, that it is,
not the CIA, but the pro-French andpro-Jommunist elements which are
having a field day, For the net impact of all the rumors is to
discredit virtually all the Vietnamese Presidential candidates,
chisel divisions among them and to make the American officialdom
here appear as bumbling hillbillies in Ivy League suits.
(More)
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- Page 6
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Deepe
Article 1 of 2-part series
Ky page 6
The statement of Ambassador Bunker here, that America
while explaining
supports "no single candidate, and we oppose none,"
the virtues of free elections was openly received here by Vietnamese
politicians as "a green light" for the nationalists to fight
it out among themselves.
during this
With America officially on the sidelines
"purely Vietnamese affair," the Vietnamese
non-Communists have accelerated their latent maneuvering and
intrigue to such an extent one Western diplomat ei exclaimed:
"These nationalists are killing each other and loving every minute
of it. These people can't be real--they're all on a Graham Greene
on."
film that goes on and on
While American officials talk about the growth of constitutionalism,
the fear on the Vietnamese side is that they may get the opposite--chaos
and anarchy. While the Americans talk of the virtues of a
freely elected government, most Vietnamese would prefer any actual
thAT Actually yoVERNS,
government and a minority think the election won't even be held.
While American sources, in private, predict a pre-cooked
election victory for Generals Thieu and Ky,
Chinese businessmen,
noted for their political acumen and notorious for their gambling,
are refusing to take any bets on who will win the race at all.
(More)
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- Page 7
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Deepe
Article 1 of 2-part series
Ky page 7
politically-oriented.
Thus, it appears here that the Vietnamese and Americans
are looking at the upcoming election in totally different terms,
seeing two distinct events in the offing, which is a rather common
phenomena here, generally explained in journali journalese as "the
Americans being out of touch with Oriental realities,"
diplomat-ese, as "looking at a Vietnam problem on different levels."
or in
The uncertainties in Vietnamese political circles about the election
is matched only by their tenacious skepticism of them. This skepticism
is based on the Vietnamese premise that the election is more advantageous
to American interests than to Vietnamese interests, x and secondly, that
the United States uses the highly whimsical tactic of interfering
in the election when it chooses but makes "neutrality" #tates
statements when it doesn't.
ED
Part of this premise is based on the fact establish by Vietnamese
politicians and Western diplomats here, although never officially
t confirmed xxit nor denied by the American officialdom,
prime mover for the elections was President Lyndon Johnson,
insisted on them at the Honolulu Conference in February, 1966, when
that the
who
he met with Generals Thieu and Ky. Ky and Thieu both opposed the
idea of elections when their internal political and military situations
TheN
were still so perilous.
(More)
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- Page 8
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Deepe
Article 1 of 2-part series
Ky--page 8
But, less than 48 hours after the Vietnamese delegation returned
here from Honolulu, the anti-government Buddhist leaders knew about
the President's desire for elections. And, through a series of
demonstrations, bloody riots and a civil-military insurrection, they
pressured the Ky government to hold the elections--originally scheduled
for the fall of 1966, but now being held a year behind schedule.
Why did President Johnson = insist on Vietnamese elections?
The first, over-riding reason, it appeared, was to establish a
legitimate government in Saigon. For, America is currently faced
with the astronomical dilemma that it has 470,000 American troopw
troops in Vietnam at the invitation of a governm government that
no longer exists--the government of Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat
in early 1965--and even when it existed, it was never considered
legal, and for that matter, rarely considered a government.
Thus,
a legitimate government is needed to legalize the American presence
here, and whether the American policy is to bring in more troops
BEGIN
or to be talking with the Communists,
or straddling both
courses simultaneously, America needs a legal Vietnamese government
to validate the am moves.
(More)
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- Page 9
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Deepe
Article 1 of 2-part series
Ky-page 9
A significant fringe benefit from a popularly-elected,
constitutional government here would be a much more palatable rugh
regime to justify to Americah's friends and enemies at home and
abroad the increasing measure of American commitment of ground
troops. On the pragmatic side internally, American officials have
maintained fair elections would enhance the willingness of the
Vietnamese population to support a government they themselves
elected, and to promote this ened, a series of elections for
hamlet and village chiefs, plus the constitution-drafting
assembly have been held in the past year.
they
thy
If these American objectives are laudable and necessary,
are somewhat hypotheth hypothetical for Vietnamese who hold bitter
political memories of the so-called free elections which put
President Ngo Dinh Diem in £ office for nine years-and which, rather
than gaining him popular support, only repelled it. Is Likewise,
the American premise that the election may usher in a legitimate reg
government remains to be seen, for vicious controversies may arise
especially since several well-known
DREAM
candidates have been barred from running. The American dram that a
stable, popular government may blossom is also debatable at this time,
for political observers here are shocked at the street demonstrations
South Korea, contesting the fairness of the election in there.
that the election
in
was rigged,
(More)
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- Page 10
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Deepe.
Article 1 of 2-part series
Ky-page 10
The Vietnamese constitution is modeled after the South Korean
constitution,
and hence it is easy here to jump to conclusions,
only partially justified at this moment, that charges of a rigged
election and street violence may be one of the lay likely
by-products of such a constitution here.
view
The Vietnamese skepticism was recently reinforced here with the
snowballing in political circles that the American officialdom
"dumped" Prime Minister Ky and helped out-maneuver him from the
Presidential race. He accepted to run as Vice-Presidential candidate
to Chief of State General Thieu. The move was interpreted as
especially significant here for Ky had remained in power for two
years with the express backing of--not the American Ambassador or
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, has had his predecessors-
but the backing of President Johnson, who became personally
identified with the pilot-premier at three rapid-fire, high-level
conferences in Honolulu, Manila and Guam.
But, by the middle of this year, Washington began to re-think
its position on Ky, and commissioned an American political scientist
from a New York univer i university to evaluate whether the United States
should continue its support of Ky. The professor was of some importance, for
he had advised the Koreans in the drafting of their constitution and had
subsequently assisted the Vietnamese in drafting their Korean-styled
constitution.
The professor'
prising recommendations
were tht that
it would be disaster for Ky to run for President and a double
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- Page 11
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Deepe
Article 1 of 2-part series
Ky-page 11
in
By early June,
the Americans were faced with the added
problem that General Thieu had announced his candidacy, which,
their
n view, meant the Vietnamese armed forces would be
racked with dissension when it should be fighting the Communists.
The oel American officials failed to ak add, however, that
having two military candidates competing with each other would
decrease the possibility of a rigged election, for neither general
had exclusive control of the government Xxx structures needed for
rigging.
Then, in early J, June, the Vietnamese Ambassador to
Bui
Washington, Mr. Sd Diem, appeared in Saigon and sprinkled around
the town his claims of having seen President Johnson in Washington,
He proceeded to the Presidential Palace to attempt to persuade
General Thieu to withdraw from the race. He left Saigon several
days later predicting it was Busty "seventy per cent sure" that
Thieu would withdraw. But a quick check of Thieu's supporters showed
the el little general had even less intention of withdrawing than
ever.
By mid-June--with time running out--American officials were faced
with two military candidates for President and they wanted only one.
There were at least three standard alternatives for the United States
each about equally be bad: to persuade Thieu at any cost--generally
expressed in dollars--to withdraw, or to "shovel out" Ky, as one source
explained
which would have been interpreted as a direct about-fa
--------------------
- Page 12
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pe.
A ticle 1 of 2-part series
Ky-page 12
during the Election,
the Americans would neither oppose nor support any candidate, which
Casting
withdrew American support from Ky, while at the same time c
AS
the American position to one of praiseworthy non-interference.
This latter alternative was the choice when Ambassador D
Ambassador Bunker finally called Generals The Thieu and Ky to his
house for lunch--diplomats believe Bunker waited too long for the
showdown--and criticized Ky for gun beginning his campaign early,
which would undercut the appearance of a fa free election, and then
stated that the Vietnamese military could have only one candidate-
a pledge that Ky and Thieu had bety both made to President by
Johnson
the President's reasoning
at the Guam Conference,
reportedly being that a free election did not include a free-for-all
among the generals.
(More)
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- Page 13
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Deepe
Article 1 of 2-part series
Ky--page 13
Then, on June 28, three days before the final filing for
the Presidential race, the 48 Vigh Vietnamese generals who
run the armed forces-and pretend to run the country--were called
in to arbitrate the confrontation between Ky and Thieu. A free-for-all
Another
was one rest results. The stirer was Ky's withdrawing from
the Presidency and accepting to run as Vice President with Thieu.
When the results was announced, those Americans who thought
America was still supporting Ky were shocked; one of them sadly
"this is the beginning of the worst." The Ky supporters
were also stunned--not only because their leader had been defeated,
but also because his Presidential campaign funds, totalling sixty
million piastres--or half-million dollars--were to be handed out six hours
predicting,
after the crucial decision.
But, the most surprised to all was tebe General
Nguyen Cao Ky., who erroneously thought he still had e support
from Washington.
-30-

Date

1967, Jul. 21

Subject

Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Nguyẽ̂n, Cao Kỳ; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Prime ministers; Elections

Location

Saigon, South Vietnam

Coordinates

10.8231; 106.6311

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B7, F5

Format

dispatches

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Collector

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries

Language

English