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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-08483 to 363-08488.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-08483 to 363-08488
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Title
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Part four of a five part series on the Vietnam War
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Description
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Original title: "SERIES- article four of five - article series", Keever's title: N/A, Article draft about part four of a five part series on the Vietnam War, for The North American News Alliance
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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Beverly Ann Deepe
64A Hong Thap Tu
Anigon, Vietn
January 14) 1967
Series article four of five-article series
Pago I
Saigon The 1967 American-South Vietnamese battle strategy for running the
wer in Vietnam calls for more of the same, except for re-emphasis on the ground
instead of political speeches-on the revolutionary development program, or
rov,, dov, no American colonels call it.
The Revolutionary Development program the attempt to pacify the rural
population in seleted target aren--is clearly one of the chief barometers of
progress in the current phase of the Vietnam wer; the degree of progress or
non-progress may well determine the omucial assessment of whether Americry and
hor allies can win the war and save South Vietnam from Communist control.
American officials here, speaking in private, concede that the Revolutionary
Development program will determine American foreign policy within the next six
A
months and hence pro
ovably the future of South Est sie end potentially future
insurrections in other under-developed countries. These officials argue that
if the American-allied forces fail to make substantial progress in the
Rovalutionery Development program, American policy will fail in Vietnam. However,
the reverse is not necessarily true, these sources say. If the Revolutionary
Succeeds
Development program street forfectly, the country and the war could still
bo lost because the Communists have broadened their base of support in the
urban centers, which are becoming festering sores of anti-Americanism.
fact
The mood of uncertainty, if not pessimism, within circles of Americans
here results from the fast that the Revolutionary Development xx program has
failed to make any progress since it was launched in a spec tucular manner
at the Honolulu Conference attended by President Lyndon Johson and Prime
Minister Nguyen Cao Ky a year ago this month.
The name of Revolutionary Development is itself a Madison Avenue-ism a 1r
Vietnam and was born at the Honolulu Conference.
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Despe
Seriosrticle four of five-article series
Page 2
are BUT
t-self
The words Revolutionary Development the soft-self English translation for
Jasy image purposes from the Vietnamese words of "Xay Dung Nong Thon"
which means literally, "rural building on officials here are miffel t
that for Vietnamese consumption, the world meanier "revolution" are edited out of
Vietnamese government spectacles.
SPE
Despite it's jazzy name useful for foreign press reports, the Rev Döv
program is old in concept tactics and techniques; experts on pacification report.
Some of these sources
the program is not only ourrently failing but is
inpossible to succed in the future.
"The 1967 Rev Dev program is simply the resurrection of the old strategic
hamlet program launched in 1962 by American advisors and the Vietnamese
government then headed by President Ngo Dinh Diem," one Vietnamese politicion
explained. "The program failed then and it is even more certain to fail again
unless radical changes are made." These sources point out that there are now
far more odds against the program then there were in 1962, first because at
that time the Communist controlled little of the rural terenity territory or
the population--and now they control substantial numbers--and second because the
government of President Ngo Dinh Diem had disciplined political administrative
and military charmos of Command. Now the administrative-political structure
under Prime Minister Ngyuen Cao Ky for purposes of governing is virtually
termited away with Communist subversion, corruption among government employes
and general lack of leadership.
HN
Countryside,
Of the 12,000 hamlets in the Vietnamese counteyside, 5,000-on paper for
public consumption--are considered by the Vietnamese government to be under
government control. Privately, these well informed sources say that the Vietnamese
government concedes it controls only slightly more then 1000 of the 12,000
hamlets in the country. According to the Revolutionary Development plan American
troops are to launch offensive operations, which will provide an outer screen
security for the four high-priority target areas in the countryside in the
first phase called olearing. (m(MORE)
oft
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Doope
Series-article four of five-article series
Page 3
Then Vietnamese army and para-military troops will systematically
attempt to protect these selected villages in the second phase of the program
called securing.
Then in the third phase called nation-building, 500 pacification teams
each team will attempt
of 59 mon each will be sent to these selected hamlets;
to pacify two hamlets a year during 1967, raging by raising by at least another
1000 the to total number of hamlets under government control. Rx The
59-man teams are broken down into six kinds of cadre, each to perform difforont
They ares people's self-defense teams, real new life hamlet
functions.
cadre, new-society-building cadre in charge of self-help projects such as
building a schools and bridges, rural political cadre, civic action teams
and armod propaganda teams.
sinstor
In addition to the 59-man teams, there is also a rather
bunch of "census grevance takers", which are inconspicuously linked to the
American Central Intelligence Agency. They travel the country logging
who's
complaints and trying to keep track of who's who in the Viet Cong, won's on
the Saigon side and who's sitting on the fence.
Consus ei grievance workers must fill out nineteen forms each day so
that American-supplied computers can digest how many pigs are in an area,
much food is in the market and so on.
a red one for
Each census grievance cadre also has two penis pencils,
coloring Viet Cong areas on his village map and a green one for in-between
and wavering areas.
Friendly areas are left uncolored.
(More)
how
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Deepe
Serios article four of five-article series
Page 4
Besides the Revolutionary Development program, the over-all military
strategy for 1967 calls for continuous, intensive and systematic tactical
operations rather than the mihan random reaction-type operations which have
occured since the arrival of American units here in March, 1965. The highlights
of this more-of-the-same policy ares
1. An all-out effort to annhiliate or noutralize roughly a dozen
clusters of the ninety Communist military base areas in South Vietnam.
The tactical implementation calls for the harshost, most destructive non-
nuclear means soon to date in the war. American air, artillery and naval
gunfire will be called on more than eve to ever to pulverize small portions
of these selected targets. Other means include digging up Communist tunnel
complexes with special engineering equipment and explosives, aprking
sprinkling non-lethal tear gas in these selected areas, defoliation of large
tracts of Communist-held jungle wasteland, destruction by aerial spraying
of rice inmixx crops grown by Communist or pro-Communist elements,
blowing up important salt beds, rooting up sections of the Communist-hold
jungles with special plows and in significant resettlemont of the
rural population now living in the Communist-held base areas.
"In small selected areas, wo want to take the jungle, the rice and the
people away from the Communists," one source explained.
2. While destroying Communist base areas on a priority basis, other
"search and destroy" operation-in a slight shift of emphasis since 1966-
will be fa confined to military priority areas which directly support and
fory
provide security of the Revolutionary Development program.
(More)
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Doope
Series articlo four of five-article series
Page 5
More American ground operations are to serve as follow-ups of B-52
Strategic Air Command raids and artillery bombardments rk rather thn
then sol solely strike forces of ground-power.
3. An o across-the-board intensification of attempts to seal off
both the ground and sea routes of infiltration into South Vietnam.
4. Far greater emphasis on psychological warfare techniques- leaflets,
radio broadcasts, personal appeals to cast cause the Communist troops to
defect to the Vietnamese government side or to desert their own unito.
5. Far greater intensification of intelligence-gathering, not only
for day-to-day tactical military and political information within South
Vietnam, but also strategic information on over-all Communist plans, such
as attempting to ascertain these questions will the Communist Chinose
directly intervene in the Vietnam conflict, either with ground forces in South
Vietnam or other parts of South East Asia,, or in the air either to fight
to Launch
American bombers over North Vietnam or launching their own retaliatory
air-raids against strategic American airbases, such as at Danang or in
Thailand?
Will a dissident, neutralist or pro-Communist group attempt to
el ther through a
seize power in ambon coup d'etat or political insurrections?
(More)
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Deepe
Sories article four of five-article series
Page 6
Concurrently, political attempts are in the offing to strongthen
the sai gon regime at the central-government level, the beginning being the
drafting of a constitution and the re-birth of a popularly-elected
executive and legislative bas branches of government which would provide
a legal and representative basis not simply for the government a but also
possibly for the American presi presence in South Vietnam. This process at the
central government lovel is not considered a solution to Vietnam's political
problems, but is simply the first of a long, painstaking series of steps
necessary to build a cohesive body politic on the non-Communist side within
the South, political sources report.
Some Western political sources believe that it is already too late to
re-knit a peli non-Communist political fabric strong enough to withstand
the ever-expanding Communist subversion of the cities, the government, the
polico, schools and nationalist political and social organizations.
"The
"The question is not whether the Communists think they can win
South Vietnam politically," one high-ranking Western source explained.
question is whether they believe they have already won it. Maybe they have."
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Date
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1967, Jan. 14
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B118, F6
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
